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BRITISH FAR EASTERN POLICY
1894-1900

BY
R. STANLEY McORDOCK

BRITISH FAR EASTERN POLICY 1894-1900

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PREFACE

THE Far Eastern rivalry of European powers during the years 1894-1900 is very significant because it played such a large part in shaping the foreign policy of the Occidental countries. Anglo-Russian antagonism in eastern Asia during the years under review brought London and St. Petersburg to the very verge of war. England's inability to cope with Russian encroachment upon her Far Eastern trade was partly responsible for Downing Street's decision in 1898 to abandon "splendid isolation".

Great Britain's failure in the same year to secure an alliance with Germany was partly due to the Wilhelmstrasse's desire to avoid being drawn into the war which they felt sure would break out in Asia between Russia and England. Germany's refusal to assist Britain in Far Eastern questions led the latter Power to make an alliance with Japan in 1902.

At a time when the break-up of the Chinese Empire seemed a foregone conclusion Great Britain was a conspicuous supporter of Chinese unity and independence. But for British opposition Manchuria might have been absorbed by Russia. But for British opposition France would have entrenched herself in southern China more strongly than she actually did.

Since the appearance of Dr. Morse's *International Relations of the Chinese Empire* many hitherto unpublished documents from Europe's secret archives have been made available by the British and German Governments (*The British Documents on the Origins of the War* and *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*). Numer-

ous biographies have thrown new light on men and motives. It would seem therefore an appropriate time to review England's Far Eastern policy. It is the aim of this book to interpret British Far Eastern policy in the light of this recent historical evidence.

The author is indebted to Professors Parker T. Moon and Harry J. Carman of Columbia University for their guidance and valuable suggestions in the preparation of the dissertation.

R. S. M.

HARROGATE, TENN., FEBRUARY, 1931.

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CHAPTER I

BRITAIN OPENS TRADE WITH CHINA

THE BRITISH MERCHANT ENCOUNTERS THE MANDARIN

ON July 11, 1596, Queen Elizabeth made Great Britain's initial attempt to trade with China when she intrusted to her merchant subjects, Richard Allot and Thomas Brome-field, a courteous personal communication to the Celestial Emperor, bespeaking that monarch's benevolent consideration of the advantages to be obtained by both nations should commercial relations between them be encouraged.¹ The Queen's message, however, was not delivered, for the ship bearing it to China was lost en route.² Four years later the development of Anglo-Chinese commerce was a part of the task assumed by the East India Company, which was chartered by Queen Elizabeth in 1600 and granted a fifteen-year monopoly on all trade between England and the Far East.³ King James I made this a perpetual monopoly in 1609.⁴

In the pursuit of its objective, the company soon encountered opposition from the Dutch East India Company which

¹ Hakluyt, R., *Collection of the Early Voyages, Travels and Discoveries of the English Nation*, vol. iv, p. 374.

² *Ibid.*, p. 373.

³ Charter granted by Queen Elizabeth on December 31, 1600; quoted in Ilbert, Sir Courtenay, *The Government of India*, p. 464. The original name of the organization was "The Gouvernour and Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies."

⁴ Morse, H. B., *Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China 1634-1834*, vol. i, p. 6.

at that time had greater resources in both ships and money.¹ The Dutch organization had the further advantage of enjoying the full support of the Netherlands Government, while James I, until near the end of his reign, looked upon the Far Eastern rivalry as merely a matter of petty squabbles between two commercial organizations. Instead of giving the East India Company much needed support he endeavored to assume the rôle of a mediator.² Realizing the futility of competition, the British negotiated an alliance with the Dutch company in 1619, whereby all nations, save these two, were to be excluded from the Chinese trade.³ This agreement, however, failed to ensure cooperation between the two companies. In 1623 the Dutch exterminated the East India Company's Factory (agency) at Amboyna in the Molucca Islands. By that date they had virtually eliminated English competition.⁴

In addition to Dutch hostility, the English had to cope with the Portuguese, who, by virtue of their explorations in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, had been the first modern nation to come into commercial contact with the Chinese. The Portuguese had established a commercial colony at Macao, near Canton, in 1557 and had since en-

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 11; Treat, Payson J., *The Far East*, p. 53; Foster, S. W., "The East India Company" in *The Cambridge History of the British Empire*, vol. iv, *British India*, p. 82. The Dutch East India Company was organized in 1602. Previously the Dutch merchants had contented themselves with sending their ships to Lisbon to secure Chinese produce which the Portuguese had brought from the Far East. In 1594 Spain, temporarily in control of Portugal, closed Lisbon to the Dutch, who were then in revolt against the Madrid Government. Consequently, the Holland merchants started to send their ships direct to the Far East.

² Khan, Ahmad S., *The East India Trade in the 17th Century*, pp. 62-67; *The Cambridge History of the British Empire*, vol. iv, p. 82.

³ Sargent, A. J., *Anglo-Chinese Commerce and Diplomacy*, p. 3.

⁴ Treat, *op. cit.*, p. 53; Wright, A., *Early English Adventures in the East*, chap. xiv, pp. 209-225.

joyed the exclusive right to trade there.¹ The Iberians were, however, commencing to feel Dutch pressure and in 1634, on the theory that their own vessels were no longer ensured adequate protection by the Portuguese flag, they approved the dispatch of one British vessel to Macao on condition that they be permitted to supply part of the return cargo.² While the ship was en route to Macao, where it arrived in July, 1635, the East India Company and the Portuguese Far Eastern Viceroy at Goa concluded an agreement for a truce and equal privileges with China.³

In accordance with this agreement, Captain Weddell,⁴ a British mariner, arrived in Macao on June 25, 1637 with a letter from King Charles I to the Portuguese Governor-General at that station.⁵ The latter, however, anxious to prevent any possible competition, explained that the Chinese would trade with no Europeans, save the Portuguese. Nevertheless, Captain Weddell proceeded up the bay as far as the Bogue forts, intending to deal directly with the Chinese. Before the negotiations were completed, the forts opened fire, whereupon Captain Weddell silenced them and secured Chinese permission to trade.⁶

¹ Danvers, F. C., *The Portuguese in India*, vol. i, p. 487; Ljungstedt, A., *Contribution to an Historical Sketch of the Portuguese Settlements in China, Principally of Macao*, pp. 1, 6, 40.

² Auber, P., *China, an Outline of its Government, Laws and Policy*, pp. 134-5; Sargent, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

³ Foster, W., *The English Factories in India, 1634-6*, p. 88.

⁴ Captain Weddell was financed by the Courteen's Association, which had received Charles I's approval despite the East India Company's monopoly; Cordier, H., *Histoire général de la Chine et de ses relations avec les pays étrangers depuis les temps les plus anciens jusqu'à la chute de la dynastie mandchoue*, vol. iii, p. 211.

⁵ Temple, R. C., editor, *The Travels of Peter Mundy in Asia (1608-1667)*, vol. iii, p. 159; Morse, H. B., *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, vol. i, p. 51.

⁶ Temple, *op. cit.*, da Câmara to Weddell, July 8, 1637, p. 167; Diary, pp. 181-189, 190-6; Morse, H. B., *The Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire*, p. 273.

miles to get Oriental wares, the Chinese believed these merchants to be the representatives of poor countries whose livelihood depended upon Celestial products.¹ This opinion was strengthened by the fact that the Europeans made huge profits even under restrictions and were therefore ready to accept onerous conditions rather than have the trade stopped.² Unfortunately the first Europeans who came to China's shores in the sixteenth century were not of the type which would be apt to show Orientals that the friendship of the Occident was worth cultivating. On the contrary, the piratical depredations of these Western commercial pathfinders merely served to convince the Chinese of their own superiority.³ It is interesting to note that it was not until the questionable activities of the Westerners became apparent that the Chinese considered the advisability of placing restrictions upon them.⁴

The East India Company had hardly become established at Macao when, in 1702, the Chinese Government showed its intention to regulate foreign trade by appointing an official known as the "Emperor's Merchant" who was

¹ "Their (England's) broadcloths are still more unimportant and of no regard. But the tea, rhubarb, and the raw silk of the Inner Dominions are the sources by which the said nation's people live and maintain life."—Memorial of the Governor of Canton, quoted in *Correspondence Relating to China* (1840), incl. no. 2 in no. 8, p. 23.

² Vinacke, H. M., *History of the Far East in Modern Times*, p. 33.

³ "The early Portuguese traders were truculent fellows for the most part, half merchant, half pirate, and raised much disorder in the ports of China". Latourette, K. S., *The Development of China*, p. 65; "With the possible exception of the British and the Russians, the conduct of these pioneers of the so-called peaceful commerce was such as befitted pirates rather than amicably disposed and civilized men", Blakeslee, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁴ "...it was experience and experiment, rather than hostility to foreigners, which resulted in the closing of the empire", Vinacke, *op. cit.*, p. 30; Willoughby, *op. cit.*, p. 545; See, Chong-Su, *The Foreign Trade of China*, pp. 9, 37.

granted the exclusive right to buy the foreigners' merchandise and sell them Chinese products.¹ This arrangement proved unsatisfactory, as the new appointee was unable to supply the necessary goods promptly and because other Canton merchants were anxious to secure a share of the commerce. A compromise was effected two years later whereby other native merchants were permitted to trade upon paying the Emperor's Merchant 5000 taels (\$8000) per ship.²

In 1715 the East India Company made an agreement with the Chinese Collector of Customs at Canton (known as the Hoppo) whereby freedom was given to trade with all Chinese without restrictions.³ On the strength of this arrangement, the company inaugurated a regular sailing schedule from England to China, but the agreement was not respected.⁴ On the contrary, a guild known as the Cohong was formed by a number of Canton merchants in 1720 for the purpose of regulating prices.⁵ The East-India Company protested but the Cohong, although abolished when the British threatened to stop trade, was soon re-established.⁶

With the formation of the Cohong, Chinese assessments on foreign ships began to increase, so that in 1727 the company's representatives threatened to leave Canton and seek trade at Amoy.⁷ The following year a ten per cent duty was placed on all Chinese goods sold to foreigners and it

¹ Auber, *op. cit.*, p. 150; Cordier, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 367.

² Auber, *op. cit.*, p. 151; Gilbert, R., *The Unequal Treaties*, pp. 65-6.

³ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. i, p. 64; Auber, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-5.

⁴ Auber, *op. cit.*, p. 152; Martin, R. M., *China, Political, Commercial and Social*, vol. ii, p. 10.

⁵ Morse, H. B., *The Guilds of China*, p. 66; Eames, *op. cit.*, p. 64; Auber, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

⁶ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. i, p. 65; Auber, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

⁷ Auber, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-8; Martin, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 11-12. °

soon became the practice for the Hoppo to require a gratuity of 1950 taels (\$3120) per ship.¹ Both of these taxes were in addition to the regular measurement fee which the Chinese collected according to the size of the vessel. By Imperial Edict in 1736 the ten per cent duty and the gratuity of 1950 taels were removed because the East India Company gave the Chinese officials a bribe of \$48,000, but the orders were disregarded and both taxes continued to be levied until 1834,² although each protest evoked assurances from the Chinese that the excessive taxation would be removed. In 1755 all foreign trade at Canton was confined to the members of the Cohong, who were at the same time made responsible to the Peking Government for the foreigners' good behavior and for the payment of all duties required on imports.³ Two years later Canton was made the sole port of entry for all foreign goods except Russian.⁴ Trade had theoretically been allowed at all Chinese ports since 1685, but the taxation at other places had been so excessive that all trade had gravitated towards Canton.⁵ The East India Company, however, had not been unmindful of the desirability of opening trade at other places, and just before the promulgation of the Imperial Edict of 1757, had decided to send an agent to Ningpo. In accordance with this decision, Mr. Flint went to that city in 1759, but the Chinese imprisoned him for three years and then deported him to England.⁶

¹ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. i, p. 66.

² Gutzlauff, R., *A Sketch of Chinese History, Ancient and Modern*, vol. ii, p. 329; Auber, *op. cit.*, p. 162; Eames, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-2.

³ Auber, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-9; Eames, *op. cit.*, p. 81; Martin, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 14.

⁴ Eames, *op. cit.*, p. 86; Auber, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

⁵ Gilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

⁶ See, *op. cit.*, p. 58; Morrison, J. R., *A Chinese Commercial Guide*, p. 47; Cordier, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 373.

Several reasons caused the Chinese to make the momentous decision to confine European trade to Canton. The local authorities at that port were enjoying the liberal gratuities and taxes paid by the foreigners and feared that loss of part of this revenue would be inevitable if the Europeans were permitted to open trade relations elsewhere on the Chinese coast. Hence the Canton Viceroy, the Hoppo, and the Hong merchants used their powerful influence with the Peking Government to have foreign trade restricted to Canton.¹ Furthermore, the Chinese felt that disturbances would arise unless the foreigners were rigidly controlled. China desired to sell her tea and silk, but to avoid difficulties she proceeded to enact laws which tended to make the foreigner's life in the Orient very uncomfortable.²

By Imperial Edict in 1760, regulations were promulgated for the purpose of controlling the foreigners' activities. Warships were prohibited from passing the Bogue forts; women were forbidden to come to Canton and the men had to return to Macao at the close of the trading season;³ weapons of any kind were not to be brought into the city; pilots needed by European ships were required to procure a license from the Chinese Assistant Magistrate at Macao, only eight natives could be employed as servants; foreigners could take walks just three days a month and then only in parties of ten, accompanied by a Chinese linguist who was held responsible financially, and probably physically, for the actions of the foreigners when on these excursions; no rowing for pleasure on the river was allowed; if the Westerners had any communication to make, it must be in the form of a petition and could be presented only to the Cohong, direct

¹ Gilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 70; Auber, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

² Keeton, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 10; Staunton, G. T., *Miscellaneous Notices*, pp. 128-130.

³ Trading with the Chinese was carried on at Canton whither the Europeans went from Macao during the trading season.

access to the Viceroy or Peking authorities being prohibited; the Hong Merchants were ordered not to borrow money from foreigners and all ships from Europe were admonished not to loiter about the river.¹ Several of these regulations, such as the prohibition against hiring more than eight native servants and loaning money to local merchants, were in course of time relaxed, but they were often read aloud at the factories and the foreigners therefore considered themselves in a degraded position.²

Foreign trade was further hampered by the numerous gratuities which the European merchants found it necessary to give to the Chinese officials. A ship arriving at Whampoa, outside Canton, usually remained for three months, "and while there continued to give a steady stream of profit to the interpreter and comprador [or ship chandler] to the bumboatman and other small fry and to the minor officials from daily and monthly fees and gratuities to facilitate her [the ship's] working and expedite her departure".³ The Cohong, on the other hand, was squeezed unmercifully by both Imperial and Viceregal authorities, all of whom expected a share in the monetary gain arising from the trade. While the Hong merchants operated on the basis of getting as much as possible out of the trade, the demands made upon them proved so intolerable that by 1771 many of them were bankrupt.⁴ The Cohong was therefore abolished, for which favor the East India Company expended 100,000 taels (\$160,000).⁵

¹ Hunter, W. C., *The Fan Kwae at Canton before Treaty Days, 1825-1844*, p. 28; Morse, *International Relations*, vol. 1, pp. 69-71.

² Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 28; Aube., *op. cit.*, p. 344; Morse, *International Relations*, vol. 1, p. 69.

³ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. 1, p. 75.

⁴ Eitel, E., *Europe in China*, p. 8.

⁵ Auber, *op. cit.*, p. 178; Martin, *China, Political, Commercial and Social*, p. 15.

The high rates of interest, which even on the best security ran as high as one per cent a month,¹ attracted considerable capital to China. By 1782 the native Canton merchants owed foreigners \$3,808,075.² An Imperial Edict of that year directed that these debts be paid and that no such liabilities be incurred in the future.³ At the same time, twelve native merchants (later thirteen) were given a monopoly of foreign trade, thus reviving the Cohong system.⁴ In order to provide for any future liabilities of the new Hong, the Consou Fund, a three per cent direct levy on all foreign trade, was originated.⁵ Thus was the Cohong "armed with the full powers of the government, acting as its agent and receiving its full support on the one hand, and, on the other, serving as a channel through which was transmitted the stream of wealth in which the officials expected to share largely".⁶

The British soon began to chafe under these restrictions, for by this time the Chinese trade had become important, thanks to the rapidity with which the British people had acquired a taste for tea. This beverage was practically unknown in England until 1664, when the East India Company made Charles II a present of 2 lbs. 2 ozs., which cost them \$20.64.⁷ The first attempt of the company to intro-

¹ Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

² Matheson, J., *The Present State and Prospects of the British Trade with China*, p. 96.

³ Auber, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

⁴ Martin, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 15.

⁵ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. i, p. 68.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ There are indications of a slight use of tea in 1660 when it was taxed 8d a gallon, (12 Car. C. 23.) Pepys in his diary on September 25, 1660, mentions that he sent for a cup of tea. (Wheatley edition, 1923, vol. i, p. 231.) But, generally speaking, tea as a beverage was in little use in England until 1697.

⁸ Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. i, p. 9.

duce tea to the British market was made in 1669, when 143½ lbs. were imported.¹ The venture, however, was unsuccessful, as a large part of the shipment was found to be defective upon arrival at London and the East India Company's officials consumed the remainder.² Another attempt was made in 1678, when 4713 lbs. were imported, but this second venture was equally unsuccessful, since the market was glutted, only 318 lbs. being received in England during the following six years. By 1697, however, imports of tea rose to 20,000 lbs. annually, and by 1745, when 2,209,183 lbs. were received in England, the East India Company was threatened with a revocation of its charter if a sufficient supply of tea were not given London.³ By 1793 imports were 16,005,414 lbs. valued at approximately \$16,000,000, and tea constituted China's main export, although small quantities of raw silk were sent to England.⁴ This trade was profitable alike to the East India Company, whose income from tea in 1793 was \$2,577,068, and to the British Government, which in the same year received a revenue of \$2,963,937 on tea imports.⁵ From 1780 to 1793 the total duty paid to the British Exchequer on tea was \$48,500.00.⁶ As for the British people, they had acquired a desire for tea

¹ Martin, R. M., *The Past and Present State of the Tea Trade of England and of the Continents of Europe and America*, p. 18; Macpherson, D., *The History of European Commerce with India*, p. 128.

² Milburn, W., *Oriental Commerce*, vol. ii, p. 531.

³ Martin, *The Past and Present State of the Tea Trade*, p. 18; Milburn, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 534; Robinson, F. R., *The Trade of the East India Company, 1709-1813*, p. 124.

⁴ Dennett, B., *Americans in Eastern Asia*, p. 45; Martin, *The Past and Present State of the Tea Trade*, p. 21; Milburn, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 256; Martin, R. M., *China, Political, Commercial and Social*, vol. ii, p. 152.

⁵ *Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee of the Honorable House of Commons on East Indian Affairs (1813)*. Chart opposite p. 820; Martin, *The Past and Present State of the Tea Trade*, p. 65.

⁶ Milburn, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 542.

and failed to understand why they should not be permitted peacefully to buy their requirements of the Chinese without being frequently reminded of their inferior position and being subjected to numerous restrictions and oppressive taxation.¹

While the Chinese had found in tea a product which the foreigners eagerly bought, the British were not equally successful in producing an English product which would find a market in China, and, as a result, exports from England to Canton were comparatively small, amounting to \$3,693,746 in 1793, and consisting mostly of woollen manufactures and a small quantity of metals, calicoes, and cotton twist.² This export trade was an unimportant factor, and was carried on by the company at a loss, which, from 1781-92 inclusive, amounted to \$927,856.³ The inability of the British to sell their products to the Chinese to anything like the value of the tea used in Great Britain, meant that there was a continual flow of silver bullion from England to Canton. During the entire eighteenth century this amounted to \$208,980,000, and for the years 1785-1793 to \$17,438,963.⁴ This was a serious matter for England, because by 1793 the Industrial Revolution had started and Britain was endeavoring to find additional markets for the manufactures which her newly-built factories were turning out in increasingly large quantities. The company made vigorous efforts to sell English woollens to the Chinese, and its representatives at Canton had standing orders to inquire into the possibilities of extending the sales of British goods even without profit.⁵

¹ Staunton, G., *An Authentic Account of an Embassy from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China*, vol. i, pp. 24-6.

² Sargent, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-1; Staunton, *op. cit.*, Appendix VIII, vol. iii, p. 487.

³ Milburn, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 475.

⁴ *Ibid.*; Wagel, S. R., *Finance in China*, p. 96; Sargent, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

⁵ Sargent, *op. cit.*, p. 10; Remer, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

Despite the loss, however, at which the woollen trade was carried on, it amounted to only \$13,805,394 in the years 1781-93.¹ All other exports to China for the same period amounted to only \$3,066,198.² When it is understood that in the decade 1781-90 England imported 123,171,196 lbs. of tea at a sale price of \$96,267,832,³ it will be seen that by 1793 England had not been successful in selling her merchandise to China, but that, on the other hand, the Chinese had a monopoly on tea which was fast becoming a necessity in England and which provided the British Government and the East India Company with a substantial revenue.

It was apparent that the British would have to seek a solution for this peculiar economic situation. They naturally looked upon the two hundred and fifty million Chinese as affording vast commercial potentialities and felt that the restrictions imposed upon foreign trade at Canton were merely the result of caprices on the part of the local officials. Were they able to gain an audience with the Emperor at Peking, the foreign merchants thought, all abuses would be rectified speedily. Furthermore, it seemed to them illogical to be forced to send British woollens to the southern port of Canton for transmission to the colder regions of the north, which, of course, constituted their most important market. Hence, there arose a desire to have northern Chinese ports opened to trade. The poor transportation facilities in China gave rise to the belief that more British merchandise could be sold were trade permitted at places other than Canton. Furs were used as clothing to a great extent in North China, but the English hoped to popularize the use of woollens there. Furthermore, the Cohong was looked upon by the British as an unnecessary impediment to trade, because there was

¹ Milburn, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 475.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 535.

afforded no opportunity of surveying the market to ascertain just what merchandise was salable in China. English merchants thought it intolerable that they must buy from and sell to the Cohong at whatever prices those merchants set upon the goods. Finally, they resented the impossibility of having any direct communication with the Canton Viceroy to explain their difficulties to him.

Under these circumstances the British Government intervened and decided to send an embassy to the Chinese Emperor for the purpose of securing better living conditions, more favorable trading facilities, especially the opening to trade of Chusan, Ningpo, and Tientsin, the removal of excessive taxation, permission to have a warehouse in Peking, and the use of some island off the coast.¹ ✓

In 1788 Colonel Cathcart was appointed to undertake this task. However, his death on the voyage to the Far East led to the selection of Lord Macartney, who in 1793 made his way to Peking and was shown great courtesy by the Chinese, although their disinclination to treat him as an equal was revealed by the fact that they conveyed him up the Pei-ho River in a transport waving flags inscribed "Ambassador bearing tribute from the country of England".

Proceeding from Peking to Jehol, the hunting palace of the Chinese monarch, Lord Macartney refused to "kowtow" ² before the Emperor unless a mandarin of similar rank performed the same obeisance before a picture of King George III. The Chinese refused this proposition but the Ambassador was accorded an audience ³ at which he merely

1 Martin, *The Past and Present State of the Tea Trade*, p. 17.

2 Robbins, Helen H., *Our First Ambassador to China*, p. 269; Staunton, *An Authentic Account of an Embassy*, vol. ii, p. 303.

3 i. e. to kneel thrice and touch the floor nine times with one's face, Morrison, R., *Memoir of the Principal Occurrences during an Embassy from the British Government to the Court of China*, pp. 7-9; Staunton, G., *Miscellaneous Notices*, p. 123.

bent on one knee, exactly as he would in the presence of the British Sovereign.¹ Nothing was gained by Lord Macartney's visit save the Emperor's promise to treat foreigners with the utmost indulgence and affection".² Conditions at Canton did improve for a while, but not permanently.³ Lord Macartney's mission was a decided failure, in that the Chinese Emperor not only refused to open any additional ports to trade, but threatened, in a letter to King George III, to expel any British merchants found attempting to trade at any place in China other than Canton.⁴ England's first diplomatic mission was, to use Auber's often-quoted phrase, "received with the utmost politeness, treated with the utmost hospitality, watched with the utmost vigilance, and dismissed with the utmost civility".⁵

The wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon occupied England's attention for the next twenty years, but the commercial situation remained unsatisfactory to the British merchants. In 1815 trade at Canton was stopped by the Chinese, because of the appearance at that port of *H. M. S. Doris* with the American ship *Hunter*, which she had captured off the Chinese coast.⁶ This incident showed the insecurity of British trade and the Government decided to send another embassy to China for the purpose of "establishing the company's trade on a secure, solid, equitable footing, free from the capricious arbitrary aggression of the local authorities, and under the protection of the Emperor

¹ Staunton, *An Authentic Account of an Embassy*, vol. ii, p. 319; vol. iii, pp. 16-18, 38; Robbins, *op. cit.*, pp. 299-300.

² Eames, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

³ Keeton, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 19.

⁴ MacNair, H. F., *Select Readings of Modern Chinese History*, pp. 2-11. Mandate of the Emperor Ch'ien Lung to King George III; Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. ii, pp. 224-253.

⁵ Auber, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

⁶ Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. iii, pp. 216-225.

and the sanction of regulations to be appointed by himself".¹ Lord Amherst was therefore sent out to Peking in 1816.² Once again misunderstanding arose over the refusal to perform the kowtow unless a mandarin of similar rank performed the ceremony before a picture of King George III, or the Emperor gave a promise that any Chinese Ambassador sent in the future to England would kowtow before the British Sovereign.³ Relations were further strained when Amherst declined to appear at an Imperial audience immediately after arriving in Peking at daybreak following a long fatiguing journey, unless the Emperor were informed of the Ambassador's indisposition. As a result, the delegation was ordered to depart, and did actually leave for Canton the same day. Later the Emperor declared that he would have changed the time of the audience had he known of Lord Amherst's all-night journey to Peking.⁴ Nevertheless, this second mission to China was a worse failure than the first, as the Ambassador did not even have an audience with the Emperor. How far apart were the Chinese and the English viewpoints is shown by the following sentence from a letter indited by the Emperor to King George after the departure of the embassy from Peking. "Hereafter there is no occasion for you to send an ambassador so far and to be at the trouble of passing over mountains and crossing seas."⁵

In order to appreciate the importance of the kowtow, it must be borne in mind that the Chinese looked upon their

¹ The East India Company's Memorandum to Lord Amherst, January 17, 1816, quoted by Auber, *op. cit.*, p. 256; Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. iii, p. 284.

² Ellis, H., *Journal of the Proceedings of the Late Embassy to China*, p. 9; Morrison, *Memoir of the Principal Occurrences*, p. 13.

³ Ellis, *op. cit.*, p. 211; Morrison, *Memoir*, pp. 29-37.

⁴ Ellis, *op. cit.*, pp. 269, 274-6, 278, 311; Morrison, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-63.

⁵ Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. iii, p. 6. Imperial Mandate, September 11, 1816.

Emperor as the Son of Heaven and therefore rendered to him the same homage they would pay to Heaven itself.¹ The British, on the other hand, considered the Celestial Monarch merely the Emperor of China and the kowtow, in their opinion, was only a degrading ceremony whereby they acknowledged the preposterous assumption of the Chinese that their Emperor ruled the universe.²

It was becoming increasingly evident that the Chinese were determined to treat the British as inferiors and undesirables. It was likewise easy to foresee that England, after having conquered Napoleon, would not much longer suffer British representatives to be treated so contemptuously as Lord Amherst had been. However, an even more potent factor in shaping England's attitude toward China was the ever-increasing importance of the tea trade, together with the consequent necessity of selling the Chinese additional British goods to offset the unfavorable balance of trade. The United Kingdom's tea imports, which in 1793 had been 16,005,414 lbs. increased by 1818 to 31,467,073 lbs.,³ while Anglo-Chinese trade employed a fleet of fifty-four vessels.⁴ The revenue derived by the Government from the tea trade mounted from the \$2,963,832 of 1793 to \$4,996,372 in 1800, and to \$16,342,178 in 1818.⁵ The tea trade was such a lucrative field for taxation that the British Government

¹ Eames, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

² Morrison, *Memoir of the Principal Occurrences*, p. 9.

³ Great Britain—*An account of the quantity of tea annually imported into, exported from and retained for home consumption in Great Britain in each year since 1805* (1826).

⁴ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. i, p. 90.

⁵ Martin, *The Past and Present State of the Tea Trade*, p. 65; Great Britain, *Accounts of the Quantities of Tobacco, Foreign Wines, Foreign Spirits, Sugar, Tea, Coffee, etc., which have paid the Duties of Customs and Excise for Home Consumption*. (June 19, 1829), p. 11. These figures do not include the duty on imports of tea into Ireland.

increased the duty steadily from 1784, when it was 12½ per cent, to 1819, when it reached 100 per cent.¹ Exports from Great Britain to China amounted to a value of approximately \$5,000,000 and still consisted chiefly of woollens and metals.²

Anglo-Chinese relations were greatly influenced by the drift towards free trade and liberalism which became manifest in England during the second quarter of the nineteenth century.³ There was a spirit of reform throughout the land resulting in the passage of Lord Grey's Reform Bill of 1832, which reorganized the House of Commons by depriving "rotten boroughs" of representation and giving representation to manufacturing towns, such as Manchester.⁴ The newly elected Parliament soon attacked the monopoly on Anglo-Chinese trade which had been held by the East India Company since 1600.⁵ The case against the company was considerably strengthened by other factors, among which was the feeling that unrestricted competitive trade would increase British exports to China,⁶ and would decrease the price of tea, which in 1834 was \$1.08 per pound.⁷ It was also felt that the extravagance of the company enabled Americans, buying British produce in England and

¹ Martin, *The Past and Present State of the Tea Trade*, p. 81.

² Sargent, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

³ Ilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 84; Anderson, G. and Subedar, M., *The Development of an Indian Policy (1818-1858)*, p. 23.

⁴ See Trevelyan, G. M., *Lord Grey of the Reform Bill*.

⁵ The company lost its monopoly on the Indian trade in 1814, after which there was a rapid increase in the exports of British manufactures to that country, especially after 1826. Advocates of free trade with China anticipated equally happy results in the case of that country after 1834. Porter, G., *The Progress of the Nation*, 1851 Edition, p. 369.

⁶ Buckingham, J. S., *Lectures on the Eastern World*, p. 35; Porter, *op. cit.*, p. 552.

⁷ Dennett, *op. cit.*, p. 72; Clapham, J. H., *An Economic History of Modern Britain*, p. 252; *Third Report of the House Select Committee*, July 10, 1821, p. 205.

carrying it to China, to undersell the British at Canton.¹ The result was that in 1833 Parliament passed an Act terminating the company's monopoly as of April 12, 1834.²

ENGLAND WAGES WAR FOR "TRADE"

The elimination of the company proved an important turning point in Anglo-Chinese relations. Hitherto most of China's dealings with England had been handled by the company's representatives who, although at times taking a firm stand against what they considered exactions, never lost sight of the fact that the proceeds from the Chinese tea trade represented their main source of revenue, and consequently inclined to the policy of submitting as far as possible to Chinese wishes. Furthermore, having direct control over all British ships participating in the China trade, the company could act as a unit in opposing the monopolistic Cohong. After 1834 this was no longer possible, as the Chinese Hong dealt with a number of British merchants competing with each other. By the Act of 1833 Anglo-Chinese trade relations were put in charge of a representative appointed directly by the British Government. Thereafter, English private traders who participated in the Chinese trade looked to the Foreign Office at London for protection. While the Chinese could treat the East India Com-

¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xx, pp. 251-9; 3 and 4 Will., 4 c93.

² Sargent, *op. cit.*, p. 41; Crawford, J., *A View of the Present State and Future Prospects of the Free Trade and Colonization of India*, pp. 1-10; *Great Britain Statutes at Large*, vol. 73, p. 866.

³ Great Britain, *Copy of Correspondence between the Directors of the East India Company and the Board of Control, Respecting the East India Charter (1833)*, no. 2, p. 2, *Minutes of Conference of the Court of Directors of the East India Company*, Oct. 12, 1830. . . .

⁴ Ashley, A. E., *The Life and Correspondence of John Henry Temple, Viscount Palmerston*, vol. i, p. 297.

⁵ Matheson, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

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⁴ Ashley, A. E., *The Life and Correspondence of John Henry Temple, Viscount Palmerston*, vol. i, p. 397.

⁵ Matheson, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

pany's representatives with indignity, it was quite another thing when they attempted to act towards a representative of the British Government in the same manner as they had towards commercial agents in Canton. Henceforth national honor was involved and the question of whether China would treat Europeans as equals was brought to a head.¹

Lord Napier² was sent out as Great Britain's first representative to China in 1834 with instructions not only to protect and foster trade but also to ascertain the possibilities of extending it.³ He was to endeavor to open up direct communication with Peking, but was to act cautiously and to "adopt no proceedings but such as may have a general tendency to convince the Chinese authorities of the sincere desire of the King to cultivate the most friendly relations with the Emperor of China and to join with Him in any measures likely to promote the happiness and prosperity of their respective subjects".⁴ In fact, the instructions given to Lord Napier evinced the desire of the British Government to increase their Canton trade while conforming to Chinese customs.⁵ To avoid difficulty, the Chinese authori-

¹ "Again, the Parliament, having thought proper to place the trade in China under the control of a representative of the crown, its dignity must now be consulted, and the insults which might have been endured by the company of merchants, must now be resented by the Queen."—The committee of the London East India and China Association to Viscount Palmerston, Nov. 2, 1829, *Memorials Addressed to Her Majesty's Government by British Merchants Interested in the Trade with China*, no. 11, p. 11.

² With Mr. Plowden and Mr. Davis as Second and Third Superintendents.

³ *Correspondence Relating to China* (1840), incl. no. 2 in no. 1, p. 2. Extract from the Royal Sign Manual Instructions to the Superintendents of Trade in China, December 31, 1833.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 2, p. 4, Palmerston to Napier, Jan. 25, 1834.

⁵ "Lord Napier's instructions," says Dr. Morse, "were such as to satisfy every Chinese objection to the transfer of the control of the English trade from a commercial company to the King's government and they might have been drafted by the Canton Viceroy".—*International Relations*, vol. i, p. 121.

ties were purposely not advised of Lord Napier's appointment, as it was felt that such notice would only disturb them and it was hoped that they would receive him without objection. Furthermore, in sending Lord Napier with the title of Chief Superintendent of British Trade in China, the English thought that they were merely conforming to the wishes of the Chinese Viceroy of Canton, who, on hearing rumors of the termination of the company's monopoly, issued an edict on January 16, 1831, requesting England "to appoint a chief who understands the business to come to Canton for the general management of the commercial dealings by which means affairs may be prevented from going to confusion and benefits remain to commerce".¹

However conciliatory in tone, Lord Napier's instructions contained several ominous clauses. First, His Lordship was bidden to ascertain "whether there were any places at which ships might find requisite provisions in the event of hostilities in the China Seas".² Secondly, Lord Napier was given the seemingly harmless orders to take up his residence at Canton and to announce his arrival to the Viceroy. The first order indicated a possibility of future naval activity, while the second disregarded the Chinese rule that foreigners could have communication only with the Cohong. As the East India Company had always dealt with the Cohong, Lord Palmerston had inaugurated a radical change in Anglo-Chinese relations, but it was the inevitable result of the 1833 Act of Parliament, whereby the British Government was brought directly into contact with China.

Unfortunately the Chinese did not distinguish between the representative of the East India Company and a represen-

¹ *First Appendix to the Third Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons*, p. 95, Edict of Viceroy, Jan. 16, 1831.

² *Correspondence Relating to China (1840)*, no. 2, p. 4, Palmerston to Napier, Jan. 25, 1834.

tative of the British Government. Furthermore, Lord Napier greatly increased their natural disinclination to deal with foreign nations, by proceeding to Canton without the customary permit from the Chinese authorities and by notifying the Viceroy of his arrival with "political and judicial" powers.¹ His Lordship's communication was promptly returned with the advice that any letter from him must be superscribed *pin*, i. e. "petition", and be given to the Cohong.² In this attitude the Chinese remained adamant. Lord Napier waxed angry and appealed to the Chinese people over the head of the Viceroy.³ He likewise expressed his contempt for the Chinese Government by frequently referring to it in such terms as "too contemptible to be viewed in any other light than that of pity or derision", and inquired whether he was "to submit to every edict or whether His Majesty's Government will enforce the same respect for our country as is received from other states".⁴ The best solution of the difficulty in the opinion of the Superintendent was to dispatch "a British force with some small craft to act along the coast", and he confidently informed the Foreign Minister that such action would, without the "loss of a single man", bring the Chinese Emperor "to his senses" and make an impression on the Viceroy, whom he termed a "presumptuous savage" and "a petty tyrant".⁵ That the British Government intended to adopt no such coercive policy is shown by the reply made to Lord Napier by the Duke of Wellington, who had replaced Lord Palmerston at the For-

¹ *Ibid.*, incl. in no. 6, p. 10, Napier to the Governor of Canton, Aug. 26, 1834.

² *Ibid.*, no. 6, p. 7, Napier to Palmerston, Aug. 9, 1834.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 14, p. 32, Proclamation of Napier, Aug. 26, 1834.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 7, p. 11, Napier to Palmerston, Aug. 14, 1834; no. 11, p. 26, Napier to Grey, Aug. 21, 1834.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 7, p. 11, Napier to Palmerston, Aug. 14, 1834; no. 11, p. 26, Napier to Grey, Aug. 21, 1834.

eign Office by the time the Superintendent's reports reached London.

It is not by force and violence [wrote the Duke] that His Majesty's Government intends to establish a commercial intercourse between his subjects and China, but by the other conciliatory measures so strongly inculcated in all the instructions you have received.¹

The Viceroy was at first inclined to excuse Lord Napier's action in coming to Canton without a permit, as an indiscretion committed in ignorance of Chinese rules,² but when the British Superintendent showed no intention of returning to Macao and requesting the required permission,, the Chinese official became indignant.

A lawless foreign slave, Napier [he protested in an edict] has issued a notice. We do not know how such a dog barbarian of an outside nation as you, can have the audacious presumption to call yourself Superintendent. Being an outside savage superintendent, and a person in an official situation, you should have some little knowledge of propriety and law. You have passed over ten thousand miles in order to seek a livelihood; you have come to our Celestial Empire to trade and control affairs; how can you not obey well the regulations of the Empire? You audaciously presume to break through the barrier passes, going out and in at your pleasure, a great infringement of the rules and prohibitions. According to the laws of the nation, the royal warrant should be respectfully requested to behead you and openly expose [your head] to the multitude as a terror to perverse dispositions.³

As a result of this difference of opinion between the Viceroy and Lord Napier, the former suspended trade with England

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 10, p. 26, Wellington to Napier, Feb. 2, 1885.

² *Ibid.*, incl. no. 3 in no. 7, p. 18, Governor of Canton to Hong Merchants, July 27, 1834.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 14, p. 32, Memorandum of Foreign Office, Feb., 1840.

on September 2, 1834, and to remove this embargo, the British Superintendent, already ill of fever, withdrew to Macao where he died shortly afterward.¹ Immediately after his departure, trade was resumed and the Cohong was ordered by the Viceroy to write to the British merchants, requesting that a representative be sent to Canton "for the control and direction of commercial affairs in accordance with the old regulations".²

Lord Napier's successors, Sir John Davis (Oct., 1834-Jan., 1835) and Sir George B. Robinson (Jan., 1835-May, 1837) adopted what is known as the "Quiescent Policy" by remaining away from Canton and avoiding any communication with the Viceroy. They wrote Lord Palmerston (he had again become Foreign Minister in April, 1835) about the difficulties encountered by Lord Napier and advised that they anticipated receiving instructions from Downing Street and that pending their receipt all difficulties would be avoided.³ Although Sir George Robinson was continually advising the Foreign Minister of the excellent results secured by the peaceful policy, he was informed on June 7, 1836 that the office of Chief Superintendent was abolished and was directed to turn over all his papers to Captain Elliott, then Third Superintendent.⁴

Captain Elliott soon took the initiative and endeavored to conciliate the Chinese by reopening relations with the Vice-

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 15, p. 39, Astell to Backhouse, Sept. 28, 1834; no. 14, p. 32, Memorandum of Foreign Office, Feb., 1840.

² *Ibid.*, incl. no. 1 in no. 21, p. 47, Governor of Canton to Hong Merchants, Oct. 19, 1834; no. 2 in no. 24, p. 56, Governor of Canton to Hong Merchants, Nov. 6, 1834.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 18, p. 43, Davis to Palmerston, Oct. 12, 1834; no. 42, p. 100, Robinson to Palmerston, Oct. 16, 1835.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 56, p. 113, Palmerston to Robinson, June 7, 1836; no. 45, p. 104, Robinson to Palmerston, Nov. 24, 1835; no. 74, p. 131, Robinson to Palmerston, April 18, 1836.

roy at Canton in the manner desired by that official, i. e. by inditing a petition to the Cohong.¹ Permission was thereupon granted for Captain Elliott to proceed to Canton, where he arrived on April 12, 1837, after promising "to conform in all things to the imperial pleasure".² The new Superintendent was not permitted to work out this policy, for as soon as Lord Palmerston heard of the Captain's actions, he specifically forbade Elliott either to deal with the Cohong or to affix *pin* to any of his communications to the Chinese officials.³ Lord Palmerston's instructions, coupled with the determination of the Viceroy not to admit a representative of a foreign nation, brought to a head the entire question of national equality, which the Chinese resisted as strenuously as the Foreign Minister pressed it.

In view of China's haughty assumption of superiority over European nations and British resentment at being considered as an inferior nation, worthy of no notice, it is certain that a clash would have come sooner or later.⁴ Unfortunately, however, a quarrel arose over opium, which the British had discovered to be one of the few articles wanted by the Chinese. The British had readily seized upon the opportunity of paying for China's tea with opium, rather than silver. Imports of foreign opium into China had been

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 85, p. 139, Elliott to Palmerston, Dec. 30, 1836.

² *Ibid.*, incl. no. 1, in no. 96, p. 193, Edict of the Governor of Canton, March 18, 1837; no. 100, p. 198, Elliott to Palmerston, Apr. 27, 1837.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 88, p. 149, Palmerston to Elliott, June 12, 1837.

⁴ "This assumption of supremacy and a real impression of its propriety was a higher wall around them than the long pile of stones north of Peking. Force seemed to be the only effective destroyer of such a barrier and in this view the war may be said to have been necessary to compel the Chinese Government to receive Western Powers as its equals or at least make it treat their subjects as well as it did its own people. There was little hope of an adjustment of difficulties until the Chinese were compelled to abandon this erroneous assumption". Williams, *op. cit.* vol. ii, p. 511.

only 1,000 chests¹ in 1767, but in 1780 the East India Company had taken over the monopoly of Indian opium and, under that organization's encouragement, exports of opium from Calcutta to China had reached 4,500 chests in 1800, when China had noticed the deleterious effects of the drug and had prohibited its importation and cultivation.²

This edict, however, had not been enforced by the Chinese officials at Canton, who readily received foreign bribes to connive at the illegal traffic.³ Hence, imports had risen rapidly until by 1831-2 China had received 16,225 chests of Indian opium valued at approximately \$13,150,000.⁴ The opium trade had grown so successful that it contributed a considerable portion of the Indian Government's revenue, amounting in 1831 to \$6,939,677 out of a total income of \$87,170,015.⁵ A Select Committee of the House of Commons investigating East Indian Affairs in 1832, after deprecating the traffic, expressed the opinion that "it did not appear advisable to abandon so important a source of revenue."⁶

Hence, it has been asserted that the opium traffic was carried on with the knowledge and consent of the British Parliament. Nevertheless, the British Government officially recognized the right of China to prohibit the importation of opium and Lord Palmerston advised Captain Elliott that any

¹ One chest contained about 150 lbs.

² Morse, *International Relations*, vol. i, p. 209.

³ *Annual Register* (1840), p. 100.

⁴ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. i, p. 210.

⁵ *Appendix to the Third Report from the Select Committee of the House of Commons and Minutes of Evidence on the Affairs of the East India Company, 1831*, pp. 10-12. Estimate of the Revenue and Charges of India submitted July 22, 1831 by Mr. J. C. Melvill, Auditor of Indian Accounts.

⁶ *Hansard*, vol. liii, p. 740.

loss sustained by British opium runners detected by Chinese enforcement officers must be borne by those who risked participation in the traffic.¹ On the other hand, England did not propose to enforce China's laws for her and remained unresponsive to all suggestions that British merchants be instructed by London to stop importing opium into Canton. This attitude was strengthened by the belief that, were Englishmen prevented from dealing in opium, other Westerners would soon see that China was well supplied with the drug.

In 1838 the illicit opium traffic amounted to 34,373 chests,² reaching such proportions that the Chinese Emperor decided to make strenuous efforts to enforce the prohibition edict. Opium runners were stopped; violators were publicly executed and the Viceroy addressed notes to all foreigners calling their attention to the law and requesting that violations of it cease. Finally, in December, 1838, Lin tse-hsü was appointed Imperial High Commissioner with instructions to suppress the traffic.³ Arriving at Canton on March tenth of the following year, Lin spent one week investigating and on the eighteenth startled the foreign community by ordering them to give up all opium on hand and to promise to import no more on penalty of death. Only three days were given for compliance.⁴

In Commissioner Lin the foreigners encountered an unfamiliar type of Chinese official. When he arrived they had anticipated that the traffic would be disrupted for a short

¹ *Correspondence Relating to China* (1840), no. 116, p. 258, Palmerston to Elliott, June 15, 1838.

² Morse, *International Relations*, vol. ii, p. 210.

³ *Correspondence Relating to China* (1840), no. 120, p. 299, Elliott to Palmerston, Apr. 20, 1838; no. 133, p. 323, Elliott to Palmerston, Dec. 8, 1838; no. 134, p. 324, Elliott to Palmerston, Dec. 13, 1838; incl. in no. 143, p. 345, Proclamation of the Governor of Canton.

⁴ *Ibid.*, incl. no. 1 in no. 145, p. 350, Edict from the Imperial Commissioner Addressed to the Foreigners of all Nations, Mar. 18, 1839.

time, but would soon be adjusted with payment of the customary gratuities. The new Commissioner, however, proceeded to exert pressure to force the surrender of the opium and the foreigners found their factories surrounded by Chinese troops and cruisers.¹ Under this pressure, which was not, however, of a kind to cause the foreigners to believe their lives in danger,² Captain Elliott, on March twenty-seventh, ordered all British subjects to deliver their opium to him under promise of monetary compensation.³ Accordingly, 20,291 chests, valued at \$10,000,000, were surrendered and turned over to the Commissioner, by whom they were later destroyed.⁴ Captain Elliott, in dudgeon over this action and also because of Lin's demand that foreign merchants sign the bond involving the death penalty, left Canton with the entire British settlement and went to Macao.⁵ On May twenty-seventh he issued an order forbidding British ships to enter Canton harbor or British subjects to dwell in the city, on the ground that their lives were not safe there.⁶ Commissioner Lin had gained his point, but it is unfortunate that he had assumed such an aggressive attitude, since Captain Elliott had been disposed to cooperate in the effort to eradicate the opium traffic and had warned the British

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 146, p. 355, Elliott to Palmerston, Mar. 30, 1839.

² Although supplies of provisions and water had been shut off, the Europeans had an ample stock of both, *Report from the Select Committee on Trade with China*, July 2, 1840, Questions 1112-22, 1127-30.

³ *Correspondence Relating to China* (1840), incl. no. 20 in no. 146, p. 374, Public Notice issued by Captain Elliott to British Subjects, Mar. 27, 1839.

⁴ *Chinese Repository*, July, 1837; *Great Britain, Peace Handbook*, no. 67, p. 8.

⁵ *Correspondence Relating to China* (1840), no. 150, p. 410, Elliott to Palmerston, May 27, 1839.

⁶ *Ibid.*, incl. no. 15 in no. 148, p. 404, Public Notice to Her Majesty's Subjects; no. 150, p. 409, Elliott to Palmerston, May 18, 1839.

merchants against importing the drug.¹ The latter had been willing to agree not to engage in the traffic but stoutly resisted approving the death penalty, which they considered a cruel punishment, likely to be inflicted upon some innocent person.² In such an attitude, however, the Commissioner merely saw a determination to continue opium importations once matters quieted down. He therefore insisted on the bond with the death penalty.

While relations were thus strained, a riot took place at Hongkong on July seventh between natives and intoxicated British and American sailors, resulting in the death of a Chinese, one Lin Wei-li, for which crime Captain Elliott fined and imprisoned five sailors. He also compensated the deceased's family to the extent of \$1,900.³ Matters were further aggravated when a British merchant signed the bond required by Lin and took his ship, the *Thomas Coutts*, to Whampoa, whereupon the Commissioner demanded that the other British merchants do likewise within three days and asked the surrender of Lin Wei-li's murderer.⁴ The action of the *Thomas Coutts* was particularly unfortunate, since there were already signs that British opposition to the bond would force the Commissioner to accept a compromise rather than end trade with England permanently.⁵ However, Elliott was powerless to stop the *Thomas Coutts*, for

¹ *Ibid.*, incl. no. 8 in no. 137, p. 332, Public Notice to Her Majesty's Subjects, Dec. 18, 1838; incl. no. 14 in no. 146, p. 367, Elliott to Governor of Canton, Mar. 25, 1839.

² *Ibid.*, incl. no. 4 in no. 148, p. 394, Elliott to the Imperial Commissioner, April 8, 1838.

³ *Ibid.*, incl. no. 154, p. 432, Elliott to Jardine, Matheson and Company and Dent and Company, July 15, 1839; Keeton, *op. cit.*, pp. 146, 155.

⁴ *Additional Correspondence Relating to China* (1840), no. 2, p. 8, Elliott to Palmerston, Nov. 5, 1839; *Additional Papers Relating to China* (1840), incl. no. 24 in no. 1, p. 25, The Prefect of Nanhung Choy and the Keun-Min-Foo to Elliott, Oct. 26, 1839; Keeton, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

⁵ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. i, p. 233; Gilbert, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-8.

Palmerston previously had warned him against exercising such control over British ships.¹ As Commissioner Lin had forbidden the Portuguese at Macao to give refuge to the British, Elliott and his countrymen were forced to flee to Hongkōng.² The natives were likewise told not to furnish water and other supplies, and ships sent by Captain Elliott to procure these necessities came into conflict with a fleet of twenty-nine Chinese junks, four of which were sunk during the ensuing battle.³ Thus, on November 3, 1839 began England's first war with China.

The immediate cause of the war was the decision taken by the Chinese Government in 1839 to enforce the opium ban which had remained in desuetude since its enactment in 1800.⁴ But besides opium, the war had many other causes. Among these were: first, the refusal of Captain Elliott to allow a British sailor to be subject to China's laws, which the English considered cruel and inhuman; second, the anger of the British Government when reports were received in London that her representative and merchants, some of whom had never handled opium, had been held captive in Canton and forced to flee first to Macao and then to Hongkōng; third, the insistence of the British on the elimination of the use of "petition", together with all other indications of national inferiority; ⁵ fourth, the desire of the British to have direct communication with the Viceroy of Canton;

¹ *Correspondence Relating to China* (1840), no. 65, p. 121, Palmerston to Elliott, July 22, 1836.

² *Ibid.*, no. 155, p. 433, Elliott to Palmerston, Aug. 27, 1839.

³ *Additional Correspondence Relating to China* (1840), no. 2, p. 8, Elliott to Palmerston, Nov. 5, 1839.

⁴ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. i, pp. 177-182.

⁵ "Is another English gentleman of character and talent to be sent to China and directed to submit to all the humiliating concessions of national inferiority which will be demanded before he is recognized by China?"—

• Mr. H. H. Lindsey, *British Merchant to Lord Palmerston*, 1836, p. 3.

fifth, the desire of the British for the elimination of the Cohong, with all other trade restrictions; sixth, the necessity of securing for the British people an adequate supply of tea; seventh, the desire to increase the exports of British manufactures by opening to trade additional Chinese ports, especially in the north, where there would be a demand for British woollens; and eighth, the desire to place Anglo-Chinese trade on a firmer foundation.¹ The opium war was the inevitable result of the fundamental difference between Oriental and Occidental viewpoints. England, having produced the Industrial Revolution earlier than other Western nations and being one of the first European countries to build up an important commerce with China, was inevitably the pioneer in forcing the Celestial Empire to remove the burdensome restrictions placed upon foreign trade. The Indo-Chinese opium trade, while constituting an injustice to China, and recognized as such by many English statesmen,² would never have assumed the proportions it did, but for the unfortunate inability of the English merchants to find any other British product which the Chinese would purchase, and for the dishonesty of native officials, high and low, who for monetary compensation allowed the Imperial prohibition edicts to be violated so flagrantly.

In order to appreciate England's reasons for sending a military expedition to China in 1840, the development of Anglo-Chinese commerce up to 1839 must be understood. Tea imports in 1839 were 27,191,762 lbs., giving the Gov-

¹ "... we hope that these occurrences may be taken advantage of to place our commercial relations with China on a secure, sound, and permanent basis."—Manchester Merchants to Palmerston, Sept. 30, 1839, *Memorials Addressed to Her Majesty's Government by British Merchants Interested in the Trade with China* (1840), no. 1, p. 11.

² John Bright, Richard Cobden and William E. Gladstone. A motion condemning the Government for its handling of the Chinese situation was lost by the scant margin of 262 to 271.—*Annual Register* (1840), p. 104.

ernment a revenue of \$17,781,683.¹ The English had come to look upon tea as a necessity and the Government could not well disregard the revenue secured from the trade. India in the year 1838-9 shipped 40,200 chests of opium to China, and the Indian Government was receiving from the trade an annual income of almost \$10,000,000.² The economic importance of opium to India is further illustrated by the fact that the Chinese in 1834-9 took an annual average of \$20,000,000 of Indian merchandise, two-thirds of which was opium.³

In the late thirties British manufactures used by China included cotton piece goods as well as woollens, the average annual shipments of the former amounting to \$1,620,000 in the years 1834-8, and the latter, to \$2,425,000.⁴ Other exports, such as yarn, which amounted to about \$250,000 annually, and metals, brought the total amount of British merchandise shipped to China from the United Kingdom in 1838 to \$6,853,170.⁵ The sharp decrease of woollen shipments during the years 1834-39 emphasized the necessity for a treaty port farther north than Canton. The exports of cotton piece goods, on the other hand, showed enough of an increase to arouse eagerness in Manchester for the removal of Chinese commercial restrictions. As soon as the stoppage of trade at Canton in September, 1839 was known in London, Palmerston was deluged with resolutions from Chambers of Commerce throughout the manufacturing cen-

¹ Great Britain, *Returns Respecting the Importation of Cinnamon, Cassia, Tea, Raw Silk, Nankeen Cloth and other Articles from 1830-42*, pp. 4-5.

² Banerjee, P., *Indian Finance in the Days of the Company*, p. 204 (\$8,561,697 in 1837); Mudie, R., *China and its Resources*, etc., p. 186.

³ Sargent, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Porter, *op. cit.*, 1851 Edition, p. 370.

ters of England, pointing out how important they considered Chinese trade and urging him to adopt vigorous measures to place the trade on a more secure basis.¹ Such importunities the Foreign Minister could not well disregard. While it is true that China was only thirteenth in the list of England's customers, her vast population represented great commercial possibilities which seemed to be capable of illimitable development.²

Great Britain easily defeated China and on August 29, 1842 forced her to sign the Treaty of Nanking which was ratified at Hongkong June 26, 1843, giving England numerous concessions.³ Article II provided that "British Subjects with their families and their establishments shall be allowed to reside for the purpose of carrying on their mercantile pursuits without molestation or restraint at the cities and towns of Canton, Amoy, Foochow-fu, Ningpo, and Shanghai, and Her Majesty the Queen of England, etc., will appoint superintendents or consular officers to reside at each of the above named cities or towns to be the medium of communication between the Chinese authorities and the said merchants".⁴ At all five ports China agreed to establish "a fair and regular tariff of export and import customs, which tariff shall be publicly notified and promulgated for general information", and provision was made for the trans-

¹ *Memorials Addressed to Her Majesty's Government by British Merchants Interested in the Trade with China* (1840).

² Porter, *op. cit.*, p. 483; Mr. Lindsey, British merchant, wrote Lord Palmerston in 1836 that the China trade "if judiciously fostered and encouraged, is capable of almost unlimited increase". *Letter to the Right Honorable Viscount Palmerston on British Relations with China*, p. 18.

³ Mayers, W. F., *Treaties between the Empire of China and Foreign Powers*, p. 1.

⁴ *China, Imperial Maritime Customs, Miscellaneous Series no. 30, Treaties, Conventions, etc. between China and Foreign Countries*, vol. i, p. 160, The Treaty of Nanking, Art. I.

portation of foreign goods from the treaty ports to the interior on payment of a fee, the amount of which was to be decided upon later.¹ The Cohong was abolished and British merchants were given the right "to carry on their mercantile transactions with whatever persons they please".² The use of "petition" was eliminated by providing for communications to pass between the British Chief Officer and the Viceroy under the term "communication", and subordinate officers were to be permitted to style their letters to Chinese High Officials "declarations". Merchants were to use "representation" on all papers intended for the Chinese Government.³

The Treaty of Nanking imposed upon China a war indemnity of \$21,000,000, six millions of which were payable immediately, six millions in 1843, five in 1844, and four in 1845. Three millions were to retire the Cohong's debts to British merchants and twelve millions to compensate England for "having been obliged to send out an expedition to demand and obtain redress for the violent and unjust proceedings of the Chinese High Authorities towards Her Majesty's officers and subjects".⁴ Six millions were allocated to compensation for British merchants whose opium had been destroyed by Commissioner Lin. With this indemnity in the treaty, it has always been a difficult proposition to convince any Chinese that the war was not waged to force upon them a noxious drug which they were trying to suppress.⁵ To appreciate China's contention, one need only

¹ *Ibid.*, Art. X.

² *Ibid.*, Art. V.

³ *Ibid.*, Art. XI.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Arts. IV, VII. Save for the indemnity, opium was not mentioned in the treaty, but Sir Henry Pottinger had instructions to endeavor to get China to legalize the importation of opium, *Papers Relating to the Opium Trade in China (1842-56)*, no. 1, p. 1, Palmerston to Elliott, Feb. 26, 1841.

⁵ "To the Chinese there was but one *casus belli*, and that was opium". See, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

visualize the wave of anger that would sweep England were she to ban opium and later be forced to pay \$6,000,000 to a stronger nation as compensation for some of the contraband product destroyed after a futile endeavor to smuggle it past British Customs Officers.

By the same treaty of 1842, England secured from China the island of Hongkong.¹ The reason for taking this island is clearly shown in Lord Palmerston's letter of February 20, 1840 to the Minister of the Emperor of China, wherein he pointed out that "The British Government demands security for the future that British subjects resorting to China for purposes of trade in conformity with the long-established understanding between the two countries shall not again be exposed to violence and injustice, while engaged in the lawful pursuits of commerce". An island was wanted "as a place of residence and of commerce for British subjects, where their persons may be safe from molestation and where their property may be secure".² Lord Aberdeen, the Prime Minister, in writing Sir Henry Pottinger on November 4, 1841, observed that, "With respect to the occupation of Chinese territory which may have been rendered necessary in course of warlike operations, Her Majesty's Government do not feel disposed to regard any such acquisition in the light of a permanent conquest".³ When Hongkong was taken in 1842, there was little indication that what was then a barren rock situated eighty miles from the Chinese emporium, Canton, and with only 2,000 inhabitants, would ever become commercially important.⁴ England took Hongkong

¹ Treaty of Nanking, Art. III.

² Quoted by Morse, *International Relations*, vol. i, p. 621.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 622.

⁴ "From Hongkong we cannot be said to have derived directly much commercial advantage, nor does it seem likely by its position to become the seat of an extended commerce", *Report of the Select Committee on*

merely because British subjects had been subjected to violence at Canton and had been refused asylum at Macao by the Portuguese. The new possession was intended solely as a place of refuge, whither English merchants could retire in time of need and where they could carry on trade free from Chinese molestation.¹

In 1842 the Chinese made no great objection to the cession of Hongkong and the Chinese version of the Nanking Treaty, when translated into English, reads that the Chinese voluntarily ceded Hongkong in return for Great Britain's promise to allow other Westerners to trade at the newly opened treaty ports.² In time, however, Hongkong out-rivalled Macao, British commerce soon transforming the barren rock into a trading metropolis giving livelihood to many Chinese as well as English. While it is reasonable to assume that Hongkong, left to China, would never have grown to such importance, nevertheless, the sight of that thriving community under foreign rule has always been a thorn in Chinese pride. One can imagine that similar thoughts would arise in the minds of most Britons were any foreign country to take a desolate part of the British coast and proceed to make of it a city rivalling Liverpool. Chinese resentment has been aggravated because the fact that Hongkong was under foreign control made it more difficult for the Chinese officials to suppress smuggling. Furthermore, the colony became a haven for native criminals who fled there from the continent.³

Commercial Relations with China, July, 1847; An unfavorable report on Hongkong in the late forties is found in Martin, R. M., *Reports and Despatches on the British Position and Prospects in China*.

¹ Gilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 119; Great Britain, *China Trade Resolutions to be proposed by Sir George Staunton on Tuesday, the 16th of April, 1833*, Resolution no. 8.

² Dennett, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

³ Williams, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 558; Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 120; Morse, *International Relations*, vol. ii, p. 380.

The tariff and general trade regulations provided for in the Treaty of Nanking were promulgated in an agreement of October, 1843, which fixed a five per cent ad-valorem duty on most imports and exports save tea, on which a ten per cent export tax was levied.¹ China henceforth could not raise her tariff without the approval of Great Britain, for the treaty could be changed only by mutual agreement.² The amount of the transit tax was provided for in the ambiguous wording that such duty should "not exceed the present rates which are upon a moderate scale".³ This matter was not specifically settled because transit duties did not assume serious proportions until after 1850, when rebellions forced China to increase her internal revenue.⁴

A Supplementary Treaty, signed October 8, 1843, incorporated three conditions under which China has chafed ever since, namely, the most-favored-nation clause, extraterritoriality, and settlements. The first of these provided that British subjects would secure any privilege or immunity which China, at a later date, might grant to any other country. This clause read as follows:

The Emperor of China, having been graciously pleased to grant to all foreign countries whose subjects or citizens have hitherto traded at Canton, the privilege of resorting for the purposes of trade to the other four ports of Foochow, Amoy, Shanghai, and Ningpo in the same terms as the English, it is further agreed that should the Emperor hereafter, from any cause whatsoever, be pleased to grant additional privileges or immunities to any subjects or citizens of such foreign countries, the same privileges and immunities will be extended to and enjoyed

¹ China, *Treaties, op. cit.*, Tariff and Duties on the Foreign Trade with China, Promulgated July 22, 1843, p. 167.

² Cheng, Sih Gung, *Modern China, A Political Study*, p. 196.

³ China, *Treaties, op. cit.*, Declaration Respecting Transit Duties, June 26, 1843, p. 165.

⁴ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. i, p. 314.

by British subjects; but it is to be understood that demands or requests are not on this plea to be unnecessarily brought forward.¹

The most-favored-nation clause as applicable to China did not originate, however, with the British Supplementary Treaty of 1843. Six weeks after the Treaty of Nanking was signed, Commodore Kearny of the United States Far Eastern Naval Squadron wrote to the Canton Viceroy expressing the hope that American citizens would "be placed upon the same footing as the merchants most favored". To this communication the Viceroy replied favorably.² Great Britain immediately adopted the idea and incorporated it in the Supplementary Treaty. The fundamental reason for the most-favored-nation clause was the desire to prevent any Western nation from securing concessions which would place the traders of other countries at a disadvantage. In 1842 China was not opposed to the most-favored-nation clause, for she did not then realize that some Western nations would not only invoke it later to secure privileges previously granted by Peking to other countries, but that they would at the same time refuse to be bound by the conditions on which the privileges in question had been granted originally.³ Chinese have now come to regard the most-favored-nation clause as a serious infringement upon their country's rights.⁴

The second condition incorporated in the Supplementary Treaty is extraterritoriality, providing for the removal of British criminals in China from Chinese jurisdiction and

¹ China, *Treaties*, *op. cit.*, p. 199, Supplementary Treaty, Art. VIII.

² Dennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-9; Fuess, C. M., *The Life of Caleb Cushing*, vol. i, p. 406.

³ Sze, Tsung Yu, *China and the Most-Favored-Nation Clause*. p. 31; Willoughby, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 35.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 263-7.

making such malefactors amenable only to British courts set up in China, but using English law.

The punishment of criminals in China had been the subject of controversy for some time prior to 1843. In 1689 Russia arranged a form of extraterritoriality with China, but the agreement was reciprocal and the trial of Russian criminals apprehended by China was held in Russia.¹ In the early part of the eighteenth century the Chinese seemed glad to be relieved of the responsibility for trying troublesome foreigners, and in 1721 and 1722 cases of homicide committed by Europeans in China were settled by monetary compensation.² By 1773, however, an Englishman named Scott was executed by the Chinese, and in 1780 a Frenchman who in self-defense had killed a Portuguese sailor was publicly strangled by order of the Viceroy, although no witnesses of the crime were produced.³ Four years later occurred the *Lady Hughes* incident which had such a potent influence in creating the British demand for criminal jurisdiction over English citizens in China. A sailor of the *Lady Hughes* was strangled by the Canton authorities because in firing a salute he had accidentally killed a Chinese.⁴ From that time on, no British subject was ever handed over to the Chinese for criminal prosecution, although an American sailor, Terranova, was handed over and put to death in 1821.⁵

The British had come to look askance at Chinese laws which they felt did not distinguish between premeditated

¹ China, *Treaties, op. cit.*, p. 3, The Treaty of Nerchinsk, Aug. 27, 1689, Art. VI.

² Morse, *International Relations*, vol. i, p. 101; Keeton, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 30-1; Jernigan, J. B., *China in Law and Commerce*, p. 194.

³ Keeton, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 37, 39; Davis, J. F., *China and the Chinese*, p. 81.

⁴ Keeton, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 140-2; Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. ii, p. 99.

⁵ Keeton, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 47; Dennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-7; Koo, V. K. W., *The Status of Aliens in China*, p. 54.

murder, accidental homicide, and killing in self-defense. To make matters worse, Chinese courts accepted what the British considered flimsy evidence and did not give the accused what the Westerners felt was a fair trial.¹ According to Chinese philosophy, a murder had to be expiated by the execution of some one, but sufficient emphasis was not laid on the essential point of making absolutely certain of the guilt of the accused.² Public strangulation was deemed by Occidentals a cruel form of punishment, while the Chinese criminal code, which made a man's family responsible for his crimes and sanctioned the use of torture to extract evidence, was looked upon with abhorrence.³ Finally, Westerners had no confidence in the honesty or ability of Chinese judges and saw in Chinese prisons only vile dungeons.⁴

Hence there arose a desire for extraterritorial privileges, and in 1833 Parliament provided for the establishment at Canton of a British court having criminal jurisdiction over English citizens in China, but Lord Palmerston instructed Captain Elliott to avoid calling the court into action unless absolutely necessary.⁵ Consequently, the first case brought before this British court was that involved in the death of Lin Wei-li in 1839.⁶ In 1838 Palmerston endeavored to

¹ Keeton, *op. cit.*, vol. i, chap. iii; Gilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 76; "Rightly or wrongly there lurked in the hidden nooks of every Occidental mind a vague notion that Oriental jurisprudence could not possibly be in keeping with Western ideas of justice and that an Occidental would certainly do violence to his dignity and pride by rendering obeisance to a deficient judicial regime", Shih, Lui Shun, *Extraterritoriality, Its Rise and Its Decline*, p. 84.

² Keeton, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 118-19; Gilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

³ Morse, *Trade and Administration*, p. 178; Keeton, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 119, 135-6.

⁴ Keeton, *op. cit.*, pp. 99, 130; Etherton, P. T., *China, The Facts*, p. 201.

⁵ 3 & 4 Wm. IV c93, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xx, p. 256; *Correspondence Relating to China* (1840), no. 2, p. 4, Palmerston to Napier, Jan. 25, 1834.

⁶ Keeton, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 147; see p. 38.

have civil jurisdiction added to the powers of the court, but withdrew the bill from the House of Commons when opposition developed on the ground that approval should first be obtained from the Chinese Emperor.¹ To legalize this British court and to avoid a repetition of the unfortunate *Lady Hughes* incident, England inserted the following clause in the Supplementary Treaty of 1843.

Regarding the punishment of English criminals, the British Government will enact laws necessary to obtain that end and the Consul will be empowered to put them in force.²

Extraterritoriality was more specifically defined by Caleb Cushing, Commissioner of the United States, who in 1844 negotiated the Treaty of Wanghia with China, the benefits of which were automatically accorded England by virtue of the most-favored-nation clause.³ Article XXI of this treaty provided that:

Subjects of China who may be guilty of any criminal act towards citizens of the United States shall be arrested and punished by the Chinese authorities according to the laws of China and citizens of the United States who may commit any crime in China shall be subject to be tried and punished only by the consul or other public functionary of the United States, thereto authorized according to the laws of the United States, and in order to the prevention of all controversy, justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides.

Article XXV stipulated: All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, arising between citizens of the United States in China shall be subject to the jurisdiction of,

¹ *Hansard*, vol. xliv, pp. 751-3.

² China, *Treaties, op. cit.*, p. 191, Supplementary Treaty, Oct. 8, 1843, General Regulations under which the British trade is to be conducted at the five ports of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai, Article XIII.

³ Text in China, *Treaties, op. cit.*, p. 473.

and regulated by, the authorities of their own government and all controversies occurring in China between the citizens of the United States and the subjects of any other government shall be regulated by the treaties existing between the United States and such governments respectively without interference, on the part of China.

Another result of the Opium War was the establishment of settlements. The poor living conditions in the native Chinese cities, together with the lack of modern sanitation, made it undesirable for the foreigners to live there.¹ This fortunately coincided with the views of the Chinese, who were most anxious for the foreigners to remain as far away from them as possible. Hence, when the British secured the right to reside at the five treaty ports, they adopted the policy of obtaining a strip of land which could be developed into a community where British traders would have municipal control and could build habitations to their own liking. In all five treaty ports, save Canton, where the turbulent natives delayed the entry of foreigners until 1860, there arose, soon after 1842, segregated foreign communities, later designated "settlements," and "concessions". The reasons for this *imperium in imperio* were the fundamental difference in living conditions of Westerner and Oriental and the desire of the Europeans to have places where they could live in safety.² Settlements have since become a source of irritation to the Chinese who have not taken kindly to the sight of foreign communities growing up in their midst despite the fact that these settlements provide conveniences

¹ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. i, p. 347; "Concessions and settlements will be abolished when the local government of China has been improved to such a standard of efficiency as to be able to afford foreigners the security and comfort which they enjoy in other foreign states."—Cheng, Sih Gung, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

² Cheng, Sih Gung, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

unknown to native Chinese cities.¹ Furthermore, the Chinese resent the fact that the Orientals living in the settlements are not given an adequate share in the government.

English merchants eagerly awaited a considerable increase in shipments of British merchandise as a result of the Treaty of Nanking.² There was a rush to participate in the expected profits and hence a period of speculation which resulted in an increase of cotton shipments from \$2,109,000 in 1839 to \$8,432,785 in 1845, and during the same period woollen exports increased from \$709,560 to \$2,661,224.³ China by 1845 had become England's third best customer for woollens, being surpassed only by the United States and Germany.⁴ Bearing in mind that seventy-two per cent of China's imports came from Great Britain and India and that English ships handled over seventy per cent of this trade, it will be understood with what enthusiasm British woollen manufacturers looked for an increased market in China's vast population.⁵ Unfortunately, the peak of increased exports to China was reached in 1845 and immediately thereafter a reaction set in which by 1847 decreased cotton and woollen shipments to \$4,151,000 and \$1,890,540, respectively.⁶ The average value of all British exports to China during the years 1845-1849 was \$8,650,000 and for the

¹ Bau, M. J., *The Foreign Relations of China*, pp. 319-322; Cheng, Sih Gung, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-194.

² The Mayor of Manchester, in a speech of welcome on the occasion of Sir Henry Pottinger's return from China, expressed gratitude to the diplomat for "having opened to British enterprise the commerce of an empire, the national advantages of which it is all but impossible to overestimate."—*The Times*, Dec. 23, 1844.

³ Sargent, *op. cit.*, pp. 126, 129, 130; *Report of the Select Committee on Commercial Relations with China (July, 1847)*, p. iii.

⁴ Porter, *op. cit.*, 1912 Edition, p. 326.

⁵ *Select Committee Report (July, 1847)*, p. iii.

⁶ Sargent, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

years 1850-1854 it was only \$9,000,000, showing practically no increase for the decade.¹

India, however, increased her shipments of opium, China's imports growing from 34,373 chests in 1838 to an average of 68,500 in the years 1855-1859. The revenue derived by the Indian Government from this trade in 1858 reached \$28,277,302, or twenty per cent of the entire revenue.²

Tea continued to be a Chinese monopoly and England's imports increased to 86,200,414 lbs. at an approximate value of \$25,000,000 in 1857.³ Dissatisfaction was felt, however, because tea cost twelve times as much in London as it did in Hankow, and the English believed that China's taxes were partially responsible for this situation.⁴ Furthermore, British goods cost considerably more in the interior of China than at the treaty ports. This was due to the Chinese policy of taxing foreign merchandise at every possible place. Consequently, the demand arose that merchants secure the privilege of buying Chinese produce at the place of growth and selling British goods in the interior. Of raw silk, the United Kingdom in 1856 imported over 6,000,000 lbs. at a value of £6,013,000.⁵

A SECOND WAR IS NECESSARY

Trade conditions after the Opium War were considerably hampered by internal rebellions in China, coupled with violent antagonism shown toward foreigners by the Chinese, especially at Canton. It was not astonishing that the treaties of 1842-3 failed to end the difficulties between Orient and

¹ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. ii, p. 210.

² Sargent, *op. cit.*, p. 132; Banerjea, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

³ *Correspondence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty of Tientsin* (1870), no. 107, p. 345, Board of Trade to Foreign Office, May 19, 1869.

⁴ Osborn, S., *The Past and Future of British Relations with China*, pp. 98-9; Noble, J., *The Queen's Taxes*, p. 51.

⁵ *Correspondence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty of Tientsin* (1871), no. 107, p. 345, Board of Trade to Foreign Office, May 19, 1869.

Occident. The great expanse of China and her inefficient means of communication left many of her people ignorant of the superiority of Western arms.¹ The treaties were not promulgated by either central or provincial officials, nor were the ratified copies even forwarded to Peking.² (Hence, the history of 1842-56 is the story of Chinese efforts to invalidate the treaties she had signed and of British endeavors not only to make the Celestials live up to the 1842-3 agreements, but also to obtain additional privileges.) The Westerners were especially determined when British exports after 1847 did not show the anticipated large increase. British writers are inclined to denounce as dishonorable any Chinese evasions of their written promises, but it must be borne in mind that the Chinese were merely seeking to nullify what they considered harmful treaties imposed upon them by superior force. Small wonder that the Chinese assumed an obstructive attitude when during the ten years following the treaties of 1842, their country was involved in "more complications, miseries and disasters than had been known since the Manchu conquest".³)

England's relations with China were strained further on October 8, 1856, when the Chinese officials at Canton, in search of a criminal, raided the merchant ship *Arrow* and seized twelve of her native crew.⁴ Although the ship was owned and manned by Chinese, she was flying the British flag because the Chinese owners lived at Hongkong and consequently had the privilege of registering the ship at that port and flying the British colors.⁵ In the summary action of

¹ Treat, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

² Williams, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 562.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 633.

⁴ *Papers Relating to the Proceedings of Her Majesty's Naval Forces at Canton (1857)*, incl. no. 1 in no. 1, p. 1, Parkes to Bowring, Oct. 8, 1856.

⁵ *Ibid.*, incl. no. 3 in no. 1, p. 3, Bowring to Parkes, Oct. 10, 1856; *Correspondence Respecting the Registration of Colonial Vessels at Hongkong*, incl. in no. 2, p. 2, Hongkong Ordinance no. 4 of 1855.

boarding the *Arrow*, the Chinese had not been without provocation, since Chinese ships under the British flag not only had become notorious opium smugglers but also had engaged in the coolie traffic, i. e. the practice of kidnapping Chinese natives for labor in distant lands.¹ Furthermore, the *Arrow*, on the admission of the British Trade Superintendent, Sir John Bowring, had no right to fly the Union Jack, as her registry at Hongkong had expired eleven days prior to the time she was raided, but the Chinese were not cognizant of this irregularity.² The British flag had been hauled down and Sir John contended that the Chinese had violated article nine of the Supplementary Treaty providing that in case Chinese criminals fled to Hongkong or British ships, "a communication shall be made to the proper English official in order that the said criminals and offenders may be rigidly searched for, seized, and on proof or admission of their guilt, delivered up".

Mr. Harry Parkes, Consul at Canton, contended that the Chinese should have appealed to him if native criminals were members of the *Arrow's* crew, and the British Foreign Minister considered the matter so important that "no British lorcha would be safe if her crew were liable to seizure on such grounds".³ Hence Consul Parkes and the Trade Superintendent, Sir John Bowring, demanded the return of the prisoners for investigation at the British Consulate.⁴ The Chinese Viceroy, Yeh, remained obdurate for some time

¹ Williams, *op. cit.*, vol ii, pp. 633-4.

² *Papers Relating to the Proceedings of Her Majesty's Naval Forces at Canton (1857)*, incl. no. 14 in no. 1, p. 10, Bowring to Parkes, October 11, 1856.

³ *Papers Relating to the Proceedings of Her Majesty's Naval Forces at Canton (1857)*, no. 3, p. 15, Clarendon to Bowring, Dec. 10, 1856; incl. no. 16 in no. 1, p. 12, Parkes to Yeh, Oct. 12, 1856.

⁴ *Ibid.*, incl. no. 2 in no. 1, p. 2, Parkes to Yeh, Oct. 8, 1856; incl. no. 14 in no. 1, p. 10, Bowring to Parkes, Oct. 11, 1856.

but after reiteration of the British demands, coupled with a threat of force, he released the prisoners. Still he resolutely refused to apologize, whereupon Admiral Seymour bombarded the Viceroy's office, while that functionary accepted the challenge of war by offering a reward for every English head brought to him.¹

Opinion in England was very much divided on the question of whether war should be waged because of the *Arrow* incident. Lord Palmerston supported Sir John Bowring's action, but was defeated in the House of Commons by a vote of 263-247.² Choosing a general election rather than resignation, he was returned to power with a majority of 85,³ and was able to proceed with the war. England was assisted by France, incensed because the Chinese had executed a French priest. Louis Napoleon, furthermore, was at the time following a general policy of cooperation with England,⁴ Russia and the United States, though deprecating the use of force, were anxious for treaty revision and gave the Anglo-French allies moral support.⁵

Once again Chinese military resources were not sufficient to withstand Western arms, and with the fall of Tientsin in May, 1858 the British and French dictated the Treaty of Tientsin. By this treaty Great Britain and France were given the right to "appoint Ambassadors, Ministers or other diplomatic agents to the Court of Peking", and permission to acquire at Peking a site for building, or "hire houses, for the accommodation of Her Majesty's mission" and

¹ *Ibid.*, incl. no. 3 in no. 5, p. 26, Parkes to Bowring, Oct. 22, 1856; incl. no. 1 in no. 6, p. 94, Seymour to Admiralty, Nov. 14, 1856; incl. no. 20 in no. 12, p. 128, Proclamation, Nov. 25, 1856.

² *Annual Register* (1857), p. 69.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 83-4; Morse, *International Relations*, vol. i, p. 427.

⁴ Cordier, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 46.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 44-46; Dennett, *op. cit.*, p. 311; *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, vol. ii, p. 427.

"the Chinese Government will assist [them] in so doing".¹ The Chinese Emperor agreed to "nominate one of the Secretaries of State or a president of one of the boards as the High Officer with whom the Ambassador, Minister or other diplomatic agent of Her Majesty, the Queen, shall transact business, either personally or in writing on a footing of perfect equality".² Out of this clause grew the Tsungli Yamen, which functioned as China's Foreign Office until 1901. England agreed not to send a representative to Peking immediately, but did not renounce the right to do so.³ Any future difficulty regarding the kowtow was eliminated by a stipulation that the British representative "shall not be called upon to perform any ceremony derogatory to him as representing the sovereign of an independent nation, on a footing of equality with that of China. On the other hand, he shall use the same forms of ceremony and respect to His Majesty, the Emperor, as are employed by the Ambassadors, Ministers or diplomatic agents of Her Majesty towards the sovereigns of independent and equal European nations" and "shall not be subjected to any kind of molestation whatever".⁴ Those teaching or professing Christianity, which had been proscribed since 1724, were henceforth not to be persecuted or interfered with.⁵ British ships of war coming for no hostile purpose, or being in the pursuit of pirates, were to "be at liberty to visit all ports within the dominions of the Emperor of China and shall receive every facility

¹ China, *Treaties, op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 212, The Treaty of Tientsin, Arts. II, III.

² *Ibid.*, Art. V.

³ *Correspondence with Mr. Bruce, Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary (1860)*, no. 1, p. 1, Malmesbury to Bruce, March 1, 1859.

⁴ Art. III.

⁵ Art. VIII. For the 1724 proscription of Christianity, see Cordier, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 337-340.

for the purchase of provisions, procuring water, and, if the occasion require, for the making of repairs".¹ Extra-territoriality was reaffirmed in terms similar to those used by Caleb Cushing in 1844.²

Among the important commercial concessions granted by the Treaty of Tientsin was the right "to trade upon the Great River (Yangtze)" as far as Hankow, and three river ports, to be agreed upon later, were to be opened to trade. Other ports to be opened were Chinkiang, to be opened one year from date of treaty, Newchwang, Tengchow, Taiwan, Chaö-chow, and Kiungchow. At these places the British might build "houses, warehouses, churches, hospitals, or burial grounds".³ The transit tax was set at two and a half per cent of the value of the goods and when paid "shall exempt the goods from all further inland charges whatsoever".⁴ British subjects were "authorized to travel for pleasure, or for purposes of trade, to all parts of the interior under passports which will be issued by their Consuls and countersigned by the local authorities".⁵ Importation of opium was finally legalized with an import duty of 30 taels (\$48.00) per picul (133½ lbs.).⁶ Once again China was presented with the bill, amounting to 4,000,000 taels (\$6,400,000), half of which was for losses sustained by British merchants during the difficulties at Canton, and half for the cost of the military expedition.⁷

¹ Art. LII.

² Art. XVI.

³ Arts. X, XI, XII.

⁴ Art. XXVIII.

⁵ Art. VIII.

⁶ China, *Treaties, op. cit.*, Treaty of Tientsin, Rules of Trade, Rule 5, Sec. 1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 288. This provision was made in separate article attached to the Treaty of Tientsin.

Unfortunately, these new rights were attended with serious disadvantages. Toleration for Christians made the Chinese liable to the foreign governments if native Christians were molested or if the European Consuls thought so.¹ Permission to travel in the interior meant that in case of criminal action, the foreigner would have to be returned to the nearest Consul for trial, not an easy task in view of the detestation Europeans had engendered in the minds of the Chinese. In many cases the nearest Consul was located at a considerable distance from the site of the crime and hence it was difficult to have the necessary witnesses brought before the Consul.² The transit tax also caused considerable trouble as the provincial authorities were in need of funds to cope with rebellions, and as a British Consul reported, "made a continuous, permanent, and, in the main, successful attempt to evade the fulfilment of the article".³ Chinese opposition to the transit tax was further strengthened because of the practice indulged in by some unscrupulous merchants of selling passes to natives.⁴

China did not, however, submit to these terms without another final effort. The Tientsin Treaties were inoperative until ratified at Peking,⁵ but when the foreign envoys in June, 1859, endeavored to proceed thither they found that the Chinese had strengthened the Taku forts which guarded the Pei-ho River.⁶ The river likewise had been blocked with chains, booms, and spikes.⁶ In making these hostile prepara-

¹ Treat, *op. cit.*, p. 99; Ching-Lin, Hsia, *Studies in Chinese Diplomatic History*, p. 40.

² Ching-Lin, Hsia, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

³ Sargent, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-157.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

⁵ Art. LVI.

⁶ *Correspondence with Mr. Bruce* (1860), no. 10, p. 21, Bruce to Malmesbury, July 13, 1859.

tions the Chinese had not violated the Treaty of Tientsin, as they offered to take the British representatives to Peking, via Peitang, but they resolutely opposed the idea of warships going up the Pei-ho and giving the appearance that China was threatened.¹ By their attempt to make this change in British plans, the Chinese were merely pursuing their well-known policy of "saving face".² When it is considered that the Treaty of Tientsin was forced upon them, it is easy to imagine their feeling that they should be entitled to insist that the allied warships not be brought up the Pei-ho. Defeat was bad enough, they thought, without the further humiliation of such a naval demonstration. Nevertheless, their sincerity in inviting the British to enter Peking via Peitang may be questioned because of the experience of the American representatives, who accepted the proposal only to be forced later to leave Peking owing to Chinese insistence on the performance of the kowtow, with which request the Americans refused to comply.³

The British and French representatives, on the other hand, insisted upon an advance up the Pei-ho, thinking it doubtful if anything less than a show of force at Peking would make the Chinese recognize the equality of Westerners. They felt that the Chinese Emperor had to be shown that European countries must be treated as equals and not as tributary to China. After a century of unsuccessful attempts to secure equality from the provincial authorities at Canton, the English were determined to deal directly with the Imperial authorities at Peking and insisted upon British warships

¹ *Ibid.*, incl. no. 3 in no. 9, p. 20, Tang to Bruce, June 23, 1859.

² Wildman, R., *China's Open Door*, p. 4; see Tsiang, T. F., "China after the Victory of Taku," in *American Historical Review*, July, 1930.

³ Dennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 340-45; Martin, W. A. P., *A Cycle of Cathay*, pp. 199-201.

proceeding up the Pei-ho River and having the Treaty of Tientsin ratified at Peking.¹

After an initial repulse in June, 1859, the British and French armies seized the Taku forts in August, 1860 and advanced upon Peking.² Forced to negotiate, the Chinese in desperation seized and held as hostages five European officers and their staff of twenty-one attendants, who, under a flag of truce, had advanced beyond the British lines to arrange peace terms. Among those seized were the English Consul, Mr. Harry Parkes, and Mr. Loch, private secretary to Lord Elgin, British representative in China.³ So great was English resentment over the hardships endured by these prisoners, only thirteen of whom returned alive, that upon subsequently capturing Peking, they burned the summer home of the Manchu Dynasty, a palatial work of art consisting of two hundred buildings of eighteenth-century architecture.⁴

In possession of Peking, whence the Manchu Emperor had withdrawn to Jehol on the approach of the foreign armies, England and France demanded additional privileges. Great Britain secured four square miles of the Kowloon Peninsula, the possession of which British military men considered necessary for the defense of Hongkong.⁵ Tientsin

¹ *Correspondence with Mr. Bruce, Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in China (1860)*, no 3, p. 4, Russell to Bruce, July 9, 1859.

² *Ibid.*, no. 9, p. 16, Bruce to Malmesbury, July 5, 1859; *Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China (1859-60)*, no. 71, p. 128, Foley to Russell, Aug. 25, 1860; no. 88, p. 178, Elgin to Russell, Oct. 8, 1860.

³ *Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China (1859-60)*, no. 84, p. 172, Elgin to Russell, Sept. 23, 1860; no. 106, p. 221, Elgin to Russell, Oct. 26, 1860.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 103, p. 213, Elgin to Russell, Oct. 25, 1860; no. 106, p. 221, Elgin to Russell, Oct. 26, 1860.

⁵ *China, Treaties*, The Convention of Peking, p. 238, Art. VI.

was opened as a treaty port, thereby giving merchants the opportunity of sending British woollens to a northern port where they would be in demand.¹ Lord Elgin's promise not to place a British representative in Peking immediately was withdrawn and the amount of the indemnity was raised to eight million taels (\$12,800,000), six millions of which were allocated to war expenses and two millions to losses sustained by British merchants as a result of the difficulties with Commissioner Yeh at Canton.²

An indirect result of the Arrow War was the opportunity given Russia in 1860 to pose in Peking as China's friend by seeming to counsel moderation to the British and French.³ Then, when the Chinese were prostrate, the St. Petersburg Government took as its reward for this assistance an important slice of Chinese territory between the Ussuri River and the Pacific Ocean, including the site of the important city of Vladivostok.⁴

While undoubtedly the English and French would in any event have been successful in the Arrow War, it is significant that the Chinese Government was at the same time contending with the Taiping Rebellion, which since 1851 had been ravaging China.⁵ This movement was started at Canton by Hung Siu-chüen, who had been greatly influenced by Christianity, which he subsequently accepted.⁶ Originally named the "Association for the Worship of God" and hence looked upon favorably by Europeans, it eventually

¹ *Ibid.*, Art. IV.

² *Ibid.*, Arts. I, II.

³ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. i, pp. 613-4.

⁴ China, *Treaties, op. cit.*, Additional Treaty of Peking between Russia and China, 1860, Art. I.

⁵ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. i, pp. 444-456.

⁶ Treat, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-7; Brine, L., *The Taiping Rebellion in China*, pp. 66-96.

drew to itself all anti-Manchu elements, religious and otherwise.¹ Assuming an imperial title, Hung undertook to overthrow the Manchu Dynasty and led his army victoriously from Canton to Tientsin during the years 1852-5, leaving ruin and desolation behind him.² The depredations committed by this band as it swept northward caused Western merchants to see that even Manchu rule was preferable to that of Hung.³ Eventually in 1867 the revolt was suppressed partly through the efforts of foreign generals who organized Chinese regiments.⁴ The most noted among these were the American, Frederick Ward, and the Englishman, Charles Gordon.⁵ But the Orientals were not likely to forget that while they were suppressing a revolt, the leader of which professed the religion of the West, English and French armies were securing concessions at Peking.⁶ The British, on the other hand, have always, with some justification, maintained that but for General Gordon, the Manchu Dynasty would have fallen, but they do not always add that the loss of prestige sustained by the Emperor as a result of defeat in the Opium War made it more possible for the Taipings to come so near success.

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 107-9.

² In 1883 S. Wells Williams wrote, "The once peaceful and populous parts of nine great provinces through which his hordes passed have hardly yet begun to be restored to their previous conditions. Ruined cities, desolated towns, and heaps of rubbish still mark their course from Kwangsi to Tientsin, a distance of two thousand miles, the efforts at restoration only making the contrast more apparent. Their presence was an unmitigated scourge, attended by nothing but disaster from beginning to end." Williams, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 623.

³ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. ii, pp. 64-5.

⁴ For the work of native Chinese in suppressing the rebellion, see Hail, W. J., *Tsêng Kuo-fan and the Taiping Rebellion*.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 94-112; Dennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 369-70; Morse, H. B., *In the Days of the Taipings*, Books II, III.

⁶ Cyrron, G. N., *Problems of the Far East*, p. 323.

The Taiping Rebellion, however, had one beneficial indirect result. It so happened that when the rebels captured Shanghai in 1853 the flight of the native officials led to the decision of the foreign Consuls to take over temporarily the collection of customs duties.¹ So great was the increase in the amount of cash turned over to Peking that by the Treaty of Tientsin the practice was extended to all treaty ports, and later under the management of the Englishman, Sir Robert Hart, (1864-1908) the Maritime Customs gave China a most efficient service in collecting duties at the sea ports.

A glance at China's trade statistics will show why England was determined to place Anglo-Chinese relations on a firm basis. In 1864 Great Britain and her colonial possessions sent to China £16,506,925 worth of merchandise, which represented eighty-five per cent of China's imports. During the same year China received only \$36,304 in goods from all European continental countries together, from Japan \$2,955,370, and from the United States, \$5,092,090. With 7,915 ships totaling 2,862,214 tons engaged in the China trade, Great Britain predominated in shipping, although the American total of 5,036 ships of 2,609,390 tons was a factor to be reckoned with until after the American Civil War, when the United States merchant marine rapidly declined. Germany, England's nearest competitor on the continent, employed only 2,100 ships of 560,000 tons.² With but one exception, all the foreign banks operating in China in 1864 were British, and three-quarters of the foreign business houses at Shanghai were British concerns—and Shanghai handled more than half of China's trade.³

¹ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. ii, pp. 12-13, 22-23; Willoughby, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 769.

² Great Britain, *Abstract of Trade and Customs Revenue from 1864-6*, p. 3

³ *Summary of Statistics*, p. 111

The exports from the United Kingdom to China and Hongkong increased from an average of \$21,900,000 during 1860-4 to \$46,750,000 average from 1869-72.¹ Cotton goods and yarns, which in 1839-43 had averaged \$2,920,000 annually, rose to an average of \$23,050,000 in 1865-8, while woollens during the same period increased from \$1,275,000 to \$7,750,000.² Indian opium exports also showed a gain, reaching 75,700 chests in 1867, valued at \$50,000,000 and constituting forty per cent of China's imports.³ On tea China still held practically a monopoly, the United Kingdom in 1867 taking 125,800,000 lbs. valued at \$50,000,000.⁴ England's share of China's exports in 1867 was sixty-six per cent while British possessions took another eight per cent.⁵

As the Treaty of Tientsin had called for a revision at the end of ten years, British merchants eagerly awaited the opportunity of removing more of China's restrictions.⁶ In an effort to counter this movement, China startled the European settlements in November, 1867 by appointing Mr. Anson Burlingame, formerly United States Minister at Peking, as China's envoy to the world, to visit in turn each of the important Western nations.⁷ Mr. Burlingame, with the intention of preventing the further use of force against China, went first to the United States, where he was cordially re-

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 132, 199.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 126, 209.

³ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. ii, pp. 397-8; Sargent, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 404.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 403.

⁶ Art. XXVII.

⁷ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. ii, pp. 188, 190, 192, 193, 202; Grumpach, J. von, *The Burlingame Mission*, p. 34, Imperial Rescript, Nov. 27, 1867.

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¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 132, 199.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 126, 209.

³ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. ii, pp. 397-8; Sargent, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 404.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 403.

⁶ Art. XXVII.

⁷ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. ii, pp. 188, 190, 192, 193, 202; Grumpach, J. von, *The Burlingame Mission*, p. 34, Imperial Rescript, Nov. 27, 1867.

ceived and concluded a treaty, calling for non-interference in China's development and affirming that country's integrity.¹ Proceeding to England, Mr. Burlingame was at first received coldly, but with the advent of Mr. Gladstone's ministry on December 4, 1868. England's official attitude became more conciliatory.² The new Foreign Minister, Lord Clarendon, on December twenty-eighth, outlined England's policy as deprecating the use of "unfriendly pressure", and announced Britain's intention to deal with the Peking Government rather than with local officials, provided China observed the treaties.³ Mr. Burlingame's subsequent death in St. Petersburg abruptly ended China's first mission to the West.⁴

The Burlingame mission and the accession of the Liberal Government to power in 1868 produced a change in Great Britain's Chinese policy, as was shown in the 1869 negotiations for a revision of the Treaty of Tientsin. The English representative, Sir Rutherford Alcock, had a difficult task. On the one hand, the Chinese were anxious to withdraw some of the privileges already granted, and, on the other, English merchants were not in sympathy with the concilia-

¹ Williams, F. W., *Anson Burlingame and the First Chinese Mission to Foreign Powers*, chap. lii; China, *Treaties*, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 525. Additional Articles to the Treaty between the United States of America and Ta-tsing Empire of the 18th June, 1858, Arts. I, VIII.

² Williams, F. W., *op. cit.*, pp. 171-2, 186. Mr. Gladstone had been a severe critic of England's Chinese policy as handled by Lord Palmerston. See Morley, J., *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone*, vol. i, pp. 226-7.

³ *Correspondence Respecting Relations between Great Britain and China 1869*, no. 1, p. 1, Clarendon to Burlingame, Dec. 28, 1868, also quoted in Williams, F. W., *op. cit.*, pp. 173-6. England's promise was made subject to change in cases where life or property were in danger.

⁴ A Manchu named Pinchun had gone to Europe with Sir Robert Hart in 1866, but his aversion to Western customs caused him to return to China without accomplishing much. *Morse, International Relations*, vol. ii, pp. 185-7.

tory attitude of Mr. Gladstone's Government and were anxious to place commercial activities in China on a still firmer basis. Among the points which the merchants hoped to get settled were the elimination of numerous internal taxes and the extension of steam navigation to rivers in the Chinese interior.¹ They also were anxious to have railroads built, for they saw the impossibility of completely developing China's vast commercial prospects without modern means of transportation and communication.² The right of trade and residence at all places in China was demanded on the ground that Article XII of the Treaty of Tientsin gave foreigners the right to reside at treaty ports "and other places". Foreign merchants showed their interest in China's natural resources by urging that the Peking Government exploit Chinese mineral wealth.³

Sir Rutherford Alcock was not in sympathy with these extreme views of British merchants,⁴ and was instructed by the Foreign Office to obtain China's consent to "such arrangements as they have already expressed their willingness to adopt".⁵ Any attempt to force a revision of the Treaty of Tientsin along the lines advocated by the merchants was abandoned by the Government until 1872-3, when the Chinese Emperor would have attained his majority.⁶ Hence, the agreement known as the Alcock Convention, signed by Sir Rutherford in 1869, was negotiated with, and not dictated to, the Chinese. Among its provisions were: (a) Eng-

¹ *Correspondence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty of Tientsin (1870)*, incl. no. 2 in no. 21, p. 17, Memorial of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, Nov. 7, 1867.

² *Ibid.*, incl. no. 3 in no. 25, Memorial of the Hongkong Chamber of Commerce, Oct. 14, 1867.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 29, p. 56, Alcock to Stanley, Nov. 15, 1867.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 100, p. 355, Clarendon to Alcock, May 21, 1869.

⁶ *Ibid.*

land would not invoke the most-favored-nation clause to obtain privileges granted by China to another country unless she adhered to the conditions on which the privileges in question were originally granted; (b) China might place Consuls at all British ports; (c) textiles were to pay import duty and transit tax simultaneously and to be exempt from all further taxes; (d) any excess duty paid on native produce transported by foreign merchants from the interior was to be refunded; (e) the duty on opium was to be increased in return for certain advantages, among which was the opening of two or three coal mines.¹

Foreign merchants were chagrined at the provisions of the Alcock Convention, and memorials soon flooded the Foreign Office demanding that ratification of the agreement be refused.² A complaint was raised that the tariff changes would operate to China's advantage.³ Objection was taken to the appointment of a Chinese Consul at Hongkong, on the ground that the main duty of that functionary would be to extort money from the Chinese merchants.⁴ Merchants interested in cottons, woollens and linens found fault with the provisions requiring the payment of one and a half duties on the ground that China could not stop illegal internal taxation.⁵ In fine, British merchants were grievously disappointed at the failure to receive satisfactory treaty revision and chose to rely on the Treaty of Tientsin rather than the Alcock Convention. The Foreign Office could not disregard such opposition and ratification was refused.⁶

¹ China, *Treaties, op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 286, Supplementary Convention to the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of the 26th of June, 1858.

² *Memorial Respecting Chinese Treaty Revision (1870); Further Memorials Respecting Chinese Treaty Revision (1870).*

³ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. ii, p. 217.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 218; Sargent, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

⁵ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. ii, p. 218; Sargent, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

⁶ Sargent, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

The British had meanwhile found that even the second defeat had not broken down China's isolationist spirit. Although China had been forced to permit the residence in Peking of foreign envoys, any attempt on the latter's part to gain an audience with the Emperor was successfully frustrated for thirteen years by the newly created Tsungli Yamen. It was not until 1873 that they were received, and then only in the hall customarily used by delegations from tributary nations.¹ Not until 1877 did China send a representative to London.² When the merchants of Shanghai in 1872 desired to facilitate shipping by removing the Woosung Bar, which obstructed the harbor of that port, the Chinese authorities opposed the suggestion.³ Chinese hostility found further expression in numerous attacks on foreigners in various parts of the empire. Many of these disturbances were, however, partially caused by the failure of the foreigners to be considerate of Chinese susceptibilities.⁴ These outbreaks culminated in the Tientsin Massacre of 1870, which cost the lives of nineteen foreigners and forty of their native Christian converts.⁵

Great Britain and China nearly came to blows for the third time in 1875 when an English expedition under Colonel Brown, accompanied by a Mr. Margary as interpreter, was sent from Burma to Yunnan for the purpose of investi-

¹ *Correspondence Respecting the Audience Granted to Her Majesty's Minister and other Foreign Representatives at Peking by the Emperor of China* (1874), no. 1, p. 1, Wade to Granville, July 7, 1873; Morse, *International Relations*, vol. ii, p. 269.

² Morse, *International Relations*, vol. ii, p. 313.

³ *Correspondence Respecting the State of the Woosung Bar near Shanghai* (1874), no. 1, p. 1, Harper to Hammond, April 18, 1872; no. 20, p. 10, Wade to Derby, Apr. 3, 1874.

⁴ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. ii, pp. 240-1.

⁵ Great Britain—China No. 4 (1871), *Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tientsin on the 21st June, 1870*.

gating the possibilities of a trade route between these two places. Unfortunately, Chinese troops resisted the advance of this expedition and Mr. Margary was killed, although in possession of an Imperial passport.¹ The British representative, Sir Thomas Wade, not only demanded an indemnity for the murder, but seized upon the tragedy as an opportunity to secure a favorable revision of the Treaty of Tientsin.² The Margary affair was settled, after a naval demonstration, by the Chefoo Convention, signed September 13, 1876 by Sir Thomas Wade and that most noted of all Chinese diplomats, Li Hung Chang. By this agreement not only was an indemnity of 200,000 taels (\$720,000) exacted for the murder, but Ichang, Wuhu, Wenchow, and Pakhoi were opened to trade, and call privileges were granted at six Yangtze ports, Tatung, Nganching, Hukou, WuSueh, Luchikou and Shashih.³ Lawsuits in mixed cases were to be tried in courts of the defendant's nationality.⁴ England was also given the right to send another trade mission into Yunnan, whenever she so desired, and the Governor-General of that province would be instructed by Imperial Edict "to select a competent officer of rank to confer with them [i. e. the members of the mission] and to conclude a satisfactory arrangement". England was permitted to "station officers at Tali-Fu or at some other suitable place in Yunnan to observe the conditions of trade", and might open trade between Burma and Yunnan at any time within five years.⁵

¹ *Correspondence Respecting the Attack on the Indian Expedition to Western China and the Murder of Mr. Margary* (1876), incl. in no. 3, p. 2, Wade to King, Mar. 12, 1875.

² Morse, *International Relations*, vol. ii, p. 295.

³ China, *Treaties, op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 299, Agreement between the Ministers Plenipotentiary of the Governments of Great Britain and China, Sept. 13, 1876, Section I, Clause 5, Section III, Clause 1.

⁴ Section II, Clause 3.

⁵ Section I, Clauses 3, 4.

To watch over British trade in the Province of Ssuehuen, English representatives could reside at Chungking but British merchants could not open warehouses there.¹

ENGLAND FINDS CHINESE TRADE PROFITABLE

Despite opposition, the influence of the foreigners increased steadily and China was powerless to prevent several of her tributary states being taken from her by European countries. Three provinces of Cochin China were taken by France in 1867.² Russia in 1881 secured a portion of Ili.³ Japan took the Liuchu Islands in the same year and was exhibiting an interest in Formosa.⁴ China took up arms against France in 1884-5 in an effort to retain jurisdiction over Annam, but, although her armies gave a good account of themselves, that territory was acquired by France.⁵ In 1862 Great Britain annexed Lower Burma and, shortly after the Franco-Chinese War, acquired Upper Burma as a counterweight to French acquisitions in Indo-China.⁶

The beginning of 1894 found England in a paramount position in China. Of the 23,632 foreign ships (22,488,861 tons) that cleared Chinese ports during the previous year, 19,365 (19,203,978 tons) flew the Union Jack. In other words, British ships handled eighty-five per cent of that part of China's trade which was carried in foreign bottoms. If Chinese shipping be included — 6,829,950 tons — it will be seen that Great Britain handled sixty-five per cent of all the tonnage clearing Chinese ports. Germany, England's closest competitor, employed only 1,508,015 tons in the China trade,

¹ Section III, Clause 1.

² Dennett, *op. cit.*, p. 471.

³ *China, Treaties*, vol. i, p. 72, Treaty of St. Petersburg, Feb. 25, 1881.

⁴ Dennett, *op. cit.*, p. 471; Morse, *International Relations*, vol. ii, p. 322.

⁵ Sargent, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

⁶ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. ii, p. 372.

while France and Russia accounted for 259,687 and 132,613 tons, respectively. Of the total receipts of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs, 21,989,300 taels (\$21,123,508), which included 9,416,700 taels paid in by Chinese ships, England contributed 10,230,477 taels (\$9,788,647), or forty-six per cent of the entire customs receipts, and eighty per cent of that portion of the Chinese Imperial Maritime revenue paid in by foreign ships. Germany, France and Russia contributed 1,024,805, 361,951 and 287,802 taels, respectively.¹

The total value of the merchandise cleared from Chinese ports during 1893 in foreign and coast trade was 684,848,603 taels (\$655,271,000), of which 219,700,383 taels was carried in Chinese ships. The share of this trade conveyed in British bottoms was 386,187,196 taels (\$369,518,305), fifty-five per cent of the total value of China's trade or eighty-three per cent of that portion carried in foreign bottoms. The value of China's trade carried in other foreign ships was 34,627,116 taels for Germany, 12,983,983 for France, and 8,419,431 for Russia.² China's total imports for the year amounted to \$143,453,650, of which \$31,274,100, or twenty-one per cent, came from England and was British or Irish produce.³ China's total exports amounted to \$111,595,252, of which \$23,230,275, or twenty per cent, went to England.⁴ If England's dependencies be included it will be found that the British Empire took eighty per cent

¹ *China, Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports (1892-1901)*, vol. ii, pp. iv, xxxvi.

² *Ibid.*, p. xviii.

³ *Ibid.*, p. xiv; Great Britain, *Exports to China and South America* (1906); *Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom (1881-1895)*, pp. 55, 57, 97.

⁴ *Decennial Reports (1892-1901)*, p. xvi; *Statistical Abstract (1881-1895)*, pp. 55, 57.

of China's exports and supplied almost fifty-seven per cent of China's imports.¹

By 1894 China no longer had a monopoly on tea. The difficulty experienced in carrying on trade with China in the early eighteenth century had shown England the advisability of securing a supply elsewhere.² Discovery of the wild tea plant in Assam in 1838 led to investigations which showed that Indian soil was suited to the cultivation of tea. Experiments in Ceylon were equally successful and by 1883 England began to reduce her purchases of Chinese tea.³ This change was facilitated by the carelessness of the Chinese and their failure to adopt the modern methods by which the British were able to produce a cheaper and better product in India and Ceylon.⁴ In 1893 England's imports of tea were 108,140,000 lbs. from India, 64,218,000 lbs. from Ceylon, and only 32,060,000 lbs. from China, or fifteen per cent of the United Kingdom's requirements.⁵

The British Crown Colony of Hongkong, comprising with the Kowloon extension about thirty-two square miles, had become a most important dependency. During the year 1893, 32,983 ships with a tonnage of 7,177,025 entered Hongkong harbor and 32,858 ships totaling 7,172,097 tons departed, of which tonnage sixty-nine per cent was British.⁶

¹ Ireland, A., *China and the Powers*, pp. 136-7; *The Economist*, Apr. 27, 1895. Hongkong, through which most of China's trade passed, is considered as a British dependency.

² Mudie, *op. cit.*, p. vi.

³ Torgasheff, B. P., *China as a Tea Producer*, p. 155.

⁴ ~~Baridon~~, S., *The Tea Industry in India*, pp. 20-34; *Decennial Reports* (1892-1901), vol. i, p. 482.

⁵ Great Britain, *Statement Showing the Imports of Tea and Coffee into the Principal Countries of Europe, the United States and Certain British Colonies* (1902).

⁶ *Board of Trade Journal*, June, 1894, p. 727; Great Britain, *Colonial Report Number 107* (1893), p. 8.

Forty-eight per cent of China's foreign trade was carried through Hongkong.¹ The revenue of the colony had grown from \$131,439 in 1852 to \$2,042,345 in 1893.² The population of approximately 2000 in 1842 had increased to 238,724, including 10,686 Europeans.³ Truly could E. J. Eitel, writing the history of Hongkong in 1895, refer to that metropolis as "one of the wonders of commercial emporiums of the world".⁴ The possession of such a strategic base was vitally important to England at a time when European countries were seeking naval bases in all parts of the world to enable them to further their nationalistic and commercial ambitions.

Twenty-three Chinese ports had been opened to trade by the beginning of the year 1894 and nineteen of them had been opened as a result of British treaties with China.⁵ At most of these ports British citizens, who comprised over forty per cent of all foreigners in China, had set apart settlements for their habitation, and at Shanghai a modern city had grown up, to which thousands of Chinese had been attracted.⁶ British investments in various Chinese loans, and stocks of companies doing business in China amounted to approximately \$130,000,000.⁷ British firms had supplied

¹ Remer, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

² Great Britain, *Statistical Tables Relating to the Colonial and Other Possessions of the United Kingdom, Part 3, (1855)*, p. 54; *Statistical Abstract for the Several Colonial and other Possessions of the United Kingdom (1882-1896)*, p. 7.

³ *Statistical Tables Relating to the Colonial and other Possessions of the United Kingdom, Part-xxi (1891-3)*, p. 98; *Colonial Report No. 107*, p. 7.

⁴ *Europe in China*, p. v.

⁵ *Blackburn Chamber of Commerce Mission to China*, p. 367; *Decennial Reports (1892-1901)*, pp. xl, xli.

⁶ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. ii, p. 120.

⁷ *Quarterly Review*, July, 1897; Huxfordson, W., *L'Exportation des capitaux anglais avant et après la guerre*, p. 63.

the entire amount of \$17,775,000 in Chinese Government loans outstanding on January 1, 1894.¹ Sixty per cent of the 580 foreign firms operating in China were British; among these was the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, founded in 1865, possessing in 1893 a capital stock of \$50,000,000 and having deposits of \$4,288,377.²

As China's imports had increased forty-five per cent from 1884 to 1891, and as her rulers had commenced to approve the building of railways, England in 1893 looked forward to seeing China take a still greater quantity of British goods in the ensuing years.³ England's commercial position in China was stronger than that of any other foreign country and the policy of Downing Street was to maintain and extend her favored position. Two factors supervened at this time, however, which resulted indirectly in the first challenge to Great Britain's superior position. The first was the unexpected rise in the strength of the Japanese Empire, and the second was the equally unanticipated military collapse of the Middle Kingdom when put to the test by the Mikado's Government. The Sino-Japanese War found Great Britain in a position of predominance in the Far East. It left her prestige seriously diminished and, as a result, changed the whole Oriental situation. It is to this important event that we must now turn our attention.

¹ *Journal of Finance*, March, 1898; *Burdett's Official Intelligence for 1894*, pp. 173-5.

² *The Banker's Magazine*, February, 1899, "The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation", p. 211; *Burdett's Official Intelligence for 1894*, pp. 754-5.

³ *Statistical Tables Relative to the Progress of the Foreign Trade of the United Kingdom and of Other Countries in Recent Years (1894)*, p. 15. At the beginning of 1894 there was only one railroad built in China (about 170 miles in length). This ran from the Tangshan coal mines through Tientsin to Shanhaikwan and construction had reached about forty miles east of the latter town in June, 1894. Hsu, M. C., *Railway Problems in China*, pp. 15-22; Stringer, H., *The Chinese Railway System*, pp. 1-2; Wagel, *op. cit.*, pp. 407-411.

CHAPTER II

ENGLAND FAILS TO SAVE CHINA

TROUBLE STARTS IN KOREA

FRICTION arose between China and Japan because of Korea. The Hermit Kingdom had been a tributary of the Celestial Empire since the seventeenth century, but in 1866, and again in 1871, when Korea became involved in difficulties with France and the United States, China disclaimed responsibility for the acts of the Seoul Government.¹ Japanese statesmen were quick to take advantage of China's failure to assert her suzerainty at crucial moments. Therefore, in 1875, when a Japanese ship was fired upon off the Korean coast, the Mikado's Government, in the following year, negotiated with Korea a treaty which referred to the latter as an independent state.²

In endeavoring to establish Korea's independence, Japan was pursuing a policy antagonistic to that of Great Britain. British statesmen, anxious to block Russian expansion in Asia, desired China to retain suzerainty over Korea.³ Eng-

¹ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. iii, p. 25; United States, *Foreign Relations* (1877), p. 112, no. 29, Yamen to Low, Mar. 28, 1871.

² Hulbert, H. B., *The Passing of Korea*, p. 120; Chung, H., *Korean Treaties*, p. 205, Japan-Korea, Feb. 26, 1876.

³ *The Annual Register* (1885), (p. 339) mentions the rumors that Russia planned to annex Korea and adds that "it would have become a serious danger to our commerce in the Far East had Russia found a pretext for interfering and establishing a protectorate over the country"; Curzon, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-30; Gundry, R. S., *China and Her Neighbors*, pp. 271-2; Dennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 472, 475.

land desired that the Chinese Government be made just as strong as possible, for so long as the latter served as a buffer state between Russia's interests in the north and those of England, which were confined for the most part to the Yangtze Valley district in the south, there was less chance of a collision between them.¹ Furthermore, the English feared that if it fell into Russian hands, Korea would be surrounded with high-tariff barriers. Hence, England frowned upon any attempt to diminish Chinese suzerainty over Korea.²

In 1882 China, suddenly changing her attitude, endeavored to regain the authority over Korea which she had lost during the preceding decade.) As China's new policy coincided with British interests, it is felt that English diplomacy was instrumental in urging the Tsungli Yamen more vigorously to assert its suzerainty over Korea.³ Sir Robert Hart doubtless exerted his powerful influence in the same direction.⁴ England's attitude was clearly demonstrated by her refusal to negotiate a treaty with Korea, when requested to

¹ Steiger, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

² "China desires to keep the Russian army out of Korea and the Russian navy away from the Yellow Sea. We are similarly interested in both objects. China wants to retain Yarkund and Kashgar and therefore requires a defensible and defended frontier on the Pamirs. We also are anxious to avoid Russian contiguity with ourselves at the Hindu Kush or Karakoran." Cyzon, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

³ "Great Britain, becoming alarmed for fear that Korea, completely severed from China, would the more easily fall into the hands of her European rival, Russia, and perhaps not unwilling to cultivate Chinese ~~favor~~ and distract Chinese attention to the north while British interests were being served in Burma and westward, immediately adopted the subtle, yet none the less energetic policy working through Peking and especially through Li Hung Chang. In 1882 it would appear that England was even more interested in the Korean question than were the Chinese." Dennett, Tyler, "America's Early Relations with Korea," *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1923.

⁴ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. iii, pp. 13-16.

do so by Li Hung Chang,¹ who felt that such treaty relations would be the surest way of preventing Russian acquisition of Korea.²

Other nations, however, were quick to take advantage of Korean trade possibilities and in 1882 the United States concluded the Shufeldt Treaty, in which Li Hung Chang made a futile effort to have Chinese suzerainty mentioned. The Tsungli Yamen had to be content with a letter from the Korean King to the President of the United States, explaining that, although Korea considered herself a tributary of China, such relationship did not concern the United States.³ England in the following year made a similar treaty with Korea, but her determination to treat that country as a vassal of China was evinced by the fact that the British representative at Seoul was made responsible to the British Minister at Peking.⁴ In 1885 when it was rumored that Russia was about to acquire a protectorate over Korea, England safeguarded China's suzerainty by occupying Port Hamilton and refusing to evacuate it until two years later, after Russia had given China a promise never to occupy any Korean port.⁵ England's desire to prevent a political separation of China and Korea was further illustrated in 1887 when Korea's attempt to send a diplomatic agent to Europe was frustrated by the British fleet, which saw to it that the representative did not get farther than Hongkong.⁶

✓ Meanwhile the Japanese, who had proceeded to Korea in

¹ Dennett, T., *Americans in Eastern Asia*, p. 472.

² Krahmer, G., *Die Beziehungen Russlands zu Japan*, p. 29.

³ *Foreign Relations (1894)*, p. 29, King of Korea to President Arthur, May 29, 1882; Chung, *op. cit.*, p. 197, Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Korea and the United States, May 22, 1882.

⁴ Dennett, *op. cit.*, p. 475.

⁵ *Papers Respecting the Temporary Occupation of Port Hamilton (1887)*; Brändt, M., *Dreiunddreissig Jahre in Ostasien*, vol. iii, p. 221.

⁶ Dennett, *op. cit.*, p. 484.

great numbers after the treaty of 1876, had instituted many reforms which had aroused opposition, culminating in riots during 1882 and 1884. During the course of these disturbances the Japanese legation at Seoul was burned twice.¹ After the second outbreak Japan had negotiated a treaty with China whereby each agreed to withdraw all military forces from Korea and to notify the other in the event of any necessity arising in the future to dispatch troops.² If in thus recognizing Japan's interest in Korea, China had again failed to assert her suzerainty over Korea, her weakness was caused to some extent by the fact that she was involved at the time in difficulties with France and Russia.]

✓ The tension between China and Japan was further aggravated in 1894 by a rising of the *Tong-Haks*, a Korean religious cult seeking posthumous pardon for its leader, who had been executed in 1864.³ At first insignificant, this revolt spread until the insurgents defeated the government troops and captured Chon-ju, an important city in southern Korea.⁴ Disturbed at this reverse, Korea turned for aid to her acknowledged suzerain, China, and Peking's answer was the dispatch of two thousand troops on June fourth to Asan in the affected district, where they arrived four days later.⁵ In accordance with her treaty obligations, China notified Tokio of her action, which she said was being taken in accordance with her policy of assisting her tributary states.⁶

¹ Chéradame, André, *Le monde et la guerre russo-japonaise*, p. 82; Pasvolsky, *Russia in the Far East*, pp. 21-2; Hishida, *The International Position of Japan as a Great Power*, pp. 164-5.

² Cordier, H., *Les relations de Chine avec les puissances occidentales*, vol. iii, pp. 221-2.

³ *Foreign Relations* (1894), no. 1, p. 5, Heard to Gresham, Apr. 4, 1893.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 11, p. 18, Sill to Gresham, June 1, 1894.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 13, p. 20, Sill to Gresham, June 18, 1894; Brandt, M., *Drei Jahre Ostasiatische Politik*, p. 29.

⁶ Eastlake, F. W. and Yamado, Yoshi-aki, *Heroic Japan, A History of the War between China and Japan*, p. iii, Wang to Mutsu, June 7, 1894.

Japan, however,¹ refused to acknowledge that Korea was in any way dependent upon China and countered China's action by sending 13,800 troops, not to the seat of the *Tong-Hak* disturbance, but directly to Seoul.¹ The revolt meanwhile had collapsed before the arrival of any foreign troops, thus eliminating the necessity for action by either China or Japan.² Negotiations followed, revealing that the Chinese were agreeable to simultaneous evacuation of their troops with those of Japan.³ Tokio, however, insisted that those of China depart first. Hence an *impasse* was reached which required the attention of European powers having interests in the Far East. ✓

England's sympathy was completely with China, for in addition to the reasons already mentioned which made Downing Street sponsor China's claims, Peking, by agreeing to simultaneous evacuation, seemed to be seeking a peaceful solution of the difficulty. Furthermore, the British Government was anxious to avert a conflict, which would naturally disturb trade. Hence, England was favorably disposed when Korea on June twenty-fourth requested foreign intervention, stating that Chinese troops were on her soil by invitation but that those of Japan were there against the protest of the Korean Government.⁴ Russia was inclined to support Korea against Japanese encroachment as she had no desire to see China's control over the peninsula supplanted by that of aggressive Japan.⁵ France naturally supported

¹ *Foreign Relations* (1894), Sill to Gresham, June 18, 1894, no. 13, p. 20; Vladimir, Pseud. Volficelli, Z., *The China-Japan War*, p. 340, Mutsu to Wang, June 7, 1894.

² Franke, O., *Die Grossmächte in Ostasien*, p. 31.

³ *Foreign Relations* (1894), no. 13, p. 20, Sill to Gresham, June 18, 1894; no. 15, p. 22, Sill to Uhl, June 24, 1894.

⁴ *Ibid.*, incl. no. 1 in no. 16, Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs to Sill, June 24, 1894.

⁵ Yarmolinsky, A., *The Memoirs of Count Witte*, p. 83.

her ally. The United States, being obligated in the Shufeldt Treaty to endeavor to preserve the peace of Korea, and, for commercial reasons desiring to prevent war in the Far East, was willing to "use every possible effort for the preservation of peaceful conditions".¹ England, France, Russia, and the United States, therefore, on June twenty-fifth suggested that China and Japan simultaneously evacuate Korea.² China was willing, but not Japan.³ As this was merely a friendly gesture and no military action had been contemplated, its rejection by Japan was not considered a rebuff to the powers.

Several days later England again endeavored to avert the threatened war by sending notes in the interest of peace to both China and Japan.⁴ Sir Edward Grey, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of the British Foreign Office, promised the House of Commons that "every effort which could properly be made by us will be used to bring about a friendly arrangement between them", i. e. China and Japan.⁵ From Chinese sources we learn that on June ninth Sir Nicholas O'Connor, the British Minister in Peking, at the request of Li Hung Chang, asked his government to advise Japan not to land troops in Korea. Later, on June twentieth, he told the Viceroy that such a communication had been sent to Tokio.⁶ O'Connor had meanwhile offered Britain's good offices as mediator between China and Japan.⁷

¹ Chung, *op. cit.*, p. 197; *Foreign Relations* (1894), no. 14, p. 22, Uhl to Sill, June 22, 1894.

² *Foreign Relations* (1894), incl. no. 2 in no. 16, p. 23, Joint Note from the Foreign Representatives at Seoul to China and Japan, June 25, 1894.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 18, p. 27, Yuan Shi Kai to Foreign Representatives, June 26, 1894; no. 20, p. 29, Ye Sung Soo to Gresham, July 5, 1894.

⁴ *Hansard*, Fourth Series, vol. xxvii, p. 1263, Sir Edward Grey to the House of Commons, July 30, 1894.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. xxvi, p. 950, July 5, 1894.

⁶ Hsu, S., *China's Political Entity*, p. 154.

⁷ Vladimirov, *op. cit.*, p. 347, Komura to Yamen, July 14, 1894.

Early in July, Great Britain sounded Germany, Russia, the United States, and probably also France, on the proposition of a joint intervention for the purpose of seeking a peaceful settlement of the difficulties which had arisen.¹ Germany felt that the Korean question was one which primarily interested only Russia and England and, having in mind the antagonism existing between St. Petersburg and London, the German Foreign Office feared that the Far Eastern problem might lead to a clash of interests between Russia and England. Hence, Germany advised England that any direct intervention was the task of either Russia or England.² However, in view of Germany's Far Eastern commercial interests the German representatives at Tokio and Peking were instructed to use their influence for peace, but to be reticent in the event of Anglo-Russian differences of opinion.³

Meanwhile the negotiations which had been proceeding simultaneously at Washington had been equally unsuccessful. On July third O'Connor requested his American colleague to ask his government by cable to take the initiative in uniting the powers in a joint protest to Japan. This Denby refused to do unless so requested by the Tsungli Yamen.⁴ Two days later the British Ambassador at Washington inquired of the American Secretary of State whether the United States would cooperate with England in an effort to preserve the peace of the Far East, on condition that no hostile pressure would be used. President Cleveland's administration, however, was averse to intervening jointly with the other powers and would go no further than to offer Japan the good offices of the United States.⁵

¹ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. ix, no. 2213, p. 241, Rotenhan to William II, July 16, 1894.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 242, footnote.

⁴ *Foreign Relations (1894)*, no. 21, p. 30, Denby to Gresham, July 6, 1894.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 28, p. 36, Gresham to Bayard, July 20, 1894.

Negotiations between England and Russia were handicapped because of mutual antagonism which rendered it particularly difficult for the two countries to cooperate effectively, as each was afraid that the other would step in and endeavor to settle the Korean question single-handed. Thus when China appealed to Russia for aid, *The Times* printed the following from its Shanghai correspondent:

It is a startling instance of what passes for statecraft in the Far East that in these circumstances China has actually invoked the mediation of Russia. Doubtless the diplomats of Peking do not mean this intervention to go very far. They flatter themselves, it may be, that it will give them time to draw on the vast but unwieldy resources of their wide dominions. They think that when they have availed themselves of the mediator so far as it suits them, they can courteously but effectively dismiss him. On any other view it is impossible to conceive what can have induced them to summon to their assistance so formidable a friend.¹

The Russian press reciprocated these hostile sentiments by ominously pointing out that should England endeavor to mediate alone, Russian interests in the Far East would be jeopardized.² Nevertheless, although the two Occidental Empires had many divergent aims, they were agreed that Korea should not fall into the possession of Japan. Though distrustful of each other, they therefore cooperated in making numerous friendly overtures to China and Japan.³

It is unfortunate that this lack of harmony prevented England and Russia from using more vigorous measures to prevent a war that neither country desired to see break out.⁴

¹ *The Times*, July 15, 1894.

² Russian Press Quotations in the *North China Herald*, July 13, 1894.

³ *The Times*, July 3, 1894; *Foreign Relations* (1894), no. 37, p. 48, Denby to Gresham, Aug. 4, 1894.

⁴ Brandenburg, E., *From Bismarck to the World War*, p. 53.

It is quite likely, however, that neither St. P^étersburg nor London really expected that Japan would attack China.¹ Although Admiral Freemantle, in charge of the British Far Eastern Squadron on June twenty-first warned the Admiralty that war was impending, other well-informed Britons in the Far East disagreed with him.² Great Britain's Intelligence Department in China was functioning very poorly at the time. As late as June twenty-fifth O'Connor reported to his government that he felt the Sino-Japanese dispute would be settled amicably,³ and on June ninth he told Li Hung Chang that he was sure that Japan's troops would not proceed farther than Chemulpo.⁴ Russia, as well as England, had made it clear to Japan that changes in the status of Korea would not be tolerated; but unfortunately both of them gave the Tokio Government reason for believing that they would not interfere were she to wage war upon China.⁵ Had Russia and England made a joint display of force, Japan would undoubtedly have hesitated, but Anglo-Russian relations were too unfriendly for such close cooperation.

Despite the peace efforts which were being made in Europe, Japan had clearly shown that she intended to settle the Korean question. On June seventeenth she suggested to China that the two governments collaborate in reforming the Korean system of government so that such disturbances as had distracted that country in 1882, 1884, and again in 1894 could not be repeated.⁶ Conservative China, however, had no intention of reforming Korea, be its government ever so inefficient, and politely replied that such matters should

¹ Hsu, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

² Freemantle, *As, The Navy as I have Known It*, p. 428.

³ Hsu, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-5.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 156; Okuma, S., *Fifty Years of New Japan*, p. 111.

⁶ Vladimir, *op. cit.*, p. 343, Munemitsu to Wang, June 17, 1894.

be arranged by the Koreans themselves.¹ Not to be thwarted, Japan announced that her troops would not leave Korea until reforms had been carried out.² On July twenty-third her troops occupied the palace of the Korean King and forced that monarch to declare war upon China.³

Such a display of aggressiveness had not been made by Japan without reason. In the first place, Korea was of importance to Japan economically as a source of supply for foodstuffs and raw materials, both of which were becoming more and more essential since she changed from an agricultural to an industrial nation.⁴ Furthermore, Korea was fast becoming an excellent customer for Japan's manufactured articles.⁵ Obviously, then, Japan wanted Korea prosperous so that the Hermit Kingdom could buy more manufactured articles and supply more and better foodstuffs. But Korea was notoriously corrupt and neither she nor China showed the slightest desire to rectify the matter.⁶ Having such interests in Korea, Japan did not intend to allow the Hermit Kingdom to drift on in its lethargy until the mob should again burn the Mikado's legation at Seoul.

In such a corrupt condition, Korea was becoming the object of covetous glances from Russia, and Japan was apprehensive lest a country so important to her should fall under the Czar's sway.⁷ In 1891 Russia had started to build the great Trans-Siberian Railway which would have as its

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 344, Wang to Mutsu, June 22, 1894.

² *Ibid.*, p. 345, Munemitsu to Wang, June 22, 1894.

³ Cortjser, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 235; Morse, *International Relations*, vol. iii, pp. 23-4.

⁴ Hishida, *op. cit.*, p. 169; Dennett, *op. cit.*, p. 485.

⁵ Professor Asakawa in his *Russo-Japanese Conflict* quotes some convincing figures on this point.

⁶ Gubbins, J. H., *The Making of New Japan*, p. 215.

⁷ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. iii, p. 12.

Far Eastern terminus the port of Vladivostok, just north of Korea. Japan desired to get the independence of Korea firmly established before this road should be completed.¹ Moreover, Tokio's statesmen did not lose sight of the fact that the proximity of Korea to the Japanese mainland (150 miles) made it a most advantageous point from which to invade Japan and that it was the point from which Kublai Khan did endeavor to cross to Japan in the thirteenth century.²

Japan was especially interested in military affairs. Back in 1869 her army was still using the bow and arrow, but since the rebirth of the nation in 1868 preparations had been proceeding rapidly, albeit hardly attracting outside attention. In 1894 the army stood ready, every man in his place and the proverbial last gaiter button accounted for—an army that had been rigidly trained first by French, and later by German military officers. Her navy had been organized by the British and was likewise ready to strike. Japan was anxious to try out this foreign-drilled army and navy.³

This desire to exhibit military skill was accentuated when Japan realized that an impressive demonstration would be of great assistance in enabling her to hurry through the negotiation of new treaties which would give her control of her own tariff schedules and deprive foreigners of extra-territoriality. To be sure, England had signified her intention in July, 1894 of granting Japan's desires—but this was contingent upon all other treaty powers doing likewise and would not come into effect for five years. Japan felt that a military victory would gain for her the respect of the Western nations and place her in the ranks of great powers.⁴

¹ Brandt, *Drei Jahre Ostasiatische Politik*, pp. 26-7.

² Vladimir, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-14.

³ Steiger, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-4.

⁴ *Ibid.*

Japan was also greatly aroused by the murder in April, 1894 of the Korean instigator of the 1884 riot, Kim-ok-Kiun. Kim had resided in Tokio for ten years but had been lured to Shanghai in 1894 and shot by a partisan of the Korean Government. His body was dispatched to Seoul on a Chinese warship, was later quartered and sent to various parts of Korea. The murderer, on the other hand, was shown every courtesy by the Korean Government.¹ Japan felt that China had been partly responsible for the murder, and the culprit proudly boasted that he had only executed a commission given him by the Korean King.²

But of great importance in accounting for Japan's determination to settle the Korean question in 1894, is the chaotic condition of the internal affairs of the Mikado's Empire. The constitution of 1890 had organized a Parliament of two houses with a measure of self-government which had proved anything but conducive to harmony. In June, 1894 there was friction between the Government, which was responsible only to the Emperor, and the lower house, which was desirous of securing more liberty in legislation. Three times in the preceding three years, Parliament had been dissolved, only to be returned again by the electorate with a majority hostile to the Government. In the spring of 1894 the Japanese legislature had passed a vote of lack of confidence in the Prime Minister. Confronted with this situation, it was but natural for the men in office to view without great misgivings any popular foreign difficulty which would serve to unite the nation.³

• Finally, Japan knew that China's hour of weakness was at hand. For a year prior to 1894 Tokio had honeycombed

¹ *Foreign Relations* (1894), no. 7, p. 16, Allen to Gresham, April 6, 1894, Cordier, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 228-31.

² *Ibid.*, vol. iii, p. 229.

³ Gubbins, *The Making of Modern Japan*, chap. xx; Uyehara, G. E., *The Political Development of Japan*, pp. 221-227.

the Celestial Empire with spies, and Count Hayashi has averred that Japan's emissaries even had access to the archives of the Chinese Foreign Office.¹ The Japanese had made accurate maps of Korea and "knew better than the Chinese how many men each province could put into the field".² Tokio understood, therefore, that her huge neighbor had but clay feet and was totally unprepared for war; would in fact be apt to concede almost any terms to avoid a conflict at a time when preparations were being made in Peking to celebrate the Empress's sixtieth birthday.³ Tokio knew that only three-fifths of China's troops had rifles and that some regiments had as many as thirteen different makes of weapons.⁴ Japan's statesmen were thoroughly acquainted with the fact that China's military leaders were selected for their proficiency in the classics, and Admiral Ting, the leader of the Celestial navy, had formerly been a cavalry officer.⁵

Truly then Japan's hour had struck, and she knew it. This accounted for her rapid, methodical action. As Count Okuma wrote in June, 1894,

The time has come for Japan to avenge her disgrace of 1884. In carefully profiting by the present circumstances which are unique, Japan can rectify all her past errors and make herself a strong empire which will be feared and respected not only by Korea but also by all other powers.⁶

¹ Pooley, A. M., *The Secret Memoirs of Count Hanyashi*, p. 41; Brandt, M., *Drei Jahre Ostasiatische Politik*, p. 41.

² Bishop, J. B., *Korea and Her Neighbors*, p. 181; Brown, A. J., *New Forces in Old China*, p. 122.

³ Brandt, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁴ Michie, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 393; Aston, G. G., *Letters on Amphibious Wars*, p. 174.

⁵ Norman, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

⁶ Tchen, Hoshien, *Les relations diplomatiques entre la chine et le japon de 1871 à nos jours*, p. 58.

ENGLAND FAVORS CHINA

In refusing China's seemingly reasonable request that both countries simultaneously remove their troops, and in continuing to act so aggressively in Korea at a time when England was working so strenuously to preserve peace, Japan made a very unfavorable impression on English public opinion. Of course the fact that England was in any case favorable to China for the reasons already mentioned, made her all the more critical of Japan. British opinion was all the more inclined to place the blame upon Japan because the nature of Japan's vital interests in Korea was not well understood in England.

Some explanation for this hostile public opinion is found in the fact that reports emanating from the Far Eastern correspondents of the newspapers were not at all designed to show Englishmen the Japanese viewpoint. Witness the following from *The Times* correspondent at Shanghai: *

Japan is evidently bent on gaining the supremacy in Korea and continues warlike preparations on a large scale. She has summoned the King of Korea to declare independence, to accept Japanese protection and to dismiss the Chinese resident. She has answered the English and Russian pacific representations by sending three thousand more troops to Seoul.¹

The Liberal *Manchester Guardian* was also out of sympathy with Japan.* This newspaper said editorially on July twenty-fifth:

China cannot yield. After all, Korea is her vassal state and though she has been foolish enough to repudiate her obligations as suzerain from time to time and has thus given a foothold to her rivals, still her authority in Korea has a sanction and a basis to which Japan can lay no claim.²

¹ *The Times*, July 2, 1894. •

² *The Manchester Guardian*, July 25, 1894.

the Celestial Empire with spies, and Count Hayashi has averred that Japan's emissaries even had access to the archives of the Chinese Foreign Office.¹ The Japanese had made accurate maps of Korea and "knew better than the Chinese how many men each province could put into the field".² Tokio understood, therefore, that her huge neighbor had but clay feet and was totally unprepared for war; would in fact be apt to concede almost any terms to avoid a conflict at a time when preparations were being made in Peking to celebrate the Empress's sixtieth birthday.³ Tokio knew that only three-fifths of China's troops had rifles and that some regiments had as many as thirteen different makes of weapons.⁴ Japan's statesmen were thoroughly acquainted with the fact that China's military leaders were selected for their proficiency in the classics, and Admiral Ting, the leader of the Celestial navy, had formerly been a cavalry officer.⁵

Truly then Japan's hour had struck, and she knew it. This accounted for her rapid, methodical action. As Count Okuma wrote in June, 1894,

The time has come for Japan to avenge her disgrace of 1884. In carefully profiting by the present circumstances which are unique, Japan can rectify all her past errors and make herself a strong empire which will be feared and respected not only by Korea but also by all other powers.⁶

¹ Pooley, A. M., *The Secret Memoirs of Count Hanyashi*, p. 41; Brandt, M., *Drei Jahre Ostasiatische Politik*, p. 41.

² Bishop, J. B., *Korea and Her Neighbors*, p. 181; Brown, A. J., *New Forces in Old China*, p. 124.

³ Brandt, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁴ Michie, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 393; Aston, G. G., *Letters on Amphibious Wars*, p. 174.

⁵ Norman, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

⁶ Tchen, Hoshien, *Les relations diplomatiques entre la chine et le japon de 1871 à nos jours*, p. 58.

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¹ *The Times*, July 2, 1894.

² *The Manchester Guardian*, July 25, 1894.

Likewise the English press in China accused Japan of forcing war upon the Celestial Kingdom. *The North China Herald* of Shanghai said editorially on July sixth:

In a word, Japan has determined to ask China to efface herself from Korea and hand the country over to Japan. . . . We can hardly believe that China will let Korea go without fighting; she did not let Tonking go without an effort, and France was a more formidable enemy than Japan.¹

Later, on July twentieth, the same paper asserted that it was quite sure that "China does not want to go to war and will not go to war unless Japan forces her to do so".² When war had broken out it was their opinion that "for this war we cannot see that China is in any way responsible except in so far as she has the misfortune to have a vassal state which Japan wants".³

On one point British public opinion was in agreement with Japan, namely, that the Korean Government was hopelessly corrupt and that the country needed a complete reformation. It was even admitted that under the control of Japan the condition of the Hermit Kingdom would be vastly improved. There was considerable doubt in some British quarters, however, as to whether Japan would be successful in any attempt to force Western civilization upon Korea. Professor R. K. Douglas, noted British authority on Far Eastern matters, voiced these sentiments:

The news from Korea that Japan is insisting upon the introduction into that country of certain reforms and improvements, is interesting by the light of the events which have been going on in the peninsula for some years past. The old saying that you can "take a horse to water but you cannot make him drink"

¹ *The North China Herald*, July 6, 1894.

² *Ibid.*, July 29, 1894.

³ *Ibid.*, July 27, 1894.

is particularly applicable to the attempts which have been made to induce the Koreans to conform more to the outward and visible forms of European civilization.

Reforms are not plants which grow readily on Korean soil and unless the Japanese are prepared not only to plant their proposed reforms, but to superintend their growth and development, it is much to be feared that they will see them fade and wither away as so many well-intentioned schemes for the regeneration of that country have done.

After citing a number of previous attempts to reform Korea, Professor Douglas went on to say:

These instances are enough to show that if the Japanese intend to create a new Heaven and a new earth in Korea, they have no light task before them. It is not every people who can adopt Europe's customs and manners wholesale as they have done.¹

Along the same lines *The Times* pointed out that, the Japanese, of all peoples, being so thoroughly detested by the Koreans, were certainly not the race best qualified to lead the Hermit Kingdom into the blessings of Western civilization, which admittedly were sadly needed in that land.²

England was further antagonized by the alleged attack upon Mr. Gardner, British Minister to Korea, by Japanese troops in July. According to Mr. Gardner he was, while on the public path, "dragged about fifty yards" and was at the same time "struck with fists by Japanese wearing military uniforms". Later on the same day, Mrs. Gardner "was hustled about and her chair was pushed from the road into the ditch".³ Upon being questioned, the Japanese General advised that no foreigners had been struck with

¹ *The Times*, July 16, 1894, Letter from Professor Douglas.

² *Ibid.*, July 13, 1894.

³ *Foreign Relations* (1894), incl. in no. 27, p. 33, Gardner to Otori, July 15, 1894.

fists, but that two men had forced themselves past the Japanese sentries and had been escorted politely outside the military lines. No lady had been seen, much less pushed from the road.¹

Despite such conflicting reports, there was an obvious cooling of relations between Mr. Gardner and Mr. Otori, Japanese representative at Seoul. This was shown when the latter protested against a report that the British Minister had sent to London to the effect that Japan had asked Korea to dismiss its naval adviser, Mr. Colliwell. Mr. Otori's protest was registered in terms surprisingly bitter for diplomatic intercourse, and he received a curt reply from Mr. Gardner to the effect that he might inquire through the proper channels for any information.² Naturally the reported attack upon Mr. Gardner produced an unfavorable impression in London. British marines were promptly landed at Seoul to protect Mr. Gardner from any further trouble.³

If the British were indignant at the Japanese for disturbing the peace of the Far East, they were thoroughly outraged at the sinking on July twenty-fifth of the *Kowshing*, a British steamer which had been chartered by the Chinese to carry troops to reinforce the two thousand men previously sent to Asan.⁴ The Japanese cruiser *Naniwa* intercepted the *Kowshing*, and when she ordered the transport to follow, the Chinese soldiers became so panic-stricken that they threatened their European superiors with death if they did as the Japanese ordered. Captain Galsworthy of the *Kow-*

¹ *Ibid.*, incl. no. 3 in no. 27, p. 33, Otori to Gardner; incl. no. 4 in no. 27, p. 84, Report of General Oshima.

² *Ibid.*, incl. no. 5 in no. 27, p. 34, Otori to Gardner, July 16, 1894; incl. no. 6 in no. 27, p. 35, Gardner to Otori, July 17, 1894.

³ *The Times*, July 24, 1894.

⁴ *Foreign Relations* (1894), no. 32, p. 41, Denby to Gresham, July 28, 1894.

shing and Captain von Hanneken in charge of the troops, endeavored to explain their predicament to the *Naniwa's* commander, but they were given orders to leave the ship. To do so, however, was obviously impossible as they were in the power of the Chinese soldiers.¹

Finding that the *Kowshing* refused to follow as ordered, and under the necessity of preventing at all costs the landing of the Chinese troops, the *Naniwa* fired a torpedo which sent the *Kowshing*, together with over a thousand Chinese soldiers, to the bottom of the sea. Captains Galsworthy and von Hanneken were rescued by the Japanese, and some Chinese soldiers were picked up four hours later by French and German ships which happened to pass by.²

A wave of wrath swept England at the news of such an attack upon a vessel flying the British flag in time of peace, for neither China nor Japan had as yet declared war. The people saw only the fact that the Union Jack had been fired upon and that over a thousand men in an unarmed merchant vessel had been unnecessarily killed, for they thought that every purpose of the Japanese would have been fulfilled equally well by bringing the *Kowshing* to the nearest port. The British were particularly angry because Captain von Hanneken's report indicated that the Japanese had fired indiscriminately upon the Chinese struggling in the water.³ This assertion, as it turned out, was erroneous, but it had its effect.⁴

Unusually bitter was the comment of *The Times* which, after stating the facts of the sinking, went on to add:

¹ Cordier, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 236; Morse, *International Relations*, vol. iii, p. 24; Takahashi, S., *Cases on International Law during the China-Japanese War*, pp. 24-42.

² Cordier, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 236-7.

³ *Foreign Relations* (1894), no. 36, p. 45, Captain von Hanneken's Report.

⁴ Vladimir, *op. cit.*, p. 366, Captain Galsworthy's Report.

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If unhappily it shall prove to be in its main points correct, not only has the British flag been seriously outraged, but a hideous massacre worthy of the most barbarous times and the most savage peoples of Asia has been perpetrated by the Asiatic state which prides herself, and which has hitherto prided herself with a just pride, on standing in the van of Asiatic progress.¹

The Manchester Guardian voiced the same sentiments:

There remain the facts that the Japanese, having the transport in their power and unable to offer resistance, deliberately massacred the whole of the Chinese troops with their machine guns, and that the ship attacked was flying a neutral flag at a time when war had not been declared.²

Equally bitter was the English press in China. According to the *North China Herald*,

Until this atrocity, for it is nothing less, has been atoned for and its perpetrator punished, we can hardly accord our sympathy in the present struggle to Japan as the representative of Western civilization.³

Occasion was taken to point out that despite her adoption of Western ideas, Japan had shown herself not yet ready to enter into the family of nations. Hence, the China Association thought that the opportunity should be taken to retract the pledge made in July that extraterritoriality privileges in Japan would be abolished in 1899.⁴

Civilizations [wrote E. T. C. Werner in the *Fortnightly Review*] that are adopted, somehow never seem to be the same as those which grow and have their genuineness proved by passing

¹ August 2, 1894.

² August 3, 1894.

³ August 10, 1894.

⁴ R. S. Gundry, Secretary of the China Association to *The Times*, Aug. 9, 1894.

through the fire of the ages. Veneer civilizations are bound to crack off when exposed to the severe heat of international rivalry, and Japan recently by her action after the sinking of the *Kowshing*, allowed the world a glance below the surface which was not at all reassuring to those who imagined that the spirit of true civilization would have sunk much deeper than it appears to have done during the last forty-five years.¹

Nor were these condemnations made only by people friendly to China. Even Lord Curzon, who admitted great admiration for Japan, wrote of the incident as a "barbarity which, if true, would disgrace the most civilized of powers".² The indignation reached the House of Commons when the Government was asked

whether several Japanese men-of-war attacked and sunk the merchant vessel *Kowshing*; whether the *Kowshing* is a British vessel and flies the British flag; if this occurred prior to a declaration of war between China and Japan, and if these facts are correct, what steps the Government propose to take for this outrage on the British flag and to obtain adequate compensation for the families of the Englishmen who perished by this unusual incident in naval warfare.³

On behalf of the Government, Sir Edward Grey made the conciliatory reply "that the accounts of what has taken place are most conflicting, and until the facts are placed beyond dispute, I cannot make a statement as to compensation. The Japanese have, however, informed us spontaneously that they are ready to make full reparation if it is found that their officers are in the wrong".⁴ But later, on August tenth, Sir Edward reflected the indignant public opinion when he told the House that:

¹ April, 1895, "China and Its Solution", E. Werner.

² Letter to *The Times*, August 6, 1894.

³ *Hansard*, fourth series, vol. xxvii, p. 1573, August 2, 1894.

⁴ *Ibid.*

The full depositions of the officers of the *Kowshing* who were saved are on their way home and will be received about the twenty-fourth of September. The Japanese Government have been informed that in consideration of the circumstances as set forth by them, Her Majesty's Government must hold them responsible for any loss of British life or property.¹

Yet even amid the general indignation, some voices were raised on behalf of Japan. Professor Westlake, on August third, pointed out that :

The *Kowshing* appears to have been British owned and to have been rightfully flying the British flag, but it is equally clear that she was acting as a transport in the Chinese service. If to this it shall be added that the service was a belligerent one, nothing is more certain than that she was not entitled to any protection of the British flag or ownership. [Furthermore, it was] equally certain that the Japanese were not precluded from taking the service as a belligerent one by the fact that war had not been declared. To begin war without a declaration is a bad habit which has, nevertheless, found its way for centuries past into the practice of nations.²

Professor T. E. Holland, noted British authority on International Law, held that hostile acts had taken place prior to the sinking of the *Kowshing*, and hence the Japanese commander was within his rights.³ However, neither Professor Westlake nor Professor Holland attempted to defend the Japanese from a purely humanitarian point of view. The English people regarded the sinking as unnecessary and the drowning of over one thousand Chinese soldiers as inhuman. Mr. R. S. Gundry in November, 1894, summed up the British views of the incident as follows :

Much logic has been chopped on the subject; but it is hard to

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. xxviii, p. 569.

² *The Times*, August 3, 1894.

³ *Ibid.*, August 10, 1894.

resist an impression that if a British cruiser had been in sight, the common sense of its commander would have carried him straight to the conviction that firing upon a British flag in time of peace was an unjustifiable outrage, which the whole character of the proceedings tended rather to aggravate than allay. For, even admitting the exigency of motive, it appears undeniable that the object could have been attained in a manner more consistent with humanity and civilization by accepting the proposal of those on board to return to a Chinese port.¹

On the other hand, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the Europeans on the *Kowshing* knew before they left China that they were about to participate in a very hazardous enterprise in view of the strained relations that had existed for more than a month previously. Certain it is, also, that some of the responsibility must rest with the inefficient Chinese navy and with the Chinese Government itself, for as it was said at the time, "If the Chinese were not so culpably easy-going and had earlier stopped the transmission of cypher telegrams, this disaster would not have occurred".²

Furthermore, the *Kowshing* had been cleared at Tientsin by the British Consul with the approval of O'Connor, who, although anxious to assist a friendly power, must have known the risks entailed.³ And when the war was later declared, Great Britain forbade her subjects to undertake any task similar to that in which the *Kowshing* had been engaged.⁴ England finally admitted that Japan had been within her rights in sinking the *Kowshing* and abandoned her claim for damages against that country.⁵

When on August 1, 1894, China and Japan declared

¹ *The Fortnightly Review*, November, 1894, "Korea, China and Japan."

² *The North China Herald*, August 3, 1894.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *The London Gazette*, August 7, 1894.

⁵ Takahashi, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

war against each other, England issued a proclamation of neutrality.¹ Britain's sympathy was, however, almost completely with the Chinese and she had every confidence in the ability of China to defend herself against the aggressions of the Island Kingdom. On the other hand, Japan was considered amazingly stupid to attack a colossus ten times her size, and it was anticipated that she would suffer an overwhelming defeat, richly merited by her uncompromising attitude in the two months preceding the outbreak of war.²

The British knew that Japan had undergone great changes since 1868 and that foreign mentors had reorganized the Japanese army and navy. They were aware that Japan had sent several military missions to Europe to study Western methods of warfare, and that large sums had been appropriated for the purpose of placing the Mikado's land and sea forces on a more efficient basis. But to modernize military forces was considered such a huge task that the British people did not think it possible that Japan could have made such drastic changes in such a short time. Britain applauded Japan's efforts but did not realize how successful those efforts had been.

The Manchester Guardian, taking for its text, "The Numbers of Them are Enormous", gave its readers a most graphic description of the probable outcome of the war. To that publication's editor:

It is as if a man of immense stature and muscle, but imperfectly trained, and as yet comparatively unskilled, should agree to fight every day for a whole year, a pugilist of less physical strength but of greater agility, a better boxer, and trained to the hour.

¹ England's Proclamation of Neutrality is in *The London Gazette*, August 7, 1894; China's War Declaration in *Foreign Relations* (1894), incl. in no. 41, p. 53; Japan's War Declaration in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXXVI, p. 303.

² *The North China Herald*, July 20, 1894.

The first few weeks of the fight would almost certainly go in favor of the trained and skilled man. But the strength of the other would last, his muscles would harden, and his skill would increase at each defeat, and every day he would learn something of the nimbleness and knowledge used against him by his adversary. At the end of the year he might have at his mercy the man who thrashed him daily at its beginning.¹

Equally confident of China's eventual victory was *The Times*. Editorially it said on July twenty-fourth:

The Japanese may accordingly count not unreasonably upon initial success. But if the Chinese go into the matter in earnest, Japan may in the long run pay dearly for her earlier victories. She can go on pouring men into Korea in numbers which will be found very hard to cope with, even by greatly superior Japanese troops. She will be practically at home, while the Japanese will carry on war at a great distance from their base, and will depend absolutely upon their command of the sea.²

According to *The Economist*, the advantage lay clearly with China:

In the first encounters with Japan it is almost certain that China will be worsted. The superior armament and training of the Japanese troops is bound to tell. But however heavily she may be defeated in the beginning, there will be with China no thought of giving up the struggle. The loss of tens of thousands of men is to her a matter of comparative indifference. Her dependence is upon the masses of troops she can keep pouring and, if necessary, spending in the peninsula, and her policy will be to bear down her opponent by sheer weight of numbers.³

Even military experts had confidence in China's strength. General Wolseley thought she would win.⁴ So did Captain

¹ August 3, 1894.

² *The Times*, July 24, 1894.

³ July 28, 1894.

⁴ Arthur, G. C. and Wingate, F. B., *The Life of Wolseley*, p. 29.

Lang, who had been naval adviser to the Chinese for some years prior to his resignation in 1890.¹ Many others who spoke with authority upon China had previously expressed their belief that Peking's military strength was a factor to be reckoned with. Sir Harry Parkes had written in 1885, when Sino-Japanese relations had been strained, that "Japan had better be warned not to engage in war with China: that France was fast making China a military nation".² Charles Gordon had said that "China's power is in her numbers", and felt that no nation could stand up against a foe that outnumbered her ten to one.³ Charles Pearson, a keen British annalist, had pointed out that China would one day take her rightful position as a great power, and predicted that she would accomplish much in the military way.⁴ Finally, Marquis Tseng, Chinese Minister to London, had greatly impressed British circles by an article published in 1887 which portrayed China as awakening out of her long-accustomed conservatism.⁵

There was of course some reason for such a strong belief in China's military ability. For more than a decade prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, China had given the appearance of considerable strength. In 1881 she had taken such a strong stand against Russia in regard to a dispute over the ownership of some territory in the Kuldja district, that the *Annual Register* of 1882 mentioned "the great diplomatic success for China".⁶

¹ Captain Lang's Letter in *The Times*, August 8, 1894.

² Lane-Poole, S., *The Life of Sir Harry Parkes*, vol. ii, pp. 221-2.

³ Hake, A. E., *The Story of Chinese Gordon*, p. 295.

⁴ Pearson, C., *National Life and Character*, pp. 49-52.

⁵ *The Asiatic Quarterly*, Jan., 1887, "The Sleep and the Awakening", Marquis Tseng.

⁶ p. 340. General Kuropatkin has written that Russia granted China's wishes because the St. Petersburg Government "entertained a very ex-

During the war with France in 1884-5, a British writer was optimistic enough to assert that: "The Chinese were growing in boldness and strength and were beginning to assume the offensive. Defeat did not discourage them, and their losses were speedily filled up by reinforcements that appeared inexhaustible."¹ The following year, 1886, China gave further evidence of her renewed vigor by sending four war vessels to the Amur coast and nine to Chemulpo because of rumors of Russian aggression on Korea.²

The warships purchased abroad by China had been considered in England as "among the most formidable vessels of their class and displacement".³ In 1890 Captain Lang, upon leaving his command as naval adviser to the Chinese, had considered that two more years would have been sufficient to enable China's navy to "take its place among the best equipped of the world", and it was not thought possible that its efficiency could have been much diminished in the four years that had elapsed since the Captain's retirement.⁴ Furthermore, it was known that Japan had no ships to compare with the pride of the Chinese navy, the *Chin-Yuen*, a vessel of 7,400 tons.⁵

Since her war with France, China had likewise paid attention to her land defenses. Port Arthur and Weihaiwei had been strongly fortified under foreign supervision, and were equipped with the best material money could buy.⁶ The exaggerated idea of the value of the Chinese troops themselves and of China's military resources". *The Russian Army and the Japanese War*, vol. i, p. 94.

¹ *The Annual Register* (1886), p. 330.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 445-6.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 441.

⁴ Michie, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 397.

⁵ Fujisawa, R., *The Recent Aims and Political Development of Japan*, p. 170.

⁶ Michie, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 297.

docks and fortress at Port Arthur alone had cost [£]16,500,000 taels (\$26,400,000),¹ and during the twenty-five years prior to 1894, Li Hung Chang had spent about \$250,000,000 in preparing for China's defense.² For more than a decade, French, and later German officers had been instructing the Chinese army. It was felt that the Celestial Empire's period of subjection was over.³

So confident had been the British that China was about to assert herself, that they had come to look upon the invigorated Celestial Kingdom as being capable of affording considerable assistance in resisting Russian expansion in the Far East. For some years prior to 1894 there had been rumors of an Anglo-Chinese alliance, and some Britons had openly advocated the negotiation of such an agreement. The *Annual Register* of 1885, after citing the military exploits of China's army during that year, remarked that "In the event of war, Great Britain would feel the need of such an ally in the East as China".⁴ Sir Charles Dilke in 1881 had remarked that England and China were "more closely allied by trade than are any other two countries in the world. Surely these two considerations point to an alliance between the two countries".⁵ In 1890 Sir Charles felt that in a league to enforce the *status quo* in the Far East, China "would have more temporary power even than England of enforcing the decisions of the alliance".⁶ As late as the spring of 1894, when Li Hung Chang visited Admiral Free-

¹ *Annual Register* (1894), p. 353.

² Putnam-Weale, B. L. (Pseud. Simpson, B. L.), *The Vanquished Empire*, p. 180.

³ Boulger, D. C., *History of China*, vol. ii, p. 502; Norman, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

⁴ p. 335.

⁵ Dilke, C. W., *The Present Position of European Politics*, p. 31.

⁶ Dilke, C. W., *Problems of Greater Britain*, p. 391.

mantle on the *Centurion*, the event evoked very friendly utterances from the British press.¹

England's confidence in China was also partly based upon the fact that the latter would be facing an Oriental foe. It was well known that the Chinese thoroughly detested the Japanese as renegades who had abandoned the ancient culture for Western innovations.² China herself showed great confidence in entering the war to "root the Wojen out of their lairs".³ Furthermore, in fighting for Korea, China would have an added incentive, inasmuch as that country afforded a ready gateway to Manchuria, the home of the Manchurian Dynasty.⁴ Hence, there was ample reason for British optimism regarding China's military prowess. This optimism in turn was probably instrumental in forming England's anti-Japanese attitude at the outbreak of the war.

It cannot be said, however, that England did not have some warning of China's military impotence and impending downfall. There were numerous dissentients to the accepted theory of China's power. Lord Curzon, in August, 1894, published a book entitled *The Problems of the Far East* in which he warned against placing too much confidence in China's military efficiency:

The Chinese army [wrote Lord Curzon] under Chinese officers, even with muskets in its hands and cartridges in its pouches, is an undisciplined rabble of tramps, about as well qualified to withstand a European force, as a body of Hyde Park processionists would be able to repel a charge of the Life-Guards.⁵

¹ Brandt, M., *Drei Jahre Ostasiatische Politik*, p. 6; Norman, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

² Holcombe, C., *The Real Chinese Question*, p. 299; Fujisawa, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

³ From China's Declaration of War Against Japan.

⁴ Eastlake and Yamado, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁵ Curzon, *op. cit.*, p. 411.

Equally certain of China's impotence was 'Mr. Henry Norman, a well-informed authority on Far Eastern affairs. On August 18, 1894 Mr. Norman wrote:

This ethnical fable of Jack and the Bean-Stalk is very amusing to any one who really knows the first truths about China. . . . China has long been destined to be the prey of the first armed comer. Fortunately for herself, but unfortunately for the interests of other countries, that has been Japan. She has no illusions about China and she is engaged in pricking the bubble.

Mr. Norman went on to quote a newspaper report that each province of China had been called upon to furnish twenty thousand men.

But [he adds] the newspaper reader may not perhaps be expected to know that the Emperor of China could as easily raise twenty thousand troops in Mars as in some of his provinces; that it would not be difficult to enlist a considerable force in parts of China to attack another part; that absolutely no organization exists in China for the handling of such masses; that the men would find themselves without food, without the most rudimentary knowledge of war, without leaders of any description whatever; or that a huge army of the kind in the neighborhood of the capital would be almost certain to seize the opportunity to upset the present alien government.¹

Mr. R. S. Gundry, President of the China Association, had written in 1893:

But though her almost limitless numbers will always make China a formidable antagonist, it will be long before the looseness of Chinese discipline and the incapacity of Chinese officers will be so far mended as to make a Chinese army the match for that of any Western power in pitched battle; while the incapacity of her fleet was the chief reason she had eventually to surrender Tonking.²

¹ *Contemporary Review*, September, 1894, "The Question of Korea", Norman, H.

² Gundry, R. S., *China and Her Neighbors*, p. 291.

General Grant of the United States had also seen the flaws in the military system of China and, upon his return from a trip to the Far East, announced his opinion that "a well-appointed body of ten thousand Japanese troops could make their way through the length and breadth of China against all odds that could be brought to confront them".¹

Warnings that all was not well with China were not long in making their appearance soon after the Far Eastern crisis had forced itself upon the attention of the world. "The Chinese Empire," declared *The North China Herald* on July thirteenth, "is rapidly approximating the vortex of dynastic revolution or dismemberment". In discussing the Chinese navy about the middle of July, *The Times* admitted that:

Unfortunately for China it is in the internal economy of the ships where the foreign director is least tolerated. No true estimate can be formed of the value of the Chinese navy without taking into account that which is hidden from view. The muscles may be alright and yet the viscera may be diseased.²

On the other hand, the rapidity and efficiency with which Japan moved her troops into Korea astonished England and earned complimentary remarks in the British press.³ From Berlin came the knowledge that the colonel commanding the Japanese troops in Korea had served a year in the German army with distinction and that the Chinese would find him "a foe not at all to be despised".⁴

Despite this increased respect for Japanese arms, England's patience with Japan for provoking war was further taxed by the fear that neither China nor Japan would profit by the outcome, but that Russia would step in at the proper

¹ *The Atlantic Monthly*, December, 1879.

² *The Times*, July 17, 1894.

³ *Ibid.*, July 26, 1894.

⁴ *Ibid.*, August 3, 1894.

time and be the chief gainer. Indicative of this sentiment is the cartoon in *Punch* of August fourth entitled "The Korean Cock Fight", showing two roosters fighting, one a bantam and the other full-grown, with the Russian Bear looking gleefully on from a distance and saying to himself, "Ha! whichever wins, I see my way to a dinner." And, observed *The North China Herald* on July sixth, "If Japan and China go to war about Korea they may find themselves left with the shells and Russia with the oysters". *The Times* felt that there would be a repetition of the old fable of the wolf and the jackal quarrelling over the "prostrate form of the lamb, while an eagle hovers overhead ready to pounce down so soon as the combatants have reduced themselves to a state of helplessness".¹

When war broke out England was concerned about protecting her commerce. Solicitude was felt about the safety of Shanghai until China and Japan agreed to leave the city outside the area of warlike operations.² The Foreign Office had "no reason to suppose that the squadron in Chinese waters was insufficient or that any opinion to that effect had been expressed by the naval authorities in the Far East",³ and Admiral Freemantle gave orders to the ships under his command "to convey British merchants and prevent their being interfered with by Japanese men-of-war".⁴ The British Admiral frankly told Count Ito that he would tolerate no interference with British ships.⁵ The English commander later admitted his desire to keep a close watch on the movements of the Japanese fleet and his memoirs

¹ July 13, 1894.

² *The North China Herald*, July 17, 1894.

³ *Hansard*, fourth series, vol. xxix, p. 490, Sir Edward Grey to the House of Commons, August 27, 1894.

⁴ Freemantle, *op. cit.*, p. 430.

⁵ Takahashi, *op. cit.*, p. 50; Brandt, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

indicate that in July, 1894 he had a strong pro-Chinese attitude.¹ It has even been asserted that, when the Japanese captured Port Arthur, they found among Li Hung Chang's papers, dispatches from Admiral Freemantle giving details of the movements of the Japanese fleet.² Throughout the war a British fleet was stationed at Shanghai with orders to prevent the Japanese fleet from entering the Yangtze.³ England resisted all efforts of the Tokio Government to withdraw her guarantee to keep Shanghai neutral, on the ground that a Chinese arsenal in that city was supplying ammunition to her enemy.⁴

Count Hayashi's memoirs, the authenticity of which has been questioned, give a rather interesting sidelight on England's demand for the neutralization of Shanghai. Japan, according to the Count, was apprehensive regarding England's probable attitude toward a Sino-Japanese War, and even feared that there was an Anglo-Chinese alliance which would require London to render Peking some form of assistance. Cautiously broaching the subject at London, the Japanese Ambassador was told that England would deprecate the outbreak of war and would under no circumstances tolerate any infringement of Korea's interests. This was not very encouraging, but a second inquiry evoked the reply that England would welcome any amelioration of the chaotic internal condition of Korea. Still Japan's fears were not removed, and only after July twentieth, when the British demanded the neutralization of Shanghai, did the Tokio authorities realize that London would not interfere on China's side. Consequently they went ahead with their war

¹ Freemantle, *op. cit.*, p. 433.

² Pinon, R. and Marcillac, J., *La Chine, qui s'ouvre*, p. 27.

³ *The Times*, Jan. 11, 1895. •

⁴ Bragdt, *op. cit.*, p. 123; Gorst, H. E., *China*, p. 235.

plans, after assuring England that they contemplated no change in Korea's political status.¹

As was natural, the first reports of battles on land and sea were conflicting, but the British press in China and England was quick to point out evidences of Chinese victories, and, on the slightest opportunity, took occasion to remark exultingly that perhaps the Chinese were not so badly prepared as the Japanese thought. Thus *The North China Herald* declared on July twenty-seventh:

We gather from this that the Chinese have not been quite so unready as they seemed to be. . . . The Chinese have been unusually and remarkably reticent on this occasion, and while they have been making us all, including the Japanese, think that they would accept any alternative rather than fight, they have all the time been preparing for the fray, determined to put up with no terms from Japan which involved injury to China's prestige—so that the War Office in the Viceroy's Yamen is not so devoid of an Intelligence Department as we might imagine.²

ENGLAND ATTEMPTS TO SAVE CHINA

As Japan won victory after victory — starting with the Chinese rout at Ping Yang and the naval encounter at Yalu — and China began frantically to call for help,³ England sought hurriedly to end the war, fearful that not only would defeat demoralize the Chinese market, but also that Russia would be given an excellent opportunity to step in and gain a predominant position in China and Korea.⁴

On October sixth the Foreign Office enquired of Ger-

¹ Pooley, *op cit.*, pp. 45, 49, 58.

² *North China Herald*, July 27, 1894. Likewise, *The Times* thought that the Chinese were starting the war in a more aggressive manner than were the Japanese, August 3, 1894.

³ *Foreign Relations* (1894), no. 73, Denby to Gresham, Nov. 3, 1894.

⁴ See p. 106.

many, France, Russia, and the United States if they would participate in a joint intervention, having for its purpose the ending of war between China and Japan, on a basis of an indemnity for Tokio and an international guarantee of Korea's independence.¹ Thus England abandoned her policy of regarding Korea as a dependency of China. Having seen that China was incapable of holding the Hermit Kingdom, the British adopted the next best method of check-mating Russia.² Fear of Russia was not without reason, since St. Petersburg had hinted at the establishment of a Russo-Chinese protectorate over Korea.³

England's suggestion was received, however, without approval by the United States and Germany.⁴ Secretary of State Gresham told the British Ambassador that the United States could not intervene, but that President Cleveland "earnestly desired" that China and Japan should "speedily agree upon terms of peace alike honorable to both and not humiliating to Korea".⁵ This attitude of the United States, Ambassador Goschen was not able to change despite the fact that he was later instructed to advise "that the intervention contemplated would be limited to diplomatic action and would only take place in the event of a suitable opportunity presenting itself".⁶ Mr. Gresham felt that, "With a few exceptions the record of our diplomatic history shows no departure from the wise policy of avoiding foreign alliances

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 56, p. 70, Goschen to Gresham. Oct. 6, 1894.

² Franke, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁴ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. ix, no. 2216, p. 243, Aufzeichnung von Marschall, Oct. 9, 1894; *Foreign Relation (1894)*, no. 58, p. 70, Gresham to Bayard, Oct. 12, 1894.

⁵ *Foreign Relations (1894)*, no. 58, p. 70, Gresham to Goschen, Oct. 12, 1894.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 59, p. 70, Goschen to Gresham, Oct. 12, 1894.

and embarrassing participation in guaranteeing the independence of distant states".¹

In the case of Germany, England made two separate requests. On October fifth, the British Ambassador at Berlin, Sir Edward Malet, told Baron Marschall that the London Foreign Office had received advice that revolutionary uprisings in China might lead to a massacre of foreigners, and asked what attitude Germany would take toward a suggestion of cooperation between the various European warships in Far Eastern waters. Baron Marschall replied that intelligence reaching Berlin corroborated England's fear, and that hence Germany would accept the suggestion in principle, "on condition that the cooperation should be solely for the protection of life and property of foreigners".²

Two days later, Sir Edward Malet laid before Marschall the same proposition of intervention which Goschen had suggested at Washington. The German Foreign Minister replied that Japan's favorable military situation would certainly cause her to reject any peace proposals at that time. Furthermore, he thought it important to know in advance what course was contemplated, whether diplomatic action or compulsion, and also what would be the attitude of Russia, whose Far Eastern interests were considerable. These questions the Ambassador could not answer,³ whereupon Baron Marschall remarked that he thought the time inopportune for intervention.⁴

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 81, p. 81, Gresham to Denby, Nov. 24, 1894.

² *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. ix, no. 2214, p. 242, Marschall to German Ambassadors, Oct. 6, 1894.

³ Mr. Bertie, the Permanent Under Secretary of the British Foreign Office told Count Hatzfeldt that if Japan should refuse the friendly counsel of Germany and England, the united fleets would go into "action". Lord Rosebery, however, overruled Mr. Bertie. Brandenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

⁴ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. ix, p. 243, no. 2216, Aufzeichnung von Marschall, October 9, 1894.

Germany rejected England's proposal because her Far Eastern interests were relatively slight, and as Herr Brandt expressed it, she "had no desire to pull England's and Russia's chestnuts out of the fire".¹ Moreover, German public opinion was proud of Japan's victories as these had shown the efficacy of the instruction given by General Meckel and others of the Imperial German Staff.² England did not press the matter. Sir Edward Malet left the impression that he shared the German Foreign Minister's views, and Count Hatzfeldt reported from London that Lord Rosebery was inclined to agree with Baron Marschall's objections.³

Russia was agreeable to the intervention, but England was unwilling to take action without the support of other powers.⁴ What the answer of France was, has not been made public, but it is reasonable to assume that she would follow the lead of her Russian ally. Apparently this peace effort of October failed because of German opposition and the non-cooperation of the United States, coupled with the hesitancy of England to take action with Russia and France, whose aims in the Far East were so much in opposition to those of Great Britain.

Lord Rosebery, as Prime Minister, later gave his version of the October peace effort by stating that the Foreign Office had received "from a source which I may characterize as in my opinion the most authoritative and most convincing" that we could have on that subject—news that China would grant terms such as would exceed Japan's pre-war de-

¹ Brandt, M., *Ostasiatische Fragen*, pp. 254-5.

² Wirth, A., *Weltgeschichte der Gegenwart*, p. 149.

³ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. ix, no. 2216, p. 243, *Aufzeichnung von Marschall*, Oct. 9, 1894.

⁴ Brandenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

⁵ Probably Sir Robert Hart. See Jeyes, S. H., *The Earl of Rosebery*, p. 160.

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⁴ Brandenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

⁵ Probably Sir Robert Hart. See Jeyes, S. H., *The Earl of Rosebery*, p. 160.

mands". The various powers were immediately asked "if, in their opinion, there was any possibility of Japan and China coming to terms on such conditions as I have indicated". The reception was, according to Lord Rosebery, "extraordinarily favorable—the powers seemed to feel that a common calamity overshadowed them, but in the opinion of one or two of them—only one I think, but we will say one or two to be within the confines of truth—it did not appear that the time had yet arrived when conditions could be put forward with any advantage for the consideration of the combatants".¹

While these negotiations were going on in Europe, England approached Japan directly, but received the polite reply that thus far Japan's arms "have not made sufficient progress to ensure a satisfactory result of the negotiations".²

COULD ENGLAND HAVE PREVENTED WAR?

Why, it may be asked, did not England, upon finding the cooperation of Germany and the United States unattainable, use a little more pressure upon China or Japan, or both, in June and July, 1894, when the Far Eastern dispute was in its incipient stage? Would not both Oriental Empires have adjusted their difficulties, had England, instead of advising them to evacuate Korea simultaneously, ordered them to do so and backed up this order with a strong naval demonstration? In answering these questions, it must be borne in mind that the Prime Minister, Lord Rosebery, was a peaceful man and would not under any circumstances involve England in a major European war, except in defense

¹ Lord Rosebery's speech at Sheffield, October 25, 1894. Text in Lord Rosebery's Speeches, Neville Beeman Edition, p. 118.

² *Foreign Relations* (1894), no. 74, p. 78. Text of Japan's reply to England sent to State Department by Minister Dun at Tokio, Nov. 29, 1894. This overture was made during October but the exact date has not been given.

of something vital to the British Empire.¹ It was Lord Rosebery who once said that "any British Minister who engages in a European war, except under the pressure of the direst necessity, except for interests directly and distinctively British, is a criminal to his country and to his position".²

It was, therefore, natural for Lord Rosebery to refrain from any steps which might cause such a struggle. But would the forcible maintenance of Far Eastern peace have resulted in England's being challenged in Europe? The answers to these questions must always be matters of conjecture, but we do know that the semi-official press in Russia was angrily proclaiming that the Czar's Government would not allow any independent action by England. Whether or not St. Petersburg would have followed up these threats is not known, but Lord Rosebery had such a horror of war, and had such faith in the efficacy of the "Concert of Europe", that he preferred to act only in cooperation with the other powers. It is quite likely also that other powers besides Russia might have objected to England's taking strong isolated action in the Far East.³ As to whether war between China and Japan would jeopardize any vital British interest, it must be borne in mind that most Englishmen expected China to win and to emerge from hostilities with added prestige—and a strong China was England's desire.

The October peace effort was, however, a rather half-hearted attempt. Rosebery, himself, admitted that he had from the first entertained no hope of its success, but merely had consulted the other powers because he did not feel justi-

¹ Cecil, Algernon, *British Foreign Secretaries*, p. 275.

² *The Foreign Policy of Lord Rosebery*—reprints from the *Contemporary Review*, p. 82; Coates, T. F. G., *Lord Rosebery, His Life and Speeches*, vol. ii, p. 873.

³ Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

fied in refusing China's request.¹ As we have seen, this impression was given to the German Ambassador at London.² Certainly the British Ambassador at Berlin made no effort whatever to change the German Government's decision.³ That this decision could not have been altered by further argument, does not dispose of the fact that the German Government was sounded in such a half-hearted manner that after one conversation with Baron Marschall, the British Ambassador admitted that he agreed with the German refusal.

Lord Rosebery explained why he sought the cooperation of the great powers instead of intervening directly.

In the first place [he said], in a great catastrophe of this kind, the more powers you have engaged in peace-making, the better chance for peace. The next reason is this, that in all great international concerns, a concert of powers, when it can be obtained, is increasingly valuable. . . . A Foreign Minister to my mind would have been grossly blamable if he had not sought in some respect to obtain a concert of the powers. Another reason is this, that between combatants it is a point of pride not to be the first to ask for peace, and it is a valuable matter to have a mediator from whom peace may be accepted honorably—and in an international consideration of this kind, the more mediators there are, the more likely you are to secure the object in view. . . . There is no power so little suspicious of others, or so profoundly suspected by others, as that empire to which you and I have the honor to belong. You cannot open a paper abroad which does not point to some convulsions in politics and to some convulsions of nature as due to British influence. But certain I am of this, that in the jealous conditions of things produced by the war between China and Japan, it would have been

¹ From his speech at Sheffield, October 25, 1894. .

² See p. 111.

³ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. ix, no. 2216, p. 243, Aufzeichnung von Marschall, October 9, 1894.

impossible for this country to have gone alone and attempted to act as bottle holder between China and Japan, without incurring the suspicion of every power interested—and all the powers are interested in the East.¹

Of course if England had overcome her anti-Russian animus and reached an agreement with St. Petersburg for a simultaneous display of force, war would have been averted. However, it must be remembered that the causes of the Sino-Japanese War were deep-seated, and even had it been averted temporarily in 1894, it was sure to blaze forth some time unless the remote causes were removed. Furthermore, the war probably could have been prevented only by thwarting the national desires of Japan and so alienating her, that instead of later becoming England's ally, she would have been a deadly enemy.

ENGLAND'S SYMPATHY SHIFTS TO JAPAN

Leaving for a moment England's official attitude toward the Sino-Japanese War, let us see how public opinion changed as the war progressed. When in mid-September the Chinese army was routed by the Japanese and a few days later the Chinese navy was defeated at the Yalu, it was generally agreed in England that China was in a very precarious position. Some thought the rout was complete, while others, maintained that these reverses were only the early Chinese defeats which everybody had anticipated, and that the Celestial Empire was far from being conquered. Those holding this view, however, admitted that China would have to show a considerable reversal of form.

Cartoons in *Punch* illustrated the thoughts of those who held the opinion that Japan had arrived as a great power. "Jap, the Giant Killer", on September twenty-ninth, showed

¹ From Lord Rosebery's Speech at Sheffield, October 25, 1894.

The appalling military impotence disclosed by China forced the English people to change their opinion so rapidly that by the end of the year they had lost all confidence in Chinese arms.¹ Nevertheless, English public opinion was still sympathetic with China. On January twenty-second, the London *Standard* asked whether the time had not arrived for intervention. On February seventh, *The Times* printed a report from Paris to the effect that Russia, France, and England had reached an agreement to advise Japan that Europe could not allow her "to annex one inch of Chinese territory". On February twenty-second, however, the *Pall Mall Gazette* inquired what would happen should Japan and Russia make an agreement regarding China, and this served to call British attention to the fact that Japan would make an efficient barrier against Russia, and that her friendship should be cultivated.²

With the political wisdom for which they are famous, the British quickly grasped the idea, with the result that English public opinion changed abruptly. Incompetent China was abandoned and victorious Japan was welcomed.³ The *St. James Gazette* of March eighteenth voiced the changed attitude in the following manner:

If Japan aspires to be a first rate naval power, Europe cannot hinder it. . . . England's policy must be to take cognizance of the fact and be satisfied therewith. . . . If Japan and China desire to fight it out, that is their business. . . . For ourselves, if Japan acts as a counterpoise to the formidable Empire which is stretching one of its arms round Northern Asia, we are no

¹ "The whole story is absolutely monotonous. The Japanese always win. The Chinese always retire, with or without a show of fight. . . . The one side is well armed, well disciplined, and well led. The other is none of these things." *The Times*, January 24, 1895.

² Brandt, *op. cit.*, p. 128; Franke, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

³ Debidour, A., *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe depuis le congrès de Berlin jusqu'à nos jours*, p. 210.

losers, and if Japan throws open the gigantic territories of China, we, of all peoples in the world, have most to gain by it, in spite of the competition of Yokahama and Tokio.¹

By the end of March, the revised British attitude had made its effect upon the Foreign Office. Lord Kimberley advised the German Ambassador that England was not inclined to intervene against Japan as the people were not so disposed.² The Foreign Minister also cancelled instructions previously given to the British Minister at Tokio to declare jointly with his Russian and German colleagues that they looked favorably upon China's request to learn Japan's peace terms.³

While British public opinion had been changing in this manner, Downing Street had been negotiating with St. Petersburg regarding the advisability of European intervention. On February eighth, M. de Staäl told Lord Kimberley that the Russian Government desired to ascertain Japan's peace terms, and, if the latter were reasonable, to recommend that China accept them. The Foreign Secretary gave de Staäl to understand that he was perturbed at the possibility of an alliance being formed between China and Japan.⁴

The Russian Foreign Office, however, did not think that the two Oriental countries would make any such agreement, at least not for some time.⁵ Lobanov seemed quite anxious to secure England's support in the question of opposing any attempt of Japan to acquire territory on the Chinese main-

¹ Joseph, P., *Foreign Diplomacy in China*, pp. 89-90; Franke, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

² Franke, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

³ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. ix, no. 2230, p. 259, Marschall to Tschirschky, Mar. 27, 1895.

⁴ Meyendorff, A., *Correspondence diplomatique du Baron de Staäl*, vol. ii, no. 6, p. 260, Chicane to de Staäl, Feb. 8, 1895.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, no. 9, p. 264, Lobanov to de Staäl, March 14, 1895.

land. Kimberley apparently encouraged de Staäl to expect British cooperation, because as late as April third the Ambassador reported to St. Petersburg that the interests of the British Cabinet were more "on the side of the Celestial Empire".¹ On April sixth, Kimberley told de Staäl that Japan's occupation of Port Arthur changed the balance of power in the Far East.² On April eighth, however, de Staäl advised Lobanov that "public opinion in England had changed the Government's attitude".³

The pro-Japanese tendency was greatly strengthened when the peace terms submitted to Peking were found to call for numerous commercial advantages in China, which had been sought for decades by England and which she would now obtain by virtue of the most-favored-nation clause. Among these valuable concessions were: the opening to trade of the following towns, Shashih, Chungking, Suchow, and Hangchow; steam navigation on the Yangtze River to be extended from Ichang to Chungking, and on the Woosung, from Shanghai to Suchow and Hangchow; the right to rent or build warehouses, and to store goods therein without taxes; the right to engage in manufacturing in China, and to import the necessary machinery, subject only to the stipulated import duties; and the assurance that all merchandise manufactured in China by foreigners would stand upon the same footing, in respect to taxation, as merchandise imported into China by foreigners.⁴

The British also became more aware of the fact that Japan, as a new world power, would take an increased amount of European manufactures, and they were anxious

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, no. 12, p. 265, de Staäl to Lobanov, April 3, 1895.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii, no. 13, p. 266, de Staäl to Lobanov, April 17, 1895.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ China, *Treaties, op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 1818, The Treaty of Shimonoseki, Art. VI.

to do nothing which would jeopardize their chances of supplying the needs of this market. In an address before the London Chamber of Commerce early in June, 1895, the British Consul-General at Tokio said:

China has, not including Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and Eastern Turkestan, etc., about ten times as large an area, and ten times as large a population, as that of Japan, and she has a greater number of ports opened to trade than Japan has, numbering twenty. Notwithstanding this larger area and population, this greater number of open ports, and supposed boundless resources (and no doubt they are immense), China's foreign trade last year (1894)—in which year the value of trade amounted to the highest figure ever attained, as was the case with Japan—was in Mexican dollars, which are equivalent to silver yen, only 443,563,777, not quite double the amount of the foreign trade of Japan in the corresponding year. Again, the rate of growth of the foreign trade of Japan has been greater than that of China, though I will not trouble you with dry statistics on this point.¹

Hence, the British press was almost unanimously disposed to avoid alienating Japan by depriving her of the fruits of victory. *The Times*, while recognizing that Japanese occupation of Port Arthur threatened Peking, stated that:

No doubt the presence of the Japanese on the Liaotung Peninsula must be at once galling to Chinese pride and paralyzing to Chinese power. But that is one of the consequences of defeat. It does not appear that there is any reason why this country at any rate should interfere to prevent the cession of this small corner of Chinese territory to Japan. British interests, so far as we can see, are not in any way threatened by this step, while by the other parts of the agreement, they may possibly be advanced. We have no right to meddle in these negotiations unless British interests are injured or imperilled.²

¹ *The Statist*, June 15, 1895, p. 754.

² *The Times*, April 8, 1895.

The evident desire of the British to avoid alienating Japan is more strongly evinced by a leading article on April twenty-third. After stating that England would have preferred the situation as it existed before the war, *The Times* continued:

But that is past praying for. A new world has been called into existence in the Far East. We must live with and make the best of it. We may think some parts of the treaty imposed upon China by Japan not only unfair and unreasonable, but ill-judged even in the interests of the victorious power. We cannot see, however, any stipulations so seriously and directly prejudicial to British interests that we should think it necessary to compel their withdrawal, possibly at the cost of making irreconcilable enemies of the Japanese. . . . The bitterness of feeling that would thus be aroused among the Japanese would be visited upon all the nations who took part in the coercion by the European concert and Great Britain, which has the largest commercial interests in the Far East, would suffer far more than any other power from that state of things. . . . The permanent result of the war—the rise of a great naval power in the waters of the Far East—cannot be altered by any change in the terms of peace imposed upon China.¹

According to *The Statist*:

Whether it is or is not desirable that China should be weakened, and whether it is or is not desirable that Japan should not be strengthened, are questions which we need not discuss here; the war has decided them, and the point for the people of this country to consider is whether, now that peace is restored and China admits herself unable to resist any longer, this country is to enter into any course of transactions that may possibly lead to a quarrel with Japan, or at any rate, may contemplate the prevention of Japan from reaping the benefit of her endeavors. . . . If there is any power which has cause to dread a recuperated China, it is not the United Kingdom, but Russia.²

¹ *The Times*, April 23, 1895.

² *The Statist*, April 20, 1895.

England, being primarily interested in commerce, was naturally apprehensive of any nation that threatened to be a competitor in China, and at first there was fear in British circles that the enterprising Japanese would injure England's commercial interests in the Far East. It soon, however, became clear that Japan had no desire to exclude English competition, and had no intention of securing any commercial concessions for her exclusive benefit.¹ Hence, England decided to give her approval to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, as she felt that its advantages outweighed its disadvantages.

Having graciously accepted Japan's advent as a new power, and having recognized the possibility of her becoming a barrier to Russian expansion, the British soon began to discuss the advisability of making an alliance with her. On this point, however, there was a sharp division of sentiment. While in some quarters Japan's victories over China were considered sufficient to rank her as a military power of the first order, there was, on the other hand, a tendency in other sections to await further developments in the Far East before considering the Island Kingdom as the equal of a European power. A prominent British journalist, E. J. Dillon, admitted that Japan had fought brilliantly against China, but added:

When Russia and Japan are pitted against each other, the result may not be the same as when China and Japan were trying issues. All the probabilities are that it will be the other way. Japan is not Germany, nor are its inhabitants Teutons, and even if they were, they could not, without a miracle, effect in three or four years what it took the Germans generations to accomplish.²

The Economist echoed these sentiments:

¹ Brandenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 57; "All her other demands will redound to the benefit of the outside world as much as hers." *The Statist*, April 17, 1895.

² *Contemporary Review*, Nov., 1895, "Our Foreign Policy."

She [Japan] is a capable power and a brave power, but she has never defeated a Chinese army for there has never been a Chinese army to defeat, and not one battle has been fought. . . . The same may be said of the fleet. The Japanese fleet defeated the Chinese one, but though the latter was badly equipped, and badly handled, the feat was not easily accomplished, and but for mutiny, it is now said, in Admiral Ting's squadron, might not have been accomplished at all. There is no evidence that Japan could have defeated a European fleet of fairly equal strength, and if she could not, then her strength is in some degree unduly exaggerated by her success.¹

But Japan had a host of friends. "Japan", said the *Edinburgh Review*, "has emphatically vindicated her right to be treated as a power of no mean order."² In the opinion of Sir Edwin Arnold, former Ambassador to Tokio, "The victory of such a race in Asia is the victory of enlightenment and civilization against barbarism and exclusiveness; and the policy of wise English statesmen henceforth will be to maintain and improve the friendship happily established by the revised treaty of this year between the two empires of Great Britain and Japan."³

RUSSIA, GERMANY; AND FRANCE OBJECT

Although England had decided not to intervene in the Far Eastern peace settlement, other nations were not inclined to allow Japan to occupy territory which strategically controlled Peking and hence would give her a preponderating influence over the Chinese Court. Consternation, tempered with anger, prevailed in Russian official circles when news of Japan's terms reached St. Petersburg.⁴ The Mikado's

¹ *The Economist*.

² *Edinburgh Review*, July, 1895.

³ Arnold, E., *East and West*, p. 289.

⁴ Dillon, E. J., *The Eclipse of Russia*, pp. 246-7; Yarmolinsky, A., *The Memoirs of Count Witte*, p. 83; Skrine, F. H., *The Expansion of Russia*, pp. 339-40.

Government was recognized as Russia's future enemy in the Far East and it was seen that unless Port Arthur remained under Chinese control, Russia's long-cherished dreams of acquiring a warm-water port on the Pacific would be unattainable.¹ Russia's interest in the Far East was greatly increased by the accession of Nicholas II on November 1, 1894, and the appointment of M. Lobanov as Foreign Minister on March 11, 1895, both of whom felt that Russia's future lay in Asia.² Hence, the St. Petersburg Government was in no mood to tolerate Japan's acquisition of territory on the Chinese mainland, and a Crown Council decided that Russia would force Tokio to relinquish her claim to the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur.³

Russia was opportunely aided by a significant change in Germany's attitude. Count Caprivi, Bismarck's successor as Imperial Chancellor, had been content to follow his predecessor's policy of maintaining friendly relations with England.⁴ However, Prince Hohenlohe, who became Chancellor on October 29, 1894, constantly kept in mind the desira-

¹ "But now all far-seeing observers recognize that Japan is the rock which may some day arrest our progress. It would seem as though Europe were well pleased at the appearance of this new great power. If that be the case, it is only because Europe has suddenly discovered that Japan has become our rival." *Novoe Vremja*—*The Times*, Mar. 22, 1895.

² Friedjung, H., *Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus*, p. 146; Driault, E., *La Question d'extrême orient*, p. 301; Rambaud, A., *Histoire de la Russie*, pp. 852-3.

³ Rosen, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 136-7; Dillon, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-7.

⁴ "I entirely agree with your excellency," wrote Count Caprivi to Count Hatzfeldt during the summer of 1893, "that the goal of our foreign policy must constantly be directed towards obtaining England's adherence to the Triple Alliance. At any rate, everything must be avoided in so far as possible which might lead to an interruption of the friendly relations which fortunately exist between England and us." Eckardstein, *Erinnerungen*, vol. iii, p. 52.

bility of cultivating Russia's friendship, while the Kaiser at this time determined to repair the wire to St. Petersburg which had become strained since the failure of Germany to renew the Reinsurance Treaty in 1890.¹ Moreover, as the victories of Japan became more pronounced, the Kaiser conjured the alarming vision of the yellow hordes of China, led by Japan, overrunning and vanquishing Europe. This specter was strengthened early in April by a conversation with Herr Brandt, the pro-Chinese German who had spent a lifetime in the Far East.² Holstein, the *l'eminence grise* of the German Foreign Office, saw with dislike the possibility of the Franco-Russian Alliance being strengthened by a successful intervention of those two countries against Japan, while the Kaiser perceived also the opportunity of preserving peace in Europe by diverting the Czar's interest from the Balkans to the Far East.³ ✓

There also arose in Germany at this time the desire to acquire a port on the Chinese coast to be used as a coaling and naval station. Germany had not decided which port she desired, and, until this point was settled, she looked askance at Japan's giving other nations an excuse for taking Chinese

¹ Hohenlohe told the Czar in September, 1895, that Germany's policy had been directed with the view of securing Russia's favor, Hohenlohe, Prince, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. ii, p. 520; Gooch, G. P., "Baron Holstein" in the *Cambridge Historical Journal*, vol. i; Reventlow, E., *Deutschlands Auswärtiges Politik*, p. 84.

² Wirth, *Weltgeschichte der Gegenwart*, p. 148; Brandenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

³ Gerard, A., *La triple entente et la guerre*, p. 26; Hammann, O., *Der Neue Kurs*, p. 113; Mévil, A., *De la paix de Francfort à la conférence d'Algésiras*, p. 2. See also the Kaiser's letters of May 26, July 10, and Sept. 26, 1895, to the Czar, urging the latter to protect "the Cross and Christian Culture against the onrush of the Mongols and Buddhism"; Germany will protect his western frontier from any European disturbance while he is fulfilling the "great mission for which Heaven" had "shaped" him, Goetz, W., *Briefe des Kaiser Wilhelms an den Zaren*, pp. 10-18.

territory, possibly leading to a European war.¹ In the meantime, however, by doing China a good turn, Germany might later receive a suitable port from a thankful Chinese Court.² At the same time any possible Russian objections would be eliminated by aiding St. Petersburg to oust the Japanese from the Liaotung Peninsula.³

Also instrumental in causing Germany's change of attitude was the fear that Russia, France, and England would come to some agreement on the Far Eastern situation and allow Germany to go empty-handed.⁴ In November, 1894 the Kaiser had become panicky because Lord Rosebery had spoken optimistically about England's relations with Russia and France. At the same time the British fleet was concentrated at Shanghai, and there were rumors of troop transports being prepared in India. In view of these circumstances, the Kaiser felt that England was about to seize Shanghai, and the French to take Formosa. Russian approval, he thought, had been secured by London through concessions in the Balkans. He was determined that Germany must be consulted in any readjustment of the Far Eastern situation. In his opinion, orders should be sent to the German fleet to occupy Formosa before the French did.⁵ Such action, however, was frustrated by Baron Marschall,

¹ Hammann, O., *Deutsche Weltpolitik*, p. 40; Brandenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 59; *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. ix, no. 2232, p. 261, Marschall to Tschirschky, April 4, 1895.

² *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. ix, no. 2238, p. 265, Promemoria of Brandt, Apr. 8, 1895.

³ The Kaiser broached this subject to the Czar in his letter of May 26, 1895 (see p. 126, footnote no. 3). A report of the Czar's favorable reply is found in Hohenlohe, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 521. In February Count Hatzfeldt asked what England's attitude was but Lord Kimberley would not comment. However, he made no protest, Brandenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

⁴ Brandenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

⁵ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. ix, no. 2219, p. 245, Hohenlohe to Marschall, Nov. 17, 1894.

who pointed out that England, desiring a strong China, would hardly give the signal for its partition. Nevertheless, to be certain, he instructed Hatzfeldt at London and the German Consul at Calcutta to investigate the truth of the rumors that England was about to take Shanghai.¹

Hence, both Germany and Russia were ready to act against Japan when it became known that she had acquired the Liaotung Peninsula. Germany, however, was the first to act. On April fourth Baron Marschall wired the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, advising that were Japan to obtain Port Arthur (part of Liaotung), she could transform it into a second Gibraltar which would give her control over the Gulf of Pechili and reduce China to the position of a protectorate of Japan. Germany viewed this with alarm and Ambassador Tschirschky was instructed to sound the Russian Government on the subject.² The same protest was wired to Hatzfeldt at London with the additional remark that the possession of Port Arthur would raise the question whether other powers might not seize Chinese territory in emulation of Japan. The double fear was registered that Russia, France, and England had come to an agreement to take Chinese territory and that Japan had removed Russian objections by offering her a port in Manchuria as a terminus for the Trans-Siberian Railroad.³

Count Hatzfeldt replied that Lord Kimberley personally agreed that Japan's acquisition of Port Arthur would amount to a protectorate over China, as well as bring up the question of all the other powers' taking Chinese territory. Russia, thought Lord Kimberley, would not believe her interests jeopardized by a break-up of China and would be inclined to let matters run their own course. Neither would

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. ix, no. 2220, p. 246, Marschall to Hohenlohe, Nov. 17, 1894.

² *Ibid.*, no. 2232, p. 261, Marschall to Tschirschky, April 4, 1895.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. ix, no. 2233, p. 261, Marschall to Hatzfeldt, April 4, 1895.

France be averse to a weakened China. Count Hatzfeldt reported the conviction that no agreement had been made between Russia and England, either for the acquisition of Chinese territory or even for cooperative action in the matter. He was of the opinion that England would support a protest to Japan if Russia so desired, but that if St. Petersburg took no action, England would hardly do so individually.¹

Two days later, April sixth, Count Hatzfeldt gave a slightly different report when he advised that Lord Kimberley personally thought it very unwise to intervene between China and Japan, and thereby alienate either one of these powers. The cession of the Liaotung Peninsula would affect Russian interests, remarked Lord Kimberley, as it would affect the independence of Korea and threaten Peking, but these difficulties could be avoided by Japan's keeping only the southern tip of Liaotung, and the Chinese Government could, if need be, move to their ancient capital of Nanking.² This was an excellent idea from a British standpoint, for then the Chinese Government would be removed from Russian influence and placed close to Shanghai, where it could be watched by England. When further questioned, however, Lord Kimberley admitted that Japanese possession of the southern tip of the Liaotung Peninsula would be just as objectionable as would be the case were they to take the entire peninsula.³

From Russia, Germany on April eighth received a suggestion that the powers intervene and advise Tokio that "the annexation of Port Arthur would be a lasting obstacle to the resumption of good relations between China and Japan and a standing menace to the peace of the Far East". Germany agreed, and the Kaiser registered his emphatic

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. ix, no. 2234, p. 262, Hatzfeldt to Marschall, Apr. 4, 1895.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ix, no. 2236, p. 264, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, April 6, 1895.

³ *Ibid.*

approval by writing on the margin of the document, "Yes, even without England".¹

On April eighth the Rosebery Cabinet in London held a meeting to decide what action England would take in regard to this intervention in the Chino-Japanese peace negotiations. Its decision was given personally by Lord Rosebery to Count Hatzfeldt and was in substance, "that the interests of England in Eastern Asia were not sufficiently affected to justify intervention, which presumably could only be carried out by force". The Russian Ambassador in London and the French Foreign Office were also notified of this decision.²

Lord Rosebery's action was very distasteful to the German Emperor, who thought that England and Japan might have a secret treaty. However, Germany decided to go ahead and support Russia, while the Kaiser angrily noted on the dispatch, "Change absolutely nothing in my original instructions. The British will pay dearly for their short-sightedness."³ Herr Brandt at the time wrote, "England has proved by her attitude during the Japanese war that she is incapable of understanding or appreciating the rôle which China is destined to play in the Far East".⁴ In fact, official Germany was astonished at England's reversal of policy.⁵

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. ix, no. 2237, p. 265, Marschall to Tschirschky, April 8, 1895.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ix, no. 2239, p. 266, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, Apr. 8, 1895; no. 2241, p. 268, Munster to Foreign Office, Apr. 10, 1895. Several days later, on April tenth, the Chinese representative in London told Lord Kimberley that China would reject Japan's peace terms. This caused the British Foreign Secretary to consider intervention against Japan. But when China actually did accept Tokio's terms, Lord Kimberley reverted to the policy of non-intervention against Japan. See Franke, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

³ *Ibid.*, The Emperor's marginalia on no. 2241, p. 268.

⁴ Gorst, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

⁵ Brandenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

France felt the English decision keenly, as she had no desire to become involved in a Far Eastern war just at a time when she was planning to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the French Republic.¹ Neither did she have any desire to be associated in a joint project with Germany.² Furthermore, French relations with Japan prior to 1894 had been very friendly, while Franco-Chinese relations had been strained frequently.³ France at first hesitated and advised Germany that she must reserve her decision should England refuse to participate.⁴ But the new alliance with Russia had to be backed up with deeds to make it lasting, and hence France decided to join with Germany and Russia, even should England persist in remaining aloof.⁵ M. Hanotaux endeavored, without success, to persuade England to change her mind by pointing out to Kimberley the responsibility Britain would assume by refusing to join the "Concert of Europe".⁶ As M. Tardieu has put it, France followed the lead of Russia and Germany "with sheeplike docility", despite vigorous protests from some sections from the press.⁷

¹ *Ibid.*

² M. Goblet, a former Premier, asked, "What shall we have gained by this intervention in which to our great surprise we find ourselves for the first time drawn into acting in concert with Germany." *The Times*, May 15, 1895.

³ Driault, E., *La question d'extrême orient*, p. 301; Leroy Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

⁴ Franke, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

⁵ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. ix, no. 2242, p. 268, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, Apr. 13, 1895; Bourgeois, E. and Pagès, G., *Les origines et les responsabilités de la grande guerre*, pp. 248-253.

⁶ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. ix, no. 2242, p. 268, Hatzfeldt to the Foreign Office, April 13, 1895; Gerard, *Ma mission en Chine*, p. 43.

⁷ Tardieu, A., *France and the Alliances*, p. 18; *Le Soleil* described France's action as "incomprehensible." — *The Times*, Apr. 25, 1895;

England tried to prevent intervention on April nineteenth by suggesting that the two powers jointly ask Japan to submit the authentic text of the peace terms. What action England proposed to take after that was not disclosed. However, M. Lobanov, the Russian Foreign Minister, thought that this would serve no purpose, and besides, the main points had already been communicated to him by the Russian Minister at Tokio. After the agreement with Germany and France, he said, he could not discuss the treaty terms, but if England would join the intervening powers, she would be welcomed with joy by Russia and her two associates.¹

All the persuasive powers of Hatzfeldt were trained upon Lord Kimberley in an effort to get England to join the other powers. In vain did he point out on April twenty-second that England's refusal would strain Anglo-Russian relations. Lord Kimberley knew this. In vain did the German Ambassador call attention to the fact that France would desire a new alienation of Russia and England, even though she was at the time pressing most strenuously at London for England's participation in the triple intervention. Lord Kimberley expected this would be the case. And Count Hatzfeldt wired once more to Berlin on April twenty-second that England would not join.² The next day he had another interview with the British Foreign Minister and met with as little success as he had on the previous day.³

Le Figaro warned that "Russia must not imagine that she can lead us anywhere and everywhere that it may please her to lead us. . . . We had an excellent position in Japan; let us not destroy it."—*The Times*, April 28, 1895.

¹ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. ix, no. 2243, p. 269, Tschirschky to Foreign Office, April 17, 1895.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ix, no. 2248, p. 272, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, April 22, 1895.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 2249, p. 273, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, Apr. 23, 1895.

On April twenty-third the Ambassadors of Russia, France, and Germany presented to Count Hayashi (Japanese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs) the friendly advice that Japan renounce the Liaotung Peninsula.¹ On May first Japan acquiesced, with the reservations that she be allowed to keep the territory until the indemnity had been paid and that she retain permanently the Province of King-Chow (the southern portion of Liaotung which included Port Arthur), whereupon she was told that she must return the entire peninsula, as it had been Port Arthur which had originally caused the protest. The powers would consider the request that she keep the territory until the indemnity had been paid. Japan's suggestion that she be allowed some other portion of the Chinese coast in lieu of the Liaotung Peninsula was rejected.²

Then difficulties arose between the intervening powers. France discovered that Russia had obtained her object in keeping Japan out of Port Arthur, but that the possession by Tokio of the Pescadores Islands would be detrimental to French interests. The Quai d'Orsay thought that either these should be neutral or that Japan should be forbidden to fortify them, and in this proposition secured the cooperation of St. Petersburg. Russia utilized the opportunity to add a few new demands of her own and suggested that Japan be required to give a pledge that the Pescadores be ceded to no other power, and that the indemnity from China be reduced. Lobanov pointed out that these new items should be presented merely as interpretations of the original demands and not as an entirely new proposition. This attitude was taken because the Russian Minister feared that if new demands were made, England would seize the opportunity of

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 2251, p. 274, Gutschmidt to Foreign Office, Apr. 23, 1895.

² *Ibid.*, no. 2258, p. 282, Aufzeichnung of Marschall, May 1, 1895.

entering the discussions and thus reap some of the benefits of the three-power intervention.¹

Germany felt that the three powers had no right to make these new demands upon Japan, especially as the latter on May fifth had given notice of her decision to retrocede the entire Peninsula of Liaotung.² The original intervention, Baron Marschall said, had been made on the sole basis of preventing danger in either Korea or Peking, and to bring the Pescadores into the discussion would be an entirely new proposition which could not be undertaken without England.³ Germany was plainly fearful that a war would break out amongst the powers over the Far Eastern Question and sought to exercise a pacifying influence on all the parties.⁴ Besides endeavoring to hold France and Russia to their original demands, she advised China in forceful language to ratify the Treaty of Shimonoseki,⁵ and she sought to soothe the feelings of Japan by offering to get China to request the retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula.⁶

To the suggestion of England's participation in further discussions, Lobanov strenuously objected, being of the opinion that the three intervening powers alone should receive the fruits of their "intervention." Furthermore, he thought that were England admitted to the "Concert of Powers" at that time, her prestige in the Far East would be enhanced, as the impression would be gathered that nothing could be accomplished without her. This possibility Lobanov wanted to avoid.⁷

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 2265, p. 287, Radolin to Foreign Office, May 9, 1895.

² *Ibid.*, no. 2262, p. 285, Marschall to Emperor William, May 5, 1895.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 2268, p. 290, Aufzeichnung of Marschall, May 11, 1895.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 2269, p. 292, Marschall to Hatzfeldt, May 11, 1895.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 2263, p. 286, Marschall to Schenck, May 6, 1895.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 2262, p. 285, Marschall to Emperor William, May 5, 1895.

⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 2270, p. 293, Radolin to Foreign Office, May 12, 1895.

This difference of opinion between Russia and Germany resulted in negotiations from April until October, during all of which time Germany was vigorously endeavoring to check Russia and make the Japanese exit from Liaotung just as graceful as possible. It was not until October, eighteenth that the three intervening powers² came to an agreement with Japan, whereby the latter promised:

- a. That the Imperial Government regards the Formosan canal as constituting a great maritime route³ of the nations and that in this character, it is consequently outside of its exclusive control or position. The Japanese Government engages not to cede the Islands of Formosa or the Pescadores to any power.
- b. That the Japanese Government has resolved, first, to reduce the amount of the compensatory indemnity for the retrocession of the Feng Tien Peninsula to thirty million taels (\$28,000,000); second, not to make the conclusion of the Trade and Navigation Treaty with China a condition precedent to evacuation of the said peninsula, but to effect the said evacuation within the term of three months as from the date of payment in full by China of the said indemnity of thirty million taels.¹

During these negotiations between Japan and the three intervening powers, England officially advised the Mikado to yield.² Likewise, *The Times* in its leading article of April twenty-fifth held that Japan's wisest policy would be to "give way".³ As a wave of wrath swept over Japan after the intervention, it is quite likely that Tokio would have shown more resistance had she received any encouragement

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 2305, pp. 327-8, Text of Agreement with Japan.

² *Annual Register* (1894), p. 344.

³ When Japan finally deferred to the wishes of the intervening powers, *The Times* said, "We welcome this decision with satisfaction as removing a danger to the peace of the Far East."—July 7, 1895.

from London.¹ But England desired peace in the Far East and gave Japan clearly to understand that nothing more than neutrality might be expected from London.² As Japan endeavored to secure Germany's approval by suggesting that Berlin take a port in South China and also made a vain effort to remove Russia's objections by offering St. Petersburg a free hand in Manchuria, it is quite likely that some offer—probably Chusan—was made to London at the same time.³ Unfortunately, however, the British Government has published no blue book on this point.

Possibly the knowledge that Japan's terms were excessive partly accounted for England's reluctance to support Tokio. On the other hand, it is quite likely also that England's belief that the divergent aims of the three intervening powers would cause the intervention to fail, was one reason why Downing Street refused to support Germany, France, and Russia. Ambassador Hatzfeldt on April eighth quoted Lord Rosebery as saying that he did not believe Russia would go as far as opposing Japan.⁴ *The Times* suggested that the whole matter was "merely an example of diplomatic bluff".⁵ Moreover, both Lord Kimberley and Lord Rosebery felt that mere friendly advice would not be sufficient to force Japan to refrain from annexing Port Arthur.⁶ Pro-

¹ M. S., *La Chine—Expansion des grandes puissances en extrême orient*, p. 35; Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

² Stead, A., *Japan by the Japanese*, p. 204.

³ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. ix, no. 2231, p. 260, Aufzeichnung of Muhlberg, April 2, 1895; Joseph, *op. cit.*, p. 110. Germany rejected Japan's offer as she did not desire to enter England's sphere of interest in China. The Japanese Ambassador at Berlin suggested Chusan as England's share, should each nation acquire a part of China.

⁴ Franke, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

⁵ *The Times*, April 23, 1895.

⁶ Meyendorff, *op. cit.*, no. 12, p. 265, de Staäl to Lobanov, April 3, 1895; no. 17, p. 270, Lobanov to de Staäl, April 12, 1895.

fessor Franke lays considerable emphasis on this point and is of the opinion that had Lord Rosebery known that the three-power intervention would have been successful, England might have participated in the original protest to Japan.¹

It is necessary to point out that the three-power intervention was by no means an anti-English Continental Coalition as has been asserted.² It has already been mentioned that both France and Germany used every means to secure England's adherence and were greatly disappointed that their efforts in this direction were unsuccessful.³ That Russia likewise had no desire to lose touch with England is unmistakably clear, for had St. Petersburg not desired England's participation in the intervention project, there would not have been such an outburst of wrath from Russia when London refused to act against Japan.⁴ But there are further indications of Russia's attitude. On December 27, 1894, the Russian Foreign Minister, de Giers, told the German Ambassador Russia would intervene *in conjunction with England* if Japan's terms were too high.⁵ As late as April 12, 1895, Prince Lobanov "still hoped for England's participation in the intervention project".⁶ In fact Russia was amazed at England's abstention.

In England practically no criticism was leveled at Lord Rosebery for his refusal to participate in the coercion of Japan. There was no Parliamentary debate, and no influ-

¹ Franke, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

² Pinon and Marcillac, *op. cit.*, p. 44; Friedjung, *op. cit.*, p. 149; Bismarck denounced it as an anti-English development of German Foreign Policy, (Hammann, O., *Deutsche Weltpolitik*, p. 42).

³ See pp. 131-2.

⁴ The Russian press "most unmercifully criticized and vilified England," *The Times*, April 26, 1895.

⁵ Franke, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

ential member of any party nor any important journal showed an inclination at the time to have the Prime Minister act against Japan. Later, however, Lord Rosebery was criticized because he did not secure suitable compensation from the three intervening powers for having stood aside while they gained their ends in China.¹ This criticism was intensified when it became apparent later that China resented England's attitude and began to reward the three intervening powers to such an extent that Great Britain's position in the Far East was challenged.

But many factors prevented Lord Rosebery from taking an active part in Japan's behalf even had Tokio so requested. Of primary importance was the fact that the Liberal Party had a very scant majority in the House of Commons and was in daily fear of being thrown out of power. *Punch* called attention to the critical position of the cabinet, when, apropos of Mr. Gladstone's election to the National Microscopic Society, it pictured him using his newly acquired instrument for the purpose of locating the Liberal majority in the House.² Any effort to thwart a combination of France, Germany, and Russia, except on some question of vital interest to the British Empire, would clearly have alienated a considerable following and hence caused the overthrow of the cabinet.³

Furthermore, the general European situation was anything but secure. Armenian atrocities had once more attracted attention, bringing in their train all the jealousies of the powers over the inheritance of the Sultan's dominions.

¹ Chirol, V., *The Far Eastern Question*, p. 3. Lord Salisbury in 1898 told the House of Lords that some concession should have been secured from Russia. (*Hansard, Fourth Series*, vol. lvii, p. 1515.) Sir Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett was very bitter because of Lord Rosebery's action. (*Hansard*, vol. liii, pp. 129-301.)

² *Punch*, December, 1894.

³ Thurston, E. H., *The Earl of Rosebery*, p. 202.

In Africa, France and England were at swords' points over the Egyptian situation, and were also involved in disputes about the Gold Coast region.¹ Clearly this was no time for defying, even with Japanese help, such strong resistance as Germany, France, and Russia could have made.²

Of course the question naturally arises as to whether the three powers would have gone to war with England and Japan had Lord Rosebery decided to interpose his veto on the intervention. Of the three powers, only one (Russia) was in deadly earnest and vitally interested in keeping Japan off the Chinese mainland. The motives back of the action of Germany and France have already been mentioned, and it will be noted that they were not of sufficient importance for them to embark, willingly on a general European War. Hence, the matter depended upon Russia's attitude and, if Russia were bellicose, whether or not France and Germany could dissuade her from carrying the matter to the arbitrament of war.

From the reports of the German Ambassador at Russia, we know that St. Petersburg contemplated military operations by the three powers in the event of a Japanese refusal.³ Count Witte and Baron Rosen corroborate this in their memoirs.⁴ Furthermore, the Russian Admiral, who had orders to act against the Japanese should they prove recalcitrant, suggested to his French colleague that they jointly open attack on the Japanese fleet, but the French commander

¹ Hassall, Arthur, *History of British Foreign Policy*, pp. 327-335.

² When *Le Temps* remarked that England had too many other problems "for a wise government in all lightness of heart to go and stir up a conflict regarding the conquests of Japan and their irrevocability" *The Times* replied, "We quite agree." *The Times*, May 2 and 5, 1895.

³ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. ix, no. 2243, p. 269, Tschirschky to Foreign Office April 17, 1895.

⁴ Yarmolinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 83; Rosen, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 138.

refused to resort to such extreme measures.¹ It is possible that France could not have objected to assisting her in this first test of the new Franco-Russian Alliance, but it is at least within the realm of probability that she would have endeavored to dissuade Russia to desist.

There are several reasons for believing that Germany would not have supported Russia in military action against England and Japan. First, Germany was plainly endeavoring to keep Russia in check with the primary purpose of averting war. Secondly, Baron Marschall, during the long and sometimes bitter discussions on the subject in the spring and summer of 1895, remarked to Count Hatzfeldt that Russia was not at the moment sufficiently strong for a land war against Japan and had better be prudent.² The Grand Duke Alexis also was "impressed with the serious character" of the intervention project.³ It seems quite likely, therefore, that Germany might not have pleased Russia to the extent of waging a war over Far Eastern matters, where she had only limited commercial interests. On the other hand, the matter of prestige must be considered, for Germany would not readily have backed down before an English threat, and if she did, the relations between the two countries would have been embittered for some time.

It will be seen, therefore, that while vigorous action by England might have thwarted the three-power intervention, it would have been a hazardous undertaking, involving either a European war or a serious embitterment of England's relations with the continental countries. Lord Rosebery, as we have said, was the last person to risk a general war on

¹ Wirth, *op. cit.*, p. 149; Leroy-Beaulieu, *op. cit.*, p. 250; Driault, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

² *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. ix, no. 2269, p. 292; Marschall to Hatzfeldt, May 11, 1895.

³ Rosen, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 137.

an issue not of primary importance to the British Empire. Furthermore, such action would have angered China, while at the same time the only benefit—Japan's friendship—was secured by abstaining from the intervention.

The enmity of China, however, was a serious matter for England, as it threw the Middle Kingdom into the arms of Russia and gave Peking the impression that England was afraid of Russia. As a result, Britain, for the first time in the history of her trading relations with China, found her supremacy threatened, because of the added influence Russia acquired at Peking. Yet Lord Rosebery's action has stood the test of time. His non-cooperation with those who sought to wrest the spoils of war from Japan, laid the foundation of Britain's friendship with the Island Empire—an empire which nine years later proved itself strong enough to check Russian penetration into China. In thus removing a fear that for decades had haunted the British Empire, Japan rendered England a service of paramount importance and vindicated the policy of the statesmen who piloted England through that eventful spring of 1895.

CHAPTER III

ENGLAND'S SUPREMACY IS CHALLENGED

ENGLAND FINDS THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION ALTERED

ON June twenty-first 1895 Lord Salisbury succeeded Lord Rosebery as Prime Minister of Great Britain.¹ The new government pursued a two-fold Far Eastern policy, namely, to maintain the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire, and to assure for English trade advantages equal to those enjoyed by any other nation in any part of the Celestial Empire.² Of these two objectives, the latter assumed the major importance, and indeed England's desire to uphold the territorial integrity of China was caused by the fear that if the Peking Government fell, European nations might seize Chinese ports and interfere with British commerce.³

Paradoxical though it may appear, such an attitude was essentially consistent for the nation which had disregarded Chinese territorial integrity in 1842 by annexing Hongkong for the purpose of fostering trade; and which later, as we shall see, virtually invited Russia to occupy a Chinese port and placed only one obstacle in the way of Germany's terri-

¹ *The Times*, June 22, 1895.

² *Edinburgh Review*, July, 1898.

³ "Some foreign power with protectionist principles might dot the coast of China with stations over which they had complete control and through which they would not permit the trade of the world freely to permeate; where they would put up customs barriers or something equivalent, hostile to us and favorable to themselves." Mr. Balfour at Manchester, *The Times*, Jan. 11, 1898.

torial ambitions in China—that she would not encroach upon the region in which England was commercially supreme. Prior to 1894 England had indeed endeavored to keep Korea a vassal state of China, but only because the London officials feared Russia might seize Seoul, thereby gaining a paramount influence over the Peking Government and placing herself in a position to force China to adopt measures hostile to British commercial supremacy. It is evident, therefore, that England considered trade more important than the maintenance of China's territorial integrity.¹

Likewise Britain's desire to uphold the Chinese Government is attributable not to any belief in the excellence of the Manchu Dynasty, but rather to the belief that that dynasty was better than no government. In other words, England feared that should the Peking Government fall, anarchy might result and trade suffer.

While positive disgust at the military impotence displayed by China, coupled with admiration for the unexpected achievements of Japan, had caused England to transfer her sympathy to the Island Kingdom, Great Britain by no means desired to become an enemy of China. But in this case also, the potential trading possibilities of four hundred million Chinese people furnished the impetus, rather than any special interest in the welfare of that vast population.

British writers did not hesitate to admit that the integrity of China was supported merely because it was at the moment the most efficacious method of maintaining commercial supremacy. Illustrative of this view is the following quota-

¹ A second reason for England's desire to uphold the *status quo* in the Far East was, that should China be partitioned, a European war might break out over the spoils. Nevertheless, England was prepared to fight rather than be excluded from China's markets. Hence, trade was considered the most important reason for upholding the territorial integrity of China.

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tion from Sir Valentine Chirol's *The Far Eastern Question* (1896).

Whether the maintenance of the Chinese Empire itself continues to be in the future, as in the past, a matter of British interest, is a question to which China must be left to furnish the answer by her own acts. If her helplessness is such that she may at any moment lapse into the hands of powers who will use her for purposes detrimental to our interests; if she takes no steps to arrest the process of internal decay which must ultimately produce total and immediate collapse from outside, we can hardly be expected to show much concern for the merely nominal independence and integrity of an empire which has survived itself.¹

That British interests lay in the commercial development of China was frankly admitted by Sir Valentine Chirol. Hence, the conclusion to be drawn is that China's territorial integrity should be upheld only if the Peking Government did nothing to injure British commercial interests.

No nation [he wrote] is better equipped than ourselves for conquering a fair share of the profusion of material advantages which must accrue to the trade of the world from the industrial and commercial development of the Chinese Empire, an empire whose population consists of nearly one-fifth of the estimated total of the human race. . . . There is not a single commercial center where our commerce has not struck deeper and firmer roots than that of any other country. We are in fact the people in possession. What we have to do is not only to see that we are neither forcibly ejected nor squeezed out by more subtle means, but also to guard carefully our prospective interests in any estate of growing or perhaps immeasurable value. Those interests are collectively those of the whole community in an empire built up as ours has been on industry and commerce, and individually those of every working man for the

¹ Chirol, Valentine, *The Far Eastern Question*, p. 177.

produce of whose labors our foreign markets must be maintained and extended.¹

Captain Younghusband of subsequent Tibetan fame was another Briton who protested against the "system of proping up China as a buffer against the advance of civilized states", a procedure which he thought like "putting steam into an engine with an old and ignorant man in the box, who may turn it on without any warning and send the engine careering madly along, quite as likely backwards as forwards".²

The potential importance to England of China's trade can best be appreciated when it is understood that in 1896 China took from England and Hongkong goods to the value of only ten cents per capita, while during the same year India took fifty cents, and Japan, seventy-five cents per capita. Japan, therefore, took practically seven times as much English goods per capita as did China.³ Even at this low rate of consumption Britain's share of China's exports and imports was \$155,000,000, and for years had been increasing.⁴ Well might the English look longingly for the day when the Chinaman would be educated into using even half as much British produce as did his Oriental neighbor. Well might the English be particularly antagonistic toward any European nation, such as Russia or France, which threatened to eliminate British influence from the Far East.

Sir Valentine Chirol was but voicing the sentiments of the average Englishman when he wrote in 1896:

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

² Younghusband, F. E., "England's Destiny in China" in the *Contemporary Review*, October, 1898.

³ Hallett, H. S., "British Trade and the Integrity of China" in the *Fortnightly Review*, April, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*

If nature has made Japan rich, she has created China even richer; and if the average value of foreign imports consumed today by every Japanese amounts to nearly three dollars a head, an average consumption of less than sixty cents per head in China can only represent a fractional part of the potential purchasing power of a country endowed with almost inexhaustible wealth. China is still a virgin soil of which we have only scratched the outlying fringe and surface. Even so it yields us an annual trade harvest of a gross value of close upon thirty million pounds. What it may yield when we have obtained security and facility of access to the whole area and have applied to it modern methods of improvement and developed it, goes beyond the dreams of avarice to conceive.¹

Even greater possibilities were anticipated by the *Quarterly Review*:

There can be no doubt [said that publication editorially] about the stakes. It is the destiny of a quarter of the human race that is now on the table with the control, or at least the predominance, of over one-half of the continent of Asia; and in the background, but looming out, there is the future of our Indian Empire and the dominion of the world; for the power that can wield to its purposes the immense latent resources of China will come near to being master of at least two continents of the Eastern Hemisphere.²

Likewise, in official circles emphasis was laid upon the importance of the Chinese trade. Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, assured an audience in May, 1898, that:

It is not a question of a single province; it is a question of the fate of the whole of the Chinese Empire, and our interests in China are so great, our proportion of the trade is so enormous, and the potentialities of that trade are so gigantic, that I feel

¹ *The Far Eastern Question*, p. 175.^c

² January, 1900, p. 6.

that no more vital question has ever been presented for the decision of a government and the decision of a nation.¹

And as Mr. Gibson Bowles enthusiastically told the House of Commons on March 1, 1898:

From the point of view of commerce, there is no country so important to us as China. When I say this I do not except India and I do not even regard Africa. In Africa there is this bar to British commerce, that the people do not wear clothes, and where the people do not wear clothes there is little that you can sell them. In Africa you have to make your market, but in China it is already made. The trade of China is already fifty-five million pounds—I take the latest figures I have, those of 1895—and of this trade thirty-five million pounds is conducted by Great Britain. It is not one-tenth of what it could be and should or will be carried on with China, if only her end is maintained and adequate pressure is put on the Chinese to remove those barriers which alone impede the commerce of today.²

It is quite obvious, therefore, that at the close of the Sino-Japanese War, the fundamental Far Eastern policy of Great Britain was to maintain, and if possible, to increase her commerce with China.³ England's attitude was of course natural in view of her previous record in the Far East. It was she who had exercised the greatest force in breaking down the exclusive spirit of China and forcing the opening of twenty-two ports to European trade. In 1896 Great Britain enjoyed about seventy per cent of the entire Chinese commerce. Bearing in mind the keen competition with which all European nations had to cope in the struggle for existence, England can hardly be blamed for her determination

¹ *Quarterly Review*, Jan., 1900, p. 7.

² *Hansard*, vol. liv, pp. 309-10, March 1, 1898.

³ McCarthy, J., *A History of Our Own Times*, vol. vi, p. 91.

zealously to guard the commercial supremacy which she had built up during the nineteenth century.¹

Great Britain's attitude is all the more intelligible when it is remembered that she asked no exclusive preferential favors, but when once any territory was opened to foreign commerce by her labors, she invited all nations to participate in its advantages. Truly has it been said that where the British trader goes, all the world is free to follow.² The fairness of this proposition can hardly be minimized by the assertion that this offer could safely be made by the nation with which no other country could compete commercially. A people who are capable of making better products, or of producing them more cheaply than their competitors, are rather to be congratulated than castigated.

Other countries, chiefly Russia and France, spurred on by the necessity of getting additional trade, resented England's commercial supremacy in China. Their attitude, moreover, is quite as intelligible as that of Great Britain. Russia had been thwarted by England in every part of the globe, and her adversary now had as Prime Minister one of the very men who had opposed Russia's plans for a large Bulgaria in 1878 and at the Congress of Berlin had torn up the Treaty of San Stefano on which the Muscovite had set his heart. Quite naturally Russia was hostile to Lord Salisbury's Gov-

¹ Mr. Balfour said at Manchester, Jan. 10, 1898, "Inasmuch as our interest in the external trade is eighty per cent of the whole trade of the rest of the world put together, . . . we have a special claim to see that the foreign policy of that country is not directed to the discouragement of foreign commerce."

² "I cannot conceive why we should object to Russia going where it will, provided we are not excluded from going there too—thus when we ask for the great waterways of a country like China to be opened to commerce, it is not to be restricted to our commerce. All the nations of the world will be free to enjoy the privilege." Salisbury in the *Edinburgh Review*, January, 1898.

ernment. Furthermore, Russia, being only on the threshold of her Industrial Revolution, was obviously incapable of competing on the same terms with the nation that had given birth to the factory method. Obviously, Russia's only hope of combating England's commercial supremacy was by avoiding such impossible competition. Hence, she proceeded to erect high tariff barriers around all territory that came under her rule. It must be recognized also that in doing so Russia was adopting the same protective policy, which almost all European powers save England had adopted since 1880, even British possessions like Canada and Victoria falling in line.

M. Novicow ably summed up the Russian viewpoint when he wrote (in 1900) :

If Russia had invariably pursued a churlish and aggressive policy in her relations with England; if she had striven everywhere to thwart the expansion of England's colonial empire, then indeed Russia would have understood that England was merely rendering like for like, and her behavior, however unpleasant, would have been quite comprehensible. But seeing that whereas Russia nowhere opposes the expansion of England, England everywhere resists the expansion of Russia, it is hardly surprising that most Russians cherish for the English a feeling of lively and thoroughly intelligible animosity.¹

Novicow went on to point out that Russia used annually forty-five million dollars' worth of English goods, disproving the assertion that her tariffs eliminated British trade. Even at Odessa, Riga, and Batoum, three-quarters of the vessels were English. Russian penetration of Manchuria, according to Novicow, would be beneficial to Great Britain, as it would open up a region in which British commerce was rather limited at that time. Furthermore, said he, Russia

¹ Novicow, N., "England and Russia" in the *Contemporary Review*, Jan., 1901.

at the start of the century certainly would not have been justified in opposing English expansion in India solely on the ground that the British Empire was a protectionist power at the time. The Russian, moreover, was not even convinced that Russian tariffs were the *raison d'être* of British hostility, because Anglo-Russian antagonism was just as pronounced from 1856 to 1881 when St. Petersburg was pursuing a liberal commercial policy.

A better understanding of the Russian viewpoint will be obtained if one remembers that England had command of the high seas and controlled most of the trade routes. Such important places as Gibraltar, Suez Canal, Ceylon, Malacca, Singapore, and Hongkong were ruled by her.¹ It was but natural, therefore, that the Russians should be anxious to penetrate China by way of the Manchurian land route through which their passage could not be checked by the British navy. Prior to 1895 England's naval supremacy had controlled the front door of China, but by building the Trans-Siberian Railroad, Russia opened the back door. It was obvious that Great Britain's commercial supremacy in the Far East was to be challenged.² This altered situation was thoroughly understood in England and caused considerable anxiety.³

Down to recent years [said the *Quarterly Review* editorially] the position of England as the dominant power at Peking was unquestioned. We were the first in the field; we possessed the bulk of the trade and we held command of the sea by which

¹ Cf. Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, p. 639.

² Mr. Joseph Chamberlain's speech at Birmingham, May 14, 1898.

³ England had ample reason to be apprehensive of Russia's desire to injure British commerce, and indeed Lobanov admitted that the real object of the St. Petersburg Government was to make it impossible for Great Britain to extend her influence in the Far East. See Meyendorff, A., *Correspondence diplomatique du Baron de Staël*, vol. i, no. 22, p. 274, Lobanov to Mohrenheim, Nov. 23, 1895.

alone access to China could be obtained. What was still more important the colonies of Hongkong and Singapore and all the coaling stations enroute were in our hands, so that no hostile fleet could approach China except with our good will. But with the approaching completion of the Siberian Railway and the massing of Russian troops on the Manchurian border, the situation has undergone a radical change. Russia has a frontier coterminous with China for some three thousand miles and can exercise an influence on China against which our sea power, however unquestioned, is of slight avail.¹

It was evident, therefore, that at the close of the century Great Britain was on the defensive in the Far East. Her prestige in China was seriously challenged by Russia, a power which had the support of her ally, France, and occasionally that of Germany. The result was a diplomatic battle of the first magnitude to which we must now turn our attention.²

FRANCE GETS A *Quid Pro Quo*

China's exhibition of military incompetence in her war with Japan precipitated a most undignified scramble of the European powers to secure concessions and favors which the unfortunate Celestial Emperor and his Tsungli Yamen were totally incapable of refusing.³

¹ *Quarterly Review*, Jan., 1900, p. 11.

² "Great Britain wishes to preserve and extend her commercial and trading interests, Russia to extend her dominions. Wherever the Russian flag flies, there the system of absolute Russian autocracy prevails.... It is a naval arsenal, not a commercial port, that she really coveted on the Pacific at the terminus of a railway which is to connect it with the military center of the empire. Russian and English ideals in the matter of expansion and colonization are in sharp contrast." *Edinburgh Review*, July, 1898.

³ Sir Frederick Whyte in his *China and the Powers* stresses the importance of the year 1895 "because it set in motion the process which brought China to the brink of partition by the development of spheres of interest, (or influence), leased territories, concessions, etc.," p. 7.

Less than two months after the ratification of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, France secured compensation for her participation in the three-power intervention which had forced Japan to return the Liaotung Peninsula. On June 20, 1895, two treaties were concluded with the Yamen by M. Gerard, the French Minister at Peking. The first of these treaties called for the cession to France of some territory on the left bank of the Mekong River.¹ By the second, China granted France the following concessions :

1. Lungchow, Mengtse and Ssumao were opened to Franco-Annamite trade. Hokou was to be substituted for Manhao as an open port.
2. France secured permission to keep a consular agent at Tongking.
3. Chinese merchandise passing through Annam was to be subject to a four-tenths reduction in the customary tariff.
4. China agreed to call upon French manufacturers and engineers in the first instance for the exploitation of mines in the Provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung.
5. Annamite railroads might be continued on Chinese territory after preliminary agreement.
6. In the telegraph system, a junction was to be made between the secondary prefecture of Ssumao and Annam by two stations which were specified as Ssumao in China and Muanghahin in Annam, midway between Laichow and Luang Prabang.²

In view of England's efforts to open up China to the commerce of the world, one would expect that Britain would be sympathetic to any effort of France to increase the number of Chinese treaty ports. In this case, however, the ports opened would be accessible only via routes controlled by France.³ By making such a treaty with China, France was

¹ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, France and China, June 20, 1895, pp. 28-30.

² *Ibid.*

³ Sargent, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

obviously trying to arrange matters so that the trade of the three Provinces of Yunnan, Kweichow, and Kwangsi would be diverted down the Red River to French Indo-China, rather than eastward to the British emporia of Hongkong and Shanghai.¹ This was the reason for the preferential tariff on Chinese goods going through Annam.²

The English, however, saw the significance of the French designs and vigorously protested even before the treaties were signed, on the ground that France was obtaining exclusive privileges in violation of the most-favored-nation clause.³ This was true, but it must be remembered that the Red River was the natural route for the trade of Yunnan, and so long as the West River was closed, railways could bring the trade from Kweichow and Kwangsi to Indo-China just as easily as it could be brought to Shanghai or Hongkong. The route from Kweichow and Yunnan to French Indo-China is certainly shorter than the route to Shanghai and Hongkong. The French knew that it was possible to divert trade to Indo-China because a commercial expedition had been over the ground and had pointed out its possibilities.⁴ Even the British press admitted that the French plans might be successful in diverting commerce to Indo-China.⁵

But England objected to the Franco-Chinese treaties for a second and equally important reason, namely, that the land ceded to France by China (the Mekong Territory) had been turned over to the Peking Government by Great Britain on

¹ The demand for French preference in mining projects in Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwanatung was considered by England as a violation of the most-favored-nation clause.

² Hence the demand which France later made to force the Chinese to render the Red River navigable.

³ Joseph, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

⁴ Duc d'Orleans, *Autour du Tonkin*.

⁵ *Edinburgh Review* Jan., 1896, pp. 254-5.

March 1, 1894, on condition that it would never be ceded to any third power without Britain's consent. China had not kept this promise.¹

Although China had not lived up to her treaty with Great Britain, it is quite obvious that the Peking Government desired neither to hand over to France any of its territory nor to incur the enmity of England by so doing. The poor Yamen was caught between two crushing forces. On the one hand, Gerard, the French Minister at Peking, threatened them if they did not hand over the Mekong territory, and on the other hand, O'Connor, the British Minister, warned them of England's wrath if they did. Gerard gives a very vivid picture of his negotiations with the Yamen at the time and relates that the argument which finally persuaded China to yield to France was the threat that otherwise the Paris and St. Petersburg Governments would refuse to loan the money necessary to pay off the indemnity to Japan. The Russian Minister had orders to support the French demands.² Who will question the wisdom of China's decision to yield to the combined strength of Russia and France, especially when those two countries had befriended her in 1895?

The desire of the French to secure a share of Britain's Hongkong and Shanghai commerce is just as intelligible as England's determination to prevent that possibility. Realizing that it would be useless to deal directly with Britain on the subject, and finding China impotent in 1895, the French Government descended upon Peking to secure trading privileges which they would not dare demand from a powerful nation. It must be borne in mind also that France had experienced the Industrial Revolution long before 1895,

¹ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 4, Great Britain and China, March 1, 1894, Art. V.

² Gerard, *Ma mission en chine*, pp. 77-8.

and, unlike Russia, could not plead inability to cope with industrial England.

Another phase of French activity in Indo-China disturbed England. It was well known in London that France aimed eventually to secure control over the Provinces of Yunnan, Kweichow, and Kwangsi. Such an eventuality would have the effect of inserting a wedge of separation between Burma and China, thereby throttling the trade with India. England could not be expected to sit idly by while her trade routes were thus being severed.

First, she made the Salisbury-Courcel agreement with France on January 15, 1896, whereby any privileges secured by either country in Yunnan or Szechuan would be shared by both countries. Then she turned upon the helpless Yamen with demands for compensation.¹ China complied with England's terms, and by a treaty signed on February 4, 1897, granted the following concessions:

1. The boundary between China and Burma to be rectified.
2. Railways to be built in Yunnan when justifiable and to be connected with those of Burma.
3. Britain to secure the right to station Consuls at Momeim or Shunning-fu instead of Manwyne—also to station one at Ssumao.
4. British to be granted permission to establish themselves and trade at these places under the same conditions as at the treaty ports in China.
5. The West River to be opened to commerce.²

These concessions were chiefly of a nature to facilitate the gravitation of Chinese trade down the West River to Hong-kong and Shanghai, and to eliminate the possibility of its going down the Red River toward French Indo-China.

¹ Hsu, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

² MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 94.

The concessions were modeled on the French demands but England omitted the points regarding railways, mining rights and tariff reduction.¹

CHINA BORROWS FROM FRANCE AND RUSSIA

Owing 230,000,000 taels indemnity to Japan and incapable of raising this sum at home, China was beset with a host of eager lenders. It being obvious that China would need a foreign loan, the English Government at the close of the Sino-Japanese War took up the matter with the Yamen and was informed that China intended to raise thirty-five million pounds, of which they had promised to borrow eight million pounds from Russia. France and Germany had also been anxious to lend money. Her Majesty's Government thereupon informed the Russian, French, and German Governments that they were necessarily deeply interested in the matter but that they only desired a scheme by which all parties concerned might be satisfied.²

Russia vigorously objected to Great Britain's making a loan to China and forestalled any such eventuality by herself

¹ "The only effective reply to the French claims was to be found in the grant of counter-concessions by China to England." Sargent, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

² *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, vol. i, no. 1, p. 1. Memorandum by Mr. Tilley, Jan. 14, 1905.

British distrust of any Russian loan is illustrated by a cartoon in *Punch* (June 22, 1895). It shows China taking sixteen million pounds in money from the Russian bear and saying, "Much obliged for this little advance but I shall want some more again." To which the bear replies, "So shall I! A good deal more from you."

Mr. Curzon wrote in the 1896 edition of his *Problems of the Far East*, "Russia does not render this assistance from a superfluity of unselfishness or for no end. She has her price and she will receive her reward. That reward will invoke the still further enfeeblement of the victim for whose inheritance she is waiting and to whose invalid gasps she prescribes with tender hand the dose that imparts a transient spasm of vitality to be followed presently by an even more profound collapse." Ronaldshay, *The Life of George Curzon*, vol. i, p. 276.

taking care of Peking's financial needs. By using powerful influence with the Yamen, a Russo-French syndicate on July 6, 1895, was successful in lending China approximately \$30,000,000 at the low interest rate of four per cent.¹ Moreover, the Russian Government by a supplementary agreement guaranteed the service of the bonds.² China agreed not to negotiate another loan for a period of six months, thereby enabling Russia to prevent, for at least half a year any further participation in Chinese finances by other foreign powers. On the other hand, the Czar's Government secured no authority to interfere with the Chinese Maritime Customs except in case China defaulted in her payments on the loan. Wille admitted to the Austrian Ambassador that he hoped this contingency would occur.³

By the terms of the supplementary agreement China agreed "not to grant to any Foreign Power any right or privilege under any name whatsoever concerning the supervision or administration of any of the revenues of the Chinese Empire. But in case the Chinese Government should grant to any one power rights of this character, it is understood that from the mere fact of their being so granted, they should be attended to the Russian Government". By incorporating such a clause in the treaty Russia showed her determination even to prevent any increase of Britain's control over the Chinese Imperial Customs.⁴

The negotiation of a Russo-Chinese loan at a time when the arrangements for the retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula had not yet been completed, caused much indig-

¹ Morse, *International Relations* vol. iii, p. 53.

² *Ibid.*

³ *R. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 1, p. 1, Memorandum by Mr. Tilley, Jan. 14, 1895.

⁴ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 401. Russia and China, July 6, 1895. Art. IV.

nation in Germany and resulted in Berlin's supporting the British opposition at Peking. But Russia was able to force her loan upon China, British, and German objections notwithstanding.¹ So angrily did Sir Nicholas O'Connor protest against this loan that China demanded his recall and in October, 1895, he was transferred to St. Petersburg.² Sir Claude MacDonald, a military officer then doing service in Africa, was thereupon appointed British representative at Peking, a selection which caused considerable censure at the time, on the ground that at such a crucial period, Salisbury should have replaced O'Connor with a man who had already demonstrated diplomatic ability.³

British prestige in China was undoubtedly undermined by this Russian loan of 1895 because during the course of this loan — thirty-six years — there would be the ever-present danger that China would default on the payments and thereby give Russia the power to interfere with the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs. By gaining an influence over Sir Robert Hart's department, Russia could force the adoption of measures which would react disadvantageously upon British commerce. It was fear of losing the China trade which motivated England to oppose Russia so vigorously in the Far East. However, the terms of the Russian loan of 1895 might have been even more inimical to British interests as the preliminary draft contained a clause which had promised Russia equal participation in all future loans.⁴ Fortunately

¹ "No eastern rulership ever throve under European patronage or shook off the deadly incubus of European debt. . . . At Peking the golden bait has just been swallowed, yet the floundering of the government shows that it already feels the hook," *Edinburgh Review*, Jan., 1896.

² Steiger, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

³ Whates, H., *The Third Salisbury Administration*, p. 108.

⁴ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 1, p. 1, Memorandum by Mr. Tilley, Jan. 14, 1905.

for England, this clause was deleted before the agreement was signed.

CHINA MAKES AN ALLIANCE WITH RUSSIA

While France had been active in southern China, Russia had been advancing her interests in Manchuria. Vladivostok had been selected as the terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. But this port would not be an ideal terminus, as it was ice-bound four months in the year. In addition to this handicap, the construction of a railway if carried through Russian territory to Vladivostok would involve serious engineering difficulties, because it would traverse a mountainous country and would have to make a circuitous bend around the River Amur.¹ Even were these difficulties overcome, a road to Vladivostok through Russian territory would pass through a sparsely inhabited territory and therefore would be less profitable when built.

For these reasons Russia looked longingly at Manchuria, a fertile province through which the line to Vladivostok could be built without any of the aforementioned engineering difficulties.² Another advantage of the Manchurian route was that it would shorten the distance from Moscow to Vladivostok by more than three hundred miles.³ Consequently, there was nothing remarkable in this Russian desire to have the Trans-Siberian traverse Manchuria. Russia, therefore, sought to secure China's approval to run the railroad through Manchuria to Vladivostok as compensation for St. Petersburg's share in the three-power intervention of 1895. For the accomplishment of this aim, negotiations were started at Peking by Count Cassini, the Russian representative to China in 1896. The treaty was signed in the

¹ Witte, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

² *Ibid.*

³ Trevelyan, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

same year at Moscow by Counts Lobanov and Witte on the one hand, and Li Hung Chang on the other.¹

Russia, it seems, suggested to the Chinese Government that it would be appreciated if the Celestial Emperor appointed a Prince to represent him at the coronation of Czar Nicholas II.² This was, however, contrary to Chinese customs and Russia therefore agreed to the appointment of Li Hung Chang, who accordingly went to Russia in 1896.³ By way of impressing upon him the grandeur of the Russian Empire, and supposedly also to flatter his vanity, Li was met at Port Said by a Russian warship and, upon debarking at Odessa, was conducted in royal splendor to Moscow by a Russian Prince.⁴

While at Moscow the aged Viceroy signed a treaty in May, 1896, by which the government of the Czar and that of China agreed jointly to resist any aggression made by Japan on the Asiatic dominions of either power.⁵ Russia's designs on Korea were indicated by the fact that any Japanese attack on that kingdom was to be resisted by both China and Russia.⁶ When once the treaty was signed, Russia claimed that she could not protect China without building railroads over which to transport troops to the Far East. China agreed to allow Russia to traverse Manchuria with the Chinese Eastern, the use of which Russia was to have for transporting troops and stores in peace and war.⁷

This agreement was kept secret and after concluding it,

¹ Witte, *op. cit.*, chap. iv.

² Cordier, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 299.

³ Michie, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 387.

⁴ Little, Mrs. Archibald, *Li Hung Chang, His Life and Times*, p. 257.

⁵ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 81; *Conference on the Limitation of Armaments*, U. S. Government Printing Office, p. 1414.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

the Viceroy continued on his journey, and received further proof that in Europe "as in China a bargain is a bargain and that nothing can be had for nothing".¹ At Berlin he was told that Germany deserved compensation for helping to restore the Liaotung Peninsula to China and that the Emperor at Peking could show his appreciation by giving Germany a port from which trade could be more energetically carried on.² In England Li endeavored to secure approval for an increase of China's import duties from five to ten per cent, but he found that a *quid pro quo* would be necessary, involving the grant of greater trade facilities.³

Well might Li return to Peking satisfied that Russia was China's only friend. All the other powers had desired to secure advantages, whereas the Russians had given a definite pledge of protection against the haughty Japanese. In an interview with the *Daily Telegraph* fifteen years later, Li's son gave it as his opinion that Li had agreed to the Manchurian Railroad solely because otherwise he would not have secured the treaty of alliance which he considered necessary for the welfare of the Chinese Empire.⁴ Furthermore, Russia and her ally France represented the strongest combination of powers, and it was therefore to China's advantage to cultivate the friendship of the Dual Alliance rather than that of England. It is not surprising that Li agreed to Russia's requests.

England herself was partially responsible for thrusting Li into the waiting arms of Russia. By standing quietly aside while the three continental powers had torn up the Treaty

¹ *The Spectator*, August 8, 1896.

² *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3663, p. 27, *Aufzeichnung* of Marschall, June 19, 1896.

³ *The Spectator*, August 8, 1896.

⁴ *Daily Telegraph*, Feb. 15, 1910.

of Shimonoseki in 1895, Great Britain not only had deserted China, her former friend, but had given Peking the impression that the British Government was unable to assert its rights—and nothing is better respected by the Oriental than ability to use force. There are several indications that Li resented England's failure to assist China to recover the Liaotung Peninsula. Sir Valentine Chirol found him very bitter for what he termed desertion.¹ Baron Marschall in reporting the interview he had with the Viceroy in Berlin in 1896, wrote that Li spoke of English foreign policy as "selfish, shortsighted and weak".² Lord Beresford reported constantly hearing it said in China that England would not oppose Russia and that the latter power, being stronger than England, was the logical one for China to please.³ The result was that in 1896 England had to cope with a China led by Russia. From the British standpoint, the Celestial Empire "had passed over to the other side".⁴

RUSSIA PENETRATES CHINA PEACEFULLY

In anticipation of the loan and railway agreements of 1896, Russia in the preceding year had organized the Russo-Chinese Bank. The headquarters of the organization were at St. Petersburg and branches were established at Shanghai and elsewhere in China. Not only could it carry on ordinary banking business, but with the consent of the Chinese Gov-

¹ Chirol, V., *Fifty Years in a Changing World*, p. 185.

² *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3663, p. 27, Aufzeichnung of Marschall, June 19, 1890.

³ Beresford, *op. cit.*, pp. 21, 117.

⁴ *The Edinburgh Review*, January, 1896. England by becoming friendly with Japan naturally alienated Li, who cherished deep animosity for the nation that had humiliated him. Russia, Japan's enemy, was the more logical friend of Li than was England since the latter was becoming increasingly favorable to Japan.

ernment it could collect taxes, coin money, and obtain grants of railway and telegraph concessions.¹

The bank was originated by Count Witte, who had conceived the idea of peacefully penetrating Manchuria in such a manner that neither China nor European nations would be alarmed.² To this bank was entrusted the task of forming the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, which was in turn to construct the line across Manchuria.³ Two agreements covered these arrangements, one between China and the Russo-Chinese Bank,⁴ and the other between Russia and the Chinese Eastern Railway Company.⁵ In effect the Chinese Eastern Railway was to all intents and purposes under the control of the Russian Government. Most important from England's viewpoint was the following provision:

Merchandise imported from Russia into China by the railway, and likewise merchandise exported from China into Russia by the same route, will respectively pay the import and export duty of the Chinese Maritime Customs, less one-third.

If merchandise is transported into the interior it will pay in addition the transit duty—equivalent to a half of the import duty collected—which frees it from any further charge.⁶

Obviously, this was tantamount to giving Russian land-borne trade advantages over the British ocean-borne traffic. It also indicated an effort on the part of Russia to free her trade from the burdensome inland taxes with which British merchants had to cope.

¹ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 1, p. 1, Memorandum by Mr. Tilley, Jan. 14, 1905.

² Dillon, E. J., *The Eclipse of Russia*, p. 245.

³ *Russia* # 1, (1898).

⁴ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 74.

⁵ *Russia* # 1, (1898).

⁶ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 77.

It will be seen that a vigorous double assault had been launched against England's commercial supremacy in the Far East. From the north came Russia creeping through Manchuria, threatening to gain virtual control over the Peking Government and endangering British trade in northern China, if not throughout the entire empire. From the south came France, likewise determined to gain trade at England's expense.

This was a difficult situation for Downing Street. To oppose either France or Russia was to oppose both, for the Dual Alliance was functioning harmoniously. England could not cope single-handed with this combination. But to whom could she turn? The United States was irritated by the Venezuelan controversy and was very much opposed to foreign alliances.¹ Germany, Russia and France presented the only European possibilities. Italy and Austria-Hungary did not count in the Far East. England turned first to Russia, then to Germany, and finally, to Japan after both European countries had refused her conciliatory offers.

ENGLAND SECURES TWO IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS

In March, 1896, China once more was in need of money. On the twenty-third of that month, Germany, still resenting the fact that Russia and France had excluded her from the 1895 loan, joined with England in granting China a loan of \$80,000,000.² Financial difficulties in France and Russia at the time prevented any effective resistance to these negotiations.

In 1897 China required another \$80,000,000, and this

¹ England secured some assistance from the United States in 1898 when Secretary Hay sent his Open Door Note to the powers having interests in Asia, see p. 291.

² *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 1, p. 1. Memorandum of Mr. Tilley, Jan. 14, 1905.

time the powers vied with each other for the coveted privilege of being China's creditor. *Punch* aptly illustrated the situation by a cartoon showing all the powers seated around a table bidding for one card (the loan) held by a Chinese who says, "Who wanchee buy dis piecee sixteen million carde? No allee speakee samee time".¹

On December 22, 1897, Sir Claude MacDonald, the British Minister at Peking, learned that Russia had offered to make a loan to China at four per cent, payment to be secured by the likin revenue and to be guaranteed by Russia. As compensation, Russia would require permission to build and control all railroads in Manchuria and northern China. Equally important was St. Petersburg's demand that a Russian be appointed as Sir Robert Hart's successor when the post of Inspectorate General of Customs became vacant. Of course such a demand evoked a vigorous protest from the British. China turned to England and was told by Lord Salisbury that England would grant the necessary loan if China would undertake:²

- (1) to allow necessary control of the revenue to ensure repayment of the loan;
- (2) to sanction the building of a railway from the Burmese frontier to the Yangtze Valley;
- (3) to guarantee not to cede any territory in the Yangtze Valley to any other power;
- (4) to make Talienwan, Nanning, and Hsiangton treaty ports;
- (5) to permit greater freedom of internal trade;
- (6) to free foreign goods from likin duties in the treaty ports.

A glance at these demands will show that England also

¹ January 15, 1897.

² *China* # 1 (1898), no. 26, p. 9, MacDonald to Salisbury, December 22, 1897; no. 30, p. 10, Salisbury to MacDonald, Dec. 28, 1897; no. 32, p. 11, MacDonald to Salisbury, December 30, 1897.

was taking advantage of China's financial embarrassment to extort from her, commercial privileges which had nothing to do with security for the loan in question. Just as Russia in 1895 had endeavored to gain control of Manchuria by lending China money, in like manner did England now use the very same circumstances to strengthen her commercial interests in the Yangtze Valley.

It will be remembered that England had asserted her interest in the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire, but here was the first instance of her endeavor to establish a special claim to a certain region—the Yangtze Valley. If England could complain of Russia's marking out Manchuria as a special sphere of influence, Russia with some truth could now say that England was showing a similar interest in an even wealthier portion of China.

England's request that Talienwan be opened as a treaty port was a direct challenge to Russia. It was also a trifle inconsistent, inasmuch as Britain previously had given Russia permission to occupy a Chinese port,¹ and Talienwan was about the only place available. Were Talienwan opened as a treaty port, Russia would be less likely to occupy it. Hence Great Britain had really told Russia that she might take a suitable place on the Chinese coast, and then proceeded to eliminate the only available port by asking that it be made a treaty port. Russia correctly considered it a repudiation of the prior promise.

France also protested against England's loan terms. Premier Hanotaux told the British Ambassador at Paris that "in the event of an isolated loan guaranteed on the part of Her Majesty's Government, there would be risk of a good deal of jealousy in other quarters".² Germany, however,

¹ See pp. 212-14.

² *China* # 1 (1898), no. 50, p. 17, Monson to Salisbury, Jan. 12, 1898.

was anxious to avoid England's objections to her Far Eastern program (the seizure of Kiao-Chow)¹ and doubtless remembered also the treatment she had received from Russia and France in the loan negotiations of 1895. Therefore, the Berlin Government told the British Foreign Office that they would raise no objections if England were successful in securing the loan.²

But the greatest protest came from Russia. The demand that Talienwan be opened as a treaty port, aroused her wrath and her Minister at Peking told the Yamen that compliance with it would incur the hostility of St. Petersburg. It would be amusing, were it not so tragic for the Peking Government, to note that the British Minister, when told by the Yamen of their plight, had no other comfort for them than to express surprise that they could not open a port where they pleased within their borders.³ He well knew that China was no longer the master of her own destinies and should have known that his arguments should have been given to Pavloff, the Russian Minister, and not the helpless Yamen.

Upon learning from the Chinese Minister in London that Li Hung Chang thought the British terms, with the exception of the Talienwan clause, were preferable to those of Russia,⁴ Lord Salisbury changed the demand regarding Talienwan to read that it should be opened as a treaty port if ever a railway were built connecting it with the interior.⁵ This change really meant very little, for without railways, the port would be useless as a commercial project. The Prime Minister admitted this himself.⁶ Nevertheless, the

¹ See p. 192.

² *China* # 1 (1898), no. 60, p. 23, Salisbury to Lascelles, Jan. 19, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 51, p. 18, MacDonald to Salisbury, Jan. 16, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 57, p. 22, Salisbury to MacDonald, Jan. 17, 1898.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 56, p. 21, Salisbury to MacDonald, Jan. 17, 1898.

⁶ *Halsard*, vol. liii, p. 40, Salisbury in the House of Lords, Feb. 9, 1898.

altered demand constituted a direct backdown before a Russian threat, since Lord Salisbury had previously said that the request for the immediate opening of Talienwan would be relinquished only with regret.¹ He realized no doubt that insistence upon the original demand would cause the loan negotiations to fail.

Despite this change in England's demands, the fact that an attempt had been made to open Talienwan to trade angered Russia considerably. On January sixteenth Count Muravief told the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that England's action could not be regarded as friendly.² Ten days later another protest was made.³

Despite Russian and French protests, however, England's efforts were successful. On January twenty-first the Yamen agreed to grant the following concessions in return for a loan of eighty million dollars.⁴ London's original offer had been for only sixty millions, as that was all that was required to pay off the Japanese indemnity.⁵

- a. Nanning and Hsiangton were to be opened to trade. The Yamen was to give assurance that Talienwan would be opened if ever a railway were constructed connecting it with the interior.
- b. British subjects were to be allowed to use steamers wherever they were by treaty then allowed to use native boats.
- c. Upon application of any British Consul, the Chinese provincial authorities were to supply details of all inland tariffs on merchandise from treaty ports to any specified place in the interior, and China was to consider what other steps could be taken to improve internal trade.

¹ *China # 1* (1898), no. 56, p. 21, Salisbury to MacDonald, Jan. 17, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, no. 61, p. 23, O'Connor to Salisbury, Jan. 19, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 72, p. 29, O'Connor to Salisbury, Jan. 26, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 62, p. 23, MacDonald to Salisbury, Jan. 21, 1898.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 46, p. 16, MacDonald to Salisbury, Jan. 8, 1898.

- d. When the Burmese railway was built to the Chinese frontier, China was to agree to its extension by a British company into Chinese territory to a point and under regulations to be arranged by the two governments.
- e. China was to guarantee not to alienate any portion of the Yangtze Valley to any other power.
- f. China was to come to an arrangement with regard to the extent of likin exemption area beyond the foreign concessions.¹

These terms are substantially the same as those previously mentioned except that they prescribe the specific ways in which China was to facilitate trade. Salisbury made no comment on these proposals except to urge that the loan be kept if possible at the original figure of \$60,000,000.²

France, however, immediately protested. Desirous, as we have seen, of diverting the trade of Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kweichow via the Red River to French Indo-China, and of driving a wedge between Burma and China, France was not anxious to see British traders get permission to go as far up the West River as Nanning. She also saw disaster to her plans in the clause calling for railways between Burma and China. Consequently, the French Minister, M. Gerard, asked the Yamen to eliminate these two clauses. The Russian Minister naturally supported his French colleague.³

Those who still cling to the idea that England, alone of the nations interested in the Far East, did not coerce China, should read Sir Claude MacDonald's account of his meeting with the Yamen regarding these protests.

I pointed out [wrote the British Minister] the very serious responsibility and danger they were incurring in listening to

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 62, p. 23, MacDonald to Salisbury, Jan. 21, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, no. 64, p. 24, Salisbury to MacDonald, Jan. 24, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 65, p. 24, MacDonald to Salisbury, Jan. 25, 1898.

such protests. They had asked us to guarantee a loan and we had consented to do so. Our financial terms were most generous and the concessions demanded were specially chosen so as not to offend susceptibility or clash with the interests of any other power, and were for the benefit of China as well as for all foreign nations. If, after all that had passed, China now renounced our offer of a loan, she must be prepared to take the consequences.¹

As a matter of fact there was both falsehood and threat in this communication. The loan terms proposed by Great Britain were chosen to facilitate British trade and not out of any feeling for the well-being of China. Furthermore, MacDonald, who had initiated the Talienwan clause, must have inserted it for the primary purpose of checking the Russian advance through Manchuria, and he must have known that it would offend that country. The same is true of the clauses to which France objected.

In despair China showed wisdom for which she is seldom given credit in proposing to extricate herself from the predicament by suggesting that England and Russia divide the loan.² China's proposition was considered by England, because it so happened that just at this time Lord Salisbury, growing weary of the Russian menace, had been endeavoring to come to an agreement with Russia on all outstanding questions. After considering China's proposition, however, England rejected it, because if Britain supplied only half the loan, her justification for demanding the favorable trading concessions would be reduced by half. Furthermore, by granting half the loan Russia would be in a position to force the Yamen to grant more concessions to St. Petersburg. Of course England did not wish Russia to get this additional grip upon China.³ Hence Lord Salisbury vetoed the Chi-

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*, no. 69, p. 26, MacDonald to Salisbury, Jan. 28, 1898.

³ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 14, p. 11, Salisbury to O'Connor, Feb. 8, 1898.

nese suggestion and wrote Sir Claude MacDonald that Russia likewise seemed against the proposal.¹

Nevertheless, the British Minister at St. Petersburg advised the Russian Government of the terms England was demanding from China in return for a loan.² Russia thereupon asked that as compensation she receive Talienwan and Port Arthur.³ England did not feel that she would be getting a good bargain and refused this offer.⁴ Salisbury, it would seem, made a mistake on this point, for, as we shall see later, Russia successfully blocked the British loan, and in addition, secured a lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan, despite British objections.⁵

Meanwhile Russia consistently opposed the English loan at Peking on the ground that it would disturb the balance of power in the Far East.⁶ Her Minister at Peking had gone so far as to tell the Yamen that if they accepted the British offer it would "entail an interruption in the friendly relations existing between the two empires".⁷ Whereupon China once again showed wisdom in refusing to borrow from either Russia or England.⁸ She would endeavor to come to some arrangement with Japan which would make it unnecessary to pay off the indemnity immediately.

Such effective opposition aroused the ire of Lord Salisbury, but, in the usual manner, he vented his anger upon the Yamen instead of St. Petersburg. His instructions to Sir Claude MacDonald read as follows:

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 15, p. 11, Salisbury to MacDonald, Feb. 11, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 16, p. 11, O'Connor to Salisbury, Feb. 12, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 1, p. 1, Memorandum of Mr. Tilley, Jan. 14, 1905.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ See page 210.

⁶ *China # 1* (1898), no. 65, p. 24, MacDonald to Salisbury, Jan. 25, 1898.

⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 79, p. 33, Salisbury to O'Connor, Feb. 4, 1898.

⁸ *Ibid.*

If the Chinese Government enter into negotiations for obtaining a loan from European financiers, Her Majesty's Government must insist on an adequate share being assigned to British banks, and if you consider such a step advisable, you are authorized to give the Tsungli Yamen a very serious warning to this effect, and to state that the friendly relations existing between the two countries will be seriously imperilled if there should be any appearance of excluding this country.¹

This was harsh language from a friendly power. Quite obviously England was thoroughly aroused and determined to secure some of the suggested concessions, "loan or no loan".² Upon being informed of the Chinese declination to borrow, MacDonald told the Yamen that he would require an assurance in writing that the Inspectorate General of Customs would always be an Englishman.³ England could afford to press this point because Germany had officially advised that in this matter she would support England.⁴

Great Britain has always felt that as she contributed three-quarters of the revenue of the Maritime Customs, she could insist on its head being an Englishman. In Sir Robert Hart this department then had as its head a man who felt himself obligated to look after the interests of his Chinese employers, for it must be remembered that he reported directly to the Chinese Government.⁵ As Russian commercial interests in China were negligible, it would have been unfair had a Russian been placed in charge of the regulation

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 80, p. 33, Salisbury to MacDonald, Feb. 5, 1898.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 11, p. 4, Gough to Salisbury, Nov. 29, 1897.

⁵ Soothill, W. E., *China and England*, p. 115; "The said Inspector General is versed in commercial matters, just in his dealings, experienced and upright, faithful and sincere, a man on whom reliance can be placed and China has in the past leant much upon him," Yamen to MacDonald, Feb. 10, 1898.

of customs, and hence in a position to set up numerous tariff barriers against English commerce. By revealing her intention to eliminate English influence from the Maritime Customs, Russia gave England cause to ask that a British subject always have charge of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs. The Yamen granted this request on February 10, 1898, with the proviso that an Englishman be appointed only so long as English trade should be greater than that of any other nation.¹

As it was equally important to British trading interests that the Yangtze Valley be ceded to no other power, MacDonald demanded that China give assurance to this effect. The Yamen did so on February thirteenth. It is commonly supposed that this agreement bound China not to cede the Yangtze Valley to any power other than England. This is an error. The promise bound China not to alienate this territory to any power, including England.² Great Britain did not want to annex any part of the Yangtze Valley, but she did desire to prevent any other power from doing so.³

Nevertheless, the making of such a request showed that England was retreating from her old policy of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire, and was staking out a claim in the Yangtze Valley. England's demand has been likened to asking a man to promise never to cut out his own heart, for the Yangtze Valley was really the heart of China. It was quite obvious that China would never cede this territory to any power except under duress. Hence, the Yamen's pledge was of use only so long as

¹ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 105, Yamen to MacDonald, Feb. 13, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 104, Yamen to MacDonald, Feb. 11, 1898.

³ "England must effectively occupy the Yangtze region and southern China, if she seriously means to hold her own," Colquhoun, A. R., *China in Transformation*, p. 140. But for England's official attitude, see pp. 222-3.

Great Britain possessed sufficient strength to force other European countries to respect China's promise.

By the Yangtze non-alienation agreement, China bound herself not to cede "any territory in the provinces adjoining the Yangtze".¹ This would give England a legal basis for preventing any hostile power from ever inveigling China into leasing or otherwise alienating even a port in England's special sphere of interest. No wonder Lord Salisbury was immensely pleased with his Minister's work, and indeed MacDonald well deserved the thanks which the Prime Minister wired to him as follows on February 14, 1898:

You have obtained very valuable concessions and are greatly to be congratulated on the skill and perseverance you have shown.²

So important did the British Foreign Office consider MacDonald's work that Under Secretary Tilley wrote on January 14, 1905:

These concessions having been secured, both the loan and the understanding with Russia became matters of comparative indifference to Her Majesty's Government and the negotiations dropped.³

This is, however, not strictly in keeping with the truth, for the *British Documents on the Origins of the War* indicate that the Anglo-Russian negotiations for a *rapprochement* early in the year 1898 failed because of St. Petersburg's displeasure over the granting of a loan to China on March 1, 1898 by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation in conjunction with the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank.⁴

¹ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 104, Yamen to MacDonald, Feb. 11, 1898.

² *China # 1 (1898)*, no. 86, p. 40, Salisbury to MacDonald, Feb. 14, 1898.

³ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 1, p. 1, Memorandum of Mr. Tilley, Jan. 14, 1905.

⁴ *Ibid.*, see p. 238.

Furthermore, the Parliamentary Blue Book of 1898 shows that the English Government loan of 1898 was dropped not willingly by the British Foreign Office but solely because of the refusal of China to borrow, which refusal was in turn induced by fear of Russia.¹

BRITISH BANKERS MAKE A LOAN TO CHINA

The objections of Russia and France had prevented the English Government making a loan to China in 1898, but a private British concern stepped in and not only secured the loan, but also obtained an exceedingly important commercial concession.

On February 19, 1898, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, in cooperation with the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, signed a preliminary agreement to loan China \$80,000,000, on condition that certain likin collectorates be placed under the supervision of Sir Robert Hart.² Likin, it must be understood, was the internal tax levied upon merchandise going to the interior of China and had been authorized at the time of the Taiping Rebellion in 1853 when the Chinese Government was financially embarrassed.³ There seemed to be no set amount to be collected but barriers were set up here and there in the interior of China apparently with the sole purpose of collecting as much as possible.⁴ Hence, every British merchant who ever visited China complained of the injustice of this tax, and predicted a great increase in commerce were the tax subjected to some efficient control.⁵

The definite agreement between China and the Bank was

¹ *China # 1* (1898), no. 79, p. 33, Salisbury to O'Connor, Feb. 4, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, no. 88, p. 40, MacDonald to Salisbury, Feb. 19, 1898.

³ *China Year Book* (1912), p. 87.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Beresford, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-6.

signed on March 1, 1898 and was to run for forty-five years, during which time the Inspectorate of Maritime Customs was to remain as then constituted, or in other words under the supervision of an Englishman.¹ Of course this stipulation constituted a further check to any Russian plan for replacing Sir Robert Hart with a Russian. This pledge was more binding than the one previously secured by MacDonald, as the head of the Chinese Customs was to be an Englishman for at least forty-five years, regardless of whether or not British trade was greater than that of any other power. Finally, any further Russian loan was made impossible for at least one year, as China bound herself not to borrow any more money for that time.² The loan of 1898 was a great diplomatic victory for England.

ENGLAND AND RUSSIA COMPETE FOR RAILWAY CONCESSIONS

Anglo-Russian relations were further strained as China developed her railways. In 1891 China decided to extend the Imperial Chinese Railways from Tientsin to Shanhai-kwan and placed in charge of this work a Mr. Kinder, an Englishman who had then been in China's employ for eleven years.³ At first Russia did not oppose this selection, but in 1897 when she was meeting with great success in her expansion through Manchuria, it occurred to her that it would not suit her purpose to have an Englishman as superintendent of a railroad running toward Manchuria. Consequently, in August, 1897, M. Pavloff, Russian Minister at Peking, requested the Yamen to dispense with Kinder's services.⁴ This action evoked a protest from MacDonald,

¹ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 105.

² *Ibid.*

³ Kent, P. H., *Railway Enterprise in China*, p. 36.

⁴ *China* # 1 (1898), no. 14, p. 5, MacDonald to Salisbury, Oct. 19, 1897.

who called on the Yamen on August twenty-first to advise them that compliance with Pavloff's demand would cause "serious displeasure" to the English Government. The Yamen replied that Pavloff had at first protested on his own initiative, and upon receiving their refusal to discharge Kinder, he returned later with "instructions from his government to demand that a Russian engineer take Mr. Kinder's place".¹ Despite this demand, the Yamen assured MacDonald that Kinder would be retained.²

There the matter rested until October fifteenth when Pavloff again requested that the Yamen dismiss Mr. Kinder. At the request of the Chinese Foreign Office, Sir Nicholas O'Connor, British representative at St. Petersburg, advised the Russian Government that China desired to retain the services of such a capable official as Kinder had proved himself to be.³ The Russian Minister then got in touch with MacDonald and explained that China had previously agreed to hire Russian officials if she ever built the railroad in question. He said that Russian engineers should build the lines approaching the Russian frontier, but that it would be improper for them to be placed in charge of railroads approaching Burma. Pavloff admitted Kinder's ability and only desired to see him transferred to some other line in the Yangtze Valley region. Russia, said Pavloff, objected to Kinder not because he was an Englishman, but because he was not a Russian. The Russian Minister told MacDonald frankly that "the Russian Government intended that the provinces of China bordering on the Russian frontier must not come under the influence of any other nation except Russia".⁴

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 13, p. 4, MacDonald to Salisbury, Oct. 17, 1897.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 14, p. 5, MacDonald to Salisbury, Oct. 19, 1897.

Inasmuch as Russia had previously given England assurance that she would make no attempt to have China dismiss any British citizens then in the employ of the Peking Government, Salisbury on December 14, 1897, referred the matter to the British representative at St. Petersburg.¹ The Russian Government advised him that general instructions had been sent to Pavloff to secure arrangements whereby Russian engineers would be used on all lines approaching Russian territory, but that he had never been told to press for the dismissal of any foreigner in the employ of China.²

Three months later, March 16, 1898, MacDonald again reported that Pavloff was urging the Yamen to dismiss Kinder.³ Again the British representative at St. Petersburg, Sir Nicholas O'Connor, took up the matter with the Russian Foreign Office.⁴ Once more the matter was settled amicably when Count Lamsdorf, Russian Foreign Minister, instructed Pavloff to raise no further objections to Kinder.⁵

Throughout the controversy the Russians officially acted with courtesy, but the action of Pavloff aroused considerable resentment in England, where the good faith of Russia was seriously questioned. The incident was looked upon as merely another attempt to injure British prestige in the Far East. It may well be that Pavloff was furnished with instructions inconsistent with the promises given to the British Ambassador—but the fact that Russia promptly disavowed her representative eliminated any ground for complaint by England.

In April, 1898 China decided to extend the Imperial Chi-

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 19, p. 8, Salisbury to Goschen, Dec. 14, 1897.

² *Ibid.*, no. 38, p. 13, Goschen to Salisbury, Dec. 28, 1897.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 111, p. 47, MacDonald to Salisbury, Mar. 16, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 113, p. 47, Salisbury to O'Connor, Mar. 17, 1898.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 111, p. 47, MacDonald to Salisbury, Mar. 16, 1898.

nese Railway from Shanhaikwan to Newchwang.¹ To carry out this project it was felt necessary to float a loan not only for the money required for the extension, but also for the funds necessary to pay off an indebtedness of about two and one-half millions of taels which had previously been borrowed for the upkeep of that part of the Imperial Chinese Railway already built.² This need was filled on August sixth by a loan from the British and Chinese Corporation, a company organized by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation—which signed a preliminary agreement on June 7, 1898 to loan China 16,000,000 taels at five and one-half per cent interest.³

Of special importance was a clause in the contract reading as follows:

The security for the loan shall be the permanent way, rolling stock, and entire property, together with the freight and earnings of the existing lines between Peking, Tientsin, Tangku, and Chung-hou-sou, and also of the proposed new lines when constructed, in addition to the rights of mining coal and iron, which will be retained by the railway administration on each side of the proposed new lines, for a distance to be determined. In the event of default or arrears in payment of interest or repayments of principal, the said railway lines and mines shall be handed over to representatives deputed by the syndicate to manage them on their behalf until principal and interest of the loan are redeemed in full, when the management will revert to the railway administration.⁴

This clause quite naturally evoked Russia's hostility because in the event of China's default on the loan, the Shanhaikwan-Newchwang Railway, a most important line near

¹ Kent, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

² Morse, *International Relations*, vol. iii, p. 84.

³ Kent, *op. cit.*, p. 52; MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 179.

⁴ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 180.

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³ Kent, *op. cit.*, p. 52; MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 179.

⁴ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 180.

Manchuria, would be controlled by an English corporation. Of course Russia feared such an eventuality near Manchuria just as much as Britain feared similar penetration by Russia in the Yangtze region.¹

Consequently, Pavloff at Peking protested to the Yamen with all the vigor at his command. So violent were his objections that England, as we shall see, thought it advisable to seek an understanding with Russia on all outstanding questions. Of this railway and the resulting compromise more will be heard later. This incident was but another illustration of the antagonism existing between Russia and England in the Far East. The former was bent on destroying the prestige her rival had built up during the preceding century—the latter was just as determined to protect that prestige.

Having secured permission to build railways in their respective spheres of interest in China, Russia and France conceived the idea of obtaining the concession to build a great trunk line from Peking to Hankow, which would not only connect their interests, but would also bisect the Yangtze Valley region.

The Chinese themselves conceived the idea of building the Peking-Hankow line, but it was their intention to use only capital and materials furnished by their country. For this purpose they established the Hanyehping iron works and opened coal and iron mines at Pingshan and Tayeh, respectively.² The effort to raise money, however, proved a failure, and China was forced to admit that she would be unable to complete the project without European assistance.

The Chinese first opened negotiations with an American firm, the American China Development Company, but in

¹ This is illustrated by England's opposition to Russian participation in the Peking-Hankow Railroad as described in the next chapter.

² Morse, *International Relations*, vol. iii, p. 86

spite of the efforts of the American Minister at Peking, Colonel Denby, the project did not materialize favorably for the Americans. Denby thought that Sheng, the Chinese Director of Railroads, had rejected the proposal because of criticism from the British press.¹ But a better reason for the failure lies in the fact that a small country, Belgium, from which China had nothing to fear, had offered considerably better terms.² British companies also had striven vainly for this important concession.³

As Sheng put it, "The several points that were wrangled about with the British and Americans were brought out and our demands were agreed to by the Belgians without further discussion".⁴ This agreement was signed in June, 1897, but the Belgian company had been so anxious to secure the concession that the terms were really too advantageous for China, and it quickly became apparent that some changes would have to be made before the agreement could be made workable. As France and Russia were interested in the Belgian company, the Peking representatives of those two countries forced the Yamen to grant more advantageous terms.⁵ The British Minister at Peking apparently did not appreciate the importance of the Belgian negotiations and satisfied himself by having inserted in the original agreement between Sheng and the Belgian company that "the money is all to come from Belgium; none from Russia or France will be accepted".⁶ On May twenty-second, however, *The Times* published a report from Peking⁷ warning

¹ *Foreign Relations* (1897), no. 2761, p. 56, Denby to Olney, Jan. 10, 1897.

² Kent, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Memorial of Sheng, quoted in Kent, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

⁵ Kent, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

⁶ *Ibid.*

the British people that Russia and France were really back of Belgium in the negotiations for the concession.¹ This aroused Lord Salisbury and he promptly cabled Sir Claude MacDonald for definite information.² This, be it noted in 'passing, is but one of the many instances in which newspaper correspondents furnished information considerably in advance of the British legation at Peking. The Minister merely replied to the effect that the Russians and the French were only trying to "arrange a modification of the agreement as the Belgian syndicate are unable to carry out the original one".³

Lord Salisbury, however, did not share the unconcern of his Minister. Perhaps he was aroused to action because the disclosures regarding the French and Russian interests in the Peking Railway had caused consternation in London. In any event, the Prime Minister sent the following wire to MacDonald on July ninth:

With reference to your telegram of the twenty-sixth of May, Her Majesty's Government entertained objection to the Han-kow-Peking line when they originally heard of its being granted to Belgian syndicate. When there is likelihood of Russo-Chinese Bank, which is tantamount to Russian Government, financing southern section of that railway, that objection is greatly increased.

A concession of this nature is no longer a commercial or industrial enterprise, and becomes a political movement against British interests in the region of the Yangtze.

You should inform the Tsungli Yamen that Her Majesty's Government cannot possibly continue to cooperate in a friendly manner in matters of interest to China, if while preferential advantages are conceded to Russia in Manchuria and to Ger-

¹ *The Times*, May 22, 1898.

² *China* # 1 (1899), no. 135, p. 96, Salisbury to MacDonald, May 24, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 139, p. 95, MacDonald to Salisbury, May 26, 1898.

many in Shantung,¹ these or other powers should also be offered special openings or privileges in the region of the Yangtze. Satisfactory proposals will be forthcoming if the Chinese Government will invite the employment of British capital in the development of those provinces.²

No reply having been received from MacDonald by July sixteenth, one week later, the Prime Minister wired him again.³ On the following day came the reply that the Yamen denied the existence of any negotiations with the Russo-Chinese Bank for financial assistance on the Peking-Hankow line, and asserted that any interference on the part of the Russian and French representatives had been confined to efforts to prevent Sheng from refusing to revise the Belgian contract of June, 1897.⁴

Being apparently unable to thwart the granting of the concession for the Hankow-Peking line to the Belgian company, Lord Salisbury authorized the relinquishment of Great Britain's rights to extend the Chinese Imperial Railway to Newchwang, if Russo-French influence were eliminated from the Peking-Hankow line.⁵ Such an agreement would have removed British railway enterprise from northern China, but it would also have eliminated Russo-French influence from the Yangtze Valley. Nothing came of this proposal, probably because of Li Hung Chang's desire, despite his preference for the Russians, to keep some British influence in the north as a counterpoise to Muscovite expansion.⁶

¹ Germany had secured preferential mining and railway rights in the Province of Shantung. (See p. 209.)

² *Ibid.*, no. 175, p. 114, Salisbury to MacDonald, July 9, 1898.

³ *China* # 1 (1899), no. 188, p. 126, Salisbury to MacDonald, July 16, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 189, p. 126, MacDonald to Salisbury, July 17, 1898.

⁵ Kent, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

⁶ *Ibid.*

On June twenty-seventh the contract was granted to the Belgians despite British protests. It is interesting to note that the information was supplied to Salisbury the very same day by the British Ambassador at Paris, while the legation at Peking did not report it until two days later.¹ Lord Salisbury was much disturbed about Belgium's receiving this concession and admitted to MacDonald that English public opinion was apprehensive.² He therefore put pressure upon Sir Claude to get full information regarding the terms upon which the concession had been granted, especially whether or not the Belgian firm had given over to the Russo-Chinese Bank the concessions which it had received from China.³ MacDonald replied that he had secured the Yamen's promise to let him see the contract, but he had no information concerning the transfer of the rights of the Belgian company to the Russo-Chinese Bank.⁴

Regarding this latter point MacDonald soon received information when a Shanghai paper early in August published what purported to be a copy of the Chino-Belgian agreement, one point of which called for the Russo-Chinese Bank to advance capital. Upon protesting, the British Minister was told that the agreement published in Shanghai would not be submitted to the Emperor for ratification if the Yamen found that it contained such a clause.⁵ This was consistent with the promise given MacDonald prior to the completion of the agreement, to the effect that the Russo-Chinese Bank was not financially interested in the Peking-Hankow line.⁶

¹ *China # 1* (1899), no. 208, p. 135, Gosselin to Salisbury, June 27, 1898; no. 209, p. 136, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 29, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, no. 233, p. 161, Salisbury to MacDonald, July 16, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 258, p. 171, Salisbury to MacDonald, July 30, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 253, p. 170, MacDonald to Salisbury, July 25, 1898; no. 259, p. 171, MacDonald to Salisbury, Aug. 1, 1898.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 263, p. 175, MacDonald to Salisbury, Aug. 6, 1898.

⁶ *Ibid.*

In the face of such promises the British Minister was startled to learn on August ninth that the Yamen intended to ratify the agreement, although it was substantially the same as that published by the Shanghai paper, and included the clauses England considered objectionable. MacDonald immediately asked for an interview with the Yamen within two days and warned that if it were not granted before the treaty was ratified, "Her Majesty's Government would look upon their action as unfriendly, and would probably insist on the same rights being given to Great Britain in all provinces adjoining the Yangtze".¹ But the members of the Yamen replied that they were busy with arrangements for the Emperor's birthday celebration. Hence, Sir Claude MacDonald had the chagrin of learning subsequently that the contract had been ratified on August twelfth. He had not even the satisfaction of securing the interview he had requested.² Great was his wrath when in reporting the matter to his chief in London, he wrote:

That the ratification has been rushed through is undoubtedly due to the influence of Li Hung Chang, combined with strong pressure on the part of the representatives of Russia, France, and Belgium, and if heavy payment is not exacted from the Chinese Government for their bad faith, Li will persuade his colleagues that it is safer to slight England than any other power, and any pressure which we may want to bring to bear in other matters will be without effect.³

Meanwhile, English private concerns had been seeking contracts to build other railways in China, and Sir Claude MacDonald suggested utilizing the Peking-Hankow incident to force the Yamen to grant these concessions to English-

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 278, p. 186, MacDonald to Salisbury, Aug. 13, 1898.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* ,

men. As a punishment for disregarding British warnings, Sir Claude suggested that China be required to agree to either of the following:

1. That the Yamen give a written assurance that if a British syndicate applied for any railway concession in the Yangtze provinces, they should be given on the same terms as those which France under cover of the Belgian syndicate had received in the Peking-Hankow contract, and that no mining concessions would be granted in those provinces unless they had been previously declined by British syndicates.
2. That the Yamen give a written assurance that all railway concessions for which British syndicates were then negotiating, that is to say:
 - a. the Shanhaikwan-Newchwang line,
 - b. the line from Tientsin to Chinkiang (in conjunction with Germany),
 - c. the line from Shanghai to Nanking with its continuation and branches,
 - d. the lines in Honan and Shansi,should be granted without any further delay on terms identical with those contained in the contract for the Peking-Hankow line.¹

The British Foreign Office was equally determined to press the issue, and the reply of Mr. Balfour—Lord Salisbury was absent on sick leave—authorized Sir Claude to insist upon his second proposal, with the exception of the Shanhaikwan-Newchwang line, for to insist upon a concession for a railroad within the Russian sphere would be tantamount to issuing a challenge to Russia. This England did not want to do.

You are authorized [Mr. Balfour wired the Minister at Peking] to inform them [the Yamen] if you have any reason to appre-

¹ *Ibid.*

hend that they will delay compliance, that unless they agree at once, we shall regard their breach of faith concerning the Peking-Hankow Railroad as an act of deliberate hostility against this country, and shall act accordingly.

After consultation with the Admiral, you may give them the number of days or hours you think proper in which to send their reply. The delay should not be of too long duration.

It should be noted on the face of your demand that Ching-kiang concession is for Americans and Germans, if they desire a share, as well as ourselves. Also make it clear that your ultimatum has nothing to do with the line to Newchwang.¹

On August twentieth MacDonald presented this ultimatum to the Yamen and received their promise to do "their very best to comply", while at the same time they disclaimed completely "any intention of discourtesy or unfriendliness towards Great Britain".²

Mr. Balfour used such vigorous language because he was startled at the prospect of Russia's becoming interested in the Peking-Hankow Railway, penetrating right into the heart of the Yangtze Valley, the region which furnished most of England's trade with China. British statesmen were apprehensive that at the rate things were going, "the mass of Chinese railways will be in foreign hands".³ As Lord Salisbury pointed out to MacDonald on July thirteenth, this would mean that not only would British firms get no orders for the materials to be used on these roads, but when the lines were once built by foreigners, there would be danger that the managers could strangle British trade by imposing differential rates and privileges.⁴ This admission of the British Prime Minister is important because it clearly sums

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 286, p. 189, Balfour to MacDonald, Aug. 17, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, no. 289, p. 190, MacDonald to Balfour, Aug. 21, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 232, p. 161, Salisbury to MacDonald, July 13, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.* ,

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¹ *Ibid*

up the reason why England was so anxious to secure her share of Chinese railway concessions.

By August twenty-fourth no further information had been received from Sir Claude MacDonald as to whether or not the Yamen had granted the demands made upon them by the British Minister on August twentieth. Mr. Balfour therefore authorized his Peking representative to warn them that unless the British demands were granted at once, England would demand the concession of still another railway.¹ This warning produced the desired effect because the British demands were granted on September fourth, including an apology for China's "breach of faith" in connection with the Peking-Hankow Railway. In reporting the Yamen's acquiescence, Sir Claude wrote euphemistically that he did not resort to an ultimatum, but "the fact that the fleet is concentrating is of course known to them".²

The concession thus secured by Great Britain included the right to build the following railroads:³

- a. The Canton-Kowloon Railway.
- b. The Shanghai-Nanking Railway with an extension to Singyang via Chingkiang.
- c. The Hangchow-Soochow Railway with an extension to Ningpo if necessary.

The Yamen also promised to allow the Peking Syndicate to build a railway from its mines to Singyang.⁴ This was a British company which had secured mining rights in the Provinces of Honan and Shansi.⁵

Meanwhile, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Cor-

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 300, p. 205, Balfour to MacDonald, Aug. 24, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, no. 314, p. 212, MacDonald to Salisbury, Sept. 4, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 323, p. 238, MacDonald to Salisbury, Sept. 14, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ See p. 190.

poration and the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank had signed an agreement to seek jointly a concession for a railway from Tientsin to Chingkiang, and Balfour had wired MacDonald to back up the demands of these private concerns. However, as this road would necessarily have to traverse Shantung, it was necessary that some arrangement be concluded with Germany, as that country possessed priority rights in that province.¹ The two banking houses arranged this on September second by agreeing that the northern part of the line be equipped and worked by the German group, the southern part by the English group. When both lines were completed they were to be worked jointly.²

The banks also agreed to refrain from seeking railroad concessions in each other's sphere of influence. These spheres were indicated as follows:

a. English Sphere

The Yangtze Valley, subject to the connection of the Shantung lines to the Yangtze at Chingkiang; the provinces south of the Yangtze; the Province of Shansi with connection to the Peking-Hankow line at a point south of Chengting and a connecting line to the Yangtze Valley, crossing the Hoangho Valley.

b. German Sphere

The Province of Shantung and the Hoangho Valley, with connection to Tientsin and Chengting or other points of the Peking-Hankow line, in the south, with connection to the Yangtze at Chingkiang or Nanking. The Hoangho Valley is understood to be subject to the connecting lines in Shansi, forming part of the British sphere of interest, and to the connecting line to the Yangtze Valley, also belonging to the said sphere of interest.³

¹ See p. 209.

² *China* # 1 (1899), incl. in no. 312, p. 212, Sept. 2, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*

CHINA GRANTS MINING CONCESSIONS

It was but natural that the vast potential mineral wealth of China should cause the strong Western powers to demand that she place her riches at the disposal of the world.

To secure a share of such concessions, many companies were organized in Europe. Among these was the Peking Syndicate, formed by an Italian, Mr. Luzzati, who secured part of his financial backing in England.¹ On May 21, 1898 this syndicate secured exclusive iron, coal, and petroleum mining privileges in the Province of Shansi for a period of sixty years, after which time all mines were to revert to the Chinese Government without compensation.² By that time China hoped to be able to dispense with foreign assistance, as one clause of the agreement called for the opening of an engineering school at which the syndicate would train Chinese youths.³ That the agreement was not one-sided is further indicated by the fact that China was to receive twenty-five per cent of the net profits accruing from the operation of the mines.⁴

Exactly one month later, June 21, 1898, the Peking Syndicate secured the same rights and obligations regarding the mining wealth of the Province of Honan.⁵ On September fourteenth the syndicate's right to build railways from its mines to Singyang on the River Han was secured from the Yamen as one of the penalties for allowing the Belgian company to build the Peking-Hankow Railroad.⁶

¹ Overlach, T. W., *Foreign Financial Control in China*, p. 55; Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

² MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 700-2, Agreement between Mr. Luzzati and the Shansi Bureau of Trade.

³ *Ibid.*, Clause 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Clause 6.

⁵ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 131.

⁶ *China # 1* (1899), no. 323, p. 238, MacDonald to Salisbury, Sept. 14, 1898.

Another British syndicate was organized by Mr. Pritchard Morgan. This company on April 14, 1899 secured exclusive mining privileges in the Province of Szechuan.¹ In addition England arranged with France that all mining rights secured by that country in the Provinces of Yunnan and Szechuan would be shared by Great Britain.²

The importance of these mining concessions was very great. The geologist Richthofen thought that in Shansi alone there was at that time enough coal and iron to supply the world's needs for two thousand years.³ Well might Sir Claude MacDonald write that "up to the present time any concessions granted to other nationalities are far outbalanced in financial value by the Shansi and Honan mining and railway concessions and by the Shanghai-Nanking Railway concession with its valuable extensions."⁴

In truth England had not come away empty-handed. She had been pressed very hard by Russia in northern China, but when the battle of concessions was over, Great Britain was in possession of valuable mining and railroad concessions, and held the Yamen's promise never to alienate any portion of the Yangtze Valley, and to keep an Englishman as head of the Maritime Customs as long as British commerce predominated. So valuable did the British Government regard these concessions that Lord Salisbury on July twenty-second authorized Sir Claude MacDonald to offer Britain's military assistance to China should she be attacked by another power because of her granting concessions to British firms.⁵

¹ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 183.

² See p. 155.

³ Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 139. More recent estimates of China's mineral wealth are less optimistic, cf. Bain, H. F., *Ores and Industry in the Far East*.

⁴ *China* # 1 (1899), no. 245, p. 169, MacDonald to Salisbury, July 23, 1898.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 243, p. 166, Salisbury to MacDonald, July 22, 1898.

CHAPTER IV

ENGLAND FAILS TO PRESERVE CHINESE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

GERMANY LEASES KIAO-CHOW

OF the three powers which had intervened against Japan in 1895, Germany was the last to obtain compensation from China. For some time Germany had desired to secure a port in the Far East which would serve as a naval base so that her ships would not have to be dependent upon Hongkong or Japanese ports for repairs.¹ The Sino-Japanese War had emphasized the necessity for such a port, but difficulties arose because the Foreign Office and the Admiralty could not agree as to which Chinese port would best serve German interests without at the same time involving her in difficulties with other powers.²

Only one week after Germany, in collaboration with Russia and France, had prevented Japan from annexing the Liaotung Peninsula, the Peking Government was approached by the German Ambassador on the subject of a German naval and coaling station in the Far East. Peking was told that Germany's friendship for China during the three-power intervention warranted such compensation, and that it would be to China's own interest to have a strong friendly German fleet in Far Eastern waters.³ Peking refused this request

¹ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, footnote p. 5.

² *Ibid.*, no. 3646, p. 7, Hollman to Marschall, April 17, 1895.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 3651, p. 15, Marschall to Schenck, Sept. 15, 1895.

on the very logical ground that were Germany to secure a Chinese port, her action would be emulated by other powers.¹ Indecision as to which port Germany wanted, led Berlin to drop the demand temporarily, while a spirited discussion took place in German official circles as to the relative merits of the Pescadores, Kiao-Chow, Weihaiwei, Amoy, Mirs Bay, and the Montebello Islands.²

Germany took particular care to select no place which would later cause a collision with the interests of any other power. Special consideration was shown for England. Berlin officials were almost unanimous in the desire to keep away from Chusan because there was a rumor to the effect that in 1842 China had promised England that this port would not be ceded to any other power.³ Although the German documents indicate that Berlin had no intention of taking Chusan, England in November, 1895 feared such an eventuality, and exacted a second non-alienation pledge from the Chinese Government.⁴

All other Chinese ports save Kiao-Chow were eliminated from consideration by Germany because they could not be made into good naval bases or because their occupation might lead to difficulties with some other European power.⁵ Finally, a German mission was dispatched to the Far East to look over the field and select the Chinese port which was best suited for Germany's purpose. Admiral Tirpitz, who accompanied the mission, designated Kiao-Chow.⁶

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3659, p. 23, Schenck to Hohenlohe, Dec. 15, 1895.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3646, p. 7, Hollman to Marschall, April 17, 1895.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 1, p. 1, Memorandum of Mr. Tilley, Jan. 14, 1905.

⁵ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3650, p. 14, Aufzeichnung of Rotenhan, Sept. 9, 1895.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3664, p. 34, Heyking to Hohenlohe, Aug. 22, 1896; Tirpitz, A., *My Memoirs*, vol. i, p. 92.

The Admiral's selection had hardly been made when it was reported that Kiao-Chow was preempted by Russia, and the latter's representative at Peking, Count Cassini, told his German colleague, Baron Heyking, that his government needed that port.¹ Not desiring to precipitate trouble with St. Petersburg, Germany proceeded to ascertain what Russia's probable attitude would be should she seize Kiao-Chow. During a trip to Russia in the summer of 1897, the Kaiser asked the Czar personally whether he would have any objection to German ships wintering at Kiao-Chow. Much to the Kaiser's satisfaction, Nicholas gave a negative reply.² As Germany considered that Russia was the only European power interested in the Shantung Peninsula, she felt that she could await a suitable pretext for seizing Kiao-Chow. Several additional requests for peaceable cession had been refused by China, and Germany did not desire to resort to force without having some excuse to do so.

She did not have long to wait. On October 30, 1897, some German officers from the gunboat *Cormoran* were stoned by the natives at Woochang.³ Several days later two missionaries of the Roman Catholic Church of Germany were murdered in the village of Kiachwang in southwestern Shantung.⁴ Prompt punitive action by the Chinese authorities was of no avail because Germany had no intention of allowing such a favorable opportunity to pass.⁵

The Kaiser, who for the two previous years had been re-

¹ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3664, p. 34, Heyking to Hohenlohe, Aug. 22, 1896.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3679, p. 58, Bülow to Foreign Office, Aug. 11, 1897.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, footnote, p. 68.

⁴ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. iii, p. 106.

⁵ Asakawa, *op. cit.*, p. 104; Morse, *International Relations*, vol. iii, p. 106.

strained with difficulty by the Foreign Office, resorted to quick action. First, he ordered Admiral Diederichs of the Far Eastern squadron to go to Kiao-Chow.¹ Then he advised the Foreign Office that the German Emperor was going to act "if necessary with the most brutal ruthlessness".² In vain did his Chancellor, Prince Hohenlohe, warn him of Russia's priority rights. The German Sovereign gloried in the thought that:

Thousands of German Christians will feel relief as they know that the German Emperor's ships are in their midst; hundreds of German merchants will leap for joy at the thought that finally the German Emperor has won a stronghold in Asia; hundreds of thousands of Chinese will tremble when they feel the iron fist of the German Emperor heavily on their necks and the entire German people will rejoice that their government has done a manly deed.³

Nevertheless, the Kaiser apparently was disturbed about Russia's possible action, for he wired the Czar regarding Kiao-Chow, and received the reply that the Russian Monarch could neither "approve nor disapprove your sending German squadron to Kiao-Chow, as I have lately learned that this harbor only had been temporarily ours in 1895-6".⁴ This was sufficient proof that Russia in 1897 neither had the right nor the intention to oppose Germany's action. Accordingly, the German warships entered Kiao-Chow on November fourteenth.⁵

The Kaiser and the German Foreign Office were chagrined, therefore, when Count Muravief, the Russian For-

¹ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3687, p. 67, Franceson to the Foreign Office, Nov. 6, 1897.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3686, Kaiser to Hohenlohe, Nov. 6, 1897.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3690, p. 69, Kaiser to Bülow, Nov. 7, 1897.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, footnote, p. 79.

eign Minister, entered an official protest on November eighth claiming for Russia the right of *priorité de mouiller* (priority of anchorage), advising that Russian ships would enter Kiao-Chow simultaneously with those of Germany. The Count expressed the hope, however, that the Chino-German difficulty would be settled without the intervention of other powers.¹

In vain did Germany outline in detail the prior negotiations between the Kaiser and the Czar from which the conclusion had been drawn that Russia had no interest in Kiao-Chow.² In vain also did the German Foreign Office point out that Russia had been officially advised of Germany's intention to have her ships winter at Kiao-Chow in accordance with the approval given by the Czar.³ The German Foreign Office was very much disturbed and matters reached a point where Prince Hohenlohe sought English cooperation.⁴

Muravief, wrote the Chancellor to the German Ambassador at London, only dared to oppose Germany on the Kiao-Chow question because he thought Berlin's relations with England were not very cordial. Hatzfeldt was asked to think over the matter and report his views. He was also diplomatically to ascertain England's possible reaction were Germany forced to leave Kiao-Chow and take a port on the Chinese coast near the British sphere.⁵ Prince Hohenlohe thought Russia's opposition would force Germany to leave Kiao-Chow.

Hatzfeldt in reply requested permission to approach Salis-

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 3693, p. 73, Rotenhan to Kaiser, Nov. 10, 1897.

² *Ibid.*, no. 3697, p. 79, Hohenlohe to Kaiser, Nov. 11, 1897.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3698, p. 81, Hohenlohe to Hatzfeldt, Nov. 13, 1897.

⁵ *Ibid.*

bury officially on the subject. Hohenlohe wired this approval, at the same time taking the opportunity of expressing the view that Russia was merely opposing Germany to gain compensation. England, he thought, must fear a Russo-German understanding and the London Government would serve its own interests if it approved Germany's occupation of Kiao-Chow.

As Salisbury was out of London at the time, Count Hatzfeldt took advantage of the delay to urge upon the Chancellor the importance of avoiding, so far as possible, any action that would make the English distrustful. Therefore, he recommended that Chusan be eliminated from the list of Chinese ports available for occupation by Germany. Furthermore, he thought it advisable to be prepared to offer England compensation for her approval of the Kiao-Chow seizure, for, although Lord Salisbury might be sympathetic, he would have to consider his colleagues and public opinion. For example, Germany might promise not to interfere with Great Britain's relations with the Transvaal Republic, or perhaps make a secret agreement whereby England would receive the southern half of the Portuguese colony of Mozambique, including Delagoa Bay.¹ The next day Hatzfeldt received Hohenlohe's approval to offer England such compensation.²

Meanwhile, Russia had reiterated her objections to the occupation of Kiao-Chow and had advised Berlin that she had no intention of withdrawing her rights of *priorité de mouiller*.³ The Chancellor had thought it advisable to delay

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3703, p. 87, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, Nov. 16, 1897.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3704, p. 89, Hohenlohe to Hatzfeldt, Nov. 17, 1897.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3706, p. 90, Muraviev to Osten-Sacken, Nov. 16, 1897.

purposely the negotiations with Russia in order to gain time for ascertaining the attitude of the other powers, especially England.¹

On November seventeenth Hatzfeldt interviewed Lord Salisbury and pointed out to him that as Germany had received no advantage from her intervention in 1895, it was improbable that public opinion would sanction evacuation of Kiao-Chow. Here was a case, said the Ambassador, where Germany would have to seek friends, and England could best serve her own interests by supporting Berlin. But he warned that should England refuse, and should objections to the occupation of Kiao-Chow be raised by other powers, Germany would be forced to secure the approval of such objectors at a high price. Lord Salisbury advised that he could not advance a final view until he looked a little further into the situation, with which he was admittedly almost unacquainted. With this reserve, however, he could say that he saw no possible ground on which England could object to Germany's securing a stronghold on the Chinese coast, adding however after some reflection, that the further north this point lay, the less objectionable or undesirable this would be to England.

German acquisition of Chusan, for example, said the British Prime Minister, was out of the question, but when Hatzfeldt wanted him to enumerate the ports which would be disapproved of by England, Lord Salisbury declined to comply. The impression given to the German Ambassador by the interview was that no objections would be raised by England; on the contrary, Lord Salisbury would view Germany at Kiao-Chow as an additional barrier against Russia.²

The next day Hatzfeldt reported to Baron von Holstein

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3707, p. 90, Hohenlohe to Kaiser, Nov. 18, 1897.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3708, p. 92, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, Nov. 17, 1897.

of the German Foreign Office that he had given Lord Salisbury to understand what the consequences would be were England to oppose Germany's occupation of Kiao-Chow. In fact, he had specifically warned Salisbury that Germany would have to pay a high price for Russia's friendship in the event of an unfavorable response from England. Salisbury had asked sharply if he meant by that an alliance against Great Britain. Hatzfeldt had extricated himself from this difficulty by replying that he felt Germany and Russia would have to work in common in the Far East were England to refuse to support Germany.¹

On November twentieth Hatzfeldt and Salisbury had another interview which gave the German Ambassador the impression that England desired an understanding with Germany, and that Britain would make no difficulties for Germany in the Far East, whether the ultimate decision were to remain at Kiao-Chow, or to take another port on the Chinese coast where there would be no collision with English interests. Since their last talk Salisbury had studied the maps and had found that Germany's presence in Kiao-Chow by no means injured England's interests, but he thought it better that no treaty port be taken by Germany. Although China had appealed to Great Britain about Kiao-Chow, Salisbury admitted that he was less interested in preserving Chinese territorial integrity than he was in avoiding any friction which might react unfavorably upon British trade.²

It must be remembered furthermore that England was already confronted in the Far East with a combination of Russia and France. She could ill afford to offend Germany and throw her back into the arms of the Dual Alliance.

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3709, p. 94, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, Nov. 18, 1897.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3710, p. 96, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, Nov. 20, 1897.

From a purely selfish point of view England's logical policy was to approve Germany's action and thus make it impossible for Russia, France, and Germany to act in unison as they had done in 1895. But seen from the viewpoint of China's welfare, England's approval was disastrous, as the seizure of Kiao-Chow was the signal for other great powers to swoop down upon China just as the Yamen had predicted.

Granting the difficulties which confronted Great Britain at this time and granting that any other country similarly situated would in all probability have acted in the same manner, the fact still remains that on November 17, 1897, England put her stamp of approval on Germany's action in occupying Kiao-Chow or any other Chinese port, just so long as the place selected was not too close to Britain's sphere of interest, the Yangtze Valley. It is important to note that not a protest was registered, and the remarks of Lord Salisbury could fairly be interpreted by Germany as encouragement. All this is true, despite England's avowed intention of maintaining the territorial integrity of China.

Great Britain, however, was fighting with her back to the wall to preserve her China trade from the combined assault of Russia and France. In Egypt, South Africa, Uganda and the Sudan, Britain in 1898 saw ominous clouds looming on the horizon. It is obvious that it would have been a decidedly dangerous proposition for England to have rejected Germany's advances at a time when there was hardly one European nation that was friendly to her.

Finally, it must be remembered that China had put herself virtually under the protection of the Russian Empire, and by so doing had forfeited any claim to British protection. Under the circumstances England knew that China's territorial integrity was in jeopardy, and that it would be only a question of time until the Russian bear would absorb at least a Far Eastern port. Indeed Curzon told the House

of Commons a few months later that the British Government had little confidence in the Manchu Dynasty, and numerous writers had been pointing out that Russia was about to annex a port on the Chinese coast. When such a situation materialized, it would be advisable to have a friendly Germany at hand.

With British approval secured, Germany turned to Russia and argued the question of Kiao-Chow with greater ease. Berlin could reply more vigorously to Russia's note of November sixteenth, the answer to which, as previously mentioned, had been purposely delayed. With the report of Salisbury's views at hand, the German Foreign Office on November twenty-second again pointed out to the Russian Ambassador that it was only after the Czar's unequivocal approval that Germany had ordered her ships to Kiao-Chow and that withdrawal would put her in a very embarrassing position.¹

Germany was not hesitant to drop the hint that at Kiao-Chow she would not be in the Russian sphere of influence but next to it. Many other places could have been taken on the Chinese coast but then it would have been necessary to curry the favor of England, and Germany preferred to have Russia profit by the strength of German might and influence.²

Russia took the hint. Her hostility waned. Finally, she showed a desire to come to an agreement with Germany. From England meanwhile came the warning that Salisbury's friendliness could not be taken with absolute certainty, because of his reliance on public opinion. Count Hatzfeldt, therefore, once again brought up the question of compensa-

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3711, p. 97, Rotenhan to Osten-Sacken, Nov. 22, 1897.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3717, p. 102, Aufzeichnung of Bülow, Nov. 30, 1897.

tions. But as Russia was showing signs of being conciliatory the Kaiser vetoed the idea, even though Prince Hohenlohe had previously approved it.¹

On December tenth, *The Times* published an article to the effect that Germany was considering withdrawal from Kiao-Chow and would take over Samsah Bay, in southern China. The German Chancellor hastened to remove England's apprehension by having Hatzfeldt deny the rumor. At the same time Salisbury was told that Germany obviously had nothing to fear from Russia, as from the beginning she could have taken a port in southern China with the Czar's consent. This warning was given for the purpose of avoiding Britain's hostility by intimating that even yet a Russo-German *rapprochement* would be possible whereby the Yangtze Valley could be invaded by the commercial interests of those two countries.

During this interview with the German Ambassador, Salisbury gave indications of appreciating the Far Eastern situation more clearly. He expressed the opinion that other powers would emulate Germany's occupation of Kiao-Chow and he thought that would lead to difficulties. England did not want any Chinese territory, but she feared France. While Salisbury did not mention Russia, it is unbelievable that he did not have Russia also in mind.² Hatzfeldt uttered an important truth when he advised his chief that so long as England remained isolated she would not oppose Germany in China, but that this attitude might be altered if once England got the impression that Russia objected to Germany's occupation of Kiao-Chow.³

Meanwhile, Germany had been experiencing difficulties in

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3721, p. 108, Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Dec. 2, 1897.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3730, p. 116, Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Dec. 11, 1897.

³ *Ibid.*

getting China's approval. Peking had been advised that before Kiao-Chow would be evacuated, five demands must be granted, namely:

1. The Chinese were to erect an Imperial tablet to the memory of the missionaries who were murdered.
2. The families of the murdered missionaries were to be indemnified.
3. The Governor of Shantung was to be degraded permanently.
4. The Chinese Government was to defray the cost of the German occupation of Kiao-Chow.
5. German engineers were to have the preference in the building of any railroad which the Chinese might construct in the Province of Shantung and also in the working of any mine along the track of such railway.¹

So long as Germany was merely punishing China for murders of missionaries, England, mindful of the difficulties she herself had at times along these same lines, wished Germany God-speed. But when Berlin asked for special mining and railway privileges it was quite a different matter. Both MacDonald² and Salisbury³ were of the opinion that the first four demands were only such as China should rightfully expect to receive after the Shantung murders, and, in anticipation of an appeal being made by China, the British Minister was instructed to advise the Yamen to comply with the first four demands.⁴ The demand, however, for preference in the building of any railway in Shantung and working the adjacent mines was considered by British officials as tantamount to making that province a German sphere of interest, in violation of the most-favored-nation clause. Salisbury thought this objection was all the more effective as he be-

¹ *China* # 1 (1898), no. 5, p. 2, MacDonald to Salisbury, Nov. 22, 1897.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, no. 6, p. 3, Salisbury to MacDonald, Nov. 23, 1897.

⁴ *Ibid.*

lieved that a British subject already had secured some mining and railway concessions in Shantung.¹

Sir Claude MacDonald was therefore authorized to inform the Chinese Government that under the most-favored-nation clause China's compliance with the fifth demand was inadmissible, but that apart from this consideration the consent of Great Britain could not be given to the abrogation of the rights of a British subject for the purpose of making a concession to others.² MacDonald found upon investigation, however, that the British subject had not received the concession referred to by Lord Salisbury.³ Nevertheless, MacDonald was instructed on December eighth to inform the Chinese Government "that Her Majesty's Government will feel themselves compelled, if the fifth point is conceded, to demand equality of treatment for British subjects under the most-favored-nation clause of the treaties and that compensation will be required on points in respect of which the rights secured by the treaty have been disregarded".⁴ MacDonald conveyed this message to the Yamen on December tenth.⁵

Upon learning of this protest, the German Minister interviewed MacDonald and obtained exact information regarding the nature of the British demands.⁶ This open dealing stands out in considerable contrast to the action of Baron Heyking in warning the Yamen not to divulge information regarding the Kiao-Chow negotiations which China was carrying on with Germany at the time.⁷

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, no. 10, p. 4, MacDonald to Salisbury, Nov. 30, 1897.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 17, p. 7, Salisbury to MacDonald, Dec. 8, 1897.

⁵ *Ibid.*, incl. in no. 70, p. 28, MacDonald to Yamen, Dec. 10, 1897.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 70, p. 26, MacDonald to Salisbury, Dec. 15, 1897.

⁷ *Ibid.*

Despite British protests, China granted the five German demands on November twentieth, but on condition that Kiao-Chow be evacuated first.¹ Russia was probably back of this Chinese acquiescence because her representative told Heyking that he had advised the Yamen to agree to all the terms in order to expedite evacuation.² Germany refused to evacuate before China carried out her part of the bargain.³ China would not act first.⁴ Whereupon Germany announced that she would hold Kiao-Chow as security and proceeded to set up a provisional government.⁵ On December seventh Germany's true motive was disclosed when Heyking suggested to the Yamen that China might give Kiao-Chow to Germany in appreciation of Germany's share in the three-power intervention of 1895.⁶

Although Salisbury had been advised on November seventeenth regarding Germany's true intentions, it was not until December fourteenth that his Minister at Peking reported the demand for a coaling station.⁷ The Yamen, he said, wanted to know England's attitude toward this demand and also toward point five of the original terms, which gave Germany special mining and railway privileges in Shantung.⁸ Salisbury evidently was not worried about a coaling

¹ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3712, p. 98, Heyking to Foreign Office, Nov. 21, 1897.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3713, p. 99, Hohenlohe to Kaiser, Nov. 21, 1897.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3716, p. 102, Heyking to Foreign Office, Nov. 22, 1897.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, footnote, p. 102.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3727, p. 113, Heyking to Foreign Office, Dec. 7, 1897. The German Foreign Office however objected to Heyking's setting up the three-power intervention as a justification as that would give Russia and France opportunity to seize territory also. *D. G. P.*, footnote, p. 114.

⁷ *China* # 1 (1898), no. 20, p. 8, MacDonald to Salisbury, Dec. 14, 1897.

⁸ *Ibid.*

station at Kiao-Chow, for he ignored that part of MacDonald's wire. He did concern himself with commercial privileges, however, and advised MacDonald that any concession of this nature to Germany would be opposed by Great Britain.¹

The same objections were registered with von Bulow by the British Ambassador at Berlin, Sir Frank Lascelles, who frankly said that, so far as he knew, England had raised no objections to German ships going to Kiao-Chow. However, should a demand for special privileges be advanced or should other countries seek to take possession of Chinese ports it would probably become necessary for England to take steps to preserve her vast interests in China.²

Sir Claude MacDonald felt that, "if the German object is to secure Kiao-Chow as a naval station under cover of their demands for reparation, it is by no means clear that their acquisition of it will prejudice our interests". His objections to the special railway and mining privileges were outlined in more detail than previously.

It has this blot on it [he wrote], that it makes the murder of German missionaries a counter for the purchase of commercial advantages. [In his righteous indignation, the Ambassador did not stop to reflect the advantages previously purchased by England even without this 'counter'.] Apart from this, it affords a novel precedent, for if China concedes such preferential rights to Germany in one province, there is no reason why she should not concede similar exclusive privileges to the other countries in the remaining provinces of the empire.³

The Yamen finally sought England's aid to have Germany reduce her demands. How much assistance they

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 21 p. 8, Salisbury to MacDonald, Dec. 15, 1897.

² *Ibid.*, no. 39, p. 14, Lascelles to Salisbury, Dec. 30, 1897.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 12, p. 4, MacDonald to Salisbury, Dec. 1, 1897.

secured is evident from MacDonald's report of an interview with the Yamen on December thirteenth.

They did indeed [wrote the Minister] more than once and with some earnestness, appeal to me to use my influence with him [Baron von Heyking, the German Minister] to effect a settlement, and I had some difficulty in evading the request without directly refusing it or seeming unfriendly toward them in their trouble. The Yamen sounded me very anxiously as to the probable attitude of Her Majesty's Government if a coaling station were given to Germany; but on this question I avoided expressing an opinion, being aware of the danger, on the one hand of their representing to the German Minister that I had opposed it, and, on the other, of their supposing that Her Majesty's Government would acquiesce without demur.¹

The Yamen were at the same time endeavoring to induce Germany to renounce Kiao-Chow in favor of some port in the south and were ready to grant all Berlin's demands if such an arrangement were made.² Germany would not entertain such a proposition, for, as Bülow told the Reichstag, this would be contrary to Berlin's entire previous policy toward England. Germany would stay, said the Foreign Minister, at Kiao-Chow where, as Russia's neighbor, she would have the same interests and the same neighbors.³ Instructions to this effect were wired to Heyking on December twelfth with the result that he pointed out to the Russian Minister at Peking that St. Petersburg could not always count on the support of France, and that Russia's influence in the Far East would be at least doubled by Germany's presence at Kiao-Chow. A strong German station in Chi-

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 70, p. 26, MacDonald to Salisbury, Dec. 15, 1897.

² *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, no. 3722, p. 110, Heyking to Foreign Office, Dec. 4, 1897.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3725, p. 111, Holstein to Radolin, Dec. 6, 1897.

nese territory would make St. Petersburg more secure against Japan and Japan's friends.¹

At this time Russia evidently saw the advantages of having Germany's support of her Far Eastern program and became apprehensive lest Berlin should be forced to come to an agreement with England. Russia also saw that Germany's occupation of Kiao-Chow would supply her with a suitable pretext to step in and seize a Chinese port herself. Consequently, Russia definitely supported the Kiao-Chow occupation in return for Germany's approval of her Far Eastern plans.²

Russia's *quid pro quo* was outlined in a note sent on January second from St. Petersburg to Berlin. In this communication Russia indicated her sphere of interest as Manchuria, Chinese Turkestan, and the Province of Chili (including Peking and Tientsin).³ To this Germany agreed, although the Kaiser thought that it was an unreasonable request. With Russian opposition eliminated, China speedily came to terms with Germany, and on January fourth agreed to lease Kiao-Chow.⁴ A treaty to this effect was signed on March 6, 1898.⁵

Despite the numerous protests which England had made to the Yamen to prevent their granting special privileges to Germany in Shantung, her remonstrances were of no avail. By the treaty Germany not only secured permission to build two railways in Shantung, together with the right to exploit mineral wealth along these routes, but also acquired the privilege of working the rich coal fields of Weihsen and

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3729, p. 115, Bülow to Heyking, Dec. 12, 1897.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3744, p. 135, Aufzeichnung of Bülow, Jan. 2, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3743, p. 134, Russian Promemoria, Jan. 2, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3747, p. 140, Bülow to Hatzfeldt, Jan. 3, 1898.

⁵ *MacMurray*, op. cit., vol. i, p. 112.

Poshan.¹ The following clause is precisely that to which England had previously objected:

The Chinese Government binds itself in all cases where foreign assistance in persons, capital, or material may be needed for any purpose whatever within the Province of Shantung, to offer the said work or supplying of materials in the first instance to German manufacturers and merchants engaged in undertakings of the kind in question. In case German manufacturers are not inclined to undertake the performance of such works or the furnishing of materials, China shall then be at liberty to act as she pleases.²

Within three months England gave her approval to this clause by agreeing not to build any railroads from Wei-haiwei to any point in the Province of Shantung, and disclaiming any desire to poach upon the special sphere of interest which Germany had set up for herself in China.³ England's speedy *volte-face* was due in part to the entrance of Russian ships into Port Arthur on December 18, 1897.⁴ Salisbury knew that the difficulties confronting him were too great for him to quarrel with Germany while he had to deal with Russia at Port Arthur.

During the negotiations Germany had taken special care to avoid causing friction with Great Britain in the Far East, and even after China had consented to the occupation of Kiao-Chow, the Berlin Foreign Office pointed out both to Salisbury at London⁵ and to the British Ambassador at Berlin⁶ that England's feelings had been carefully consid-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

² *Ibid.*, p. 116.

³ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 52, p. 33, Lascelles to Bulow, April 20, 1898.

⁴ *China # 1* (1898), no. 23, p. 9, MacDonald to Salisbury, Dec. 20, 1897.

⁵ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 4, p. 4, Lascelles to Salisbury, Feb. 2, 1898.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 53, p. 34, Lascelles to Salisbury, May 26, 1898.

ered. Even the Kaiser told Sir Frank Lascelles that Germany had meant no hostility to England by taking Kiao-Chow.¹

England is by no means responsible for the occupation of Kiao-Chow even though she did not vigorously oppose Germany's action. The German Foreign Office documents show clearly that the Berlin officials were set upon having a Far Eastern base, and so eager were they for it that had England interposed any veto on the project the none too cordial relations between Germany and Great Britain would have been strained seriously, at a time when England needed Berlin's friendship. While England might have delayed, she could not have permanently prevented, the seizure of some Chinese port by Germany.

Had England refused her consent to the occupation of Kiao-Chow, some agreement would undoubtedly have been made between Germany and Russia. In that case Great Britain would have had the embarrassment of being forced to bow to superior odds, for she quite obviously could not cope with a hostile combination of Germany, Russia, and France. Britain might favor the policy of preserving the territorial integrity of China, but she was not called upon to defend single-handed the Chinese Empire against the rest of Europe. Hence, when Lord Salisbury saw the futility of resisting Germany, he refused to involve England in a European war, and abandoned the idea of insisting upon the integrity of the Middle Kingdom.

RUSSIA ACQUIRES PORT ARTHUR

The German occupation of Kiao-Chow was the signal for other great powers to descend upon China with similar demands for leased ports. Russia came next and not unexpectedly. Her desire for a Far Eastern port had long been

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 4, p. 4, Lascelles to Salisbury, Feb. 2, 1893.

known in England and had for decades been opposed by the British Government. On the mere rumor that Russia intended to take Port Lazareth in 1885, Great Britain had occupied Port Hamilton and had refused to evacuate it until China had secured Russia's promise never to occupy any portion of Korea.¹

To this promise England steadfastly held Russia. The firm resolve of Great Britain not to tolerate any breaking of this promise had been announced in the House of Commons by Sir Edward Grey on July 10, 1894,² and by Mr. Curzon on February 20, 1896.³ Despite this official attitude, however, many British writers began to recognize the futility, if not the danger, of opposing Russia's cherished ambition to get a warm-water port in the Far East.

There may possibly be some grounds [said the *Edinburgh Review* of January, 1896] for the belief that Russia intends to press for an arrangement that will give her squadrons a naval base at Port Arthur, for her railway from Europe across Asia will not end at an ice-bound port. A vast landlocked empire with only two issues to the open sea, upon waters that are for many months frozen, may be pardoned for vigorous if not violent efforts to break through her barriers. . . . A premature outburst of indignation at the bare suspicion of such a thing comes with little profit of dignity from the English who do not stand on much ceremony when their own vital interests are at stake. If we who have stopped Russia on the road to the Bosphorus now again cross her path toward the Pacific, she will undoubtedly fall back on the device of troubling our Indian borders, and a collision between the two powers would throw

¹ Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, p. 481.

² *Hansard*, vol. xxvi, p. 1300.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. liii, p. 711. The first declaration was in order, but the second cannot be considered equally so, for Russia's promise had been given to China, and presumably had lapsed when the Hermit Kingdom had ceased to be a part of the Chinese Empire, after May 8, 1895.

all Asia into confusion. . . . So long as India is not menaced we may be cautious about challenging the prepotence of so mighty an empire.¹

Pointing out that England, in control of India with its countless millions, was wrong in begrudging Russia a stronghold in Manchuria, *The Spectator* admitted that:

If a dangerous preponderance is to be a ground of attack without actual evidence of hostility, our position would justify it far better than that of Russia which has in North China few tax paying subjects and must keep up all the armies there out of the shallow treasury of St. Petersburg.²

Despite official announcements regarding the 1887 Korean pledge of Russia, Mr. Balfour, although not in office at the time, said on February 3, 1896 that he favored granting Russia's desires for a Far Eastern port.

I for my part [he said] frankly state that so far, for example, from regarding with fear and jealousy a commercial outlet for Russia in the Pacific Ocean which should not be ice-bound half the year, I should welcome such a result as a distinct advance in this far distant region and I am convinced not merely that Russia would gain by it, but that British commerce and enterprise would be the gainers. Let us lay to heart this doctrine, that what is good for one is not necessarily bad for the other—surely Africa and Asia are large enough for all of us.³

Yet on the other hand there was in some English circles a decided distrust of Russia, which culminated in an outburst of wrath on October 25, 1895, when *The Times* published an article from its Hongkong correspondent to the effect that Russia had secured the right to connect Vladi-

¹ *Edinburgh Review*, Jan., 1896.

² *Spectator*, September 8, 1896.

³ *The Times*, Feb. 4, 1896.

vostok with Port Arthur by railroad. On this question *The Times* remarked editorially:

It is obvious that with the Russian fleet in the harbor of Port Arthur and a railway connecting that place with the great Siberian trunk line, Manchuria would practically become a Russian province, the Chinese capital would itself be in Russia's grip and every power in any degree interested in Chinese affairs would have to effect a fundamental revision of the arrangements by which its position and commercial interests are at present secured. Russian statesmen are so well aware of the magnitude of the changes involved in such movements as are now reported, that they could not carry them out unless they had definitely resolved to abandon the cautious and pacific policy of the last reign and to plunge into vast and dangerous activities.¹

Appreciating the apprehension that existed amongst some English people who saw with alarm the steady encroachment of Russia and France upon English interests, Lord Salisbury endeavored to allay the fear by remarking at the Guildhall on November 9, 1895, that he had been struck with the "false" news of Russian designs upon Port Arthur, for he apparently believed the prompt denials which the Hongkong report had elicited from both China and St. Petersburg. Furthermore, he was desirous of checking the resentment against Russia, for just at this time the Armenian atrocities had again shocked the English people, and Lord Salisbury recognized the futility of trying to accomplish anything in the Near East without Russian cooperation. Hence the Prime Minister felt the expediency of cultivating Russian friendship.²

I think [he continued] we foreshorten time and distance. De-

¹ *Ibid.*, Oct. 25, 1896.

² Salisbury was trying at this time to effect a concert of Europe to cooperate in solving the Armenian situation.

pend upon it, whatever may happen in that region, be it in the way of war or in the way of commerce, we are equal to any competition which may be opposed to us. We may look on with absolute equanimity at the action of any persons, if such there be, who think that they can exclude us from any part of that fertile and commercial region, or who imagine that if we are admitted they can beat us in the markets of the world. I should be sorry, if there should be any undue sensitiveness in that matter. I cannot forget the great words of Lord Beaconsfield—"In Asia there is room for us all".¹

Lord Salisbury's last sentence, coupled with Mr. Balfour's previously mentioned utterance, was interpreted by Russia to mean that England had withdrawn her former objection to Russia's acquiring a warm-water port in the Far East. But, while Balfour and Salisbury had been making such promises to Russia, the Parliamentary Under Secretaries of the Foreign Office had been announcing in the House of Commons that Korea was not to be considered as territory available for occupation by Russia—in other words, that the pledge of 1887 still held good.

In admitting on the one hand that Russia might have a warm-water port in the Far East and on the other, saying that it could not be in Korea, England aided considerably in diverting Russia's attention from Korea to China, and in effect gave her an invitation to claim a commercial port in an empire, the territorial integrity of which England had proclaimed her intention to uphold. Just as during the Kiao-Chow negotiations, Great Britain had put no obstacles in Germany's path, just so England later acquiesced in a further spoliation of the Celestial Empire by conceding Russia's right to a Chinese port.

The situation indeed becomes a trifle paradoxical when it is remembered that the primary reason for England's desire

¹ Whates, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

to keep Russia out of Korea in 1887 was the fact that the Hermit Kingdom was considered as a stepping-stone to China. Britain had feared that were Russia to gain possession of Korea, the St. Petersburg Government would secure a preponderance of influence at Peking. England still denied Russia that stepping-stone, but allowed her to attain the goal.

Naturally Russia did not object to this change. The closer she came to Peking, the more pressure she could exert upon the Yamen. But on the northern coast of China there were very few ports available to Russia. There was by the British Admiralty's own report just one place capable of being turned into a commercial port. That place was Talienwan.¹ But even Talienwan would be untenable if the neighboring fortress of Port Arthur came into hostile hands. For the moment China was friendly, but Russia was going to take no chances of some day finding Port Arthur in the possession of an enemy. So the Czar's Ministers quite logically decided that both Talienwan and Port Arthur must be acquired.

The deflection of Russia's interest from Korea was not without its reaction upon Japan. Although public opinion in that country was much incensed at Russia's acquisition of the very port from which she had evicted Japan in 1895, Baron Rosen, Russian representative at Tokio, tells us that the seizure of Port Arthur might have resulted in a *rapprochement* between St. Petersburg and Tokio. When Russia had obtained her objective in acquiring Port Arthur and could interest herself in Manchuria, Japan suggested that a reciprocal arrangement be made whereby Russia would recognize Japan's paramount interest in Korea in return for Japan's assurance that she would not interfere with Russia's

¹British *China Sea Directory*, vol. iii—Quoted by Michie, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 432.

plans in Manchuria.¹ Russia rejected this suggestion, fortunately for England, for had Japan made such a bargain with Russia, Great Britain's position in the Far East would have been gravely weakened.²

Germany's action in occupying Kiao-Chow gave Russia an excuse for taking Port Arthur and Talienwan, but there was no definite agreement, as was thought at the time, between St. Petersburg and Berlin prior to Germany's seizure of Kiao-Chow. It is true that the Czar had told the Kaiser that Russia would not object to German ships wintering at Kiao-Chow, but prior to the actual occupation of that port, Germany did not give Russia any reciprocal approval to occupy Port Arthur. Subsequently, however, Germany's acquiescence was readily given in order to break down Russia's opposition at Kiao-Chow. Therefore, when Russia on December 14, 1897 advised Berlin of her intention to send a fleet to Port Arthur, Germany gave her enthusiastic support.³ Russia sought to mollify Japanese resentment by agreeing to recognize the integrity of Korea and by advising Tokio that Russian ships would remain at Port Arthur only temporarily.⁴

Salisbury received the first official intimation of Russia's occupation of Port Arthur when a dispatch from MacDonald on December seventeenth advised that "the Chinese contractor at Port Arthur had been told by the Chinese General there to get ready the necessary provisions for five Russian men-of-war" which were by permission of the "Chinese

¹ Rosen, Baron, *Forty Years of Diplomacy*, vol. i, pp. 157-9.

² Dennett, T., *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 56.

³ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3733, p. 121, Muraviev to Osten-Sacken, Dec. 14, 1897; no. 3737, p. 125, Bülow to Radolin, Dec. 18, 1897.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3758, p. 159, Radolin to Foreign Office, Mar. 16, 1898; *China* # 1 (1898), no. 29, p. 10, Satow to Salisbury, Dec. 23, 1897.

Government to winter at Port Arthur ".¹ A week later came news that the Russian fleet, according to the Yamen's official advice, had been given permission to winter at Port Arthur.²

On the same day, December twenty-third, news of a more reassuring nature came from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. Count Muravief had told Sir Edward Goschen that Russian ships were at Port Arthur only because Japanese ports could not accommodate many ships, and the "convenience of Port Arthur lay in the fact that it was not so far distant from Vladivostok and that for repairs to ships, etc., it was more suitable than any other place".³ Three days later the Ambassador reported that Muravief had assured him that "Vladivostok remained as heretofore their chief center in the Far East and the headquarters of their land and sea forces so that the mere fact of the Russian squadron wintering at Port Arthur made no change whatever in the situation".⁴ A third such assurance was given as late as January twelfth.⁵

On January twelfth there occurred the famous interview between Salisbury and the Russian representative at London, during which the latter casually remarked that some British ships had recently put in at Port Arthur and that their presence there had created a bad impression in Russia.⁶ Salisbury's reply as he outlined it on the same day to MacDonald, was in substance:

I replied that I saw no ground of complaint in the presence of the British ships in a bay where they had a treaty right to enter,

¹ *China # 1* (1898), no. 22, p. 9, MacDonald to Salisbury, Dec. 17, 1897.

² *Ibid.*, no. 27, p. 10, MacDonald to Salisbury, Dec. 23, 1897.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 28, p. 10, Goschen to Salisbury, Dec. 23, 1897.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 37, p. 12, Goschen to Salisbury, Dec. 26, 1897.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 54, p. 20, O'Connor to Salisbury, Jan. 12, 1897.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 48, p. 17, Salisbury to O'Connor, Jan. 12, 1898.

but that as a matter of fact they had been sent thither by Admiral Buller without any orders from home, and that I believed that in the ordinary course they would soon move to some other anchorage.¹

Muravief also took up the matter with Sir Nicholas O'Connor at St. Petersburg and went so far as to remark that the presence of British ships at Port Arthur was looked upon in Russia "as so unfriendly as to set afloat rumors of war with Great Britain".² Baron de Staël, Russian Ambassador in London, was quite insistent in his efforts to keep British ships out of Port Arthur. On January twenty-third he told Salisbury that his government hoped England "would endeavor to avoid any friction in their sphere of interest".³ The British Prime Minister went to the trouble of having the Admiralty wire the Far Eastern commander to ascertain for the Russian Ambassador that "the only ship at Port Arthur was the *Iphigenia*". Salisbury insisted that the ship's visit to Port Arthur was made by orders from the Admiral acting in his own discretion, and not in consequence of any direction from the Foreign Office.

Salisbury has been very severely criticized by British writers, even by those friendly to him, for what they call his weak surrender in ordering British ships away from a port where they had a right to be in accordance with the Treaty of Tientsin.⁴ It is probable, however, that this was a conciliatory gesture on his part in line with his general plan of effecting an understanding with the Russian Government. Concerning this project he approached St. Peters-

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*, no. 61, p. 23, O'Connor to Salisbury, Jan. 19, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 63, p. 24, Salisbury to O'Connor, Jan. 23, 1898.

⁴ "It is a humiliating passage in the story of the negotiations," *Whates, op. cit.*, p. 117.

burg on January seventeenth.¹ Nevertheless, the withdrawal of the ships had a most injurious effect upon China when Reuter's Agency announced in Peking that the Russian Foreign Office officially claimed that the British ships had left Port Arthur upon receiving orders to do so.² Salisbury denied that any orders to move had been sent to the ships. The effect, however, was the same, for as the *Quarterly Review* put it: "On Lord Salisbury's own admission we were where we had a perfect right to be. We were asked to clear out. We did so and Russia has been in possession ever since."³

- ° On January nineteenth Russia gave England the first official intimation that not only Port Arthur but also Talienwan would be appropriated. It was then that de Staäl told Salisbury that "it was generally admitted that Russia might have a commercial *débouche* in the open sea". Although he disclaimed any Russian designs upon Chinese territory, it is difficult to interpret de Staäl's remarks in any other way than as presaging a permanent occupation of Port Arthur and Talienwan.

On January twenty-sixth Muravief, in protesting to O'Connor regarding the demand that Talienwan be opened as a treaty port, went a step further. This time he clearly intimated that Russia would take Talienwan as

that port was apparently one of the few places on the north coast of China free from ice during the winter. This being so and Her Majesty's Government having in public speeches recognized the right of Russia to have an open port, it was hardly to be expected that the Russian Government would approve the demand [i.e., that Talienwan be made a treaty port]. They had thought of a port near the mouth of the Yalu River, but it

¹ B. D. O. W., vol. i, no. 5, p. 5, Salisbury to O'Connor, Jan. 17, 1897.

² *China* # 1 (1898), no. 67, p. 25, MacDonald to Salisbury, Jan. 27, 1898.

³ *January*, 1900.

appears that the harbors in that neighborhood are frozen in winter and that the choice is very limited.¹

Likewise at London de Staäl on January twenty-seventh told Salisbury of a note received from Count Muravief promising that any port taken by Russia would be "open to the ships of all the great powers—would be open to the commerce of all the world, and England whose trade interests in those regions were so important, would share in the advantage".²

Such a declaration was bound to evoke sympathy from the British Government, whose only objection to Russia's acquisition of a Chinese port had been the fear that "Russia intended to cause some port to be opened to her own imports which should not be opened, or should be opened under a higher tariff, to the imports of other nations".³ Salisbury was exceedingly pleased with Russia's assurance that equal trading facilities would be granted in any Chinese territory taken by Russia. The British Prime Minister announced in the House of Lords on February eighth that he had written assurance that any Russian port in the Far East would be a free port.⁴

But the next day de Staäl, while approving the general tenor of the Prime Minister's address, took occasion to point out that he had meant a treaty port, rather than a free port, and that the communication was verbal and not written.⁵ Salisbury replied that he thought the distinction between a

¹ *China # 1* (1898), no. 72, p. 29, O'Connor to Salisbury, Jan. 26, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, no. 76, p. 32, Salisbury to O'Connor, Feb. 2, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Hansard*, vol. liii, pp. 40-1.

⁵ *China # 1* (1898), no. 83, p. 35, de Staäl to Salisbury, Feb. 10, 1898; Meyendorff, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, no. 9, p. 372, de Staäl to Muravief, Feb. 14, 1898.

free port and a treaty port mattered little. He maintained, however, that the communication was written, as the Under Secretary of the Foreign Office had obtained the official notice sent by St. Petersburg to de Staäl.¹ Such a protest could only mean that the Russian Government was protecting itself in case it saw fit to repudiate the promise.

On February nineteenth Count Lamsdorf, acting Russian Foreign Minister, laid his cards on the table and told O'Connor that Russia wanted a twenty-year lease of Talienwan and Port Arthur, or some other port in the north which "might ultimately be considered more desirable as a terminal railway station". This would be only a lease, said Lamsdorf, and, as the territory would still be a part of China, he speciously pointed out, the territorial integrity of the Celestial Empire would not be imperilled. Indeed the Russians wanted merely "an outlet for their commerce, and some place where they could coal and dock their ships in safety".²

Then it was that for the first time the British Government through Sir Nicholas O'Connor (and even he seems to have acted on his own initiative) protested officially against the occupation of Port Arthur, although for two months previously Russian ships had been in the harbor, and every attempt had been made to keep out British ships. The British Ambassador pointed out that the possession of such a strong military position as Port Arthur would radically alter the Far Eastern situation and intimated that England would have to seek compensation — not from Russia, but from China.³

As Russia was able to count on French and German support, it is no wonder that O'Connor was given clearly to un-

¹ *China* # 1 (1898), no. 82, p. 34, Salisbury to O'Connor, Feb. 9, 1898.

² *B.D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 18, p. 14, O'Connor to Salisbury, Feb. 19, 1898.

³ *Ibid.* 3

derstand that Russia "intended to hold both ports at any cost".¹ The Ambassador was apparently a little suspicious as he unfolded to Salisbury what he thought the aims of St. Petersburg really were. Russia, he said, thought that at the expiration of the twenty-year lease of Port Arthur, "Manchuria would be in their possession and Pechili, if not actually in their possession, virtually at their mercy". He urged the necessity of forestalling these plans by seizing Chusan and Silver Island and also by securing commercial advantages from China before Russian influence became dominant at Peking.² These suggestions were considered by the members of the British Cabinet and the decision was made that the two places mentioned by O'Connor would not sufficiently offset the presence of Russia at Port Arthur. The cabinet preferred Weihaiwei but realized that before occupying it they would have to come to some arrangement with the power then in possession—Japan.³

Meanwhile, British public opinion was becoming disturbed over the Chinese situation. The House of Commons endeavored to reassure everybody and at the same time to notify Russia that a partition of China was undesired by England. After a lengthy debate the following resolution was unanimously passed by the House:

That it is of vital importance for British commerce and influence that the independence of Chinese territory should be maintained.⁴

In the course of the debate on this resolution Curzon,

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 28, p. 17, O'Connor to Salisbury, Feb. 19, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 24, p. 17, Memorandum by Mr. Bertie, Mar. 14, 1898. By the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan was permitted to occupy Weihaiwei until China paid the war indemnity.

⁴ *Hansard*, vol. liv, p. 309.

Parliamentary Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs further amplified the meaning of "independence" by stating that:

We agree that the integrity and independence of China are matters of intense solicitude to the Government, as they must be to any British Government, and that they may be considered to be the cardinal bases of our policy with reference to that country. . . . Our policy is and must be to prevent her disruption as long as we can and to secure for her that fresh lease of life to which her immense and magnificent resources entitle her. We are therefore opposed to the alienation of any portion of Chinese territory, or to the sacrifice of any part of Chinese independence. That is a policy from which the Government have abstained and which they have no desire to imitate. . . . I can conceive of circumstances arising in the future, circumstances gravely affecting and perhaps seriously imperilling our interests in China, which might tempt us and even compel us to depart from that attitude of reserve. But the seizure of Chinese territory, the alienation of Chinese territory, the usurpation of Chinese sovereignty is not primarily any part of British policy; that which we repudiate for ourselves, it is not likely that we should regard with a friendly eye if attempted by others.¹

Obviously this direct thrust at Russia was inconsistent with the previous speeches of Lord Salisbury and Mr. Balfour which had stated that Asia was large enough for both England and Russia. Only a month before, Salisbury had given to the Russian Ambassador his approval of Russia's project.² The inconsistency was the more pointed since England had not vigorously opposed Germany's seizure of Kiao-Chow.

¹ *Hansard*, vol. liv, p. 332.

² "... Her Majesty's Government had never entertained any objection to the existence of an outlet for Russian commerce upon the open waters of the China seas by agreement, of course, with China," *China* # 1 (1898), no. 76, p. 32, Salisbury to O'Connor, Feb. 2, 1898.

On March sixth the Peking correspondent of *The Times*, and Sir Claude MacDonald, reported that Russia had demanded Talienwan and Port Arthur together with a railway concession connecting the latter port with the Trans-Siberian.¹ Salisbury immediately called upon his Ambassador at St. Petersburg to verify the information with the Russian Foreign Minister.² Count Muraviev admitted the authenticity of the reports but euphemistically referred to the seizures as merely leases and denied that Chinese territory had been violated. Talienwan, said the Count, would be opened to trade, but no mention was made of Port Arthur.³ This ignored the promise which de Staäl had previously given to Salisbury — albeit verbally — that any port taken by Russia would be a treaty port, open to the trade of all nations.

Lord Salisbury was quick to notice the discrepancy and on March eleventh called O'Connor's attention to it.⁴ The Ambassador visited Muraviev two days later and referred him to de Staäl's dispatch wherein he had promised that any port taken by Russia would be either a treaty port or a free port. Thus cornered, the Russian Minister could only respond that the Czar had given orders that Talienwan be opened to trade but not Port Arthur. A further reply, however, was promised within a few days.⁵

In accordance with this promise, Muraviev took the matter up with the Czar, who directed him to inform England that both Port Arthur and Talienwan would be opened to trade. Further evidence of conciliation on Russia's part was given

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 96, p. 42, MacDonald to Salisbury, Mar. 7, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, no. 98, p. 42, Salisbury to O'Connor, Mar. 8, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 101, p. 43, O'Connor to Salisbury, Mar. 9, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 27, p. 19, O'Connor to Salisbury, Mar. 13, 1898.

at the same time in the promise to recognize "all rights and privileges secured to Great Britain by their existing treaties with China", and the assurance that Russia had no intention to infringe them or to impair the sovereignty of China.¹

By these promises Russia had met all of Salisbury's previous demands, for heretofore he had been anxious only that any port taken by Russia be opened to trade. Sir Nicholas O'Connor, however, had pointed out to Muraviev on February nineteenth that there was a difference between a *moral fortress* and a *commercial port*.²

This viewpoint was now taken by the British Government when the cabinet met on March fifteenth to consider the courses open to England in connection with Russia's seizure of Port Arthur. Two possibilities presented themselves: first, to "allow Russia to lease Port Arthur subject to engagements to preserve existing treaty rights and possibly—though this is doubtful—to refrain from fortifying Port Arthur, we taking as a make-weight 'Wenhaiwei'", and second, to require "the Russians to abstain from leasing Port Arthur, we engaging to take no port in the Gulf of Pechili and not to intervene in Manchuria".³

The advantages of the first plan in the opinion of the British Cabinet, were that it could be effected without endangering peace and that it really would not affect North China; since "this must inevitably fall to Russia, and with or without Port Arthur, we can maintain our commercial supremacy in the Far East and even in the Gulf of Pechili".⁴

In favor of the second policy [Salisbury argued] it may be said

¹ *China* = 1 (1898), no. 110, p. 46, O'Connor to Salisbury, March 16, 1898.

² *B. D. O. IV.*, vol. i, no. 18, p. 14, O'Connor to Salisbury, Feb. 19, 1898. See p. 221.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 32, p. 21, Balfour to MacDonald, March 19, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*

that, though it can be carried through only at the risk of war, it is the only possible way of checking Russia's advance and preventing the imminent partition of China; that Weihaiwei, if obtained, would require too large a military force for its defense, and except for appearances, would be worth little to us if fortified and still less if unfortified, and would therefore be no counterpoise to Port Arthur which is so strong by nature and still possesses forts of such strength that it can easily be made impregnable, while no pledge of the Russians with regard to its defenses would be of any value; that the influence at Peking of the power which had such a base at Port Arthur must be overwhelming, and finally, that its possession would not only alter the balance of power at Peking, but discredit England throughout the Far East.¹

It is obvious from this communication that the British Government considered that the only way to keep Russia out of Port Arthur would be by war. The correctness of this view can scarcely be questioned. Russia, successful after centuries of effort to gain a warm-water port, might be expected to push to any extremity her right to maintain her privileged position, especially when she was already assured of Germany's support and that of France also.

In short, Salisbury had to decide whether or not he was going to risk war with Russia, aided by France and possibly Germany.² His decision was in the negative. He refused to take such responsibility when the only certain assistance was that of Japan. Having come to this decision, he did not make any threat to Russia, for he had a horror of bluffing. Nevertheless, he did consider it advisable to protest against the seizure of Port Arthur, and on March twenty-second sent the following telegram to O'Connor:

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 36, p. 23, Salisbury to O'Connor, Mar. 22, 1898.

² Of course Germany at this time was anxious to avoid war, and might have backed out of the agreement had Russia pushed things too far.

Please inform Count Muravief that Her Majesty's Government note with satisfaction the assurance given you to the effect that the Russian Government have no intention to infringe rights and privileges guaranteed by existing treaties between China and foreign countries, and that they do not propose to interfere with Chinese sovereignty. On their part Her Majesty's Government would not regard with any dissatisfaction the lease by Russia of an ice-free commercial harbor, and its connection by rail with the Trans-Siberian Railway now under construction. The control by Russia of a military port in the immediate vicinity of Peking opens questions of an entirely different order. The occupation of Port Arthur which is useless for commercial purposes and whose whole importance is derived solely from its military strength and strategic position, would inevitably be considered in the Far East as a standing menace to Peking and a commencement of the partition of China. The same objection would apply with almost equal force to the military occupation or fortification of any other harbor on the same coast or in the Gulf of Pechili. Her Majesty's Government gather from observations made by Count Lamsdorf and reported by you that is not a policy favored by Russia, while it is one to which Her Majesty's Government entertain grave objections. On the other hand, Her Majesty's Government are prepared to give assurances that beyond the maintenance of existing treaty rights they have no interests in Manchuria, and to pledge themselves to occupy no port on the Gulf of Pechili so long as the same policy is pursued by other powers.¹

England being the only power to protest against Russia's occupation of Port Arthur, Russia was not to be thwarted. Count Muravief would go no further than his previous promises to respect China's foreign treaties and to open Port Arthur and Talienwan to the trade of the world and also to ships of war.² At London Balfour remonstrated in vain

¹ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 35, p. 23, Salisbury to O'Connor, Mar. 22, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 37, p. 24, O'Connor to Salisbury, Mar. 23, 1898.

with the Russian Ambassador.¹ Finally, when the treaty was made between Russia and China regarding Port Arthur, Salisbury once more registered a protest with St. Petersburg and announced that England would maintain her freedom of action.²

Unable to keep Russia out of Port Arthur and realizing the impossibility of maintaining single-handed the territorial integrity of China, Great Britain renounced her oft-asserted interest in such a policy of self-denial, and herself leaped into the merry game of appropriating the possessions of John Chinaman. The British fleet on May twenty-fifth was ordered to steam to Weihaiwei, and on the same day Sir Claude MacDonald at Peking received the following cable from the Foreign Office:

Balance of power in Gulf of Pechili is materially altered by surrender of Port Arthur to Russia by Yamen. It is therefore necessary to obtain in the manner you think most efficacious and speedy, the refusal of Weihaiwei on the departure of the Japanese. The terms should be similar to those granted to Russia for Port Arthur. British fleet is on its way from Hongkong to Gulf of Pechili.³

Before passing on to the question of Weihaiwei, which will be considered in another chapter, it will be well to consider the conflicting views held in England and in Russia regarding Port Arthur.

To the Russian, England appeared as a land-grabbing power that had naval ports in all corners of the globe and which since 1842 had possessed a stronghold on the Chinese coast at Hongkong. By this acquisitive empire Russia had

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 38, p. 24, Salisbury to O'Connor, Mar. 24, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 41, p. 27, Salisbury to O'Connor, Mar. 28, 1898; Meyendorff, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, no. 14, p. 375, de Staäl to Muravief, Mar. 30, 1898.

³ *China # 1* (1898), no. 129, p. 54, Salisbury to MacDonald, Mar. 25, 1898.

always been thwarted in the Mediterranean and in the Persian Gulf. Now Russia was again confronted in the Far East by the same implacable enemy, who wanted this time to keep Russia ice-bound at Vladivostok for a third of the year, while British ships enjoyed the warm waters at Shanghai and Hongkong. Not only England, but Germany and France also had ice-free ports in the Far East. Only Russia was to be denied this privilege. England had raised no protest when France took Indo-China nor when Germany took Kiao-Chow, but when Russian ships steamed into Port Arthur, the British turned on St. Petersburg and used their utmost efforts to keep Russia out. This was done after repeated assurances had been given Russia that she would be welcomed in the Far East and after Russia had complied with England's original demands that any port taken would be opened to trade, and that the treaty obligations of China would be respected.

The Englishman, however, had a different story. To him Russia represented a menace to free trade, the basis of British commercial supremacy in the Far East. He had ever before him the spectre of Russia absorbing Chinese territory and by hostile barriers ruining British trade. A seemingly impregnable Russian fortress at Port Arthur would be a constant threat to the territorial integrity of China, and would result in a serious diminution of England's prestige in Peking. Russia was striving to destroy that commercial supremacy which it had taken England a century to build up. Hence, Russia was to be opposed not only as England's enemy, but as the enemy of all nations who desired to trade with China.

There was error on both sides. In fact Russia's conduct in the affair had been anything but straightforward. Chinese officials had been bribed to rush the lease through.¹

¹ *Krasny Arkiv*, quoted by Steiger, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-71.

When he assured England after the entrance of Russian ships into Port Arthur that the occupation was only of a temporary nature, Muravief was not acting in good faith, nor was he sincere in promising England that Port Arthur would be opened to trade.

Salisbury, for his part, had laid himself open to fair criticism, in agreeing to the occupation of Port Arthur provided it would be opened to commerce and then, two months later, when Russia had agreed to this stipulation, contending that Port Arthur was one port which Russia might not have. If he intended to keep Russia out of Port Arthur, he should not have waited from December seventeenth until March twenty-second to let Russia know of his objections. Moreover, there was little justice in the British argument that the seizure of Port Arthur was tantamount to the commencement of the dismemberment of the Chinese Empire,¹ when England had already agreed to the seizure of Kiao-Chow and Talienwan.

ENGLAND ATTEMPTS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA

While there was considerable anger in both official and private circles in England because of Russian antagonism in the Far East, cooler minds foresaw an Anglo-Russian war unless some agreement were arrived at between the two countries.² Fortunately, among those desiring to avoid this fearful eventuality was the Prime Minister. Lord Salisbury saw the danger of constant Anglo-Russian bickerings in the Far East and endeavored to improve the relations between

¹ *China # 1* (1898), no. 125, p. 53, O'Connor to Salisbury, Mar. 23, 1898.

² Lord Rosebery while Prime Minister had told de Staäl that "he had not abandoned the hope of seeing the two countries make a complete entente with each other on all outstanding questions in the Far East." de Staäl, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, no. 23, p. 275, de Staäl to Lobanov, Mar 22, 1895.

London and St. Petersburg, just as he had cultivated American friendship after the Venezuelan controversy.¹

The result was a direct overture to Russia for cooperation in China — sent on January 17, 1898, and couched in the following terms:

If practical, ask M. Witte whether it is possible that England and Russia should work together in China. Our objects are not antagonistic in any serious degree; on the other hand, we can both of us do each other a great deal of harm if we try. It is better we should come to an understanding. We would go far to further Russian commercial objects in the north, if we could regard her as willing to work with us.²

While England's motive in making this proposal was the desire to foster trade and peace, it is characteristic of pre-war diplomacy that China was left out of consideration. The proposal shows no thought of the horrors which would be inflicted upon China were Russia and England to renew their feud on Chinese soil. There was no suggestion that London and St. Petersburg work together to put China on her feet. On the contrary it was an effort to effect a reconciliation in order to get more out of China by cooperative exploitation.

When Salisbury sent this offer to Russia on January seventeenth it was thought in England that Russia and Germany were in dispute regarding Kiao-Chow. Strained relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin would offer an exceedingly favorable opportunity to cultivate the former's friendship, for Russia would be in need of British help.

¹ Lord Salisbury in a speech in November, 1896 said that there was no fundamental difference of interest between Russia and England and that of all the great powers Russia was the one with which Britain had the least conflicting interests to discuss. de Staäl, *op. cit.*, no. 34, p. 327, de Staäl to Chichkine, Nov. 11, 1896.

² B. D. O. W., vol. i, no. 5, p. 5, Salisbury to O'Conor, Jan. 17, 1898.

The British overture, however, came a few weeks too late. Russia and Germany had effected a reconciliation regarding Kiao-Chow and the entire Chinese situation on January 2, 1898.¹ Consequently, Russia with a friendly Germany and an allied France, had no immediate need to come to an agreement with England, especially since Muscovite ambitions for an ice-free port were at the time unfulfilled.²

It was unfortunate also that England's representative at St. Petersburg was Sir Nicholas O'Connor, who two years earlier had occupied the Peking legation and had been very unsuccessful in combating Russian statecraft in China. It may be remembered that Russia had been instrumental in getting him recalled.³ It was too much to expect that a Minister who had seen and felt the results of Russian antagonism in China would be very sanguine over the prospects of an Anglo-Russian agreement. Hence it is not surprising that after O'Connor received Salisbury's instructions he cautioned his superior "to take care that any understanding we may come to gives no such headway that it cannot be thrust aside when it may seem to Russia to have served its temporary purpose".⁴

Salisbury himself did not have entire confidence in the success of the negotiations. In January, 1898 he admitted to O'Connor that "The difficulty would be great".⁵ A little later, February eleventh, he confided to Sir Claude MacDonald that there had been an exchange of friendly language, "but they are insincere and their language is ambiguous".⁶

¹ See p. 208.

² Russia did not secure the lease of Port Arthur until March 27, 1898.

³ See p. 158.

⁴ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 6, p. 6, O'Connor to Salisbury, Jan. 20, 1898.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 9, p. 8, Salisbury to O'Connor, Jan. 25, 1898.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 15, p. 11, Salisbury to MacDonald, Feb. 11, 1898.

Unfortunately for the success of the negotiations, they were prefaced by several pugnacious speeches by British Cabinet Ministers. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, on January seventeenth told the Swansea Chamber of Commerce that the British Government was determined to keep the door opened in China, even at the risk of war.¹ These remarks were obviously directed at Russia and France, for Lord Salisbury told the German Ambassador that the speech was not aimed at Berlin.² Two days later the Chancellor made a rather inappropriate eulogy of the British navy and announced that the Government intended to keep an eye on the shipbuilding programs of other countries.³ Mr. Joseph Chamberlain on January eighteenth endorsed the utterances of his colleague.⁴

A further difficulty was that while at St. Petersburg the Russian Foreign Minister was showing goodwill towards England's proffered olive branch, at Peking her representative was threatening the Yarden with the direst penalties should they accept a loan from England. She was at the same time trying to put a Russian in Sir Robert Hart's place when the latter should retire.⁵ England was reciprocating in kind by wresting commercial advantages from China because Russia refused to let the Yamen borrow money.⁶ Britain was likewise trying to shut Russia out of the Pacific Ocean by attempting to make Talienwan a treaty port. In other words, while the lion and the bear were fondling each other in St. Petersburg, they were showing their claws in

¹ *Annual Register* (1898), p. 7.

² *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3751, p. 147, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, Jan. 22, 1898.

³ *Annual Register* (1898), pp. 7-8.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁵ See p. 165.

⁶ See pp. 171-3.

Peking. Negotiations initiated in such a setting were handicapped at the start.

On the other hand, the Siberian Railway was not yet completed and it would be advisable from a Russian point of view to smooth over difficulties with England until the railroad was completed, as Russia would then be in a much better position to cope with the situation. Moreover, the Russian Foreign Office knew,¹ as did Count Witte,² that there was grave danger of an Anglo-Japanese agreement should Russia reject England's conciliatory offer at a time when St. Petersburg had made friends with Germany and France. This fact should also have caused Russian officials to hesitate before rejecting the British proposal.

On January eighteenth Sir Nicholas O'Connor interviewed Count Muravief regarding Lord Salisbury's peace offer, and was forced to admit that the response of the Russian Foreign Minister had been "even more favorable" than he had anticipated. Assurance was given that Salisbury's sentiments were reciprocated by both Muravief and the Czar, before whom the Foreign Minister promised to lay the matter without delay. When the Ambassador said that England desired the agreement to cover not only the Far Eastern disputes, but also all outstanding disagreements, the Count readily acquiesced and said that "he was ready to consider at once any proposal which would bring about a closer understanding between the two countries". As additional evidence of good will, the Russian Foreign Minister declared his intention to lay all his cards on the table if England would do the same. Furthermore, he promised to

¹ Count Muravief told the German Ambassador on March sixteenth that an Anglo-Japanese Alliance must be prevented.—*D. G. P.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3758, p. 159, Radolin to Foreign Office, March 16, 1898. The Count must have known this in January, also.

² *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 8, p. 7, O'Connor to Salisbury, Jan. 23, 1898.

do what he could to change the anti-foreign tone of the Russian press.¹

After such an encouraging start, O'Connor, although a bit suspicious of Russia's good faith, visited Count Witte, who felt that the word of a united England and Russia would be law in the Far East. The British Ambassador declared that the policy of his government was to keep China open to foreign trade, to oppose prohibitive tariff barriers, and not to allow British commercial and political interests to be set aside by the action of other powers. This policy would not, as we have seen, be apt to commend itself to Russia if applied to northern China. Nevertheless, Witte declared his readiness to support England's policy provided the latter would not thwart Russia in the north.²

Both Muraviev and Witte openly explained Russia's desire for a sphere of influence in northern China, the former calling it by that name,³ the latter admitting that sooner or later Russia would absorb Chi, Shansi, Shensi, and Kansu.⁴ At O'Connor's request, Salisbury went into a little more detail regarding his plan for an Anglo-Russian Entente.

Our idea is this: [he wrote] the two empires of China and Turkey are so weak that in all important matters they are constantly guided by the advice of foreign powers. In giving this advice, Russia and England are constantly opposed, neutralizing each other's efforts much more frequently than the real antagonism of their interests would justify; and this condition of things is not likely to diminish, but to increase. It is to remove or lessen this evil that we have thought than [sic] an understanding with Russia might benefit both nations.

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 6, p. 6, O'Connor to Salisbury, Jan. 20, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 8, p. 7, O'Connor to Salisbury, Jan. 23, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 6, p. 6, O'Connor to Salisbury, Jan. 20, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. i, incl. in no. 8, p. 8, O'Connor to Salisbury, Jan. 30, 1898.

We contemplate no infraction of existing rights. We would not admit the violation of existing treaties or impair the integrity of the present empires of either China or Turkey. These two conditions are vital. We aim at no partition of territory, but only a partition of influence. . . .¹

Reduced to plain terms this was tantamount to inviting Russia to terminate the old system whereby lion and bear were opposing each other so successfully that neither one was getting as much out of Chinese commerce as would be the case were they to work in harmony. China would no longer be defended against Muscovite aspirations by British objections. No longer could she count upon the energetic protests of capable Russian Ministers whenever England endeavored to wring additional commercial concessions from a reluctant Yamen. Salisbury, to be sure, disclaimed the contemplation of any "infraction of existing rights", but he meant the rights which Russia and England had already secured from China. The rights of the Peking Government were set aside with the suggestion that Russia give advice to the Yamen regarding the northern part of the empire while England would act in a similar tutorial capacity for the Yangtze Valley.

After receiving Salisbury's dispatch, O'Connor saw the Czar on February first and was informed by His Majesty that the suggested agreement between the two countries would be "most desirable".² On February third the Ambassador interviewed Muravief, who slightly amended the Czar's complete approval by explaining that it would be better to settle the Chinese dispute first and to leave Turkey for future consideration. The Russian Foreign Minister then suggested that Lord Salisbury make a definite proposal

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 9, p. 8, Salisbury to O'Connor, Jan. 25, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 10, p. 9, O'Connor to Salisbury, Feb. 2, 1898.

as to how far he felt England and Russia should support each other in China.¹

Scarcely a fortnight after the opening of the negotiations they showed signs of foundering. O'Connor, agreeably surprised at the Czar's unexpected encouragement of the proposal, had suggested that Salisbury "formally and officially acknowledge the Emperor's assurances".² Unfortunately, this request reached Downing Street at a very unpropitious moment. The Chinese Minister had just communicated the intention of the Peking Government to refuse a loan from England because of Russian opposition.³ In cold fury Salisbury dictated his response to O'Connor's suggestion:

The Chinese Minister does not keep secrets: and therefore the announcement is practically public property. Just after this very hostile and insulting action it will be difficult for us to put on paper an effusive recognition of the Emperor's kindness. But as I am sure that this affront is not due to any order of the Emperor, you may, as from me, verbally thank the Emperor for the good will shown in his message in any terms you think suitable.⁴

Nevertheless, the negotiations continued with at least an outward show of friendliness. O'Connor disclosed to Count Lamsdorf⁵ the terms England was at the time demanding from China in return for a loan.⁶ In turn Lamsdorf outlined what counter demands Russia would make. St. Petersburg wanted Talienwan and Port Arthur.⁷ Three days later

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 11, p. 10, O'Connor to Salisbury, Feb. 3, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 13, p. 10, O'Connor to Salisbury, Feb. 7, 1898.

³ See p. 171.

⁴ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 14, p. 11, Salisbury to O'Connor, Feb. 8, 1898.

⁵ Acting Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁶ See p. 165.

⁷ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 18, p. 14, O'Connor to Salisbury, Feb. 19, 1898.

the Russian Foreign Office officially confirmed the negotiations and advised Sir Nicholas that they awaited further word from England.¹

Although O'Connor had protested against Russian acquisition of Port Arthur, the London Foreign Office had not officially replied when an event supervened which so angered Russia that the negotiations were severely checked.² This event was the signing on March first of an agreement whereby the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank were to lend China \$80,000,000.³

A second reason for the breakdown of the negotiations at this juncture was the list of concessions secured by Great Britain from China in the early part of February, when the Yamen decided to follow Russia's advice and not borrow from the English Government.⁴ These demands undoubtedly angered the Russian Government but the negotiation of a loan by the Anglo-German banks at a time when England was seeking an understanding with Russia so aroused the Czar that he was not inclined to pursue the discussion. "I do not think," wrote Sir Nicholas O'Connor to Lord Salisbury, "that the negotiations have actually broken down, but they certainly have had a severe check, and it may be difficult to put the Emperor into good humor again."⁵

Ten days later the anti-Russian suspicion of the British Ambassador again raised its head when he advised Lord Salisbury that "the Russian Government think that before

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 20, p. 15, O'Connor to Salisbury, Feb. 22, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 22, p. 16, O'Connor to Salisbury, March 3, 1898.

³ See p. 176.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 21, p. 15, MacDonald to Salisbury, Mar. 1, 1898. See p. 172.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 22, p. 16, O'Connor to Salisbury, Mar. 3, 1898.

the expiration of their lease of the two ports [i. e., Port Arthur and Talienwan] Manchuria will be in their possession and Pechili, if not actually in their possession, virtually at their mercy".¹

Mr. Bertie, Under Secretary of the British Foreign Office, likewise took a pessimistic view:

The Emperor of Russia [he wrote] has performed an *acquit de conscience* towards his English relatives by showing good-will to the theoretical idea of a general understanding with England, but circumstances and Russian feeling and ambition are too strong for him to run counter to his Minister's designs.²

But the feeling of distrust was not entirely confined to England. Despite his courteous reception of the British overture, the Czar was not at the moment very friendly to the British, as his impressionable mind was being moulded to a certain extent by his strong-willed Anglophobe cousin, William II.³ The Czar's opinion of the British proposal was communicated to the Kaiser on June third, as follows:

Three months ago, in the midst of our negotiations with China, England handed us over a memorandum containing many tempting proposals trying to induce us to come to a full agreement upon all points in which our interests collided with hers. These proposals were of such a new character that I must say we were quite amazed and yet their very nature seemed suspicious to us; never before had England made such offers to Russia. That showed us clearly that England needed our friendship at that time to be able to check our development in a masked way in the Far East. Without thinking twice over it their proposals were refused. Two weeks later Port Arthur was ours. . . . I do not see any reason why the latter [Russia]

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 23, p. 16, O'Connor to Salisbury, Mar. 13, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 24, p. 17, Memorandum by Mr. Bertie, Mar. 14, 1898.

³ See Lerin's *Kaiser's Letters to the Czar*.

should suddenly turn against old friends—only for the *beaux yeux* of England's.¹

It is quite possible that Russia mistook the British proposal for weakness, but they did not reject it "without thinking twice over it" as the Czar intimates. He was evidently trying to make an impression upon the Kaiser. Nevertheless, while the Czar's letter must be discounted, it does suggest that there was an anti-British influence at work in St. Petersburg which helped to prevent the adoption of any agreement at the time.

ENGLAND LEASES WEIHAIWEI

The British Government did not want to acquire an additional naval base on the Chinese coast. It took Weihaiwei unwillingly in an effort to prevent Russia from securing preponderant control over the region near Peking.

Prior to Russia's occupation of Port Arthur, England had no intention of obtaining a lease of any Chinese port, for her trade was centered chiefly in South China. Hongkong and the international settlement at Shanghai adequately took care of her needs. Moreover, it would be decidedly disadvantageous to England's commercial welfare to give the signal for a general descent upon a country where she had about eighty per cent of the trade. A change in the *status quo* of China could hardly benefit England and it would almost certainly injure her position.

There are many evidences of England's desire to avoid taking additional Chinese territory. On December 11, 1897 Lord Salisbury told Count Hatzfeldt that such action was not part of the British Government's intentions.² Later

¹ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3803, p. 250, Czar Nicholas to Kaiser William, June 3, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3730, p. 116, Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Dec. 11, 1897.

when Russian aspirations at Port Arthur were becoming apparent to China, the Yamen, through the medium of Sir Robert Hart, intimated to the British Government that they would offer Weihaiwei to England should such action meet with a favorable response.¹ The Prime Minister rejected this proposal the very same day, but said that he might change his decision if "the action of other powers materially alters the situation".² Furthermore, early in 1898 England officially promised to refrain from annexing a port on the Chinese coast provided Russia would agree to do the same.³

Likewise the Parliamentary resolution of March 1, 1898, declaring England's interest in the independence of China, showed the British disinclination to acquire additional territory. But it will be remembered that Mr. Curzon followed the example of his chief in maintaining that altered conditions might force England to change her attitude.⁴

While the cabinet as a whole was steadfastly adhering to the open door policy, Mr. Curzon was vainly endeavoring to force his chief to take action against Russia and disliked the disagreeable task he had of defending before the House of Commons a policy in which he did not believe. He felt that he had "successively to conjure up make-believes".⁵

On December 28, 1897, he wrote Lord Salisbury suggesting that Weihaiwei be taken, and expressing the opinion that England should "pounce the moment anyone pounces".⁶ Later on March thirteenth when Kiao-Chow had been leased

¹ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 25, p. 18, MacDonald to Salisbury, Feb. 25, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 26, p. 18, Salisbury to MacDonald, Feb. 25, 1898.

³ Meinecke, F., *Geschichte des deutsch-englischen Bündnisproblems*, p. 102.

⁴ See p. 223.

⁵ Ronaldshay, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 282.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 279.

to Germany and it was apparent to everybody that Russia was about to acquire Port Arthur, Curzon submitted his case to the cabinet, pointing out that if England took no counter action, it would be tantamount to announcing her retirement from North China and leaving Peking to her rivals—but should Weihaiwei be taken it would be an assurance that England still claimed an interest in that section of the Chinese Empire. Furthermore, the acquisition of Weihaiwei would strengthen Japan's confidence in Great Britain and would eventually lead to an alliance.¹

Mr. Balfour, Acting Prime Minister in Lord Salisbury's absence, summoned Mr. Curzon to the cabinet meetings, where the matter was thoroughly discussed, and it developed that the opposition to taking Weihaiwei came from Balfour, Chamberlain, Goschen, the Duke of Devonshire, Lord Lansdowne, and Sir Michael Hicks-Beach.² After five cabinet meetings Balfour withdrew his opposition and supported the suggested occupation.³

Salisbury himself opposed the acquisition of Weihaiwei but was in favor of eliminating the possibility of any other power appropriating the last available naval base on the northern coast of China. Although the German official documents indicate no such intention in Berlin, rumors reached the British Foreign Office to the effect that the German Government was planning to take the place should England not do so.⁴ Hence, the Prime Minister on March twenty-second, only three days before the orders were given to acquire Weihaiwei, expressed his opinion that the best policy would be merely to bind China not to alienate the port

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 284.

² *Ibid.*, p. 285.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 28, p. 20, Balfour to Satow, Mar. 15, 1898.

or else to give England the first refusal.¹ He adhered to the opinion previously set forth by MacDonald that the acquisition of Port Arthur would not give Russia any advantage which she did not have already by reason of her long frontier bordering on that of China.²

But on the same day that he was setting down these thoughts, Lord Salisbury was adopting an entirely different tone when he informed Russia that her control "of a military port in the immediate neighborhood of Peking" entirely changed the situation.³ The reason for the discrepancy between his two utterances is probably that, though he personally disapproved of taking Weihaiwei, it was impossible for him to face the growing anger of British public opinion without having obtained some compensation for Russia's occupation of Port Arthur. Indeed it is quite conceivable that by finally acquiescing in the dismemberment of China, Salisbury did much to prevent a situation in which an enraged English public opinion might demand war with Russia.⁴

Japan was the only country consulted by Great Britain prior to her decision to take Weihaiwei. Japanese forces had occupied that port since the Sino-Japanese War, and there was some likelihood that before evacuating it they would dismantle the fortifications as at Port Arthur in 1895, unless London reached an understanding with Tokio. Lord Salisbury was also apprehensive lest Japan come to some agreement whereby Russia would be allowed to take Weihaiwei as well as Port Arthur, but would undertake to re-

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 34, p. 22, Minute of Salisbury, Mar. 22, 1898.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 36, p. 23, Salisbury to O'Connor, Mar. 22, 1898.

⁴ Salisbury told de Staäl that the lease of Weihaiwei was to prevent "most dangerous consequences", Meyendorff, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, no. 19, p. 382, de Staäl to Muraviev, May 11, 1898.

frain from fortifying the latter place. Sir Ernest Satow, however, reported from Tokio that he could find no justification for the Prime Minister's fears along that line.¹

Therefore, on March fifteenth Tokio was sounded on the proposition,² and two days later replied that while she would prefer that China retain Weihaiwei, still if this were impossible she had "no objection to its possession by a power disposed to assist in maintaining the independence of China".³

On March thirty-first, six days after MacDonald had been ordered to acquire the lease of Weihaiwei, Japan was informed of England's intention to take the place, whenever it should be evacuated by Japan, though there was no disposition to hasten the date.⁴ Two days later Tokio promised "concurrence" in England's action, but asked in return England's "concurrence and support" should the Mikado's Government be forced to take similar steps. Despite the failure of Japan to pledge "support", Marquis Ito assured Satow that the omission was unintentional and the Ambassador attributed it solely to Japan's desire to avoid antagonizing the three continental powers.⁵

Salisbury promptly asked Satow what were the measures "for which the Japanese Government trust hereafter to have our concurrence and support". The Ambassador's reply has not been published, but it is not improbable that by "similar steps" Japan may have meant nothing less than Japanese occupation of another Chinese port; and the silence of the British documents on this point permits the historian to infer that Salisbury did not attempt to interpose any veto

¹ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 40, p. 25, Satow to Salisbury, March 26, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 28, p. 20, Balfour to Satow, March 15, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 30, p. 21, Satow to Salisbury, March 17, 1898.

⁴ *China # 1* (1898), no. 141, p. 60, Salisbury to Satow, March 31, 1898.

⁵ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 48, p. 31, Satow to Salisbury, April 4, 1898.

on the Japanese proposal. England's policy of maintaining the integrity of China was not, apparently, to be enforced too rigidly.

It was also necessary, for many reasons, to propitiate Germany. Weihaiwei was located in the Province of Shantung, where Berlin had established a sphere of influence. Having in Russia and France two dangerous rivals, England had perforce to cultivate the friendship of Germany in order to avoid the consolidation of an anti-British triumvirate. Apprehending this danger, Balfour and his colleague, Chamberlain, had in the latter part of March opened negotiations for an alliance with Germany,¹ and it was obviously advisable not to do anything in China which would imperil the successful completion of this important project. Accordingly, the British Government was willing to go considerably out of its way to make it clear to the Wilhelmstrasse that the acquisition of Weihaiwei was in no way directed against German interests.

On March twenty-sixth, the British Ambassador at Berlin was authorized, in case the Foreign Office there questioned him, to reply that Weihaiwei "is not at present and cannot, we believe, be made into a commercial port by which access can be obtained to any part of the province", and that England did "not wish to interfere with the interests of Germany in that region".² On April second the Ambassador received further instructions from Balfour to notify the Berlin Foreign Office of the acquisition of Weihaiwei simultaneously with the announcement which would be made in the House of Commons on April fifth.³ That England's action was inspired by political and not commercial reasons

¹ See p. 265.

² *China* # 1 (1898), no. 130, p. 54, Salisbury to Lascelles, Mar. 26, 1898.

³ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 47, p. 31, Balfour to Lascelles, April 2, 1898.

is evinced by Mr. Balfour's gratuitous offer to give Germany a formal declaration to the effect that the port could never be made a commercial success, and that no railroad would be constructed to the interior.¹

On April fourth Sir Frank Lascelles, Ambassador at Berlin, advised Baron von Richthofen, Under Secretary of the German Foreign Office, of England's conciliatory intentions,² and was informed that Germany would desire a declaration worded as follows:

England formally declares to Germany that in establishing herself at Weihaiwei, she has no intention of opposing or injuring the rights of Germany in the Province of Shantung nor of creating any difficulties for her in that province and especially she will establish no railway communication in that province.³

The Ambassador indicated his objections to the form of this declaration as it would eliminate the building of a road from Tientsin to Hankow which was being considered at the time.⁴ Von Bülow was aiming in this instance at any railways from the northern coast of Shantung into the interior of the province, but at the same time thought the projected Tientsin-Hankow line could be opposed on other grounds.⁵ Mr. Balfour also objected to the suggested declaration on the ground that it would be tantamount to cancelling the most-favored-nation clause in respect to the Province of Shantung.⁶ He suggested that in place of "in that province" there be substituted the words "between Weihaiwei

¹ *Ibid.*

² *China* # 1 (1899), no. 7, p. 5, Lascelles to Salisbury, April 4, 1898.

³ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3761, p. 162, Bülow to Hatzfeldt, Apr. 4, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *China* # 1 (1899), no. 8, p. 5, Balfour to Lascelles, April 6, 1898.

and any part of the Province of Shantung". This change would make it possible for England to build railways in Shantung so long as they did not connect Weihaiwei with the interior and thus put it in a position to deflect some trade from Kiao-Chow.

Following the best traditions of diplomatic bargaining, Berlin admitted that Balfour's declaration would be sufficient ~~if~~ extended to cover the entire coast of Shantung. Not to be outmaneuvered, Balfour replied that Weihaiwei and Germany's claims in Shantung railway projects were two separate propositions and, while he was agreeable to making a suitable declaration regarding the former, should he acquiesce in the latter, he would expect some compensation from Germany regarding the district which specially interested England.¹

Mr. Balfour gained his point. On April twentieth the following declaration was formally handed in at the German Foreign Office by the British Ambassador:

England formally declares that "in establishing herself at Weihaiwei she has no intention of injuring or contesting the interests of Germany in the Province of Shantung or of creating difficulties for her in that province. It is especially understood that England will not construct any railway communication from Weihaiwei and the district leased therewith, into the interior of the provinces."²

Russia very naturally was not agreeable to the acquisition of Weihaiwei by her rival.³ Her Minister at Peking told

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 9, p. 5, Balfour to Lascelles, April 7, 1898.

² *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 52, p. 33, Lascelles to Bülow, April 20, 1898.

³ The acquisition of Weihaiwei was vigorously denounced in the House of Commons because it would antagonize Russia. *Hansard*, vol. lvi, p. 256. Although Russia attempted to make Germany believe that the latter power should be alarmed about England's occupation of Weihaiwei (*D. G. P.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3766, p. 165, Bülow to Kaiser, April 7,

his German colleague on March sixth that Japanese wrath over Russia's entry into Port Arthur could be appeased by letting Japan keep Weihaiwei, and from a Russian point of view, he thought that would be better than having England take the place.¹ Ten days later Count Muravief approached the German Minister on the question of what coercive measures the powers should take to force Japan to evacuate Weihaiwei promptly after China had paid the final installment of the Shimonoseki indemnity.² After Tokio had been dealt with, explained the Count, additional plans would have to be brought into action to prevent England's stepping in, for this would be scarcely any better than permitting Japan to remain there.³

On April fourth, the very day Germany was informed of the English demand for Weihaiwei, and probably Russia had received the same information from Peking, the Russian Ambassador at Berlin asked Bülow if Germany would join with Russia in guaranteeing Weihaiwei to China when Japan had evacuated the port, China agreeing never to alienate it.⁴ This was a daring proposal and, had it been accepted by Berlin, it would have resulted in a disastrous diplomatic defeat for Great Britain, if it did not precipitate war. Fortunately, Germany harbored peaceful intentions, despite Bülow's intimation at London that the sentiment in Berlin

1898), Count Muravief admitted to the British Ambassador that England's action was interpreted in St. Petersburg as being directed against Russia. *China* # 2 (1899), no. 23, p. 10, Scott to Salisbury, August 18, 1898.

¹ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3754, p. 155, Heyking to Foreign Office, Mar. 6, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3758, p. 159, Radolin to Foreign Office, Mar. 16, 1898. See p. 135.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3762, p. 163, Bülow to Hatzfeldt, Apr. 4, 1898.

was to accept Russia's proposal, for the reason that an English base at Weihaiwei would threaten German as well as Russian interests.¹ Germany's reply to St. Petersburg was purposely delayed until she could ascertain whether England would give the required declaration regarding railroads in Shantung. To expedite British acquiescence, the German Ambassador was ordered to give the impression to the British Foreign Office that Germany, as well as England, was about to make an important decision.²

German officials knew very well that England's action at Weihaiwei was directed against Russia alone, despite the efforts of the Russian Ambassador to show Berlin that it was a danger also to German interests in Shantung.³ Inasmuch as the port was practically a geographical entity, separated from the rest of Shantung by high mountain ranges,⁴ even the Anglophobe Kaiser saw no objection to England's taking territory which would increase Anglo-Russian friction, and would provide another customer for the coal which Germany expected to find in Shantung.⁵ Furthermore, Russia's clumsy attempts to show Germany that it was her task to keep Britain out of Weihaiwei so irritated the Kaiser that he thought if Russia acted so falsely, it would be better after all to have England on hand on the Gulf of Pechili.⁷

Hence, Germany came to the decision that she would not oppose England at Weihaiwei. Russia would not dare to do

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3761, p. 162, Bülow to Hatzfeldt, Apr. 4, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3762, p. 163, Bülow to Hatzfeldt, Apr. 4, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3766, p. 165, Bülow to Kaiser, Apr. 7, 1898.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3765, p. 164, Metternich to Bülow, Apr. 5, 1898.

⁶ *Ibid.*, also no. 3764, p. 164, Kaiser to Foreign Office, April 6, 1898.

⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3768, p. 168, Kaiser to Foreign Office, Apr. 8, 1898.

so single-handed.¹ In order not to offend St. Petersburg, the Kaiser suggested and Bülow agreed that the Russian Ambassador should be thanked for his service in warning Germany of the danger involved by England's presence at Weihaiwei. He was told that Germany also had recognized this danger and had effected an agreement with the British Foreign Office.²

Failing to secure Berlin's assistance, Russia turned to Japan and invited that country to join in guaranteeing Weihaiwei to China when the Mikado's troops evacuated it.³ Japan, having previously given tacit approval to England's plans, could but politely refuse this request.⁴

China opposed England's acquisition of Weihaiwei, for the Yamen did not take kindly to the relinquishment of the sole remaining naval base on her northern coast. Furthermore, they feared additional demands from other powers if they complied.⁵ Hence, when Sir Claude MacDonald called on March twenty-eighth with a demand for a lease of Weihaiwei, they endeavored to evade giving a definite answer until the place had been evacuated by Japan. When pressed for an immediate reply, the Yamen vainly suggested that an island on the Korean coast would serve England as a naval base.⁶ Appreciating the force of the plea that without Weihaiwei Chinese men-of-war would have no place to retire, MacDonald suggested to Lord Salisbury that, as a matter

¹ It is noteworthy that not one word of protest about Weihaiwei was made officially to London by St. Petersburg.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3769, p. 169, Bülow to Kaiser, Apr. 9, 1898.

³ *China # 1* (1899), no. 30, p. 27, Satow to Salisbury, April 19, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 42, p. 29, MacDonald to Salisbury, Mar. 28, 1898.

⁶ *China # 1* (1899), no. 154, p. 106, MacDonald to Salisbury, Apr. 16, 1898.

of conciliation, arrangements be made whereby the Chinese might use the port.¹ This request was granted.²

On March thirty-first MacDonald returned to the Yamen and again they evaded the issue, whereupon the Minister said that, while anxious to avoid warning them on the consequences of their refusal, he must have a definite answer within two days.³ Failure to answer either "yes" or "no" would be considered as a refusal, and in that event, the Minister said, the matter would be taken out of his hands.⁴ On April second MacDonald again renewed his importunities. In vain the Yamen urged him to break the "endless chain" of encroachments by declaring that England would not make any further demands upon China in consequence of any additional concessions which might be wrung from the Peking Government by other powers.⁵ To this request a refusal was given. The Yamen was told, however, that Weihaiwei would be relinquished as soon as they could persuade Russia to evacuate Port Arthur.⁶ This promise, nevertheless, remained unfulfilled when Japan in 1905 "persuaded" Russia to relinquish her control over Port Arthur; Weihaiwei until 1930 was ruled by Britain.

As arguments and entreaties were unavailing, the Yamen then agreed to lease Weihaiwei to Great Britain on the same terms as the Russians had secured Port Arthur.⁷ On July

¹ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 42, p. 29, MacDonald to Salisbury, Mar. 28, 1898.

² *China # 1* (1899), no. 154, p. 106, MacDonald to Salisbury, Apr. 16, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 44, p. 29, MacDonald to Salisbury, Apr. 3, 1898.

⁶ *China # 1* (1899), no. 154, p. 106, MacDonald to Salisbury, Apr. 16, 1898.

⁷ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 44, p. 29, MacDonald to Salisbury, Apr. 3, 1898.

first a treaty was signed by which China leased Weihaiwei to England "for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia".¹

In order to provide Great Britain with a suitable naval harbor in North China and for the better protection of British commerce in the neighboring seas, the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of China agree to lease to the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, Ireland, etc., Weihaiwei in the Province of Shantung and the adjacent waters for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia.

The territory leased shall comprise the Island of Liukung and all other islands in the Bay of Weihaiwei, and a belt of land ten English miles wide along the entire coast line of the Bay of Weihaiwei. Within the above-mentioned territory leased Great Britain shall have sole jurisdiction.

Great Britain shall have, in addition, the right to erect fortifications, station troops, or take any other measures necessary for defensive purposes at any points on or near the coast of the region east of the meridian 121° 40' east of Greenwich and to acquire on equitable compensation within that territory such sites as may be necessary for water supply, communications and hospitals. Within that zone Chinese administration will not be interfered with but no troops other than Chinese or British shall be allowed therein. It is agreed that within the walled city of Weihaiwei Chinese officials shall continue to exercise jurisdiction except so far as may be inconsistent with naval and military requirements for the defence of the territory leased.

It is further agreed that Chinese vessels of war, whether neutral or otherwise, shall retain the right to use the waters herein leased to Great Britain.

It is further understood that there will be no expropriation or expulsion of the inhabitants of the territory herein specified, and that if land is required for fortifications, public schools or any official or public purpose, it shall be bought at a fair price.²

¹ *MacMurray, op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 152, July 1, 1898.

² *Ibid.* vol. i, p. 152.

In acquiring Weihaiwei Lord Salisbury and Mr. Balfour not only had to overcome the opposition of foreign countries but also had to cope with a formidable hostility in the House of Commons. When the occupation was announced simultaneously in the House of Lords by the Duke of Devonshire and in the House of Commons by Mr. Balfour on April fifth, it was greeted as a radical departure from the traditional British policy of maintaining the territorial integrity of China and resisting violation of any part of the Treaty of Tientsin.¹

In the upper House Lord Kimberley, former Foreign Secretary in the Rosebery Cabinet, said:

Well now, I must observe that this whole policy is changed. It is quite obvious that the policy which we highly approved, which met with the approval of the whole country, that of maintaining the open door, has practically gone and instead of it we have a system of water-tight compartments. . . . I believe that this great change which has happened will lead inevitably to the ultimate dismemberment of China.²

In the Commons Mr. Balfour eloquently defended the lease on the ground that Russia, having so long a boundary in common with China and so great an influence in Peking, had still further increased her prestige in the Far East by the acquisition of Port Arthur, and had thus made it necessary for England to redress the balance by taking Weihaiwei. By this counter-move England would prevent the Gulf of Pechili from "falling under the undisputed control of any one power". Mr. Balfour unconsciously betrayed his awareness of the need for apology when he declared, toward the close of his speech:

I have adopted no apologetic tone in what I have said for I do

¹ *Transarq*⁹ vol. lvi, pp. 168, 225.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 178-80.

not feel the need either of apology or excuse for the policy we have pursued.¹

Sir William Harcourt, leader of the Opposition, took the Government to task for abandoning the policy to which they had previously adhered.

What was that policy? [he asked] It is known by the phrase of open door. It was that we were not to occupy any territory whatever in China but that we were to insist that those who did occupy territory should open the door as freely as China had opened it before; that was the policy this House understood the Government were pledged to pursue. Well, Sir, everybody knows that that is not the policy which is enunciated today. Everybody knows that this is a new policy. . . . The Government have come forward with a proposition which they have always in the past deprecated. The right honorable gentleman has deprecated it here tonight. . . . It [the decision to take Weihaiwei] has been adopted presumably because their previous policy has failed. The present policy is not a policy of equal advantage, that is the policy of the open port, that is the Treaty of Tientsin; but this is a policy of compensation for disadvantage by the acquisition and setting up of a rival port to counteract an adverse influence and it is the acquisition of what is admitted to be an inferior port.²

The Weihaiwei action was further condemned by Mr. L. H. Courtney because it seemed:

. . . to be bringing about a practical risk [i.e. enmity with Russia] in order to prevent a danger more imaginary than real. I trust for ourselves we shall not embark on a course of military action in north China where our interests are extremely small and where there is no trade whatever to defend, in the pursuit only of political influence, which in itself is not dangerous and does not threaten the prime object of Her Majesty's Government—

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 236.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 239-249.

namely, the maintenance of equal opportunities of commerce for all the world.¹

It must be remembered, however, that Weihaiwei was taken not to preserve commerce in North China—for Mr. Balfour said that any Briton would be foolish to go to Shantung for trade²—but to eliminate the possibility of Russia's dominating the Peking Government and ruining the Far East trade. With England at Weihaiwei, Lord Salisbury thought the Yamen would take courage and oppose Muscovite inroads on China's sovereignty.³

A further vulnerable point in the Government's new policy was the inferiority of Weihaiwei to Port Arthur as a military stronghold.⁴ Port Arthur had the Trans-Siberian Railway behind it, whereas Weihaiwei was isolated, cut off even from the adjacent coal supplies of Shantung because of the gratuitous promise not to connect it with the hinterland by railroads.⁵ In view of these defects and the enormous increases recently made, in Britain's military budget, Sir Edward Grey pointed out that any additional money spent on naval bases should be allocated to strengthening Hongkong.⁶

Sir Edward Grey made an excellent point when he told the Government that they should have foreseen that Russia would require not only a commercial port in the Far East

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 257-9.

² *Ibid.*, p. 1398.

³ "I should say that what China wants is courage, and one of the defenses of the occupation of Weihaiwei is that it had a tendency to strengthen China against despair and to give her courage if the occasion should arise to stand up against her enemies."—Lord Salisbury.

⁴ In 1895 Russia used all her energy to get Japan out of Port Arthur, but allowed her to retain Weihaiwei.

⁵ See p. 247.

⁶ *Hansard*, vol. lvi, p. 1659.

but also a naval base. With this in mind they should have decided whether or not they would go to war over the question, and if not, the acquisition of Port Arthur should have been given at least the appearance of having been arrived at with the approval of England, rather than seeming to constitute a reverse to British diplomacy.¹

Mr. Curzon, on behalf of the Government, made an eloquent reply to these criticisms but practically admitted that the Foreign Office had reached a point where it was confronted with three unpalatable alternatives: first, to clear out of North China; second, to go to war with Russia; or third, to take Weihaiwei, which in plainer terms meant the abandonment of China's territorial integrity. He admitted that: "It is not a policy which on *a priori* grounds [the Government] would have preferred. It is a policy which has been forced upon the Government by steps taken by others, and it is a policy which has therefore become inevitable."²

Many an Englishman felt it was unsportsmanlike to strike at China while she was prostrate.³ However, commercial-

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. lvi, p. 277.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 270-273.

³ "The diplomatic and commercial prestige of Great Britain has been affected by the events in northern China, but only in a slight degree when compared with the loss of good name by forcing concessions from China when she is prostrated by involuntary surrenders to powers stronger than herself. Hitherto, our policy has been to befriend weaker nations. It cannot be said that this policy has been followed lately in the Far East. We have taken advantage of the impotence and distress of the authorities and people of China to advance our own interests and, consequently, China has become suspicious of Great Britain...."

"Our proceedings are certain to encompass the doom of China and equally certain to produce international strife. Mastery in Asia under a system of spheres of influence will not be determined by effusion of ink. A straightforward recognition of the principles of freedom, fair-dealing, and equality of opportunity which have made our position in the world, coupled with resolution and vigor in carrying these principles out, will not only preserve the integrity of the Chinese Empire, but will conduce more

ism was more potent than sportsmanship and the acquisition of Weihaiwei was the result.

The Chinese situation was again discussed in the House of Commons on June tenth as a result of an unfortunate utterance which Joseph Chamberlain had made in a speech to his constituents at Birmingham, on May thirteenth. Chamberlain had referred caustically to Anglo-Russian relations with the proverb, "Who sups with the devil must use a long spoon".¹ Such a remark was decidedly at variance with the remarks of the Prime Minister, three days earlier, to the effect that England should cultivate the friendship of all other nations.² The Colonial Secretary's speech, coupled with the Weihaiwei incident, signified that an anti-Russian policy was being pursued by the British Government. A vote of censure failed of passage by 254 to 128.³

Although the Foreign Office had intimated that should they recognize Germany's claims to priority in Shantung, they would require a reciprocal declaration regarding the Yangtze region, it was not until after the promise not to build railways from Weihaiwei had been given, that the British authorities tried to get such a pledge from Berlin. On April thirtieth the British representative at Peking informed his German colleague that he was asking for the right to build a railroad from Shanghai to Nanking.⁴ The hope was expressed that since Great Britain had given Germany a free hand in Shantung, Berlin would refrain from

largely to our own interests than the present plan of taking things that do not belong to us, simply because other nations are doing the same." Beresford, *op. cit.*, p. iv.

¹ *The Times*, May 14, 1898.

² *Annual Register* (1898), p. 112.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

⁴ See p. 183; also *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3771, p. 172, Bülow to Hatzfeldt, April 30, 1898.

offering opposition to British projects in the Yangtze Valley.¹

The suggestion, however, did not commend itself to the Berlin Foreign Office. "That is impossible", exclaimed the Kaiser when he heard of it. "We have great interests which prohibit us from leaving the Yangtze to Britain. Besides a big German syndicate is already at work trying to get the railway."² The German authorities clearly realized the isolated condition in which England then found herself, and Bülow knew that Great Britain would pay dearly for Germany's support. To Hatzfeldt the German Foreign Secretary expressed his opinion that:

If we did not come to an understanding, my conviction is that there will be a definite clash between German and British interests in China in such matters, and nothing would remain to us but everywhere to oppose British pretensions of this sort in the future.³

Bülow probably had not the slightest intention of embarking on an anti-British course, but he recognized the opportunity to extort a few concessions from England. Nevertheless, the German Foreign Secretary was on safe ground, for the British Cabinet was anxious to prevent German opposition. In the hope of winning German co-operation, Salisbury suggested a conference between representatives of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank,⁴ but although such a meeting was held, it failed to reach an agreement because the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3775, p. 176, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, May 5, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*

could not secure German consent to treat the Shantung question simultaneously with the Shanghai-Nanking Railway project.¹ Lord Salisbury then endeavored to keep German interests out of the Yangtze Valley, at least theoretically, by offering the German bank an equal share in the earnings of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, provided that the company operating the road would be British in name and composition.² This suggestion was turned down by Germany.

Lord Salisbury's discomfiture over the failure of these negotiations is fittingly expressed in the following dispatch to the British Ambassador in Berlin:

His Excellency [The German Ambassador] maintained that Germany, by her occupation of Kiao-Chow and her agreement with China respecting Shantung, had acquired a special position in that province which consequently is not unreservedly open to British enterprise, whereas Great Britain not having occupied any place in the Yangtze region, that region is still unreservedly open to German enterprise; consequently, my suggestion did not contain any element of reciprocity.

To this contention I was, of course, entirely unable to assent.³

Germany's attitude seemed to the British Government unjustifiably exacting. To Germany, however, the small and as yet undeveloped Province of Shantung was poor compensation for exclusion from the rich and fertile Yangtze Valley. German diplomatists reasoned, with perhaps too great astuteness and too little sagacity, that Germany's friendship in a time of England's need should be of sufficient value to warrant insistence upon equal opportunities in the Yangtze region.

England later tried to get a promise from China that,

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 178, footnote.

² *Ibid.*

³ *China* # 1 (1899), no. 96, p. 82, Salisbury to Lascelles, May 13, 1898.

"other things being equal, railroads in the Yangtze region should be conceded to English companies, and in the Province of Shantung should be conceded to German companies".¹ This effort was not successful.

Although France had in January, 1898 indicated her desire to avoid taking Chinese territory,² the British apparently did not attempt to secure French assistance either to prevent the acquisitions of Kiao-Chow and Port Arthur or to redress the situation in such a way as to make the objectionable demand for Weihaiwei unnecessary. Probably such an attempt would have resulted in failure, because France was too strongly attached to Russia. Moreover, French aggression in South China does not show that the French Foreign Office was so averse to the partition of China as their official statements to the British would have us believe.⁴

At any rate when the land-grabbing took place France was not in the background. It is sometimes incorrectly supposed that England's demand for Weihaiwei made it incumbent upon France to demand a similar port. As a matter of fact, the French Minister asked for Kwangchowwan on March sixteenth,⁵ whereas Sir Claude MacDonald did not broach the subject of Weihaiwei to the Yamen until eleven days later.⁶ The French demands, however, were not granted until April tenth, eight days after the lease of Weihaiwei had been promised.⁷ Included in the French demands were the following:

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 173, p. 117, Salisbury to MacDonald, June 8, 1898. See p. 246.

² *Ibid.* (1898), no. 50, p. 17, Monson to Salisbury, Jan. 12, 1898.

³ See pp. 151-6.

⁴ See p. 154.

⁵ *China* # 1 (1899), no. 151, p. 102, MacDonald to Salisbury, Apr. 15, 1898.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 154, p. 106, MacDonald to Salisbury, Apr. 16, 1898.

⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 17, p. 12, MacDonald to Salisbury, Apr. 12, 1898.

- a. Kwangchowwan was to be leased as a coaling station.
- b. France was to secure the right to construct a railway to Yunnan-fu from the Tonking border.
- c. China was to promise not to alienate any territory in the three Provinces of Yunnan, Kwangtung, Kwangsi.
- d. The Chinese Government was to agree that if ever they organized a postal department independent of the Maritime Customs, and if a European was to be appointed as director hereof, France should have an equal right with that of other powers to nominate a candidate for the post of director.

England had no desire to see the ally of Russia obtain such valuable concessions, but protests to France would naturally be ineffective. Sir Claude MacDonald, therefore, resorted to the then approved method of securing concessions which would as far as possible offset the disadvantageous effects of the French success. To offset French acquisition of Kwangchowwan he demanded an addition of territory on the Kowloon promontory to strengthen the military position of Hongkong.¹

During the ensuing negotiations for the Kowloon addition, Mr. Balfour on April thirteenth offered to make a most important promise to the Yamen, one which, it must be said in justice to England, was not made by any other government. This was that Great Britain would refrain from entering additional territorial demands if China conceded the following three points in addition to leasing the Kowloon Peninsula: ²

- a. Make Nanning a treaty port.
- b. Give "some" railway concession.
- c. Agree never to alienate Kwangtung and Yunnan.

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*, no. 21, p. 19, Balfour to MacDonald, Apr. 13, 1898. This was what China had proposed on April second.

The Yamen did not seize the opportunity. It does, in fact, seem an amazing offer for Balfour to make and one which would be difficult to fulfil if Russia's inroads upon China continued, assuming of course that England would refuse to countenance a diminution of her prestige in the Far East. The British Foreign Office either knew that the promise could not be kept, or else was assuming that the Anglo-Russian railway agreement, then nearing completion, would make it difficult for Russia to further dismember China.¹

MacDonald was still negotiating with China on April twenty-fifth and saw fit to augment Balfour's demands with a few personal additions, namely:

- a. That the Yamen give assurance in writing that they have not granted France any exclusive privileges either in railways or in mining.
- b. That an English firm be given the concession to build a railroad from Shanghai to Nanking.²

Upon Sir Claude's recommendation, the Foreign Office agreed to allow the Chinese administration to continue its jurisdiction over the city of Kowloon "in so far as that may not be inconsistent with the military requirements for the proper defense of Hongkong".³ To further facilitate the negotiations, the original demand for a lease "terminable only by mutual consent" was relinquished.⁴ China was likewise assured that any land needed for public purposes would be paid for at a fair price,⁵ and that a suitable landing place for Chinese men-of-war and merchant vessels

¹ See p. 277.

² *China* # 1 (1899), no. 40, p. 31, MacDonald to Salisbury, Apr. 25, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 42, p. 31, MacDonald to Salisbury, Apr. 26, 1898; no. 46, p. 32, Balfour to MacDonald, Apr. 28, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 51, p. 34, Balfour to Salisbury, Apr. 30, 1898.

⁵ *Ibid.* no. 60, p. 21, MacDonald to Salisbury, May 2, 1898.

would be provided at Kowloon.¹ Britain also agreed not to remove Chinese officials in the city of Kowloon.² These terms were incorporated in a treaty signed on June 9, 1898.³

Whereas it has for many years past been recognized that an extension of the Hongkong territory is necessary for the proper defence and protection of the colony.

It has now been agreed between the governments of Great Britain and China that the limits of British territory shall be enlarged under lease to the extent indicated generally on the annexed map.

It is at the same time agreed that within the city of Kowloon the Chinese officials now stationed there shall continue to exercise jurisdiction except so far as may be inconsistent with the military requirements for the defence of Hongkong. Within the remainder of the newly-leased territory Great Britain shall have sole jurisdiction. Chinese officials and people shall be allowed as heretofore to use the road from Kowloon to Hsinan.

It is further agreed that the existing landing-place near Kowloon city shall be reserved for the convenience of Chinese men-of-war and passenger vessels which may come and go and lie there at their pleasure, and for the convenience of movement of the officials and people within the city.

When hereafter China constructs a railway to the boundary of the Kowloon territory under British control arrangements shall be discussed.

It is further understood that there will be no expropriation or expulsion of the inhabitants of the district included within the extension and that if land is required for public offices, fortifications, or the like official purposes it shall be bought at a fair price.

If cases of extradition of criminals occur, they shall be dealt with in accordance with the existing Treaties between Great Britain and China and the Hongkong Regulations.

¹ *Ibid.*

² MacMurray, *op. cit.*, p. 130, Great Britain and China, June 9, 1898.

³ *Ibid.* The territory acquired is about 356 square miles.

The area leased to Great Britain as shown on the annexed map, includes the waters of Mirs Bay and Deep Bay, but it is agreed that Chinese vessels of War, whether neutral or otherwise, shall retain the right to use those waters.

This Convention shall come into force on the first day of July eighteen hundred and ninety eight, being the thirtieth day of the fifth moon of the twenty-fourth year of Kwang Hsu. It shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of the two countries and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as possible.¹

In witness whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized hereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present agreement.

Done at Peking in quadruplicate (four copies in English and four in Chinese) the ninth day of June in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and ninety eight, being the twenty-first day of the fourth moon of the twenty-fourth year of Kwang Hsu.²

Two additional events in the aftermath of the occupation of Weihaiwei remain to be mentioned, namely, the demand of Japan for a non-alienation agreement regarding the Province of Fukien³ and that of Italy for a coaling station at Sanmen Bay.⁴ The former was neither approved nor disapproved of by England, but the Yamen, knowing that Tokio would receive English support if necessary, granted the Japanese demand. In the case of Italy, England gave support, on condition that no military pressure would be used on China.⁵ Unfortunately for Rome, there was a change of government at Peking in September, 1898, and the Dowager Empress, once again at the helm, refused Italy's request.⁶

¹ It was ratified at London on August 6, 1898.

² MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 130.

³ Vinacke, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

⁴ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. iii, p. 124.

⁵ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 60, p. 40, Salisbury to Currie, Feb. 15, 1899; *Hansard*, vol. lxxviii, p. 1321.

⁶ Steiger, *op. cit.*, p. 114; Morse, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 146.

CHAPTER V

THE SPOILIATION OF CHINA IS PARTLY CHECKED

BRITAIN ABANDONS "SPLENDID ISOLATION"

HAVING endeavored unsuccessfully to effect a reconciliation with Russia, and being involved in colonial disputes with France,¹ England of necessity turned to Germany as the one European power which might be of assistance in opposing Russian aggression in northern China.

Count Hatzfeldt, German Ambassador at St. James', was not surprised therefore when he received an invitation on March twenty-fourth² from Mr. Alfred Rothschild³ to dine with some British Cabinet Ministers. Realizing that an overture⁴ would be made for a closer understanding between the two countries, the Ambassador telegraphed Berlin for instructions⁵ and received in reply Bülow's advice that Germany preferred to act in China without alliances.⁶

¹ See p. 230. England and France were involved in dispute over the Niger territory.

² Baron Eckardstein in his *Ten Years at the Court of St. James* (p. 93) mentions the end of February as the date of the first meeting at the home of Mr. Rothschild, but *Die Grosse Politik* shows it to have been March twenty-fifth. The British Government did not turn to Germany until after the negotiations with Russia had failed.

³ A member of the famous English banking house bearing his name.

⁴ Count Hatzfeldt in his report to Berlin indicated that he had sensed the reason for the invitation, but Baron Eckardstein has recorded that his superior had been previously advised, *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3779, p. 193, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, March 24, 1898; Eckardstein, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

⁵ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3779, p. 193, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, March 24, 1898.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3780, p. 194, Bülow to Hatzfeldt, Mar. 25, 1898.

At the dinner on the following day, March twenty-fifth, Hatzfeldt had a lengthy conversation with Mr. Balfour, who expressed friendly sentiments for Germany, voiced the opinion that the two countries had no great conflicting interests, and hoped for a better understanding between them.¹ The Ambassador was inclined to blame England for the misunderstandings in the Far East which he attributed to the stiffness of Mr. Chamberlain on colonial questions and also to the protest raised at Peking regarding point five of Germany's Kiao-Chow demands.² Such a policy, said Hatzfeldt, could only lead to a Russo-German understanding.³ No definite proposal was made by Balfour, merely an expression of a desire for better relations.⁴

Mr. Chamberlain,⁵ whom the Ambassador interviewed on March twenty-ninth, frankly admitted that the political situation had reached a point where England could no longer pursue her previous traditional policy of "splendid isolation". The reasons given by Chamberlain for the abrupt decision to search for alliances were the altered situation in China and Anglo-French disputes in West Africa.⁶ Serious difficulties, he continued, were anticipated with Russia as well as France.⁷ He reiterated Balfour's belief in the non-existence of fundamental differences between Great Britain

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3781, p. 195, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, Mar. 25, 1898.

² See p. 203.

³ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3781, p. 195, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, Mar. 25, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Then Secretary of State for the Colonies.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3782, p. 196, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, Mar. 29, 1898.

⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3789, p. 212, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, Apr. 7, 1898.

and Germany, and he thought that any small colonial disputes would disappear upon the arrangement of a political understanding. Furthermore, should Germany and England make an agreement, Chamberlain promised, Britain would not only refrain from causing Berlin any trouble in China, but would protect her there with her entire power.¹

But the Colonial Secretary's eloquence failed to produce any favorable effect upon the German Ambassador, who boasted that Germany's acquisition of Kiao-Chow had been brought about without any foreign assistance,² and complained that England was continually "sending others into the fire and remaining back herself".³ Any help given by England, he pointed out, had been in England's own interest, for had Britain refused her assent to Germany's Far Eastern plans, Berlin would have been thrust into the waiting arms of Russia.

In Berlin also, England's alliance proposal was coldly received. Bülow quite correctly interpreted the overture as weakness on Britain's part and an effort to preserve her prestige by making Great Britain in union with Germany stronger than the Russo-French combination and thereby forcing the latter to renounce their Anglophobe intentions.⁴ Bülow also questioned whether any future English Government would be bound by an agreement made by Lord Salisbury's Government.⁵

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3782, p. 196, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, Mar. 29, 1898.

² This was untrue. Both Russia and England gave their approval, without which Germany's efforts at Kiao-Chow might have been unsuccessful.

³ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3782, p. 196, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, Mar. 29, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3783, p. 199, Bülow to Hatzfeldt, Mar. 30, 1898.

⁵ *Ibid.*

Quite naturally Germany feared such an eventuality and the reasonableness of this attitude was admitted even by the British Foreign Office. However, it does not seem to have occurred to Bülow and his advisers that British friendship would have enabled Germany to effect an exceedingly powerful combination, — powerful enough to make France and Russia seriously hesitate before attacking.¹

Bülow had another idea in mind. He thought of using the British proposal as a lever to break up the Franco-Russian Alliance which had been a thorn in the side of the German Foreign Office since 1893. Unmindful that England had already tried unsuccessfully to conciliate Russia, the German Chancellor undertook to have Count Hatzfeldt explain to Downing Street how dangerous it was for them to remain at odds with Russia and France at the same time. As the Dual Alliance was of paramount importance to France, he thought it would be difficult to detach her from Russia. The Dual Alliance, however, was not absolutely vital to Russia as it was directed against Germany, and St. Petersburg now knew that Berlin did not covet Muscovite territory.²

Chamberlain renewed his negotiations with Hatzfeldt on April first when he endeavored to combat Germany's objections to an alliance with England by pointing out that history did not furnish a single instance where England had deserted an ally.³ He admitted that it would be logical to require a Parliamentary ratification, but he did not doubt that this would be attained easily as would also the approval

¹ Meinecke, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-3.

² *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3783, p. 199, Bülow to Hatzfeldt, Mar. 30, 1898.

³ Upon reading this the Kaiser angrily noted on the dispatch that England had deserted Frederick the Great.

of British public opinion.¹ The object of the agreement would not be to deprive Russia of the benefits she had secured in China, for Chamberlain considered this impossible; but even should Russia be granted Port Arthur and Talienwan and the whole of Manchuria, he thought that when the Trans-Siberian was completed, Russia would threaten the commercial interests of all nations, including those of Germany in the hinterland of Kiao-Chow.² It was the common task of Germany and England, he said, to come to some agreement regarding the rest of China which had not been appropriated by any power. Russia should then be notified, and a boundary line set beyond which she might not pass.³

Hatzfeldt correctly interpreted these remarks to mean that England had abandoned the idea of forcibly ejecting Russia from Port Arthur,⁴ and that she merely desired Germany's help to save the remainder of China from Muscovite encroachments. Chamberlain admitted that England could combat the Russo-French power in China only by an alliance with some great power such as Germany. For such assistance England would grant Germany special advantages, such as an enlargement of the Kiao-Chow hinterland.⁵

Upon reporting the result of this second Chamberlain conversation, the German Ambassador received further in-

¹ Count Hatzfeldt heard rumors that Lord Rosebery and Sir William Harcourt would not oppose an Anglo-German alliance, *ibid.*, p. 212.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3780, p. 194, Bülow to Hatzfeldt, Mar. 25, 1898. feldt, Mar. 25, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3784, p. 202, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, Apr. 1, 1898; no. 3789, p. 212, Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Apr. 7, 1898.

⁴ Lord Salisbury never felt inclined to go to war with Russia over Port Arthur.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3784, p. 202, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, Apr. 1, 1898.

structions from Bülow, who intimated quite strongly his scepticism of the Colonial Minister's assurances that Parliament and British public opinion would swallow at one gulp an Anglo-German Alliance, without exhibiting any signs of discomfort. He related how the British people had balked like angry horses when the Kaiser had dispatched his congratulatory telegram to President Kruger in 1896, whereas they had been 'conciliatory with impressive unanimity in the face of President Cleveland's even more antagonistic action during the Venezuelan controversy. The inference, of course, was that British public opinion was incurably anti-German. On the other hand, said Bülow, German sentiment could not be changed over night from Anglophobe to Anglophil. There were two factors in the situation, he continued, which were then absent, but if ever they appeared simultaneously Germany might risk an alliance with England. These were, first, a realization by the British people that they must fight with all their might for the preservation of their rights, and second, the belief in Germany that the Russo-French program threatened German interests.¹

Apparently there was a lack of harmony even in the British Cabinet, for in an interview with the German Ambassador on April fifth, Balfour admitted that neither English nor German public opinion was as yet ready for such an abrupt change and added confidentially that one of Chamberlain's foibles was the desire to go too fast.² Balfour agreed that the first task would be to effect better relations between England and Germany in small matters, and in this way pre-

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3785, p. 204, Bülow to Hatzfeldt, Apr. 3, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3786, p. 207, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, April 5, 1898; no. 3788, p. 209, Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Apr. 7, 1898. Neither the Kaiser nor Count Hatzfeldt had much confidence in Mr. Chamberlain. The Ambassador called him "a naïve beginner in foreign politics", while the Emperor referred to "the theoretical and confused fancies of Chamberlain."

pare sentiment in both countries for further cooperation in the future.¹ To this practical suggestion Hatzfeldt reacted favorably, maintaining, of course, his objections to an immediate alliance as desired by Chamberlain.²

The Kaiser was in agreement with his Foreign Minister, on the subject and addressed the Berlin Foreign Office as follows:

Since England's policy has changed to the Orient, her interest in European questions and consequently the value of her alliance to ourselves and our allies have diminished. The Niger and the Gulf of Pechili concern us less than Alsace-Lorraine. The colonial advantages which England can grant us, although useful, will strike us with less force than a close association of Russia and France, which must follow an Anglo-German Alliance concerning the Far East and the Niger. Should the English desire support to be directed in the future toward European affairs, we can get closer to them than at present.

Nevertheless it is for the present of great importance to maintain the official English sentiment favorable to us and hopeful. With an England kindly disposed towards us we hold an additional card against Russia, and have also the prospect of wringing colonial concessions and commercial advantages from England.

To the skilful Count Hatzfeldt will fall the difficult task of not allowing the postponement of a formal alliance to be taken in England as a final refusal, but to express the wish and desire for profitable cooperation.³

As the negotiations were not progressing favorably, Baron Eckardstein of the German Embassy at London was

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3786, p. 207, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, Apr. 5, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3787, p. 208, Bülow to Hatzfeldt, Apr. 6, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3790, p. 217, Kaiser to Foreign Office, Apr. 10, 1898.

sent to see the Kaiser at Homburg for the purpose of persuading the Emperor to give more enthusiastic support to the project.¹ The Baron relates that he left Homburg confident of William's support and that both Count Hatzfeldt and he were disappointed later when the alliance came to naught.² If Hatzfeldt was as sympathetic to the project as his deputy would have us believe, certainly his dispatches to the Foreign Office at Berlin do not indicate it.³ Indeed his first telegram to Berlin suggested a refusal of the British overture.⁴

Despite the initial rebuff, Chamberlain on April twenty-third requested another interview with Hatzfeldt, who again asked his Foreign Office for instructions.⁵ This time Bülow hit upon the idea of suggesting that Germany's neutrality would be sufficient to prevent a Russo-French war against England, for France would not dare act while German troops were near her eastern border. Furthermore, an Anglo-Russian war would be preferable to a conflict in which England and Germany would face Russia and France. There were two reasons for this opinion: first, Russia's preparations for an attack on England's Asiatic borders were not yet complete and hence Britain would not need the deflection of the Russian army by Germany; and, second, for some years the German fleet could not balance the strength of a combined Russo-French navy.⁶

¹ To avoid suspicion, the official pretext for the journey was Eckardstein's candidature at the forthcoming Homburg elections. Eckardstein, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

² *Ibid.*, p. 95.

³ Eckardstein refers to his superior's "despairing voice".

⁴ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3779, p. 193, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, Mar. 24, 1898.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3791, p. 218, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, April 23, 1898.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3792, p. 218, Bülow to Hatzfeldt, April 24, 1898.

Germany's neutrality could be purchased cheaply, wrote Bülow. All she desired was greater consideration from England in colonial affairs. This point he emphasized as being necessary to any *rapprochement*. A begrudging attitude on England's part would make it difficult for Germany to remain a disinterested spectator.¹ He again recommended that Great Britain effect an understanding with Russia as this was the only means of avoiding war and therefore worth a high price.² While he predicted that this would disrupt the Dual Alliance, Bülow did not realize apparently that an Anglo-Russian understanding could be achieved without making France and Russia enemies.³

With these instructions at hand, Hatzfeldt interviewed Chamberlain on April twenty-sixth. The latter renewed his arguments in favor of an Anglo-German Alliance, making it clear, however, that no war with Russia was contemplated—merely a delimitation of her boundaries in China. The German Ambassador reiterated all the previously mentioned objections to an alliance, but adhered to his instructions to avoid any definite rejection of England's overture.⁴ He suggested that England come to some understanding with Austria, but Chamberlain interjected the remark that he would prefer Germany's alliance, as this would bring Austria with it automatically.⁵

Seeing that he was not meeting with success, Chamber-

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ The conversation closed with Hatzfeldt and Chamberlain agreeing to keep open the possibility of friendship between the two countries. *Die Große Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3793, p. 221, Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Apr. 26, 1898.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3793, p. 221, Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Apr. 26, 1898.

lain registered the warning with Count Hatzfeldt that if the negotiations with Germany were unsuccessful, England would come to terms with Russia¹ or France.² This threat failed to accomplish its purpose because the Kaiser thought that, although England might make an agreement with France, it would be impossible for her to effect a reconciliation with Russia.³ Even if an Anglo-French entente were arranged it would bring with it the compensatory advantage of disrupting the Dual Alliance.⁴ Obviously the Kaiser felt that there was more efficiency and hence more danger to Germany in a Russo-French combination than there would be in an Anglo-French alliance.⁵

The Kaiser's attitude was stiffened by his erroneous impression that England's proposal was due to fear of the incipient German navy and that Britain desired either to bring Germany into alliance or else destroy the German fleet before it became too strong.⁶ The Kaiser was on firmer ground, however, when he remarked to the British Ambassador that he would not try to eject Russia from China forcibly, for if he did, Russia and France would invade Germany simultaneously. And then, asked the Kaiser, what assistance could the British fleet give her? Germany intended to avoid incurring the hostility of the two military

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. 1, no. 3794, p. 227, Bülow to Hatzfeldt, Apr. 30, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. 1, no. 3793, p. 221, Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Apr. 26, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. 1, p. 226, footnotes 18, 19.

⁴ Bülow resented Chamberlain's assumption that England had a choice of allies. He doubted that France would fight Russia for any price England could pay. *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. 1, no. 3794, p. 227, Bülow to Hatzfeldt, Apr. 30, 1898.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. 1, no. 3790, p. 217, Kaiser to Foreign Office, Apr. 10, 1898.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. xiv, pt. 1, no. 3799, p. 236, Memorandum of Kaiser (undated).

powers which were in a position to threaten her eastern and western frontiers.¹

Lord Salisbury, on returning from his leave of absence in France, was far from sanguine over the prospects of an Anglo-German Alliance. On June second he told Count Hatzfeldt that alliances concluded in advance of real necessity did not always turn out to be workable.² He gave the Ambassador to understand, however, that he desired good relations with Germany and was prepared to make a formal understanding, advantageous to Germany, if a crisis developed. However, the basis of such an agreement, unlike that proposed by Chamberlain, would be to preserve peace and provide for reciprocal defense only in certain specified cases.³

On May thirtieth the Kaiser took a step which a few days later provided Germany with an additional objection to an alliance with England. Acting upon his idea that the British overture could be used as a club against Russia, he advised the Czar that England was seeking an alliance, and calmly asked what Russia would offer should the British overture be rejected. The trap laid for the Czar by his Imperial German cousin is made apparent by his attempt to make Nicholas believe that the German Foreign Office was considering the overture when, as a matter of fact, it had shown little inclination to accept England's offer.⁴

✓ The Czar's reply to the Kaiser did not contain any Russian counter offer should Germany reject England's alliance, but it did give notice of the Anglo-Russian negotiations of

¹ B. D. O. W., vol. i, no. 53, p. 34, Lascelles to Salisbury, May 26, 1898.

² *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3800, p. 240, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, June 2, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Levin, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

January, 1898.¹ This news startled the Wilhelmstrasse and the fact that England had approached Russia first, seemed to corroborate the theory that opportunist Britain was not to be trusted. ✓

✓ In the midst of these negotiations Chamberlain startled the English people by announcing in a speech at Birmingham on May thirteenth that the time had come when Great Britain must forsake her traditional policy of "splendid isolation" and seek an alliance with some "great military power".² Although he mentioned no country in particular,³ it was generally assumed that he had Germany in mind.⁴ ✓

Naturally an explanation was demanded of such an utterance on the part of a responsible cabinet officer, but Lord Salisbury refused to denounce or approve his colleague's remarks.⁵ Consequently, the Colonial Secretary was subjected to a fiery denunciation in the House of Commons for "touting for allies in the highways and byways of Europe".⁶ Chamberlain defended himself by remarking that if no alliance were made, the House should be sensible and realize that the Government could not secure all the diplomatic successes demanded of it.⁷ A vote to reduce Lord Salisbury's salary was defeated by a large majority.⁸

Thus ended England's first attempt to cultivate Germany's friendship. The negotiations were renewed in 1899 and

¹ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3803, p. 250, Czar to Kaiser, June 3, 1898.

² The same speech in which he said, "Who sups with the Devil must use a long spoon."

³ Except the United States with whom he favored friendly relations.

⁴ *Annual Register* (1898), p. 115.

⁵ *Hansard*, vol. lvii, p. 1514.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. lviii, p. 1344.

⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. lviii, p. 1431.

⁸ *Annual Register* (1898), p. 115.

again in 1901, but the reiterated objections of the Berlin diplomats prevented the completion of any agreement.

ENGLAND MAKES A RAILROAD AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA

When on June 17, 1898 the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation signed a preliminary agreement with the Director General of Chinese Railways for a loan to cover the cost of building the Shanhaikwan-Newchwang line,¹ they aroused the wrath of Russia, whose representative at Peking protested most vehemently. These objections were based, first, on the fact that the agreement called for the acquisition of the road by the bank if China defaulted on the loan payments,² and second, that China had previously promised that Russia would be consulted in the first instance if ever that railway were built.³

On August eighth Lord Salisbury told the Chinese Minister at London that Russia "had no right whatever to protest" and recommended that the Yamen "pay no regard to it".⁴ Four days later Mr. Balfour sent for the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, and spoke of matters "assuming serious proportions" as a result of Russian interference in a strictly commercial venture in defiance of the Treaty of Tientsin.⁵ Lessar then paved the way for a future agreement by suggesting that an arrangement might be made whereby Russia

¹ See p. 179.

² *China* # 2 (1890), no. 4, p. 2, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 15, 1898; no. 10, p. 3, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 23, 1898; no. 14, p. 7, Balfour to Scott, Aug. 13, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 17, p. 8, Scott to Balfour, Aug. 18, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 11, p. 5, Salisbury to MacDonald, Aug. 8, 1898.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 13, p. 6, Balfour to Scott, Aug. 12, 1898; Lessar admitted that the Russian action was a violation of the Treaty of Tientsin, but asserted that it was no more so than England's insistence that the Maritime Customs always be headed by an Englishman. *Ibid.*, no. 14, p. 7, Balfour to Scott, Aug. 13, 1898.

would not interest herself in railway concessions in the Yangtze, while England undertook a similar engagement with regard to Manchuria. Mr. Balfour admitted that this would have certain advantages, provided that all China were left open to the world's commerce.¹ He thought, however, that northern China would not be exploited as rapidly as it should because Russia did not have the necessary resources.²

On August nineteenth Mr. Balfour wired Sir Charles Scott, successor of Sir Nicholas O'Connor at St. Petersburg, that perhaps the following proposal, which he understood to be in accordance with Russia's suggestion, could be the basis of an agreement:³

- (a) That the building of the Newchwang Railway should be proceeded with and if need be by means of a loan from the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, but that the line should be under Chinese control and should not be mortgaged to any company of non-Chinese nationality.
- (b) That Russia should engage not to take part in or to press for railway concessions in the Yangtze Basin, nor throw obstacles in the way of such concessions being obtained by England, England entering as regards Manchuria into a corresponding agreement.

Count Muravief expressed his personal opinion that such an agreement would be advantageous to both countries, but it would be necessary for him to refer the matter to the Czar for approval.⁴ On September second the Russian Foreign Minister transmitted to Scott a counter proposal, approved by the Emperor, comprising point one as in Mr.

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 13, p. 6, Balfour to Scott, Aug. 12, 1898.

² Lessar admitted that Russia found it difficult to finance the roads already projected, *ibid.*, no. 13, p. 6, Balfour to Scott, Aug. 12, 1898.

³ *China # 2* (1899), no. 18, p. 8, Balfour to Scott, Aug. 19, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 19, p. 9, Scott to Balfour, Aug. 21, 1898.

Balfour's proposition, while point two bound Russia to refrain from pressing concessions in the Yangtze, but not to abstain from throwing obstacles in the way of England's securing concessions in this region, England being bound similarly regarding Manchuria. Count Muravief gave as his reason, for this omission, the desire on the part of the Czar to avoid implying that either country would place obstacles in the other's way, as this would "imply a want of confidence in the sincerity of the engagement".¹ When Mr. Balfour expressed a desire to have the second portion of clause two incorporated² the Russian Foreign Minister refused, but agreed to accept it as being implied.³

As further evidence of sincerity, Count Muravief suggested that the Russo-Chinese Bank and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation get together and reconcile their interests in conformity with the contemplated agreement.⁴ Likewise the Russo-Chinese Bank, presumably under orders from St. Petersburg, suddenly dropped out of competition for the Shanhaikwan-Newchwang Railroad,⁵ whereas they had been offering terms to China with which no bank, not supported by its government, could compete.⁶

At this point Lord Salisbury, who had been in France during these negotiations, returned to London and attempted to add to the agreement a stipulation that "preferential

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 26, p. 13, Scott to Balfour, Sept. 2, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, no. 27, p. 13, Balfour to Scott, Sept. 2, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 28, p. 13, Scott to Balfour, Sept. 3, 1898. The Count further agreed to add a more friendly clause reading as follows: "It naturally follows, from the essence of the friendly spirit in which this engagement is concluded, that neither government will use any influence to impede the acquisition by the other". *Ibid.*, no. 37, p. 16, Scott to Salisbury, Sept. 6, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 34, p. 15, Scott to Salisbury, Sept. 10, 1898.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 33, p. 15, MacDonald to Salisbury, Sept. 10, 1898.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 36, p. 15, Salisbury to MacDonald, Sept. 10, 1898.

railway rates or differential treatment should be forbidden".¹ Ten days later, having received no reply from St. Petersburg, and having in the meantime received a communication from the President of the Board of Trade calling attention to the necessity for this clause, Lord Salisbury again telegraphed the Ambassador to "endeavor to obtain Count Muravief's consent".² While Count Lamsdorf assured Scott that he did not necessarily object to this additional clause,³ it would have to be approved by the Minister of Finance, and as Count Witte was out of St. Petersburg at the time, the negotiations were delayed.⁴

It was November seventh before Scott obtained an interview with Witte, who expressed complete confidence in the possibility of adjusting all outstanding difficulties between Russia and England, not only in China but throughout the world. The best way, however, to secure this desirable objective was not to sign an agreement on some specific item such as railroads, for, however carefully it were worded, inevitable points of dispute would arise, but to conclude a general agreement

between the two governments and ratified by their respective sovereigns recording a firm determination to establish their relations on a footing of frank and friendly understanding, and engaging that on any occasion of a question arising in any part of the world which either government regarded as involving a possible conflict between their respective interests, they would at once submit it to a frank and friendly discussion between them with a firm resolve to seek its satisfactory adjustment by a due regard to the legitimate interests of both.⁵

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*, no. 43, p. 19, Salisbury to Scott, Sept. 20, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 48, p. 21, Scott to Salisbury, Sept. 22, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 50, p. 24, Scott to Salisbury, Oct. 4, 1898.

⁵ *B. D. O. W.*, vol. i, no. 59, p. 38, Scott to Salisbury, Nov. 7, 1898.

But the practical statesmen in the British Foreign Office could not be interested in such a vague and general agreement, for the English people had a deep-seated suspicion of Russia's sincerity, and a wholesome respect for her ability to place different interpretations upon treaty clauses or wriggle out of engagements. Hence both Balfour and Salisbury rejected the proposal, the former remarking that "de Witte's proposal is derisory", and the latter saying, "I am afraid if we concluded an agreement in Mr. Witte's language, we would be a good deal laughed at".¹ Count Lamsdorf on November eighth echoed his colleague's suggestion and proposed a general understanding on a basis of the maintenance of the integrity of China, each case to be discussed and adjusted as it arose.²

No attempt was made to follow up these ideas to their logical conclusion in a document which would adjust the outstanding difficulties in various parts of the world. England had tried to negotiate such a pact in January, 1898 and had failed. This time her Ministers proposed to concentrate their attention on the railway situation.

Lord Salisbury's eagerness to adjust the railway situation is revealed by his numerous telegrams to Scott for information as to whether or not he had any further word from the Russian Government.³ At this juncture the negotiations at

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. i, no. 59, p. 39, MacDonald to Salisbury, Oct. 12, 1898.

² *China* # 2 (1899), no. 54, p. 27, Scott to Salisbury, Nov. 8, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 62, p. 42, Salisbury to Scott, Dec. 14, 1898; no. 67, p. 43, Salisbury to Scott, Jan. 1, 1899. Lord Salisbury's extreme desire to make some agreement is better understood when the negotiations for the Peking-Hankow Railroad are recalled. Downing Street wanted to make it impossible for Russia to secure any additional concessions for railroads in the Yangtze Valley. See pp. 180-5. The Duke of Devonshire on Oct. 18, 1898 emphasized the British Government's desire to make "some definition and delineation of the spheres of interest... within which the citizens of each country interested may have some prior claim to concessions of this description, and in which

St. Petersburg were again delayed by the absence of the Czar from the Russian capital,¹ and when he returned late in December, Witte inopportunately developed an illness which put the matter over into the next year.²

On January thirty-first Count Muravief had an interview with the Czar regarding the ultimate disposition of the negotiations, when there was received from the Russian legation at Peking a message which so disturbed the Czar that he ordered the discussion stopped.³ Although neither Scott⁴ nor Salisbury⁵ knew what British action at Peking had so adversely influenced the Czar, it was subsequently ascertained from Sir Claude MacDonald that the disturbance was the result of an extension of the British settlement at Newchwang. Negotiations for this had been carried on by the British Consul at that point, additions being necessary because of the disappearance of some land, due to erosion of the river. No Russian lots were included in the newly acquired land and Sir Claude could see no reason why it should affect Russia.⁶

This explanation apparently satisfied the Russian Government. On February seventh Count Muravief officially advised the British Ambassador that Russia would be willing to enter into a definite general agreement with Great Britain on the following terms, it being understood that in accord-

the citizens of other countries will undertake not to interfere with these claims". *The Times*, Oct. 19, 1898. Mr. Chamberlain, on Nov. 16, 1898, also indicated that England was ready to give Russia a free hand in North China, provided St. Petersburg would not seek concessions in South China. *The Times*, Nov. 17, 1898.

¹ He was at Livida unveiling a monument to Alexander II.

² *China # 2* (1899), no. 69, p. 44, Scott to Salisbury, Jan. 11, 1899.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 78, p. 55, Scott to Salisbury, Feb. 1, 1899.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 80, p. 55, Salisbury to Scott, Feb. 2, 1899.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 83, p. 56, MacDonald to Salisbury, Feb. 9, 1899.

ance with the avowed determination of Russia and England to avoid antagonism in the Far East, points of detail might be settled later on as each case arose:

- (a) First, that Russia will not place obstacles in the way of the railway enterprises of Great Britain in the Yangtze Basin.
- (b) Second, that Great Britain on her part will not place obstacles in the way of Russian enterprises of the same nature north of the Great Wall.¹

In addition, both countries were to disclaim any intention of infringing on either the existing treaties or the sovereign rights of China.

While satisfactory as far as it went, this proposal was considerably weaker than the one suggested by Mr. Balfour in the preceding August, and it was but natural that Lord Salisbury could not "but note the scanty dimensions to which it had been reduced by these long negotiations".²

Russia had reversed herself and was now ready to agree to the very clauses to which she had previously objected, while she omitted those to which she had previously agreed.³ "The former proposal", wrote Lord Salisbury, "would have prevented England and Russia from supporting railways in Manchuria and Yangtze respectively. The proposal now before us only imposes upon England and Russia the obligation of abstaining from opposing Russian and English railways in Manchuria and the Yangtze Basin respectively."⁴

Nevertheless, the British Prime Minister was anxious for some agreement and accepted the Russian proposal "in its

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 88, p. 59, Scott to Salisbury, Feb. 8, 1899.

² *Ibid.*, no. 93, p. 63, Salisbury to Scott, Feb. 22, 1899.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 97, p. 64, Salisbury to Scott, Feb. 27, 1899.

⁴ *Ibid.*

general scope",¹ as "England and Russia will be bound to abstain from opposing projects of the other in its own sphere of interest" although not bound to "abstain from projecting railways of its own in the other's sphere of interest".² Lord Salisbury was willing to accept the best offer that could be obtained from Russia at the time, as even this slight agreement would be "an earnest of the pacific and friendly intentions of the two governments", and would "furnish a basis on which further agreement can be founded, if any future cause of difference should make it necessary".³ In the desire for some agreement even the original demand for a stipulation against preferential rates and differential treatment was dropped, for Count Lamsdorf had told Sir Charles Scott that the Russian Government would entertain objections to its insertion.⁴

The absence of the clause regarding the building of the Shanhaikwan-Newchang Railway with British money, provided the line were not mortgaged, was noted by Lord Salisbury, who asked that the agreement specify that it in no way affected the rights which the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation had secured on that railway.⁵

When Count Muraviev's attention had been called to the limited scope of the agreement, he observed that understandings on definite questions could be made later on as each occasion arose. This would, he thought, be preferable to attempting prematurely to settle "complicated technical questions" which probably would not have to be solved "for some years to come".⁶

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 93, p. 63, Salisbury to Scott, Feb. 22, 1899.

² *Ibid.*, no. 97, p. 64, Salisbury to Scott, Feb. 27, 1899.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 86, p. 58, Scott to Salisbury, Feb. 6, 1899.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 97, p. 64, Salisbury to Scott, Feb. 27, 1899.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 105, p. 67, Scott to Salisbury, Mar. 2, 1899.

Upon further consideration, however, the Russian Foreign Office decided to revert to substantially the original Balfour suggestion of August, 1898,¹ and on March fifteenth Count Muravief communicated this decision to the British Ambassador.² Russia would agree neither to seek for Russian subjects nor oppose British efforts to obtain railway concessions in the Yangtze Valley, while England would assume similar obligations for Chinese territory north of the Great Wall.³ Regarding the Shanhaikwan-Newchwang Road, Russia would acquiesce in the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation's loan for building the line, provided that "it is clearly understood that a right of property or of foreign control over the line in question would not be constituted under the arrangement".⁴

Inasmuch as the agreement made by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation with the Chinese Government called for the hiring of a British engineer and a European accountant,⁵ Lord Salisbury endeavored to secure Russia's approval to this arrangement⁶ which he considered vital to ensure proper construction of the road and to guard against the misappropriation of funds.⁷ At first, Count Muravief was disinclined to agree that these two safeguards did not constitute foreign control,⁸ but upon reference to the Czar, consent was granted.⁹

¹ See p. 278.

² *Ibid.*, no. 108, p. 71, Scott to Salisbury, Mar. 15, 1899.

³ Mr. Balfour's suggestion of August, 1898 gave Russia's sphere as Manchuria only. See p. 278.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 108, p. 71, Scott to Salisbury, Mar. 15, 1899.

⁵ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, Great Britain and China, Oct. 10, 1898.

⁶ *China* # 2 (1899), no. 109, p. 71, Salisbury to Scott, Mar. 16, 1899.

⁷ *Ibid.*, incl. in no. 117, p. 76, Scott to Muravief, Mar. 22, 1899.

⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 118, p. 78, Scott to Salisbury, Mar. 29, 1899.

⁹ *Ibid.*, no. 114, p. 74, Scott to Salisbury, Mar. 22, 1899; no. 117, p. 76, Scott to Salisbury, Mar. 22, 1899.

While giving in on one point, the Russian Foreign Minister raised another bone of contention by objecting to the construction of a railroad between Hsiao-Hei-Shan and Sinmintung,¹ permission to build which had been secured by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation as additional security on a loan.² Although deprecating the fact that this additional opposition had been raised,³ Lord Salisbury showed the desire to meet Russia halfway by consulting with the bank officials and getting their consent to Chinese construction of this branch line on condition that a competent European engineer should "periodically inspect and certify as to the work being properly executed".⁴

Russia agreed to this on April twelfth but reserved the right to support, "if it thinks expedient, applications made by Russian subjects or companies for railway concessions to the southwest of the main line to Port Arthur, that is to say, in the region which the line conceded to the British and Chinese Corporation will open up".⁵ This reservation was accepted by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corpora-

¹ Sinmintung is about thirty miles north of Mukden, the capital of Manchuria. Russia resented an attempt to build a British railroad so near her sphere, especially as the Newchwang-Mintung line would compete with her projected Mukden-Port Arthur line.

² MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 174, Great Britain and China, October 10, 1898.

³ The branch line to Sinmintung was mentioned and indicated on a map in the loan prospectus published on Feb. 3, 1899. M. de Staal referred to it in a communication to Lord Salisbury on February tenth but took exception only to the implied foreign control. *China* # 2 (1899), incl. in no. 126. On the other hand Count Muravief insisted that the Russian Government had not seen the prospectus until a few days prior to raising its objections to the branch line. *Ibid.*, incl. in no. 126. It seems inconceivable however that the Russian representative at London would fail to transmit this important document to St. Petersburg.

⁴ *China* # 2 (1899), no. 119, p. 78, Salisbury to Scott, Apr. 7, 1899.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 123, p. 82, Scott to Salisbury, Apr. 12, 1899.

tion,¹ and consequently by Lord Salisbury,² who was confident that a British line could successfully compete with any road subsequently built by Russia in the same territory. As compensation, the bank received a half interest in the Nanpiao coal mines, a mortgage on the Shanhaikwan-Newchwang Railway up to the Great Wall, and a mortgage on the earnings of that line from the Great Wall to Newchwang.³

On April nineteenth Count Muravief transmitted to the British Ambassador a suggested treaty arrangement which comprised substantially all the points agreed upon by the two governments during these protracted negotiations.⁴ The only change Lord Salisbury desired to make in this draft was the substitution of words which would make it impossible for Russia to support demands for concessions in the Yangtze Valley made by any other nationality, including Russians.⁵ England would of course give a reciprocal promise regarding the territory north of the Great Wall.⁶ Russia accepted this change and the protracted negotiations were brought to a close when Muravief and Scott exchanged notes on April 28, 1899.⁷

The text of the two notes sent to the Russian Foreign Minister on that day is as follows:

The Undersigned, British Ambassador, duly authorized to

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 124, p. 82, British and Chinese Corporation to Foreign Office, Apr. 14, 1899.

² *Ibid.*, no. 125, p. 83, Salisbury to Scott, Apr. 15, 1899.

³ *Ibid.*, incl. in no. 59, p. 40, Concession Agreement respecting the Nanpiao Coal Mines, Oct. 10, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 129, p. 85, Scott to Salisbury, Apr. 19, 1899.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 130, p. 86, Salisbury to Scott, Apr. 22, 1899.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, incl. in no. 138, pp. 90-1?

that effect, has the honor to make the following declaration to his Excellency, Count Muravief, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs:

Great Britain and Russia, animated by a sincere desire to avoid in China all cause of conflict on questions where their interests meet, and taking into consideration the economic and geographical gravitation of certain parts of that Empire, have agreed as follows:

1. Great Britain engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of British subjects or of others, any railway concessions to the north of the Great Wall of China, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region, supported by the Russian government.

2. Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of Russian subjects or of others, any railway concessions in the basin of the Yangtze, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions, in that region supported by the British Government.

The two contracting parties having nowise in view to infringe in any way the sovereign rights of China or existing treaties, will not fail to communicate to the Chinese Government the present arrangement, which, by averting all cause of complications between them, is of a nature to consolidate peace in the Far East, and to serve the primordial interests of China herself.—Signed by Sir Charles Scott.¹

In order to complete the notes exchanged this day respecting the partition of spheres for concessions for the construction and working of railways in China, it has been agreed to record in the present additional note the arrangement arrived at with regard to the line Shanhaikwan-Newchwang, for the construction of which a loan has been already contracted by the Chinese Government and the Shanghai and Hongkong Banking Corporation, acting on behalf of the British and Chinese Corporation.

The general arrangement established by the above-mentioned notes is not to infringe in any way the rights acquired under the

¹ *Ibid.*, incl. no. 1 in no. 138, p. 90, Scott to Muravief, Apr. 28, 1899.

said loan contract, and the Chinese Government may appoint both an English engineer and European accountant to supervise the construction of the line in question, and the expenditure of the money appropriated to it.

But it remains understood that this fact cannot be taken as constituting a right of property or foreign control, and that the line in question is to remain a Chinese line, under the control of the Chinese Government, and cannot be mortgaged or alienated to a non-Chinese company.

As regards the branch line from Hsiao-Hei-Shan to Sinmintung, in addition to the aforesaid restrictions, it has been agreed that it is to be constructed by China herself, who may permit European, not necessarily British, engineers to periodically inspect it and to verify and certify that the work is being properly executed.

The special agreement is naturally not to interfere in any way with the right of the Russian Government to support, if it thinks fit, applications of Russian subjects or establishments for concessions for railways, which, starting from the main Manchurian line in a southwesterly direction, would traverse the region in which the Chinese line terminating at Sinmintung and Newchwang is to be constructed.—Signed by Sir Charles Scott.¹

The signing of this agreement did not at once terminate the friction between Russia and Great Britain. The St. Petersburg Government soon sought a concession to build a road from the Manchurian line to the Chinese capital.² Such action did not violate the terms of the April twenty-eighth agreement, for by that document Russia had only agreed to refrain from seeking concessions in the Yangtze Valley. Great Britain, however, opposed the Russian request because such a road would connect with the Peking-Hankow Railway and bring the Chinese Government more

¹ *Ibid.*, incl. no. 2 in no. 138, p. 90, Scott to Muravief, Apr. 28, 1899.

² *China* # 2 (1900), no. 130, p. 112, Bax-Ironside to Salisbury, May 10, 1899.

under the control of Russia. China heeded British protests and St. Petersburg's request was refused.¹ In June, 1899, however, China promised to allow Russia to build any roads from Peking "north or to the northeast towards the Russian border", if China decided to allow any foreign country to build such lines.²

Great Britain had succeeded in preventing Russia from seeking concessions in the Yangtze Valley, but her efforts to exploit that region herself received a rude check on December 13, 1898, when China announced her intention to grant no more concessions to build railroad lines.³ In line with this policy, the Peking Government rejected a British request for permission to build a line from Canton to Chengtu.⁴ The Chinese likewise rejected the idea of a line from Hangchow to Kiangsin.⁵ The Peking Syndicate, similarly, was unsuccessful in its attempt to secure permission to build lines from Yuhsien to Taiyuanfu and from Ping Ting Chow to Hwaichingfu.⁶ Finally, the Yunnan Company, a British corporation, struggled vainly to secure China's approval to extend the Burma railway into China.⁷

China had checked temporarily the attempts of foreign nations to build railroads on Chinese soil. Great Britain, however, had secured concessions to build 2,800 miles of

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 226, p. 180, Bax-Ironside to Salisbury, May 25, 1899.

² MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 207.

³ *China # 1* (1900), incl. no. 1 in no. 30, p. 220, Memorial, Dec. 15, 1898.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 82, p. 78, MacDonald to Salisbury, Feb. 16, 1899.

⁵ *Ibid.*, incl. no. 2 in no. 174, p. 140, Bax-Ironside to Tsungli Yamen, Apr. 17, 1899.

⁶ *China # 1* (1899), incl. no. 3 in no. 246, p. 220, Yamen to Bax-Ironside, June 9, 1899.

⁷ *China # 1* (1900), no. 378, p. 348, Bax-Ironside to Salisbury, Oct. 21, 1899.

railways, while her rival, Russia, had concessions for only 1,530 miles.¹

THE UNITED STATES CHAMPIONS THE OPEN DOOR

While the combined pressure of the Dual Alliance, supported by the spasmodic assistance of Germany,² had slowly forced England to concentrate her commercial activities in the Yangtze Valley,³ some of her statesmen still cherished the hope that those nations favoring equal trade privileges with China might yet be persuaded to unite and secure that desired objective. Japan and the United States could probably be counted upon. Germany, too, seemed to desire equal trade facilities, but withheld her support from England partially to avoid becoming entangled in Anglo-Russian rivalry.⁴ Sir Edward Grey, in a House of Commons debate on Foreign Policy, April 5, 1898, pointed out that:

There is a group of six powers more likely to be interested in the Far East than any others—Russia, France, Germany, the United States, Japan, and ourselves, but surely it is for the in-

¹ *China # 1* (1899), incl. no. 1 in no. 459, p. 344, Summary of Railway Concessions, Nov. 23, 1898.

² Germany had in 1897 approved Russia's acquisition of Port Arthur and had given her general approval to St. Petersburg's aspirations in North China. (See p. 216.) She was not, however, as were Russia and France, definitely aiming to disturb British Far Eastern commerce.

³ As evinced by the Anglo-Russian Railway negotiations of 1898-9 and the attempt to secure Germany's recognition of British priority rights in the Yangtze Valley in return for Mr. Balfour's gratuitous acknowledgment of that country's commercial ambitions in Shantung. (See pp. 245-6.) *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3778, p. 181, Aufzeichnung of Bulow, Mar. 14, 1899.

⁴ "We seek, in so far as it does not compromise our dignity and without prejudice to our status, to avoid conflicts between third powers. This applies specially to the great Anglo-Russian conflict of interests."—Bulow, *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, p. 181, no. 3778, Aufzeichnung of Bulow, Mar. 14, 1899.

terests of several of these powers, as much as our own, that there should be an open door to China and a neutral market. We have heard much in recent years of the successful commercial competition of Germany; the United States is successful all over the world, and Japan is competing in that part of the world and it becomes more and more to the interests of these nations that the policy of the open door should be maintained. It may be a paradox to say that out of successful commercial rivalry may come political agreement, but I do not see why in future years the interests of these nations should not through successful rivalry, more and more make themselves felt to help attain this.¹

Joseph Chamberlain was equally convinced that the best way out of the Far Eastern dilemma would be for England to strive for some agreement with the United States, Japan, and Germany.

I hold therefore [said the Colonial Secretary] that it is possible that we may without reference to anything in the nature of a permanent or general alliance, nevertheless, come to a common understanding, [i. e., on the open door question] may be able to remove prejudices despite suspicion and in that case, I think we may look in confidence—if the future should hereafter have need of change in these relations—we may look in confidence to even closer cooperation.²

To the United States he said:

I know of a hundred reasons why we should be friends. I know of none why we should be otherwise . . . a combination between the two great English-speaking peoples is a combination which would fear no other alliance. . . . A combination of that kind would be a guarantee for the peace and civilization of the world.³

¹ *Hansard*, vol. lvi, pp. 280-1.

² Mr. Chamberlain's speech at Manchester, Nov. 16, 1898, *The Times*, Nov. 17, 1898.

³ *Ibid.*

Mr. Chamberlain's speech was in fact a definite notification to the United States that her assistance in keeping the door of China open would be welcomed by England.

Another British statesman who looked for foreign co-operation in enforcing the open door was Lord Beresford. While on his trip to the Far East in the fall of 1898, which brought him home via the United States, Beresford expounded the idea of a commercial alliance between England, Japan, the United States, and Germany, based on the open door principle and an understanding regarding the integrity of China.¹ It was denied in Parliament that the Admiral spoke with governmental authority,² yet, while abroad, he received and accepted all the honors that could be paid to the representative of a foreign government.³

That Lord Salisbury also was aware of the possibility of securing assistance from the United States, is suggested by the welcome he gave that country when, as a result of the Spanish-American War, she acquired the Philippine Islands. America's entrance into the Orient would, in the opinion of Lord Salisbury, "not conduce to the interests of peace", but was, nevertheless, "likely to conduce to the interests of Great Britain".⁴ In other words, he felt that the United States would sooner or later be demanding an open door to China.

The two governments, however, were drawn closer together because of an agreement made on February 1, 1899 by the British and China Corporation on the one hand, and the American China Development Company on the other. The British Company offered the Americans a share in the

¹ *The Break-up of China*, pp. 446-7.

² Dennett, *op. cit.*, p. 642.

³ *The Break-up of China*, pp. 446-7.

⁴ *The Times*, Nov. 17, 1898.

Canton-Kowloon Railroad, while the latter offered the British a share in the Hankow-Canton Railroad. A further agreement was made that

each party hereto shall offer to the other a participation of one-half of its own interest in any business hereafter obtained by it in the Empire of China a reasonable time after the same shall have been obtained and the party to whom such participation shall have been offered shall have the option to accept or reject the same within a reasonable time, and shall be under no obligation to accept such participation.¹

The United States was notoriously averse to cooperating with European powers and had twice refused England's official invitation for joint cooperation in China.² There was, nevertheless, some justification for the English hope that on this particular question America might eventually see her way to deviate from her time-honored custom of standing aloof. Washington officials were bound eventually to see that unless they gave support to those nations desiring an open door, the United States' growing commerce with China³ would be effectively throttled.⁴ It was evident that the gradual development of spheres of interest in China placed the United States in the dilemma of abandoning either her trade or her policy of non-cooperation.⁵ Another sign favorable to England was that protectionist America had realized the necessity of advocating equal trade privi-

¹ *China # 1* (1899), no. 423, p. 325, Memorandum of Agreement, Dec. 13, 1898.

² Nevins, A., *Henry White, Thirty Years of American Diplomacy*, pp. 163-4.

³ "In 1900 . . . the exports [i. e. from the United States to China] had grown to over five times what they were ten years before." A. C. Coolidge, *The United States as a World Power*, p. 331.

⁴ Dennett, *op. cit.*, p. 643.

⁵ *Ibid.*

leges in her own Far Eastern possessions, as is evinced by the following instructions given to the American Peace Commission by President McKinley on September 6, 1898. In these instructions the American executive clearly championed the open door policy:

Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship cannot be indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American trade; but we seek no advantages in the Orient which are not common to all. Asking only the open door for ourselves, we are ready to accord the open door to others. The commercial opportunity which is naturally and invariably associated with this new opening, depends less on large territorial possession than upon an adequate commercial basis and upon equal privileges.¹

Cooperation between the United States and England was fostered by the appointment in September, 1898² of Mr. John Hay as American Secretary of State—a man whose residence as Ambassador in London³ during the Far Eastern discussions of 1897-8 had given him a wide insight into the Oriental problem. Mr. Hay was handicapped by some anti-English sentiment then prevalent in the United States,⁴ which prevented him from offering cooperation to England as soon as he might otherwise have done, for he was in favor of acting with the British to maintain the open door.⁵ The British Prime Minister had even suggested to Secretary Hay, while the latter was yet in London, that there be formulated an Anglo-American agreement to preserve the

¹ Joseph, P., *Foreign Diplomacy in China*, p. 378.

² Wood, G. Zay, *The Genesis of the Open Door Policy in China*, p. 137.

³ Thayer, W. R., *Life of John Hay*, vol. ii, p. 157.

⁴ Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 137; Thayer, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 234.

⁵ Dennett, *op. cit.*, p. 644.

integrity of China and the open door, but the idea was rejected because of Mr. Hay's fear that the Senate would not ratify such a pact.¹

In his annual message to Congress, December 5, 1898, President McKinley gave further evidence of the United States' growing concern over the Chinese situation.

The United States [he said] has not been an indifferent spectator of the extraordinary events transpiring in the Chinese Empire, whereby portions of its maritime provinces are passing under the control of the various European Powers; but the prospect that the vast commerce which the energy of our citizens and the necessity of our stable productions for Chinese use has built up in those regions may not be prejudiced through any exclusive treatment by the new occupants, has obviated the need of our country becoming an actor in the scene. Our position among nations having a large Pacific coast and a constantly expanding direct trade with the farther Orient gives us the equitable claim to consideration and friendly treatment in this regard, and it will be my aim to subserve our large interests in that quarter by all means appropriate to the constant policy of our Government.²

In England this declaration received a warm welcome. "There is no other combination", said Mr. Chamberlain at Wakefield four days later, December eighth, "that can make us afraid", voicing at the same time his opinion that England would henceforth not stand alone as the guardian of the open door in China.³

In addition to hinting that American cooperation would be welcomed in Far Eastern affairs⁴ British statesmen were

¹ Letters and Diaries of John Hay, vol. iii, p. 199. (Printed but not published in Washington, 1908). Quoted by Dennett, *op. cit.*, p. 642.

² Moore, J. B., *Digest of International Law*, vol. v, p. 533.

³ *The Times*, Dec. 9, 1898.

⁴ See p. 292.

cultivating the good will of the United States by various conciliatory gestures. America would not be likely to forget the friendly attitude of England throughout the Spanish-American War, when other great powers in Europe were plainly leaning towards the enemy.¹

Consequently, it was with considerable relief, although in view of President McKinley's message not with exceptional surprise, that Lord Salisbury received on September 22, 1899, through the American Ambassador, Mr. Choate, a lengthy statement of the interest which the United States placed in the maintenance of equal trading privileges in China.²

"The maintenance of this policy is alike urgently demanded by the commercial communities of our two nations as it is justly held by them to be the only one which will improve existing conditions, enable them to maintain their positions in the markets of China, and extend their future operations."³

In order to ensure this equality of trade, the United States suggested that England make the following declarations, and lend her support in the effort to obtain similar assurances from each of the various powers claiming spheres of interest in China.

1. That it will in nowise interfere with any Treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called sphere of interest or leased territory it may have in China.

2. That the Chinese Treaty Tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise, landed or shipped to all such ports as are within such spheres of interest (unless they be free ports) no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable, shall be collected by the Chinese Government.

¹ Mowat, R. B., *Life of Lord Pauncefoot*, p. 249.

² *China* # 1, (1900), no. 345, p. 303, Choate to Salisbury, Sept. 22, 1899.

³ *Ibid.*

3. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such sphere than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality—and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled or operated within its sphere on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such spheres than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals, transported over equal distances.¹

The United States, in concluding, expressed its great desire that England give "prompt concurrence" to these three points, as such action would "be very potent in promoting their adoption by other powers" such as Russia and Germany, who were similarly sounded by the American Government at the same time.² With British cooperation, the United States felt confident of getting Russia and Germany to give favorable replies.³

These notable three points were drawn up by Mr. W. W. Rockhill,⁴ later Commissioner Plenipotentiary to China,⁵ who was considered by Secretary Hay to be one of the cleverest men in the American diplomatic service.⁶ They were readily recognized by Hay as a means of checking the rapid disintegration of the Chinese Empire and putting an end to the system of greedy grabbing for concessions which threatened American trade.

The policy of Secretary Hay was not something new, for in 1842 Commodore Kearny had exacted the most-favored-nation clause from China. By this clause the United States

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Foreign Relations* (1899), p. 129.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 131, Hay to Choate, Sept. 6, 1899.

⁴ Dennett, *op. cit.*, p. 647.

⁵ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. iii. p. 488.

⁶ Thayer, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 244.

was entitled to the same privileges which any nation secured from China. Likewise, in 1843, England had insisted upon a similar clause being inserted in the treaty negotiated with the Chinese in that year.¹ England, as we have seen, had long fought to maintain this privilege, but, confronted with a powerful combination of powers not similarly minded, had given up the fight in 1898, and since that time had been concentrating her activities on staking out for herself a special trading preserve in the Yangtze Valley, similar to that which Russia had successfully set up in North China, and Germany, in Shantung.

Japan was perfectly willing to join with England to help secure the open door throughout China, but Great Britain was not yet ready to ally herself with an Oriental power to defy a powerful Russo-French combination at a time when Germany was seemingly disposed to propitiate Russia. This being the case, Japan, in emulation of European powers, likewise abandoned the idea of maintaining free trade privileges throughout China, and set to work staking out her claim to the Chinese Province of Fukien.

Hence, all major European powers and Japan had either waived or were powerless to enforce the most-favored-nation clause, and were in their respective spheres endeavoring to shut out the industry of other nationals. The Yangtze Valley preserve of England was not an exception, as Great Britain had, as we have seen, shown considerable desire to keep Russian, French, and Belgian interests from penetrating that district.² It is true that England allowed other nations to trade in the Yangtze on terms similar to those under which the British firms operated, that Germany

¹ Morse and MacNair, *op. cit.*, p. 636.

² See p. 100, The Peking-Hankow Railway.

had declared Kiao-Chow a free port,¹ and that Russia after much delay had finally declared Talienwan "open to the merchant ships of all nations".² All three nations, however, strove to eliminate any foreign railroad or mining activities in their respective spheres, upon which they were rapidly coming to look as special trading preserves.

The United States was the only nation which had not secured Chinese territory, and was hence in a position to command sufficient respect to check the rapid development of the sphere-of-influence policy in China. In their notes of September, 1899, Hay and Rockhill took up the battle for the retention of the most-favored-nation clause, where England had left off, albeit unwillingly, in March, 1898.

The fact that the United States found herself in this favorable situation—i. e., without the millstone of Chinese territory around her neck—was not due to any moral superiority of her government, but to a different outlook which geographical location had developed in the people of the United States. They possessed a virgin country of enormous extent which occupied most of their assimilative capacity. With such expansive territory and its undeveloped rich resources, they could visualize themselves as a great power without adding many over-seas possessions.³ European peoples, however, had smaller territory, proportionately over populated, and were induced by both economic necessity and pride to look differently upon the acquisition of foreign territory.

¹ *China* # 1 (1900), no. 345, p. 303, Choate to Salisbury, Sept. 22, 1899.

² *Ibid.*

³ The islands acquired from Spain in 1898 were neither sought nor desired but were taken from a defeated power in a moment of war fever. Their cession showed that the United States, while averse to overseas expansion, was not disinclined to secure possessions that might unexpectedly fall her way during a victorious war.

If England in September, 1899 was to be counted among the countries which had violated Chinese territory, and had waived the most-favored-nation clause in respect to North China and Shantung, she was, nevertheless, merely on the defensive and had never abandoned her desire for equal trade throughout China. She therefore eagerly seized the assistance now proffered by the United States, and Lord Salisbury's reply to Mr. Choate shows the delight with which England greeted Secretary Hay's proposal.

I have read with great interest the communication which you handed to me on the twenty-second instant in which you inform me of the desire of the United States Government to obtain from the various powers claiming spheres of interest in China, declarations as to their intentions in regard to the treatment of foreign trade and commerce therein.

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I will lose no time in consulting my colleagues in regard to a declaration by Her Majesty's Government and on the proposal that they should co-operate with the Government of the United States in obtaining similar declarations by the other powers concerned.

In the meantime I may assure your Excellency that the policy consistently advocated by this country is one of securing equal opportunity for the subjects or citizens of all nations in regard to commercial enterprise in China, and from this policy Her Majesty's Government have no intention or desire to depart.¹

After the matter had been discussed by the British Cabinet, Lord Salisbury, on November thirtieth, advised the American Ambassador that England would "be prepared to make a declaration in the sense desired" by the United States Government "in regard to the leased territory of Weihaiwei and all territory in China which may hereafter be acquired by Great Britain by lease or otherwise, and all

¹ *China* # 1 (1900), no. 349, p. 312, Salisbury to Choate, Sept. 29, 1899.

spheres of interest now held, or which may hereafter be held, by her in China, provided that a similar declaration is made by the other powers concerned".¹

The last clause of this declaration shows that, while England desired equal trading privileges throughout China, she did not intend to relinquish the means of eliminating foreign industry from her spheres of interest should the necessity for so doing later arise. The refusal to give an unconditional promise before the other nations acquiesced, illustrated how far England had been forced to fall back upon the sphere policy.

Lord Salisbury's note was likewise worded so as to eliminate from its provisions not only Hongkong but also the recently acquired Kowloon Peninsula, which England to avoid difficulty had in 1898 taken in lease form rather than outright cession,² but which she nevertheless always looked upon as an addition to Hongkong, i. e. a part of the British Empire. Conceivably, England had no intention of raising tariff barriers at her Far Eastern emporium, and being so vitally interested in the success of the American proposals, might have included that territory in her acceptance without making the slightest difference in its effect. To be sure, Hongkong — though not Kowloon — was British territory, but it is geographically a part of China and its exclusion from the declaration was an important indication of Britain's determination to retain her superiority in her sphere of interest.

These two reservations, however, were overlooked by the American Government. Secretary Hay instructed Ambassador Choate to "express the gratification" he felt at the "cordial acceptance by Her Majesty's Government of the

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 415, p. 381, Salisbury to Choate, Nov. 30, 1899.

² See pp. 261-4.

proposals of the United States".¹ The fact that England had ignored the request that she use her influence with other countries to help secure their approval to the Hay note² was likewise unmentioned in Mr. Choate's note acknowledging Britain's adherence.³ There is no evidence that Great Britain did specifically request any other power to give the United States affirmative replies, yet her oft-proclaimed desire for equal trading facilities throughout China, coupled with her own reply, must have had some influence.

Germany had long recognized the possibility that the open door question might result in an Anglo-Russian conflict,⁴ and, desiring to keep peace in the Far East, at least until her own strength was more firmly established in that region, she did not want the question to "become an object of controversy between the different powers engaged in China".⁵ While not answering in writing the American note of September twenty-sixth,⁶ Bülow on December fourth—just a few days after England's affirmative response—verbally told the American Berlin representative, Mr. Jackson, that "the politics of Germany in the Extreme Orient are *de facto*, the policy of the open door, and Germany proposes to maintain this principle in the future. . . . If the other cabinets adhere to the proposal of the United States Government, Germany will raise no objection, and Germany is willing to have the Government of the United States inform these other cabinets that no difficulty will come from

¹ *China # 2* (1900), no. 4, p. 3, Choate to Salisbury, Dec. 6, 1899.

² *Ibid.*, no. 1, p. 1, Choate to Salisbury, Sept. 22, 1899.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 4, p. 3, Choate to Salisbury, Dec. 6, 1899.

⁴ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3778, p. 181, Aufzeichnung of Bülow, Mar. 14, 1899.

⁵ *China # 2* (1900), incl. no. 2 in no. 5, p. 4, Jackson to Hay, Dec. 4, 1899.

⁶ *Foreign Relations* (1899), p. 129, Hay to White, Sept. 6, 1899.

her if the other cabinets agree".¹ Although favoring Secretary Hay's proposition, Germany desired that before she herself gave written approval, similar assurances should be obtained from all other interested nations.

Germany desired an open door in most parts of China, especially in England's Yangtze Valley sphere, as she was fearful lest England eventually make foreign enterprise in that region impossible.² On the other hand, she had no interest in Manchuria and cared not what Russia did in or with that region.³ Hence, she was in the predicament of having either to support England's open door policy throughout China, including Manchuria, and thereby alienating Russia, or to back Russia's protectionist policy which might eventually threaten Germany's commercial prosperity in Shantung and anger England. Germany wished to remain on friendly terms with both London and St. Petersburg in order, as Bülow said, not to "prematurely tie" her hands so that she could "at a given moment go over to that side which then most suits our interest".⁴ Therefore, Germany preferred that the United States "confer with other European Governments having interests in China,"⁵ and ascer-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 130, Jackson to Hay, Dec. 4, 1899.

² "In order to combat the British aspirations in the Yangtze region, by far the most important of China, from which, therefore, we must not let ourselves be pushed away, we must seek to hold Britain down for as long as possible to the so-called policy of the open door as recently enunciated by Lord Charles Beresford. Under the opposed principle, that of spheres of interest—or even of closed spheres of interest—we might, under the present ratio of power, come off badly." Bülow, *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3778, p. 181, Aufzeichnung of Bülow, Mar. 14, 1899.

³ See p. 208.

⁴ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv, pt. i, no. 3778, p. 181, Aufzeichnung of Bülow, Mar. 14, 1899.

⁵ *China # 2* (1900), incl. no. 2 in no. 5, p. 4, Jackson to Hay, Dec. 4, 1899.

tain their attitude before the Berlin Foreign Office gave a written reply.¹

With these replies from England and Germany, the success of Mr. Hay's project depended upon the attitude of the Dual Alliance. Count Muravief had no desire to put Russia in a position where she could not eventually do as she wished in her North China sphere and consequently, first told the American Ambassador, Mr. Tower, that the St. Petersburg Government would make no declaration as suggested by Mr. Hay.² The Count, nevertheless, gave an oral promise to do whatever France would do,³ expecting that his ally, interested in developing her South China sphere, would be inclined to reject the American proposal.⁴

France,⁵ however, did not desire to be the first nation to definitely oppose Secretary Hay,⁶ and on December sixteenth Foreign Minister Delcassé signified his acceptance, provided the other powers did so.⁷ Count Muravief, thus deserted, "flew into a passion" and insisted "that Russia would never bind herself in that way".⁸ Instead of following his first impulse, however, the Russian Foreign Minister drew up an ambiguous reply, December thirtieth, which while seemingly accepting the American proposals, was in reality capable of being interpreted in a contrary sense, should Russia later find it advisable.

¹ *Ibid.*

² Thayer, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 243.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

⁵ Secretary Hay had on November twenty-first invited France to agree to his open door proposals.

⁶ Count Muravief had only verbally indicated opposition.

⁷ *China* # 2 (1900), incl. no. 1 in no. 5, Delcassé to Porter, Dec. 16, 1899.

⁸ Thayer, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 243.

In so far as the territory leased to Russia is concerned, [wrote the Count] the Imperial Government has already demonstrated its firm intention to follow the policy of the open door by creating Dalny (Talienwan) a free port, and if at some future time that port, although remaining free itself, should be separated by a customs-limit from other portions of the territory in question, the customs duties would be levied in the zone subject to the tariff, upon all foreign merchandise without distinction as to nationality.¹

Whether the tariff referred to would be Russian or Chinese or just what the term "foreign merchandise" would include, Count Muraviev did not explain. Conceivably, the St. Petersburg Government might at a later date decide that Russian merchandise in that vicinity was not foreign and hence subject to a different tariff. No promise whatever was given with regard to any part of the Russian sphere save Talienwan, nor did Russia renounce any idea of imposing preferential railway rates or navigation dues.²

Secretary Hay considered this Russian reply satisfactory and, having previously secured the adherence of Italy³ and Japan,⁴ turned to Germany for her written declaration as promised on December fourth.⁵ Berlin complied February nineteenth, but made a damaging reservation that she would not depart from the "open door principle which at once excludes any prejudicial or disadvantageous commercial treatment of the citizens of the United States, so long as it

¹ *Foreign Relations* (1899), p. 141, Muraviev to Tower, Dec. 30, 1899.

² *Ibid.*

³ Italy was invited to agree to the Hay note on December ninth and accepted unconditionally, January seventh.

⁴ Japan was invited to agree to the Hay note November twentieth, and, six days later, advised that she would accept provided the other interested nations did.

⁵ See p. 303.

is not forced to do so, on account of considerations of reciprocity, by a divergence from it by other governments".¹

Ignoring the qualified replies that had been received from England, Russia, and Germany, the United States Government on March 30, 1900, notified the interested powers that it considered that all had accepted the proposals and that such assent was "final and definitive".² Lord Salisbury thereupon again signified Great Britain's approval and advised the American Ambassador that "the successful termination of the negotiations carried on by the United States Government in the matter" had been "a source of much gratification to Her Majesty's Government".³

The chief value of the negotiations was in its moral effect, for it was evident from Russia's reply that her ambiguous assent was unwillingly given, and so worded that she could evade its terms. By so doing she would, of course, automatically release the other countries. Notice was served, however, upon all concerned that the United States was now alert to the danger involved in the concession-hunting in China, and no European nation cared to involve itself in controversy with a country which had so recently exhibited its military strength. The United States had, in fact, joined forces with those nations which were endeavoring to ensure equal trading privileges in China. England, after a four-year effort, single-handed save for Japanese sympathy, had now gained support from the United States.

CHINA REVOLTS AGAINST THE WEST

Shortly after the American promulgation of the open door doctrine in 1899, the aggressive concession-seeking of major

¹ *Foreign Relations* (1899), p. 131, Bülow to Hay, Feb. 19, 1900.

² *China* # 2 (1900), no. 5, p. 3, White to Choate, Mar. 30, 1900.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 6, p. 6, Salisbury to White, April 5, 1900.

European powers received a serious check from an altogether unexpected source—i. e. from China herself. Angry because of the humiliations heaped upon her by foreigners since 1895, China in 1900 determined to eliminate from her borders the disturbing element which had terminated the quietude enjoyed by the Celestial Empire before European cannon had thundered at her gates.

The British Foreign Office, disgusted at the military impotence displayed by China in 1894,¹ had considered the Peking Government thoroughly effete and incapable of any resistance whatsoever unless her armies were led by European officers.² It was indeed the common belief in London that a well-drilled body of 10,000 men could march at will throughout the length and breadth of China.³ As Sir Edward Grey put it, there had been a "wrong estimate formed of the condition of China—the idea that China was ripe for partition, that great liberties could be taken and that large slices of territory could be acquired".⁴

Not only was this belief held by Englishmen in London, but as St. John Brodrick, British Parliamentary Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pointed out, English officials were given the impression "that the Chinese Colossus was prostrate and therefore fit for dismemberment".⁵

While Great Britain's public and official sentiment had been led to believe that China was impotent, rumblings of discontent were heard throughout 1899, growing more and

¹ See p. 115.

² *Hansard*, vol. lvi, p. 225; vol. lvii, p. 1510.

³ Lord Beresford suggested that English officers reorganize the Chinese army.

⁴ *Hansard*, vol. lxxxvii, p. 477—Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, Aug. 2, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. lxxxvii, p. 486.

more distinct until they burst with a loud crescendo upon a horrified world in June, 1900.

Early in October of the preceding year there appeared in the vicinity of Ch'ih Ping, Shantung, a secret society termed by Europeans the Boxers, whose attempt to put into execution part of their slogan, "exterminate the foreigners",¹ brought them into collision with the provincial troops. The result was that the Boxers were dispersed on October eighteenth.²

Yu Hsien, then Governor of Shantung,³ and noted for his anti-foreign tendencies,⁴ memorialized the throne to grant the impeachment of the commanding officer, on the ground that, in suppressing the Boxers, he had negligently killed others who were not members of that organization.⁵

Encouraged by Yu Hsien's action⁶ and considerably assisted by the Chinese belief that the Europeans were responsible for a severe drought then devastating Shantung,⁷ the Boxers soon enveloped the entire province in anti-foreign fury. Their wrath fell primarily upon the European missionaries and their converts, chiefly because these people were the representatives of the foreign influence which had so undermined China's prestige. Both Protestant and Catholic clergy were the foreigners most readily accessible,⁸ and spread a gospel which caused native Chinese to

¹ Treat, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

² *Foreign Relations* (1900), Conger to Hay, Dec. 7, 1899.

³ Steiger, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

⁴ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. iii, p. 180; Steiger, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

⁵ *Foreign Relations* (1900), Conger to Hay, Dec. 7, 1899.

⁶ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. iii, p. 177; Steiger, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

⁷ Clements, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

⁸ Their vocation brought them into close contact with the Chinese of the lower classes.

forsake the ancient celestial customs.¹ They were indiscreet enough in many cases to accentuate the already sufficiently wrathful antagonism of the Chinese, by offending Oriental susceptibilities with the erection of objectionable high church steeples,² and by occasionally interfering in the administration of justice in cases involving native Christians.³

As a result of Boxer attacks upon native and European Christians, Sir Claude MacDonald joined with his American⁴ and German⁵ colleagues in protesting to the Yamen with such effectiveness⁶ that stringent orders to suppress the disturbances were dispatched to Yu Hsien,⁷ but, these failing to evoke any salutary result,⁸ the governor was summoned to Peking for an audience⁹ and supplanted as acting governor by Yuan Shi Kai,¹⁰ a man who had shown considerable ability as China's resident in Korea¹¹ and from whom the European representatives expected much in the way of efficient government.¹²

¹ Steiger, *op. cit.*, p. 34; Clements, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

² Smith, A. R., *China in Convulsion*, p. 57.

³ "But disorders came in the form of popular demonstrations against the missionaries who exasperated the Chinese masses by their contempt for everything Chinese and by their extra legal interference in Chinese local affairs," T'ang Leang-Li, *The Foundations of Modern China*, pp. 215-6.

⁴ Mr. Conger.

⁵ Baron von Ketteler.

⁶ Mr. Conger suggested Yu Hsien's removal.

⁷ *Foreign Relations* (1900), p. 80, Yamen to Conger, Nov. 30, 1899.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 84, Conger to Yamen, December 5, 1899.

⁹ Clements, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

¹⁰ *Foreign Relations* (1900), p. 77, Conger to Hay, Dec. 7, 1899.

¹¹ See p. 78.

¹² "As regards the future situation in Northern Shantung, the most hope-

Unfortunately, however, before the new official had opportunity to make his influence felt, on December thirtieth, some Boxers at Fei Ch'eng seized the Reverend S. M. Brooks, an Anglican missionary.¹ Prompt remonstrances by Sir Claude MacDonald, supported by his French, American, and German colleagues,² caused the Yamen to order Yuan Shi Kai to apprehend the abductors and release the missionary,³ but before the governor's rescuing party had reached Mao Chia P'u, whither the Boxers had carried their captive,⁴ Mr. Brooks had already been put to death on the day subsequent to his apprehension.⁵

In addition to this laudable and prompt attempt to rescue Mr. Brooks, the Chinese Government evinced its sorrow over his untimely demise by publishing in the *Peking Gazette*⁶ and sending to Sir Claude MacDonald⁷ a special message of regret from the Emperor and Empress Dowager.⁸

The Chinese Minister in London advised Lord Salisbury of the "horror and indignation" of the Chinese Government and explained "that all officials within whose jurisdiction the outrage was committed" would be "deprived

ful feature is, I think, the choice of Yuan Shi Kai as Governor." Sir Claude MacDonald, *China* # 3 (1900), p. 4.

"The appointment of General Yuan Shi Kai as Governor of Shantung may inaugurate a new era in that province." John Hay, Feb. 1, 1900, *Foreign Relations* (1900), p. 96, Hay to Conger.

¹ *China* # 3 (1900), no. 1, p. 1, MacDonald to Salisbury, Jan. 4, 1900; no. 9, p. 3, MacDonald to Salisbury, Jan. 5, 1900.

² *Ibid.*, no. 1, p. 1, MacDonald to Salisbury, Jan. 4, 1900.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 3, p. 1, Lofenglüh to Salisbury, Jan. 10, 1900.

⁴ *Ibid.*, incl. no. 1 in no. 9, p. 4, Yuan Shi Kai to Yamen, Jan. 3, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 9, p. 3, MacDonald to Salisbury, Jan. 5, 1900.

⁶ *Foreign Relations* (1900), p. 87, Chinese Imperial Edict, Jan. 4, 1900.

⁷ *China* # 3 (1900), no. 9, p. 3, MacDonald to Salisbury, Jan. 5, 1900.

⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 2, p. 1, MacDonald to Salisbury, Jan. 5, 1900.

of their rank and honors until such time as they shall have succeeded in arresting the guilty parties", and that a "prescribed period" had "been allowed them within which to effect their capture".¹ Yuan Shi Kai thereupon ordered the local magistrates to capture the abductors within three days.²

So efficient³ were the efforts of the Chinese to atone for the demise of Mr. Brooks, that Sir Claude was able to report on January thirteenth that, three of the culprits having been apprehended and having confessed their guilt, he was directing Mr. Campbell, Vice-Consul at Shanghai, to attend the trial.⁴ Subsequently, six Chinese were punished, and three appropriations totaling 9,500 taels were made for the erection of a memorial chapel and the installation of commemorative tablets at the scene of the murder and at the college in Canterbury to which Mr. Brooks belonged.⁵

These measures fell short of satisfying the British officials. Both Lord Salisbury⁶ and Sir Claude MacDonald⁷ felt that the death of Mr. Brooks could not be expiated until punishment had been meted out to Yu Hsien, the governor who had allowed Shantung to fall into the state of disorder which made the murder possible. Their disquietude was increased because of constant reports from Shantung missionaries that the local officials there were conniving at Boxer activities.⁸

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 3, p. 1, Lofenglüh to Salisbury, Jan. 10, 1900.

² *Ibid.*, incl. no. 1 in no. 9, p. 4, Yuan Shi Kai to Yamen, Jan. 3, 1900.

³ The Yamen was urged on by Sir Claude's warning that "Her Majesty's Government required something more than mere words".

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 4, p. 2, MacDonald to Salisbury, Jan. 13, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 26, p. 12, MacDonald to Salisbury, Mar. 29, 1900.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 31, p. 17, Salisbury to Lofenglüh, Apr. 11, 1900.

⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 16, p. 7, MacDonald to Salisbury, Mar. 15, 1900.

⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 18, p. 8, MacDonald to Salisbury, Jan. 17, 1900. Mr. Brown,

Renewed protests were made on January eleventh by the British Minister¹ and on the same day there appeared an Imperial Decree which admitted the ominous character of the brigandage but, by making a distinction between good and bad societies and by failing to make specific mention of the Boxers, left itself open to the interpretation that there was an excuse for the existence of that society.² Nevertheless, it did denounce as being entitled to no leniency "worthless vagabonds" who created disturbances.³ Sir Claude, therefore, did not call the first interpretation to the Yamen's attention, but put it on file where it would be available for future requisition should the attacks continue.⁴

Unfortunately, the disturbances did continue in Shantung,⁵ but as the stern hand of Yuan Shi Kai gradually made itself felt,⁶ some of the Boxers made their way over into the neighboring Province of Chili, which soon became an additional center of anti-foreign agitation.

Therefore, on January twenty-seventh, the British Min-

¹ a missionary at Tai An, wired his bishop on January ninth, "Outlook very black; daily marauding; constant danger. Edict suppressing published; troops present, but useless; officials complete inaction; Tai An Prefect blocks; secret orders from throne to encourage."

² *Ibid.*, no. 18, p. 8, MacDonald to Salisbury, Jan. 17, 1900.

³ *Ibid.*, incl. in no. 18, p. 9, Imperial Edict, Jan. 11, 1900.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 18, p. 8, MacDonald to Salisbury, Jan. 17, 1900. Sir Claude later acted upon this idea, when on March second, he told the Yamen that the January eleventh Edict had "given rise to a widespread impression that these societies were actually encouraged by the throne". *Ibid.*, incl. in no. 33, p. 21, Memorandum of Interview between Sir Claude MacDonald and Yamen, Mar. 2, 1900.

⁶ "Subsequent reports received by me and my American, French and German colleagues from missionaries in the affected region confirmed these first apprehensions." MacDonald to Salisbury, Jan. 31, 1900, *China* # 3 (1900), no. 27, p. 13.

⁷ Steiger, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

ister, supported by his American, French, German, and Italian colleagues¹ requested an Imperial Edict declaring the suppression of the two main anti-foreign societies,² i. e. the Boxers and a similarly minded organization known as the "Big Knife Society".³

The note must have appeared somewhat insolent to the suave Orientals, as it bluntly termed China's unsettled conditions "a disgrace to any civilized country", and intimated that unless action were taken at once, Peking's international relations would be endangered.⁴ Such harsh language was not apt to appeal to the nobler characteristics of the Chinese, but at that time all Europeans were inclined to look down upon the Orientals and were incapable of seeing that this bluntness would only antagonize the Chinese the more.

No answer was given to this note,⁵ but on the twenty-fourth the anti-foreign sentiment of the Chinese court was indicated by the appointment, as heir-apparent, of Prince P'u Chün⁶ whose father sympathized with the Boxers.⁷ As tutors to the new heir were selected two officials noted for their anti-foreign proclivities.⁸

February twenty-first, the British Minister, still supported

¹ Special note is made of Russia's abstention.

² *China* # 3 (1900), no. 11, p. 6, MacDonald to Salisbury, Mar. 10, 1900.

³ Investigation proving to Sir Claude that the Boxers and the Big Knife Society were practically the same, the latter organization was later eliminated from the demands. *China* # 3 (1900), no. 106, p. 46, MacDonald to Salisbury, April 16, 1900.

⁴ *China* # 3 (1900), incl. in no. 27, p. 13, MacDonald to Yamen, Jan. 27, 1900.

⁵ *Foreign Relations* (1900), p. 102, Conger to Hay, Mar. 10, 1900.

⁶ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xciv, p. 1063, Imperial Edict, Jan. 24, 1900.

⁷ Smith, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 230.

⁸ *China* # 3 (1900), no. 28, p. 14, MacDonald to Salisbury, Jan. 31, 1900.

by his American, German, French, and Italian colleagues, demanded the decree requested on January twenty-fifth, with the additional stipulation that it be published in the *Peking Gazette*.¹ Four days later this démarche elicited from the Yamen the information that, as a result of the original request, an Imperial Decree² had been dispatched on February nineteenth³ to the Governors of Chili and Shantung, who had subsequently issued proclamations denouncing the Boxers and threatening them with severe punishment.⁴

The British Minister admitted that, had these responses been made more promptly, he would have considered them more satisfactory, but, with their appetites whetted by this Chinese capitulation, and apprehensive of Boxer activities, the foreign representatives at Peking decided to adhere to the original demand, namely, that the decree be promulgated in the *Peking Gazette*.⁵ In vain did the Yamen declare at the subsequent interview on March second⁶ that a Vice-regal Proclamation was used in all cases where speed was required,⁷ and that this document would be seen by more people than would an Imperial Decree in the *Gazette*, the circulation of which, except for provincial officials, was limited to Peking and its environs.⁸

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 32, p. 17, MacDonald to Salisbury, Mar. 5, 1900.

² *Ibid.*, incl. no. 3 in no. 32, p. 19. This severely denounced the Boxers.

³ According to the Yamen, the delay was caused by the fact that the January twenty-fifth note arrived during the New Year holidays, *China* # 3 (1900), incl. in no. 33, p. 21, Memorandum of Interview between Foreign Representatives and the Yamen, Mar. 1, 1900.

⁴ *Ibid.*, incl. no. 3, in no. 32, p. 19, Edict quoted in "Proclamation of the Governor General of Chili."

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 32, p. 17, MacDonald to Salisbury, Mar. 5, 1900.

⁶ See memorandum of this interview, *ibid.*, incl. in no. 33, p. 21.

⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 32, p. 17, MacDonald to Salisbury, Mar. 5, 1900.

⁸ *Ibid.*, incl. no. 1 in no. 36, p. 25, Yamen to MacDonald, Mar. 7, 1900.

Despite pressure, the Yamen did not yield, and, as the Peking representatives were disturbed at reports of Boxer "drills in Peking and Tientsin,"¹ we find Sir Claude on March tenth reporting the dispatch of a threat that he and his colleagues contemplated urging their governments to adopt "other measures for the protection of the lives and property" of the various nationals in China.² Lord Salisbury was thereupon asked by the Minister to station a few warships in northern Chinese waters should conditions there fail to improve.³

The Prime Minister, however, vetoed the use of warships until other means had been exhausted.⁴ Moreover, he apparently exerted his influence to restrain other cabinets, for we find that he transmitted MacDonald's request to Sir Edward Monson, the British Ambassador at Paris,⁵ who told the French Foreign Minister,⁶ that England disapproved of a naval demonstration "except under circumstances of urgent necessity",⁷ and that in any event it was probable that the unanimity of such action would be broken by the probable refusal of the United States to participate.⁸

France, however, felt that it would be inexpedient to refuse to give the Peking representatives any protection they

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 36, p. 24, MacDonald to Salisbury, Mar. 16, 1900.

² *Ibid.*, no. 11, p. 6, MacDonald to Salisbury, Mar. 10, 1900.

³ *Ibid.* Similar requests were made of their various Foreign Offices by the Peking representatives of France, Germany, Italy.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 12, p. 6, Salisbury to MacDonald, Mar. 11, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 13, p. 6, Monson to Salisbury, Mar. 12, 1900. Monson, however, in customary diplomatic fashion, intimated to the French Foreign Office that he was acting on his own initiative. *Ibid.*, no. 17, p. 7, Monson to Salisbury, Mar. 16, 1900.

⁶ M. Delcassé.

⁷ *China # 3 (1900)*, no. 15, p. 7, Monson to Salisbury, Mar. 14, 1900.

⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 17, p. 7, Monson to Salisbury, Mar. 16, 1900.

thought necessary.¹ The United States backed up Mr. Conger by dispatching a warship to Taku² while Italy and Germany sent two each. On March twenty-third³ MacDonald requested that England follow their example.⁴ Two British cruisers were sent on the following day.⁵

Possibly, this pressure did have some effect, but it was not, until after the representatives had agreed on April seventh not to press again for the publication of the Imperial Decree in the *Gazette*, but to hold the Yamen responsible for any consequent results,⁶ that the Chinese official organ printed on April fourteenth⁷ the denunciatory proclamation of the Chili Viceroy.⁸ This was followed on the seventeenth by the appearance in the *Gazette* of an Imperial Decree⁹ which denounced all secret societies, thereby removing Sir Claude's objections to the January eleventh decree.¹⁰ So gratified was

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 14, p. 6, Monson to Salisbury, Mar. 13, 1900.

² *Foreign Relations* (1900), Hay to Conger, Mar. 15, 1900; *China* # 3 (1900), no. 20, p. 11, MacDonald to Salisbury, Mar. 23, 1900.

³ Sir Claude MacDonald's insistence was doubtless increased by the appointment of Yu Hsien as Governor of Shansi on March fifteenth, despite the requests of both Lord Salisbury and the Minister that he be punished. No protest about his new appointment seems to have been immediately made by Sir Claude, although he regarded it as "an extraordinary lack of consideration . . . for the opinions and representations of foreign powers." *Ibid.*, no. 36, p. 24, MacDonald to Salisbury, Mar. 16, 1900; *Ibid.*, no. 16, p. 7, MacDonald to Salisbury, Mar. 15, 1900.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 20, p. 11, MacDonald to Salisbury, Mar. 23, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 24, p. 12, Salisbury to MacDonald, Mar. 25, 1900.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 106, p. 46, MacDonald to Salisbury, April 16, 1900.

⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 34, p. 23, MacDonald to Salisbury, April 16, 1900.

⁸ See p. 315. This Viceregal Proclamation quoted the Imperial Decree of February nineteenth which had denounced the Boxers.

⁹ *China* # 3 (1900), incl. in no. 107, p. 50, Imperial Decree, Apr. 17, 1900.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, no. 107, p. 49, MacDonald to Salisbury, April 18, 1900.

the Minister that the two warships previously sent to Taku¹ were returned to their usual work.²

Boxer activities, nevertheless, continued. On May seventeenth, sixty-one native Catholics had been killed at Pao-ting-fu, only ninety miles from Peking,³ and the London Mission at Kungtsun, forty miles away, had been destroyed.⁴ The following day these disturbances drew upon the Yamen the wrath of the British Minister, who attributed the trouble to the failure of the Yamen properly to suppress the Boxers,⁵ disregarding the fact that the Chinese Government, a full month previously, had issued the only decree asked for.⁶ In fact as soon as news of the two new disturbances reached the ears of the Yamen, and even before Sir Claude had entered his protests, an Imperial Decree had been promulgated requiring the metropolitan and provincial authorities to "adopt stringent measures to suppress the Boxers".⁷

As additional alarming reports from nearby towns were received by a Catholic Bishop,⁸ the French Minister⁹ took the initiative in calling a meeting of the foreign representatives on May twentieth, when they decided to demand¹⁰

¹ See p. 317.

² *China # 3* (1900), no. 34, p. 23, MacDonald to Salisbury, April 16, 1900.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 37, p. 26, MacDonald to Salisbury, May 17, 1900.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 38, p. 26, MacDonald to Salisbury, May 18, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 39, p. 26, MacDonald to Salisbury, May 19, 1900.

⁶ See p. 317.

⁷ *China # 3* (1900), no. 39, p. 26, MacDonald to Salisbury, May 19, 1900.

⁸ *Ibid.*, incl. no. 5 in no. 273, p. 108, Favier to Pichon, May 19, 1900. The Bishop prophesied a general Boxer attack upon Peking with the object of killing all foreigners there.

⁹ M. Pichon.

¹⁰ Russia for the first time since the Boxers began their agitation joined

that "all persons who should print, publish, or disseminate placards which menaced foreigners, all individuals aiding and abetting, all owners of houses or temples now used as meeting places for Boxers, should be arrested"; also that "those guilty of arson, murder, outrages, etc., together with those affording support or direction to Boxers while committing such outrages, should be executed".¹

Still the foreign Ministers did not yet consider themselves in any personal danger. They vetoed a proposition to bring up guards from Taku to defend the legations.² Sir Claude MacDonald, however, asked that a naval demonstration be made,³ and the representatives of all other interested powers, except Russia, made similar requests of their respective governments.⁴ Lord Salisbury wired his approval the next day.⁵

The Yamen's failure to comply with the May twentieth demands⁶ and the receipt by the French Minister from Bishop Favier of information indicating a serious outbreak in this May twenty-first demand. Her representative, however, deprecated both landing guards and naval demonstrations—*China # 3 (1900)*, no. 43—and satisfied Count Lamsdorf by telegraph that further pressure would be unnecessary (*ibid.*, no. 45).

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 41, p. 27, MacDonald to Salisbury, May 21, 1900.

² *Ibid.*, no. 42, p. 27, MacDonald to Salisbury, May 21, 1900.

³ Baron von Ketteler, the German Minister, proposed this step. Sir Claude apparently did not realize the gravity of the situation, as he did not agree with the unfavorable reports of Bishop Favier, but looked for rain to put down the Boxers. See his report to Lord Salisbury, May twenty-first, *China # 3 (1900)*, no. 273, p. 103. Nevertheless, by concurring in the demands made upon China, he was helping to make the situation most difficult for the Yamen, because in view of the hatred which the foreigners had engendered in the Chinese people, the Government would draw upon itself additional fury every time it made an additional capitulation to the hated foreigner.

⁴ *China # 3 (1900)*, no. 42, p. 27, MacDonald to Salisbury, May 21, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.* "

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 47, p. 28. MacDonald to Salisbury, May 25, 1900.

in Peking,¹ led to another meeting of the foreign representatives on May twenty-sixth to reconsider the advisability of calling up the guards.² The British Foreign Office backed up its Minister by wiring approval of this step if deemed necessary,³ and Admiral Seymour, in charge of the Far Eastern squadron, lent his cooperation by dispatching two warships to Taku.⁴ The Peking diplomats, however, again postponed bringing the guards⁵ and Sir Claude reported a satisfactory interview on May twenty-seventh with the Yamen when they convinced him that "energetic measures" would at last be taken against the Boxers.⁶

It was not until the railroad station at Ying-tai, six miles from Peking, was burned on May twenty-eighth⁷ and traffic to Tientsin interrupted,⁸ that the foreign representatives realized that their lives might be imperilled,⁹ and on the same day¹⁰ they summoned the guards,¹¹ the French Minister¹² again preceding his colleagues by issuing the

¹ *Foreign Relations* (1900), p. 130, Favier to Pichon, May 19, 1900.

² *China* # 3 (1900), no. 48, p. 28, MacDonald to Salisbury, May 27, 1900.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 50, p. 29, Salisbury to MacDonald, May 27, 1900.

⁴ *Ibid.*, incl. no. 51, p. 29, Seymour to Admiralty.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 48, p. 28, MacDonald to Salisbury, May 27, 1900.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 49, p. 29, MacDonald to Salisbury, May 27, 1900.

⁷ *China* # 4 (1900), no. 1, p. 1, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 10, 1900.

⁸ Chinese officials caused resumption of traffic the next day but it was interrupted again on June 4, 1900. *China* # 4 (1900), no. 1, p. 1, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 10, 1900.

⁹ "Without doubt it is now a question of European life and property being in danger."—Sir Claude MacDonald to Foreign Office, May 30, 1900, *China* # 3 (1900), no. 54, p. 30.

¹⁰ Admiral Seymour was notified by Sir Claude MacDonald on May twenty-eighth. Seymour, E. H., *My Naval Career and Travels*, p. 342.

¹¹ *China* # 3 (1900), no. 53, p. 30, MacDonald to Salisbury, May 29, 1900.

¹² Sir Claude MacDonald does not seem to have regarded the situation as seriously as did his French and German colleagues. In speaking of

necessary orders before the general agreement was reached.¹

The Yamen felt that their prestige would be injured if foreign troops entered Peking.² Therefore they refused to grant the necessary transportation facilities, pleading the absence of certain officials at the Summer Palace.³ Yielding to pressure, however,⁴ they agreed, provided the number brought up would not be more than thirty for each legation,⁵ which stipulation the foreign representatives, now cognizant of their personal danger, proceeded to disregard, the British alone bringing up seventy-five⁶ men on May thirty-first,⁷ and the total number being 337.⁸ While the appearance of the guards produced momentary quiet in Peking,⁹ matters

the guards he wrote Lord Salisbury that "It may possibly be that the Chinese Government, now awake to the strength of the Boxer Movement, would be disposed to welcome the additional security afforded by the presence of foreign troops." On the other hand, M. Pichon assured his colleagues that "there was grave danger of a very serious outbreak and that protection was urgently required for all Europeans in Peking," while Baron von Ketteler said it was "utterly useless to expect the Chinese Government to do anything effective". The Russian Minister did not think that matters were so black as painted by M. Pichon, but admitted that his reports could not be rejected. The fact that England and Russia were agreed on calling the guards, had influence upon Bülow who felt that Germany dare not object to do likewise. *Die Grosse Politik*, no. 4511, p. 3, Bülow to Kaiser, May 29, 1900.

¹ *China # 4* (1900), no. 1, p. 1, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 10, 1900.

² *Ibid.*

³ *China # 3* (1900), no. 55, p. 30, MacDonald to Salisbury, May 30, 1900.

⁴ The Yamen was bluntly told that the guards were coming, permission or no permission. *China # 4* (1900), no. 1, p. 1, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 10, 1900.

⁵ *China # 3* (1900), no. 56, p. 31, MacDonald to Salisbury, May 31, 1900.

⁶ There were 100 British ready to come but as Russia and France had only 75 each, 25 English were left at Tientsin.—Hart.

⁷ *China # 3* (1900), no. 59, p. 31, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 1, 1900.

⁸ *China # 4* (1900), no. 1, p. 1, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 10, 1900.

⁹ *China # 3* (1900), no. 61, p. 32, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 2, 1900.

daily became worse in the country districts. June second brought word of a collision between Boxers and a band of Europeans endeavoring to gain Tientsin after fleeing from Paoting-fu.¹ During the engagement, nine of the Europeans had disappeared.² June fourth saw an attack upon an English mission at Yung-Ching, resulting in the death of two British missionaries, Robinson and Norman.³ On the same day the station next to Ying-tai on the Peking-Tientsin line, the second from the capital, was burned.⁴

These ominous events led Sir Claude MacDonald⁵ to acquiesce in a request that the European Foreign Offices instruct their various Far Eastern Admirals to "take concerted measures" for the relief of the legations should they be besieged in Peking.⁶ The Austrian and Russian representatives joined in this proposal.⁷ To emphasize the gravity of the situation, the British Minister reiterated his request the following day⁸ and three days later expressed the hope that it had been granted.⁹ Lord Salisbury again showed promptitude by not only relaying MacDonald's dispatch to the Admiralty,¹⁰ but also by instructing the Minister himself to "take precisely what measures" he thought "expedient".¹¹

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 62, p. 32, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 2, 1900.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, no. 66, p. 34, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 4, 1900; no 71, p. 35, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 5, 1900.

⁴ *China # 4 (1900)*, no. 1, p. 1, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 10, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.* The British Minister merely acquiesced in a suggestion originated by the French Minister.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *China # 3 (1900)*, no. 68, p. 34, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 4, 1900.

⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 74, p. 36, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 5, 1900.

⁹ *Ibid.*, no. 93, p. 42, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 8, 1900.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, no. 80, p. 38, Foreign Office to Admiralty, June 6, 1900.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, no. 84, p. 39, Salisbury to MacDonald, June 7, 1900.

MacDonald's apprehension was increased by an interview which he had with the Yamen on June fifth for the purpose of protesting against the death of Robinson and Norman.¹ During this interview Sir Claude elicited the alarming admission from the Yamen that the Imperial troops might not fire on the Boxers. Furthermore, it was admitted that the influence of reactionary advisers of the Empress Dowager rendered the Yamen powerless¹ to remedy the situation.² So impressed was the British Minister by the effeteness of China's Foreign Office that he wired Admiral Seymour for seventy-five more men.³

After a similarly ineffective interview on June fifth with Prince Chüing, President of the Yamen,⁴ MacDonald and his colleagues⁵ on the following day considered the advisability of seeking permission to appeal directly to the Emperor and Empress Dowager.⁶ Although it was decided to delay taking this step,⁷ Lord Salisbury gave his approval to make the demand if necessary,⁸ and to save time, arranged with the War Office to divert troops to Taku from Hong-kong, Weihaiwei, and Singapore.⁹

The Foreign Office, furthermore, approved¹⁰ the Min-

¹ Sir Claude reported that during this interview, the Yamen was indifferent and helpless, so much so, that one of its members fell asleep. *China* # 4 (1900), no. 1, p. 1, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 10, 1900.

² *China* # 3 (1900), no. 75, p. 36, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 5, 1900.

³ *China* # 4 (1900), no. 1, p. 1, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 10, 1900.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ This time the British Minister took the initiative. He personally made this suggestion in order to avoid foreign intervention, which he knew would involve political danger. *Ibid.*

⁶ *China* # 3 (1900), no. 76, p. 36, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 6, 1900.

⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 77, p. 37, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 6, 1900.

⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 85, p. 39, Salisbury to MacDonald, June 7, 1900.

⁹ *Ibid.*, no. 97, p. 41, Foreign Office to War Office, June 8, 1900.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, no. 101, p. 44, Salisbury to MacDonald, June 9, 1900.

ister's suggestion that at the proposed Imperial audience, an intimation be given that if China herself did not restore quiet, the foreign powers would.¹ Indicative of England's desire to restore order, without which trade could not prosper, was the authorization given Sir Claude that if the Manchu Dynasty collapsed, he should support any Chinese Government that could maintain order.²

The utter helplessness of the Yamen had so impressed MacDonald that, although he had arranged for a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps again to discuss the question of an Imperial audience, he mentioned the matter, prior to conference with his colleagues, to a Yamen interpreter, who frequently acted as emissary for Prince Chung.³ The Yamen was immediately informed and hurriedly requested delay as they could promise resumption of transit on the Peking-Tientsin line within a few days.⁴ The diplomats agreed to grant this request.⁵

Instead of the Yamen's promise being fulfilled, however, July eighth brought word that Boxers were burning railroad bridges twenty miles from Peking and that Chinese Imperial troops under General Nieh were not interfering.⁶ There were also attacks on a foreign-used race-course near Peking⁷ and on some legation students.⁸ The British Minister was already disturbed, but when an emissary of the Yamen failed satisfactorily to deny rumors that the Empress Dowager desired to exterminate the foreigners,⁹ Sir Claude seems to

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 96, p. 43, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 8, 1900.

² *Ibid.*, no. 64, p. 33, Salisbury to MacDonald, June 3, 1900.

³ *China* # 4 (1900), no. 1, p. 1, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 10, 1900.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

have given way entirely to the anxiety which he had first evinced on June fifth, when he realized for the first time that the situation was getting beyond the power of the Yamen.¹

Without awaiting a scheduled meeting of the foreign representatives, the British Minister on his own initiative² took the momentous step of sending the following wire to Admiral Seymour: "Situation extremely grave. Unless arrangements are made for immediate advance to Peking, it will be too late."³ When the Ministers met subsequently, Pichon, who since May twenty-first had been more apprehensive than MacDonald, indicated that his reports of the situation were more favorable, and, as a majority of his colleagues agreed with him, they decided not to wire the other Admirals.⁴ Whereupon the British Minister advised Admiral Seymour accordingly,⁵ but later on the same day—June ninth—the original ominous rumors⁶ were confirmed by Chinese sources, which he considered trustworthy, and he requested the British Consul at Tientsin⁷ again to notify the Admiral that the legations required immediate relief.⁸ This action was taken on his own initiative after his colleagues had decided against the measure.

Admiral Seymour had anticipated the necessity of making an advance upon Peking,⁹ and to avoid placing British sol-

¹ See p. 323.

² *China* # 4 (1900), no. 1, p. 1, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 10, 1900.

³ *China* # 3 (1900), incl. in no. 103, p. 45, Seymour to Admiralty, June 10, 1900.

⁴ *China* # 4 (1900), no. 1, p. 1, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 10, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ i. e. regarding the Empress Dowager's decision to exterminate the foreigners.

⁷ Mr. Carles.

⁸ *China* # 4 (1900), no. 1, p. 1, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 10, 1900.

⁹ *China* # 3 (1900), incl. in no. 87, p. 40, Seymour to Admiralty, June 8, 1900.

diers under a foreign commander,¹ he took advantage of his being senior officer² by deciding³ to lead the relief force in person.⁴ Despite the irregularity of an Admiral's attempting to lead men on land, Seymour had no alternative but to send aid. He had to act, and act quickly, when a British representative reported himself in danger. Some idea of his promptness may be gained when it is realized that the Minister's notice to Carles, dispatched at 8 P. M.,⁵ was received by Seymour one hour later,⁶ and the Admiral left Táku with 500 men⁷ at 1 A. M. the next day.⁸ "This force was augmented within three days by detachments which brought the total up to 1876, of which 736 were supplied by the British Empire."⁹ So it was that the British Admiral, summoned by the British Minister with the approval of both the British Admiralty and the Foreign Office, was leading an army

¹ Seymour, *op. cit.*, p. 343. The British Foreign Office likewise objected to putting English troops under a foreign commander and was disturbed when the French Admiral in the Far East suggested that a Russian lead the forces to Peking, *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, no. 4517, p. 87.

² Seymour, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

³ Admiral Seymour had asked the Admiralty to approve his leading the relief force, but a reply not being received the next day when the urgent message was received from MacDonald (memoirs of Seymour, *op. cit.*, p. 343), his action was covered by general orders given him by the Admiralty on June sixth, that he was to protect the legations by such means as he considered "advisable and practicable". In deciding this he was left "a wide discretion" as to the measures to be adopted. *China # 3 (1900)*, incl. in no. 79, p. 37, Admiralty to Seymour, June 6, 1900.

⁴ Seymour, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

⁵ *China # 4 (1900)*, no. 1, p. 1, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 10, 1900.

⁶ Seymour, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

⁷ *China # 3 (1900)*, no. 105, p. 45, Carles to Salisbury, June 10, 1900.

⁸ Seymour, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

⁹ *China # 3 (1900)*, no. 124, p. 54, Admiralty to Foreign Office, June 13, 1900.

through Chinese territory to rescue his countrymen imprisoned in the Celestial capital.

Reviewing the events prior to June ninth, it seems that Sir Claude MacDonald did not himself believe that there was any grave danger until June fifth, when his interview with the Yamen convinced him that the Chinese Foreign Office had ceased to function.¹ Prior to that date he had limited his action to protests, and never lost hope in the possibility of getting the Yamen to suppress the disorders. He did, it is true, report on May thirtieth that European life and property were in danger,² but he was of the opinion that a few hundred guards would cause the Yamen to act against the Boxers.³ In other words, he counted as much on the effect the guards would have upon the Chinese Government as upon the enraged populace.

Prior to June fifth, Sir Claude, while apprehensive of the growing disorders, did not himself originate any aggressive military action. The question of calling the guards⁴ and of having the Admiralty order the Admirals at Taku to act in case of emergency,⁵ were suggested by the French Minister, while the German representative was responsible for suggesting the naval demonstration of May twenty-first.⁶

After June fifth, i. e. only when convinced of the helplessness of the Yamen, did MacDonald take the lead in calling for European intervention. Both the idea of an Imperial audience⁷ and of summoning Admiral Seymour⁸

¹ See p. 323.

² See p. 320.

³ *China* # 3 (1900), no. 274, p. 110, MacDonald to Salisbury, May 28, 1900.

⁴ See p. 321.

⁵ See p. 322.

⁶ See p. 317.

⁷ See p. 323.

⁸ See p. 325.

were his suggestions, acted upon in haste before the other Ministers had approved.¹ His anxiety first became evident on and after June fifth when he three times requested the Foreign Office to give proper orders to the Admirals.²

The Minister certainly failed prior to June fifth to indicate to the Foreign Office that the legations were in danger. Mr. Brodrick told the House of Commons that Sir Claude MacDonald had mentioned inflammatory placards but had advised only two precautions, namely, the dispatch of guards to Peking and gunboats to Taku.³ Although the Foreign Office had in March deprecated a naval demonstration,⁴ they readily acquiesced when the request was repeated.⁵ Authority to call up the guards was given immediately.⁶ In fact, during the whole crisis, the Foreign Office in no way handicapped the Minister but actually encouraged him to aggressive action.

MacDonald's nervousness after June fifth may be somewhat excused because of the excitement in which he was living. Around him on all sides the Boxers were leaving ruins, while the Chinese Government and the Imperial army had apparently ceased to function, at least in so far as protection of foreigners was concerned. The Minister was charged with the well-being of his fellow countrymen in China, and in such a crisis he would be evading responsibility if he did not summon aid. His error lies in the fact that he had so loaded the Yamen with demands that he helped to arouse the Chinese fury which necessitated armed

¹ See p. 325.

² See p. 322.

³ *Hansard*, vol. lxxxv, p. 1306, July 12, 1900.

⁴ See p. 316.

⁵ See p. 317.

⁶ See p. 321.

intervention. Although the Minister strove to prevent that intervention, his demands upon the Yamen helped to make it necessary.

The Foreign Office was pursuing a dual policy. It desired first to protect English life and property, especially the legations, and second, to prevent any uprising which would injure trade or threaten partition of the Chinese Empire.¹ The desire to safeguard trade is indicated by orders sent to Sir Claude MacDonald to support any government which could preserve order² and by the efforts later made to prevent the uprising from spreading into the Yangtze Valley.³

Suspicion that Russia might use the unsettled conditions for selfish purposes was also instrumental in quickening England's desire to avoid disorder in China. Bertie told Count Hatzfeldt on June ninth that the Foreign Office had great anxiety regarding Russia's aims.⁴ This anxiety was greatly increased when France gave evidence of cooperating with her ally by suggesting a Russian commander, for the relief force, and by endeavoring to persuade the British Government that the situation was not so serious after all.⁵

It is interesting to note that from the start of the Boxer trouble England was no longer isolated in China as she had been for some time. Germany, France, Japan, and the

¹ "The safety of the legations and the preservation of trade are the only points to which we can at this moment direct our attention." Mr. Brodrick in the House of Commons, July 3, 1900. *Hansard*, vol. lxxxv, p. 432.

² See p. 324.

³ See p. 343.

⁴ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, p. 8, no. 4517, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, June 7, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, June 7, 1900. June eleventh, Count Hatzfeldt reported that an interview with Bertie led him to believe that England's distrust of Russia was growing, *ibid.*, no. 4521, p. 11, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, June 11, 1900.

United States were as anxious as was England to put down the disturbances. On the other hand, Russia was isolated, as she alone adhered to a policy of leniency.

England's hands were strengthened on July third by a note sent to all interested powers by the American Secretary of State. The situation in China was described as one of anarchy, and the policy of the United States was outlined as an endeavor to open up communication with Peking, to protect American life and property wherever possible, to "prevent a spread of the disorders to other provinces of the Empire", and to guard against "a recurrence of such disasters". The United States desired not only to bring peace to China, but to "preserve Chinese territorial and administrative integrity, to safeguard treaty rights, and to maintain the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire".¹ These aims being so much in line with those of England, Lord Salisbury "expressed himself most emphatically" as concurring "in the outlined policy of the United States".²

The attempt of Admiral Seymour ended in ignominious failure. The military prowess of the Chinese was held in such low repute that the possibility of their successfully resisting the advance of 2,000 European troops was never considered, so that when the Chinese did open fire and train service was interrupted, the Admiral proceeded to repair the road instead of saving time by marching directly to Peking.³ So determined was the attack that about three weeks later, June twenty-sixth, a defeated European army made its way back to Tientsin⁴ with the assistance of a relief force

¹ *Foreign Relations* (1900), Hay to Herdliska, July 3, 1900.

² *Ibid.*, p. 345, Choate to Hay, July 7, 1900.

³ Seymour, *op. cit.*, p. 344.

⁴ *China* # 3 (1900), no. 219, p. 84, Seymour to Admiralty, June 29, 1900.

from that city.¹ Sixty-two were killed and two hundred and twenty-eight were wounded.² On July eleventh Sir Claude MacDonald announced the interruption of telegraph service to Tientsin, but used a different route to advise Lord Salisbury that Boxers had attacked student interpreters close to the city walls, that soldiers had assaulted the Secretary of the Belgian legation, and that his own summer home had been burned.³ The following day he warned that Admiral Seymour might meet opposition,⁴ and on June fourteenth he reported that the Chancellor of the Japanese legation had been killed.⁵ With these messages the foreign colony in Peking was cut off from communication with the outside world, and the legations were left to defend themselves as best they could during hot weather in the crowded quarters of the British legation.

By this time Tientsin was in a perilous situation, as the Boxers were in practical control. Furthermore, the Chinese were reinforcing the Taku forts. Accordingly the Admirals decided to seize these forts, because it was felt that if they remained in China's possession an attempt to relieve the legations would perhaps be unsuccessful.⁶ An ultimatum was presented on the morning of June sixteenth summoning the Chinese commander to surrender by two o'clock the following morning.⁷ The latter, however, opened fire at one

¹ Morse, *International Relations*, vol. iii, p. 215.

² *China* # 3 (1900), no. 219, p. 84, Seymour to Admiralty, June 29, 1900.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 112, p. 51, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 11, 1900.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 116, p. 52, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 12, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 125, p. 55, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 14, 1900.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 131, p. 56, Carles to Salisbury, June 15, 1900; *Hansard*, vol. lxxxv, pp. 428-9, St. John Brodrick, July 3, 1909; *China* # 3 (1900), no. 132, p. 56, Carles to Salisbury, June 15, 1900; Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 436.

⁷ *China* # 1 (1901), incl. in no. 96, p. 83, Admirals to Commander of Taku forts, June 16, 1900.

o'clock,¹ whereupon the European Admirals seized the forts.² The Europeans' excuse for capturing the forts of a nation with whom they were not at war was, that they were in honor bound to rescue their fellow-countrymen whom the Chinese had imprisoned in Peking. On the other hand, the Chinese could truthfully claim that the foreigners' insistent demands for concessions had been one of the chief causes of the Boxer Movement.

The seizure of the forts produced a tremendous reaction. From that moment the Chinese Government, whose reactionary tendencies had been augmented on June tenth by the appointment to the Yamen of three notoriously anti-foreign members³ including Prince Tuan, an ardent Boxer devotee,⁴ considered itself at war with the invaders; and by Imperial Decree on the twenty-first resolved, after reviewing Western aggressions, that it was "better to do" its "utmost and enter on a struggle rather than seek some means of self-preservation involving eternal disgrace".⁵ The European representatives were notified on June nineteenth that hostilities had commenced, and were ordered to quit Peking within twenty-four hours. Baron von Ketteler, the only Minister who ventured to visit the Yamen for the purpose of remonstrating, was killed by an Imperial soldier.⁶ The Baron was probably the object of special wrath for having caned a Boxer several days previously and having led an expedition of German marines who killed twenty natives.⁷

¹ *China # 3 (1900)*, incl. in no. 154, p. 63, Commanding Officer of *Endymion* to Admiralty, June 18, 1900.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Foreign Relations (1900)*, p. 144, Conger to Hay, June 11, 1900.

⁴ *China # 4 (1900)*, no. 2, p. 10, MacDonald to Salisbury, June 21, 1900.

⁵ *Foreign Relations (1900)*, p. 168, Imperial Decree, June 21, 1900.

⁶ *China # 4 (1900)*, no. 2, p. 19, MacDonald to Salisbury, Sept. 20, 1900.

⁷ Putnam-Weale, *Indiscreet Letters from Peking*, pp. 44, 50-51.

The legations and any relief force sent to aid them had thereafter to count on opposition from Chinese Imperial troops as well as the Boxers.¹

Finding itself cut off from communication with its Peking Minister, the British Foreign Office strove to do two things: first, to rescue those besieged in the legation by any means and by whomsoever could accomplish the task with the greatest celerity; and, second, to prevent the spread of the disorders to the Yangtze Valley. Let us consider, in the order mentioned, how the Foreign Office set about to accomplish each of these objectives.

It must be remembered that when the Boxer Movement started, England had for eight months been waging war against the Boers in South Africa² and in June, 1900 had about 250,000 men there.³ The stubborn resistance which the Boers displayed made it inadvisable to divert any of this force to China, and Lord Roberts, British commander in South Africa, refused to do so,⁴ despite the fact that Johannesburg and Pretoria had been captured early in June⁵ and that the war against the Dutch republics was practically over.⁶ Consequently, England found it inconvenient to spare many British troops for Chinese service.⁷

The Foreign Office had, moreover, to cope with an intense anti-English sentiment throughout the entire continent and the United States, engendered by the spectacle of the

¹ Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

² Cross, A. L., *A Shorter History of England and Greater Britain*, p. 775.

³ *Hansard*, vol. lxxxv, p. 395.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *The Times*, June 4, 1900, June 7, 1900.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Leading article, June 7, 1900.

⁷ Lord Salisbury emphasized this point to Count Hatzfeldt on July third. *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi,² no. 4549, p. 36, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, July 3, 1900.

mighty British Empire fighting two insignificant republics.¹ The repeated defeats suffered by British regulars in South Africa had given rise to the belief that the English had lost the art of fighting.² Incapable of intervening in China single-handed, and being the object of almost universal hostility, Great Britain had of necessity to act cautiously and not unduly antagonize any other great power. 'It was exceedingly fortunate for England that in this emergency the Far Eastern interests of France, Germany, and the United States coincided with her own.

Such troops and naval forces as England could spare from her various Far Eastern stations were immediately ordered to northern China. On June eighth the Admiralty cabled Seymour to communicate with the commander at Hongkong and secure transportation for any troops he wanted to send north.³ Five days later 950 soldiers were en route.⁴ On June eighth, Lord Salisbury caused advice to be sent the War Office that all the troops which could be spared from Weihaiwei, Hongkong, and Singapore should be concentrated at Taku.⁵ From India 10,000 native troops were dispatched,⁶ but 5,000 of them were diverted to Shanghai to preserve order there. By July third there were 'nine' British warships at Taku.⁷

Of the other powers, only two could be expected to assemble quickly any appreciable number of troops in North

¹ *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, vol. iii, p. 271.

² Thayer, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 232.

³ *China* # 3 (1900), incl. in no. 88, p. 40, Admiralty to Seymour, June 8, 1900.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 123, p. 54, General Officer commanding Hongkong to War Office, June 13, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 92, p. 41, Foreign Office to War Office, June 8, 1900.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 189, p. 75, Salisbury to Scott, June 25, 1900.

⁷ *Hansard*, vol. lxxxv, p. 430, Brodrick's statement.

China, Russia (who could draw upon her garrisons at Port Arthur) and Japan. Naturally, England was rather anxious that friendly Japan should be the power to rescue the legations, because she could supply the larger number of troops, and the estimates of the forces necessary to capture Peking were being constantly increased.¹ While England might have allowed the Russians to rescue Sir Claude MacDonald, had they been the only ones in a position to do so, British opinion was by no means anxious for such a solution, as was evinced by the antagonism which *The Times* showed to a report that China had invited Russia to suppress the Boxers.² Consequently, the British Foreign Office displayed an urgent desire to have Japan act promptly.

Japan also was apprehensive of Russia's intentions. The Foreign Minister at Tokio on June thirteenth advised Mr. Whitehead, the English Minister, that Russia already had 2,700 troops at Taku, and intimated Japan's willingness to send a "considerable force" to the relief of Admiral Seymour provided England approved.³ When the Chancellor of the Japanese legation was killed at Peking,⁴ Lord Salisbury inquired on June fifteenth as to what action the Mikado's Government proposed to take.⁵ Japan's answer was to have 3,000 men en route to Taku by the twenty-second,⁶ but this was not the number England hoped to see dispatched.

¹ The British Admiral Bruce estimated that between 80,000 to 100,000 men would be necessary to ensure the capture of Peking, *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, p. 36, no. 4549, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, July 3, 1900. Count Aoki, Japanese Foreign Minister, thought 70,000 would be required, *China* # 3 (1900), no. 248, p. 97, Whitehead to Salisbury, July 4, 1900.

² *The Times*, Leading Article, June 7, 1900.

³ *China* # 3 (1900), no. 121, p. 54, Whitehead to Salisbury, June 13, 1900.

⁴ See p. 331.

⁵ *China* # 3 (1900), no. 134, p. 57, Salisbury to Whitehead, June 15, 1900.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 169, p. 68, Whitehead to Salisbury, June 22, 1900.

To an inquiry of the Japanese Minister at London, the Prime Minister replied that England's policy was to act with the other powers interested in the restoration of order.¹ But at that time Lord Salisbury was confident that Admiral Seymour's party would reach Peking.² Six days later, June twenty-second, when he realized that the relief party also was in danger, he urged Japan to send an additional force, intimating that "the urgency of immediate action and the favorable geographical situation of Japan" made "her intentions a very grave importance in this difficulty".³ An appeal was made on the same day to the United States,⁴ and in response 300 American marines were ordered from Manila.⁵

Japan, however, was cautious, being mindful of her 1895 experience,⁶ and upon Lord Salisbury's pointing out to the Japanese Chargé that Japan alone could effect immediate rescue of the legations, he was told that while Japan was willing to undertake the responsibility,⁷ "some assurances would be required that there was no objection on the part of other governments having interests in the Far East".⁸ Desiring to give Japan the utmost encouragement, Lord Salisbury explained to Russia the impossibility, in his opinion, of getting any other troops to China at an early date, and asked approval for the dispatch of 20,000 or 30,000

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 146, p. 60, Salisbury to Whitehead, June 16, 1900.

Ibid.

² *Ibid.*, no. 170, p. 69, Salisbury to Whitehead, June 22, 1900.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 171, p. 69, Salisbury to Pauncefote, June 22, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 178, p. 71, Pauncefote to Salisbury, June 23, 1900.

⁶ See p. 124.

⁷ *China # 3 (1900)*, incl. no. 2 in no. 236, p. 91, Memorandum of Berlin Foreign Office, June 28, 1900.

⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 190, p. 75, Salisbury to Whitehead, June 25, 1900.

Japanese soldiers to Peking.¹ England's desire to prevent a Russian army from invading China is shown by the fact that no inquiry was made as to how many troops the Russians could supply from Port Arthur² although it was known that Russia must have had a considerable army at that station.³ Count Lamsdorf indeed had anticipated the necessity of calling a Russian army from Port Arthur and calculated that it could be in Tientsin within two days.⁴ General Kuropatkjin⁵ confided to the German military *attaché* in St. Petersburg that Russia alone could straighten out the situation but would do nothing unless Europe or China requested it.⁶

To expedite Russia's acceptance of Japanese intervention, Lord Salisbury⁷ asked the German Government to use its influence with St. Petersburg.⁸ For several reasons, however, London's suggestion did not appeal to the Berlin Foreign Office. Among these were Emperor William's fear of the Yellow Peril,⁹ a desire to do nothing to antagonize

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 188, p. 75, Salisbury to Scott, June 25, 1900.

² *Ibid.*

³ July fourth Count Muravief spoke to Sir Charles Scott of 10,000 men being brought from Port Arthur to Taku, *China # 3* (1900), no. 42, p. 15, Scott to Salisbury, July 4, 1900.

⁴ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, p. 91, no. 4519, Tschirschky to Foreign Office, June 2, 1900.

⁵ Russian War Minister.

⁶ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, p. 24, no. 4537, Bülow to Kaiser, June 30, 1900.

⁷ Sir Frank Lascelles told Count Hatzfeldt that it was he (Sir Frank) who had suggested to Lord Salisbury the idea of bespeaking Germany's influence with Russia, *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, p. 20, no. 4532, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, June 26, 1900.

⁸ *China # 3* (1900), incl. no. 1 in no. 236, p. 91, Memorandum from British Embassy in Berlin, June 27, 1900.

⁹ "Es ist der Kampf Asiens gegen das ganze Europa," Kaiser to Bülow, *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, no. 4527, p. 14.

Russia,¹ a pride which demanded that the German Minister's death should be avenged by German troops,² and a fear that any action by Japan, backed up by England, might lead to hostilities with Russia.³ There was also a suspicion that England desired to involve Germany with her eastern neighbor.⁴

Hence, the German Government instead of complying with Lord Salisbury's request, really desired to strengthen Russia's probable objections to a Japanese advance by intimating to St. Petersburg that Germany still considered Chili in Russia's sphere.⁵

In an effort to overcome Germany's objections, Sir Frank Lascelles, on leave of absence in London, pointed out on June twenty-seventh to Count Hatzfeldt that Japan could not possibly demand⁶ special privileges in return for relieving the legations,⁷ while Lord Salisbury on the following day assured the Count that England would give Japan no guarantee of support against Russia.⁸ Nevertheless, Sir Frank, on July first, received a purposely evasive⁹ reply that

¹ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, no. 4535, p. 22, Bülow to Foreign Office, June 27, 1900.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xvi, no. 4527, p. 14, Kaiser to Bülow, June 19, 1900.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. xvi, no. 4528, p. 15, Bülow to Kaiser, June 19, 1900.

⁴ Although British officials were quite anxious to wean Germany from Russia, Lord Salisbury had not in mind that his suggestion of Japanese intervention would cause Russo-German friction.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 4528, p. 15, Bülow to Kaiser, June 19, 1900.

⁶ Sir Frank intimated that if such a demand were made, the British fleet would make its fulfilment impossible, *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, no. 4534, p. 21, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, June 27, 1900.

⁷ *Ibid.* Lord Salisbury was not so sure about this point, however, as he admitted to Count Hatzfeldt that Japan's intervention might be a danger to future peace, *ibid.*, vol. xvi, no. 4539, p. 26.

⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. xvi, no. 4532, p. 20, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, June 26, 1900.

⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. xvi, no. 4535, p. 22, Bülow to Foreign Office, June 27, 1900.

Germany was ignorant of the particulars of the proposed Japanese intervention and was consequently unable to judge whether the interests of other powers would be affected. Therefore Germany could not approve such action unless assured that it would not jeopardize the concert of powers.¹ This reply was transmitted to St. Petersburg² and elicited the sincere appreciation of the Russian Foreign Office.³

Before Russia signified her intentions regarding Japanese intervention, the Tokio Government asked all the interested powers what measures were considered and asseverated her desire to work in concert with the European nations.⁴ This conciliatory tone mollified Russia to the extent that her Foreign Office expressed appreciation and declared that she had no desire to hinder Japan's liberty of action.⁵ To the German Ambassador, Count Lamsdorf said that while no mandate could be given to Japan, Russia would "welcome all available forces which could be sent promptly by any power to act in accord and cooperation with the other powers".⁶

Despite this conciliatory tone, Russia had in fact rejected the proposition of Japanese intervention,⁷ for obviously the Tokio Government could not send 20,000 or 30,000 troops to China unless Russia, the country she feared most, gave an unequivocal assurance that she desired such action. Instead of giving such assurance or of asking Japan to send

¹ *China* # 3 (1900), p. 91, incl. no. 2 in no. 236, Memorandum of Berlin Foreign Office, June 28, 1900.

² *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, footnote, p. 28.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 4542, p. 29, Lamsdorf to Osten-Sacken, July 1, 1900.

⁴ *Foreign Relations* (1900), p. 367, Memorandum of Japanese Chargé at Washington, June 25, 1900.

⁵ *China* # 3 (1900), p. 81, no. 210, Scott to Salisbury, June 28, 1900.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 238, p. 92, Scott to Salisbury, July 3, 1900.

⁷ It was so interpreted by Lord Salisbury, *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, no. 4549, p. 36, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, July 3, 1900.

her troops, Russia merely proclaimed her disinclination to hinder her rival's liberty of action—which is quite another thing. Naturally Japan hesitated. On the other hand, the future conduct of the Tokio diplomats proved the prescience of the Russians in insisting upon a preliminary understanding as to what Japan was to expect in return for her labors.

The British Foreign Office, however, was inclined to magnify the fact that neither Russia nor Germany had definitely stated that Japanese troops would be undesirable¹ and continued to urge the Tokio Government to action. A particularly gloomy report of the Peking situation having been cabled by Admiral Bruce,² Lord Salisbury asked Mr. Whitehead on July second to ascertain whether Japan intended to take "any additional measures".³ Tokio considered, however, that she had not yet been sufficiently assured that she would "be protected from complications" and "reasonably indemnified for outlay of money and men".⁴

In vain did Lord Salisbury warn Japan of her "heavy responsibility".⁵ In vain did he offer financial reimbursement.⁶ The one assurance which might have stirred Japan to action—namely, that England would stand back of Japan if attacked—was lacking because the political situation already explained,⁷ precluded Great Britain from making any such promise. Nor does Lord Salisbury seem to have sug-

¹ *Hansard*, vol. lxxxv, Brodrick to House, July 6, 1900, p. 774.

² *China # 3* (1900), p. 89, incl. in no. 231, Bruce to Admiralty, July 1, 1900.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 235, p. 90, Salisbury to Whitehead, July 2, 1900.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 260, p. 100, Whitehead to Salisbury, July 5, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 265, p. 102, Salisbury to Whitehead, July 6, 1900.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 266, p. 102, Salisbury to Whitehead, July 6, 1900. One million pounds were offered if Japan would send 20,000 troops to China, *China # 1* (1901), no. 32.

⁷ See p. 333.

gested that Tokio publicly renounce any desire for special privileges should her troops intervene, which declaration would of course have removed Russia's ostensible objections.

Despite these repeated failures, Lord Salisbury did not give up his efforts to induce Japan to act. He encouraged her by advising both Russia¹ and France² that his Government had recommended prompt movement of troops. Paris, in reply, expressed the hope that Japan would dispatch the regiments she had mobilized³ while St. Petersburg approved the dispatch of Japanese troops, provided there were no attempts to secure special privileges.⁴

On July tenth the British Prime Minister told the Japanese Chargé that the English officials estimated that 40,000 to 50,000 men would be needed to capture Peking. Such a European force would not be available until the end of August, when it would be too late to relieve the legations. Furthermore, it would be most difficult to commence operations at that time due to the rainy season.⁵ "The opportunity of effective intervention", warned Lord Salisbury, "now lay with Japan".⁶ These importunities mollified Japan to the extent of sending additional troops⁷ but not a force sufficiently large for an advance on Peking. She had, however, received enough encouragement to cause her to mobilize 20,000 men⁸ who would be available for immediate

¹ *China* # 3 (1900), no. 269, p. 102, Salisbury to Scott, July 6, 1900.

² *Ibid.*, no. 268, p. 102, Salisbury to Monson, July 6, 1900.

³ *China* # 1 (1901), no. 13, p. 6, Monson to Salisbury, July 5, 1900.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 18, p. 8, Scott to Salisbury, July 8, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 22, p. 9, Salisbury to Whitehead, July 10, 1900.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 17, p. 8, Whitehead to Salisbury, July 8, 1900; no. 23, p. 9, Whitehead to Salisbury, July 11, 1900.

⁸ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, no. 4554, p. 43.

shipment to China whenever desired, and the European powers were notified accordingly.¹

"On July thirteenth the Russian Government advised all interested European powers of her attitude regarding Japanese intervention and indicated that St. Petersburg interpreted the British request as possibly implying, that Japan should receive a mandate not only to capture Peking but also to restore order.² Lord Salisbury hastened to advise everybody concerned that he intended Japan, to merely rescue the besieged Ministers without thereby acquiring any special privileges.³ Count Lamsdorf assured Sir Charles Scott that he had only desired to point out that certain expressions in the original request might be interpreted as mandatory—for example, the words "an expedition to restore order at Peking and Tientsin if Japan is willing to undertake the task".⁴

Despite these efforts Lord Salisbury failed in his attempts to have Japan supply troops in such numbers that an immediate effort could be made to relieve the legations in June or July. For this failure much responsibility must rest with Russia and Germany, for it is reasonable to assume that had the governments of those two countries given Japan as much encouragement as had England,⁵ the legations would have been relieved early in July and the world would have been spared at least one month of anxiety.

That Russia was inclined to take the matter philosophically is indicated in Count Lamsdorf's nonchalant assurance to the German Ambassador that every revolution had its

¹ *Ibid.*

² *China # 1* (1901), no. 29, p. 10, Lamsdorf to Lessar, July 13, 1900.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 41, p. 15, Salisbury to Scott, July 15, 1900.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 63, p. 32, Salisbury to Scott, July 22, 1900.

⁵ The United States and France supported the proposition of Japanese intervention in China, *ibid.*, no. 4, p. 2.

victims,¹ while the German military attaché at St. Petersburg gathered the impression from General Kuropatkin that the Russian Government subordinated the rescue of the legations to "considerations of higher policy".² The St. Petersburg Government was in fact against a march of an allied army to Peking, as that city was considered to fall in the Russian sphere of influence.³

Russia's lack of enthusiasm for Japanese intervention was quite natural. The Mikado's Empire was the Czar's Far Eastern enemy and England's potential ally. If Russia gave Japan little encouragement to send her troops to China, England gave St. Petersburg no word that a Russian army from Port Arthur would be welcome. Thus, the real reason for Lord Salisbury's failure lay not entirely in Russia's obstructive tactics, as is frequently charged, but had its deeper roots in the much wider field of Anglo-Russian antagonism.

The second objective of Great Britain was, as we have noted, to confine the Boxer Movement to North China.⁴ Consul Warren at Shanghai first intimated on June fourteenth that there was a possibility of getting the Hankow and Nanking Viceroys to keep peace in their districts provided they secured "effective support" from England.⁵ The next day assurance was cabled that British ships would cooperate,⁶ and Admiral Bruce was ordered to take "ade-

¹ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, no. 4544, p. 30, Tschirschky to Foreign Office, July 2, 1900.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xvi, no. 4548, p. 34, Richthofen to Bülow, July 4, 1900. Germany did not approve this Russian attitude, and because of it, considered throwing her support to England on the question of Japanese intervention.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. xvi, no. 4573, p. 57, Bülow to Kaiser, July 18, 1900.

⁴ See p. 333.

⁵ *China* # 3 (1900), no. 128, p. 55, Warren to Salisbury, June 14, 1900.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 138, p. 57, Salisbury to Warren, June 15, 1900.

quate measures for 'protecting life and property on the Yangtze.'¹

This assistance was gratefully acknowledged by the Viceroy, who professed their ability to keep peace provided there were no naval demonstrations on the Yangtze.² This condition was granted by the British Government, and Her Majesty's ships were ordered to "avoid any demonstrations" but to "be ready to cooperate" with the Viceroy's whenever cooperation became "necessary for the protection of the lives and property of Europeans, or to support the measures taken by the Viceroy for the maintenance of order".³ It was decided, however, not to reduce naval strength on the Yangtze, and instructions were issued to send a warship to each treaty port.⁴

The cordial spirit these Chinese officials showed to foreign Consuls during June and July would seem to indicate that they did not deprecate foreign demonstrations merely to rid their districts of Europeans, but in an honest effort to maintain order and in the belief that this could not be done if warships frightened the people.⁵ This fact throws into relief the important part the foreign demands for concessions and the like had played in bringing about the Boxer Movement in the north.⁶

The Viceroy later endeavored to secure England's adherence to a number of other regulations regarding the

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 130, p. 56, Admiralty to Bruce, June 15, 1900.

² *Ibid.*, no. 153, p. 63, Memorandum of Chinese Minister, June 19, 1900; no. 156, p. 64, Commanding Officer of *Hermione* to Admiralty, June 19, 1900.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 162, p. 66, Foreign Office to Admiralty, June 20, 1900.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 166, p. 67, Foreign Office to Admiralty, June 21, 1900.

⁵ Steiger, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

movements of foreign navies and troops in South China,¹ but Lord Salisbury refused to be so bound, desiring to judge each case on its merits.² Promise was given, however, not to land any force in the Yangtze Valley so long as the Viceroy maintained the "rights of foreigners in their provinces provided for by the treaties with the Government of China",³ and assurance was reiterated that England deprecated any partition of Chinese territory.⁴

England's policy was to conciliate the southern Viceroy in every possible way. When they asked on June twenty-seventh that all Chinese territory save the districts in which fighting was actually in progress should be considered neutral territory, compliance was granted in the form of a declaration of the Far Eastern Admirals to the effect that the Europeans would attack only the Boxers and those who opposed foreign forces sent to the relief of the legations.⁵ A proclamation was issued on the same day by the Shanghai Consular body to the effect that the foreign warships were not in the Yangtze for any hostile purpose.⁶ When Li Hung Chang was summoned to Peking on June twenty-second by the Empress Dowager,⁷ England not only encouraged Li to go⁸ in the hope that he might bring order out of chaos,⁹

¹ *China # 1 (1901)*, no. 1, p. 1, Lofengluh to Salisbury, June 29, 1900.

² *Ibid.*, no. 9, p. 4, Memorandum by Lord Salisbury, July 5, 1900.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 30, p. 12, Warren to Salisbury, July 13, 1900.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 40, p. 14, Salisbury to Warren, July 15, 1900.

⁵ *China # 3 (1900)*, no. 199, p. 79, Warren to Salisbury, June 27, 1900.

⁶ *China # 1 (1901)*, incl. in no. 125, p. 59, Proclamation to Chinese by Shanghai Consular Body.

⁷ *China # 3 (1900)*, no. 195, p. 76, Lofengluh to Salisbury, June 26, 1900.

⁸ Lord Salisbury later changed his mind about Li being able to restore order in Peking and hence subsequently—July fourteenth—suggested that he remain at Canton. *China # 1 (1901)*, no. 35, p. 15, Salisbury to Scott, July 14, 1900.

⁹ *China # 3 (1900)*, no. 173, p. 69, Salisbury to Scott, June 22, 1900.

but also offered to stop all military operations on receipt of assurance from Sir Claude MacDonald that he and the other besieged British subjects were well.¹

On June twenty-ninth the foreign Consuls at Tientsin suggested that China be informed that the Imperial Mausoleums would be destroyed if the foreign Ministers were harmed.² Although advised of Germany's opinion that to refuse this proposal would be assuming a great responsibility,³ Lord Salisbury raised objections because he felt that English public opinion would not approve,⁴ and in any event, he thought that it would be impolitic to undertake a long military advance to the Imperial Mausoleums at Mukden.⁵

A better plan, in Lord Salisbury's opinion, although he did not expect much of it,⁶ would be to advise the Chinese Government that all authorities in Peking, both great and small, would "be held responsible in person and property" for "any act of violence" against the legations.⁷ This idea was imparted to Germany on July second and two days later the French Foreign Office made a similar suggestion to the interested powers.⁸ Germany, anxious to preserve the concert of powers, gave consent on July fifth, although her

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 198, p. 78, Salisbury to MacDonald, June 26, 1900.

² *Ibid.*, no. 220, p. 85, Carles to Salisbury, June 29, 1900.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 232. Although the Berlin Foreign Office gave the British Ambassador the impression that Germany desired to threaten the demolition of the graves, the German documents indicate that even they were not enthusiastic and that the Kaiser was very much opposed, *D. G. P.*, no. 4550.

⁴ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, no. 4539, p. 26, Bulow to Kaiser, July 1, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 4549, p. 36, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, July 3, 1900; *China # 3* (1900), no. 233, p. 90, Salisbury to Gough, July 2, 1900.

⁶ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, no. 4549, p. 36.

⁷ *China # 3* (1900), no. 234, p. 90, Salisbury to Gough, July 2, 1900.

⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 247, p. 96, Monson to Salisbury, July 4, 1900.

officials told Viscount Gough¹ that they did not anticipate the step would prove itself efficacious.² The same day Lord Salisbury transmitted the British warning through Consul Warren.³

Another friendly gesture on England's part was the approval of a loan of £75,000 to the Viceroy of Wuchung⁴ so that he would be able to pay his troops and thereby prevent their causing disturbances.⁵ By this loan, however, England was really helping a friendly Chinese official who was striving to maintain the peaceful conditions without which British trade could not thrive.⁶

Despite the agreement with the Yangtze Viceroys, fears began to be entertained about the middle of July that Boxer activities might spread to South China, and that perhaps it would be advisable to have a European force on hand in case of trouble.⁷ Alarming reports from Consul Warren⁸ caused consultations between the Foreign and India Offices,⁹ with the result that General Gaselee, then en route from India to Taku with ten thousand native troops, was ordered

¹ British Ambassador at Berlin.

² *China # 1 (1901)*, incl. in no. 15, p. 7, Memorandum to Berlin Foreign Office, July 5, 1900.

³ *China # 3 (1900)*, no. 257, p. 99, Salisbury to Warren, July 5, 1900.

⁴ *China # 1 (1901)*, no. 161, p. 71, Salisbury to Warren, Aug. 10, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 118, p. 54, Warren to Salisbury, Aug. 5, 1900.

⁶ "It is most important to strengthen the Viceroys in their present position, for if they were overthrown, the result would be a rising, the suppression of which would involve the expenditure of much time and the employment of large forces, and this would be inevitably followed by the partition of China." *China # 3 (1900)*, no. 144, p. 66, Consul Warren to Salisbury, Aug. 9, 1900.

⁷ *China # 1 (1901)*, no. 42, p. 15, Scott to Salisbury, July 15, 1900.

⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 43, p. 17, Warren to Salisbury, July 17, 1900; no. 36, p. 13, Warren to Salisbury, July 14, 1900.

⁹ *Ibid.*, no. 49, p. 18, Foreign Office to India Office, July 17, 1900.

to put in at Shanghai and "divert such troops as seem absolutely necessary for its defense".¹

- This action would seem to indicate that the British Government had more interest in maintaining tranquility in the commercial domain of the Yangtze than in rescuing those in the legations at Peking. Still it must be remembered that the trade of the Yangtze Valley was so vitally important to England that it must be safeguarded if humanly possible. This was pointed out by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation on July twenty-ninth when it vigorously called the attention of the Foreign Office to the disaster which would overtake England's commerce should Shanghai fall a victim to the disturbances then ravaging China.²

Although Gaselee³ advised disembarking three thousand troops at Shanghai, Lord Salisbury, before approving, cabled Consul Warren on July twenty-fourth⁴ to ascertain the local Viceroy's probable attitude toward this action.⁵ His consent was given, albeit grudgingly,⁶ several days later,⁷ but protests came from Japan,⁸ France,⁹ and a number of

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 50, p. 19, India Office to Foreign Office, 5 July 18, 1900.

² "In fact there would be few homes in the United Kingdom which would not suffer either directly or indirectly from the fall of Shanghai." *Ibid.*, no. 89, p. 39, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation to Foreign Office, July 29, 1900.

³ Admiral Seymour approved July 31, 1900, *ibid.*, no. 94, p. 44, Admiralty to Seymour, July 30, 1900.

⁴ The Blue Book shows the date as July twenty-seventh, but its context and location, coupled with Consul Warren's reply, would indicate that it is a misprint for the twenty-fourth.

⁵ *China # 1 (1901)*, no. 68, p. 28, Salisbury to Warren, July 27, 1900.

⁶ Admiral Seymour reported that the Viceroy saw no reason for landing troops at Shanghai, *ibid.*, incl. in no. 104, p. 48, Seymour to Admiralty, Aug. 3, 1900.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 145, p. 66, Whitehead to Salisbury, Aug. 9, 1900.

⁹ *Ibid.*, no. 178, p. 75, Salisbury to Warren, Aug. 12, 1900.

other Viceroys,¹ which caused Lord Salisbury on August twelfth to issue orders that the troops were not to be landed at Shanghai until further orders from London.² Upon receipt of word from the Viceroy of Nanking on August fifteenth that arrangements had been made regarding the landing of "several hundred troops at Shanghai",³ Lord Salisbury on the following day advised Consul Warren that the Admiral had been authorized to disembark troops with the approval of the Chinese authorities.⁴

The Prime Minister was likewise careful not to antagonize Germany. The Berlin Foreign Office had early seen the necessity for choosing a general to command the allied forces in China and had thought that Anglo-Russian antagonism might cause this honor to fall to Germany.⁵ About the middle of July, Baron Holstein wrote Count Hatzfeldt that the Emperor was very anxious about this matter,⁶ and the Ambassador promised to do his best to show Lord Salisbury that it was to England's own advantage to have a German general as commander in China.⁷ All this was to be done unofficially as the German diplomats were anxious to have the matter first brought up by London.⁸

The Prime Minister was not personally desirous of placing British troops under any foreign commander⁹ and had

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 162, p. 71, Salisbury to Warren, Aug. 10, 1900; no. 166, p. 72, Viceroys to Lofenglüh, Aug. 10, 1900.

² *Ibid.*, no. 180, p. 76, Salisbury to Warren, Aug. 12, 1900.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 201, p. 89, Viceroy of Nanking to Lofenglüh, Aug. 15, 1900.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 208, p. 92, Salisbury to Warren, Aug. 16, 1900.

⁵ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, no. 4528, p. 15, Bülow to Kaiser, July 19, 1900; no. 4529, p. 18, Bülow to Foreign Office, June 22, 1900.

⁶ Eckardstein, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. ii, p. 189.

⁷ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, no. 4578, p. 60, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, July 20, 1900.

⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 4584, p. 66, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, July 21, 1900.

⁹ Eckardstein, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. ii, p. 187.

told the French Ambassador in London that such a course would not be considered.¹ His opposition was further indicated when he intimated to the cabinet on July nineteen.h that he wanted to think the matter over,² although Mr. Balfour was agreeable to suggesting a German suprémé command.³

Several days later Lord Salisbury's Private Secretary, Mr. Barrington, told Count Hatzfeldt that the Prime Minister would like to know if Germany would accept the supreme command, whereupon the Ambassador replied that if England made the suggestion and the other powers agreed, Emperor William could not reject a task given him by Europe.⁴ Still Lord Salisbury hesitated, as he wanted England to control all military operations in the Yangtze Valley.⁵ With this in mind he suggested to Russia that each country operate individually in its respective sphere and that the supreme commander have charge only of the relief army from Tientsin to Peking.⁶ This was obviously an attempt to compromise, as some agrément was necessary, Russia having indicated that she would not accept an English superior officer⁷ and France being likewise against a British general because of the latter's poor showing in South Africa.⁸ Germany also opposed English military control, the Kaiser being influenced by the failure of Admiral Sey-

¹ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, no. 4574, p. 58, Derenthall to Hatzfeldt, July 18, 1900.

² *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, no. 4578, p. 60, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, July 20, 1900.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 4579, p. 62, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, July 20, 1900.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 4584, p. 66, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, July 21, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. xvi, no. 4590, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, July 27, 1900.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 4580, Bülow to Hatzfeldt, July 21, 1900.

⁸ *Ibid.*

mour¹ as well as his extreme desire to secure the supreme command for a German. Lord Salisbury was sagacious enough to appreciate this opposition and rejected² all efforts of the military men to force his hand in favor of General Wolseley.³

The British Foreign Office still temporized, pointing out to Germany that a unified command was necessary neither in 1815 nor in the Crimean War,⁴ and that British public opinion was decidedly averse to placing English troops under foreign officers.⁵

Unable to move Lord Salisbury, the Kaiser on August sixth sent a personal telegram to the Czar asking his opinion, and suggesting that Count Waldersee was available.⁶ The Russian Monarch was quite agreeable to this⁷ but adopted the British Prime Minister's compromise by specifying that Count Waldersee would have charge of the troops in the Province of Chili only.⁸

Germany the next day, August eighth, abandoned her previous policy of hinting, and advised England of Russia's approval and officially inquired as to England's attitude.⁹ To assist Count Hatzfeldt in securing Lord Salisbury's acquiescence, it was intimated that Russia and France were

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. xvi, footnote, p. 74.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xvi, no. 4592, p. 73, Derenthall to Bülow, July 29, 1900; no. 4596, p. 75, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, July 31, 1900.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 4595, p. 75, Derenthall to Hatzfeldt, July 31, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. xvi, no. 4596, p. 75, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, July 31, 1900.

⁶ *Ibid.*, footnote, p. 82.

⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 4604, p. 83, Kaiser to Bülow, Aug. 6, 1900.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, no. 4604, p. 84, Derenthall to Hatzfeldt, Aug. 7, 1900; *China* # 1 (1901), no. 128, p. 60, Lascelles to Salisbury, Aug. 7, 1900.

using this opportunity to again revive the Far Eastern Triple Alliance,¹ which in 1895 had caused such a diminution of England's prestige.² The Ambassador was further told that England's approval was not absolutely necessary as Russia, Japan, and France, all of whom either had placed or would shortly place their troops under the command of Count Waldersee, were sufficient to take care of the Peking difficulty.³

The British Foreign Office was considerably disturbed by Germany's request, but Lord Salisbury was finally won over by the favorable attitude of Sir Frank Lascelles, Mr. Balfour, the Duke of Devonshire, and Lord Lansdowne.⁴ On August tenth, after the Kaiser had sent a personal appeal to the Prince of Wales,⁵ Lord Salisbury acquiesced and officially advised Germany that England would view the selection of Count Waldersee "with great satisfaction."

Despite these pleasant words and Germany's polite thanks, England accepted the supreme command grudgingly⁶ only when she could not safely do otherwise and after she had

¹ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, no. 4604, p. 84, Derenthall to Hatzfeldt, Aug. 7, 1900.

² See p. 124.

³ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, no. 4604, p. 84, Derenthall to Hatzfeldt, Aug. 7, 1900.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. xvi, footnote, p. 88.

⁵ Lee, Sir Sidney, *Life of Edward VII*, vol. i, p. 789.

⁶ *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, no. 4607, p. 88, Lascelles to Derenthall, Aug. 10, 1900.

⁷ *China # 1* (1900), no. 185, p. 77, Lascelles to Salisbury, Aug. 10, 1900.

⁸ "The English Government, while raising no objection to the German Field Marshall's appointment, proved rather more backward than the other powers in carrying out the complemental arrangements." Lee, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 789. Sir Sidney's statement should be qualified by saying that France was even more backward than England in this matter.

aroused the Kaiser's wrath¹ over her "unfriendly attitude".² Still, by limiting Count Waldersee's control to the Province of Chili, Lord Salisbury had preserved the Yangtze Valley for England's individual action and had prevented the appointment of a Russian commander.³

Meanwhile, no official news had been received from Sir Claude MacDonald, and the Foreign Office gave credence to false rumors that foreigners in Peking⁴ had been murdered.⁵ Even when Secretary Hay on July twenty-second managed to secure a cipher message from the American representative, Mr. Conger,⁶ the British Foreign Office officials disbelieved its authenticity⁷ on the grounds that the Boxers, having entered the legations, would be in possession of the American diplomatic code. It was not until Mr. Conger sent a second message, in which he mentioned his sister's name⁸ at Secretary Hay's request,⁹ that it was finally realized that the foreign colony was still alive in Peking and that only immediate action could save them.

It was then decided to march upon Peking with whatever forces were available at Taku, and a start was made on August fourth.¹⁰ Instead of the 40,000 to 70,000 men with

¹ Bülow wrote the Foreign Office at Berlin that London offered the chief opposition to Count Waldersee. *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, no. 4608, p. 78, Bülow to Foreign Office, Aug. 10, 1900.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xvi, no. 4589, p. 78, Bülow to Foreign Office, Aug. 3, 1900.

³ *Ibid.*, Bülow to Russian Ambassador, July 25, 1900, footnote, p. 70.

⁴ *The Times*, July 14, 1900.

⁵ *Hansard*, vol. lxxxvi, p. 58, Mr. Brodrick's Statement, July 16, 1900.

⁶ *Foreign Relations* (1900), p. 156, Conger to Hay, July 21, 1900.

⁷ *Hansard*, vol. lxxxvi, p. 851, Mr. Brodrick's statement. Ambassador Choate reported to Secretary Hay that Lord Salisbury was not impressed, *Foreign Relations* (1900), p. 345, Choate to Hay, July 25, 1900.

⁸ *Foreign Relations* (1900), p. 157, Conger to Hay, Aug. 3, 1900.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 156, Hay to Conger, July 21, 1900.

¹⁰ Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 454.

which the powers had hoped to explain to the Chinese Government that the persons of foreign representatives were inviolable, just 18,800 were in the second relief force.¹

Various unsuccessful efforts were made by the Chinese to keep this army out of Peking by negotiation. Li Hung Chang on August fifth called Lord Salisbury's attention² to an Imperial Edict issued three days previously indicating that the Yamen was prepared to escort the representatives to Tientsin.³ Fortunately, a telegram was received from Sir Claude MacDonald dated August seventh, which showed not only the plight in which the legations were, but also the futility of trying to get to Tientsin without a European escort.⁴ Five days later he expressed the hope that relief would not be delayed by negotiations.⁵ Consequently, Lord Salisbury was in no mood for temporizing but, on the other hand, he had to consider the possibility that on the advance of the relief force the Boxers would slay the besieged Europeans.⁶

Hence the British Prime Minister sought to ascertain the views of the other governments on the subject.⁷ Japan,⁸ Italy,⁹ and the United States¹⁰ felt that negotiations should be undertaken for the purpose of allowing the relief army peacefully to pass into Peking and escort the besieged to

¹ Clements, *op. cit.*, p. 135, 8,000 Japanese, 4,500 Russians, 3,000 British, 2,500 Americans, and 800 French.

² *China # 1* (1900), no. 132, p. 62, Li Hung Chang to Lofengluh, Aug. 5, 1900.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 131, p. 61, Imperial Edict, Aug. 2, 1900.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 135, p. 62, MacDonald to Salisbury, Aug. 7, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 176, p. 75, MacDonald to Salisbury, Aug. 8, 1900.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 168, p. 73, Memorandum of Japanese Minister, Aug. 11, 1900.

⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 148, p. 67, Salisbury to Monson, Aug. 9, 1900.

⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 168, p. 73, Memorandum of Japanese Minister, Aug. 11, 1900.

⁹ *Ibid.*, no. 157, p. 69, Durrie to Salisbury, Aug. 11, 1900.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, no. 156, p. 69, Paunceforte to Salisbury, Aug. 10, 1900.

Tientsin. Russia was not opposed to this course,¹ but thought that the Yamen might specify in detail what measures of precaution they proposed to take in carrying out their suggestion of conveying the Ministers to Tientsin under a Chinese guard.² If considered unsatisfactory by the Powers, negotiations for the advance of the allied force under a flag of truce might be arranged.³ France, however, was of the opinion that the plight of the legations would admit of no other alternative than marching straight to Peking.⁴

Lord Salisbury adopted Russia's view,⁵ that if the Yamen could supply a Chinese escort satisfactory to the Peking Ministers, he would approve their being so conducted to the city walls to be met by foreign troops who had advanced under a white flag.⁶ On their part the Chinese would be expected to provision the legations and immediately relieve them from their perilous position.⁷ Lord Salisbury was, with the exception of Count Lamsdorf, the only major Foreign Minister who would even consider this solution of the difficulty. Hence, the relief force was ordered to advance on Peking.

So swift was the advance of the second relief force that before these negotiations could be completed, Peking was captured on August fourteenth,⁸ and freedom was given to a band of Europeans and native converts, who, under the military direction of the British Minister,⁹ had for almost

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 160, p. 70, Scott to Salisbury, Aug. 10, 1900.

² *Ibid.*, no. 191, p. 80, Salisbury to Scott, Aug. 13, 1900.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 170, p. 73, Monson to Salisbury, Aug. 11, 1900.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 191, p. 80, Salisbury to Scott, Aug. 13, 1900.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 183, p. 76, Bertie to Lofengluh, Aug. 12, 1900; no. 189, p. 79, Salisbury to MacDonald, Aug. 13, 1900.

⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 189, p. 79, Salisbury to MacDonald, Aug. 13, 1900.

⁸ Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 432.

⁹ Sir Claude had been of assistance to the relief party by sending the

two months defended themselves with courageous fortitude,¹ while Foreign Ministers had been discussing by whom and in what manner their liberation was to be effected.

It was then known how hard-pressed the legation had been—how they had vainly looked anxiously for Admiral Seymour²—how they had been spared in some miraculous manner from the fire of the Chinese heavy artillery, probably through the instrumentality of Jung Lu's far-sighted refusal to allow it to be used³—and how on the evening prior to their liberation, they had undergone the most vigorous attack yet experienced.⁴

The part played by the British in rescuing the besieged is on the whole creditable. They had striven, from the moment they were apprised of the danger, to relieve the legations; they had sought to avoid arousing the antagonism of any European power; they had endeavored to refrain from wounding the susceptibilities of Chinese officials both in the north and in the south. Most important of all, the British commander in the Far East, in collaboration with his American colleague,⁵ was largely responsible for the precipitous advance of August fourth, which effected a rescue while the German Foreign Office was arranging to send Count Waldersee to lead the relief force,⁶ and while the Russian Far

British commander (General Gaselee) a note by messenger on August fifth, to advance by the water gate which was less secure. (His letter is given in Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 416.)

¹ The best accounts of the siege are: Hart, R., *These from the Land of Sinim*; Smith, A. H., *China in Convulsion*; Putnam-Weale, B. L., *Indiscreet Letters from Peking*; Allen, R., *The Siege of the Peking Legations*; Thompson, H. C., *China and the Powers*; Savage-Landor, A., *China and the Allies*.

² Hart, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-32.

³ Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 451; Treat, *op. cit.*, p. 348.

⁴ Savage-Landor, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 167-170.

⁵ Treat, *op. cit.*, p. 350; Morse, vol. iii, p. 268.

⁶ Berlin did not want the second relief force started until reinforce-

Eastern commander had instructions not to advance without orders from St. Petersburg.¹

THE SITUATION IS SUMMED UP

From the foregoing narrative, it will be apparent that England was faced with a difficult problem during the years 1894-1900. Her Far Eastern trade was threatened, and it seemed probable that she would lose the commercial supremacy which it had taken over two hundred years to build up. England's commerce is her means of sustenance. Take away her markets and her factories will close. Close her factories and she is faced with ruin.

That fundamental fact must be kept in mind constantly if one would understand Britain's Far Eastern policy during the years under review. England was sympathetic to China at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War because her Chinese trade was rapidly increasing, and, therefore, she was apprehensive of anything that would alter the situation. Japan seemed bent upon changing the situation. Consequently, England was unfavorable to Japan.

England's sympathy, however, shifted to Japan just as soon as the Mikado's Government obtained from China con-

ments from Germany and Russia had reached China. A second defeat, they thought, would only still further endanger those besieged in Peking, *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi, no. 4547, p. 33. The Kaiser thought that the second half of September was the earliest time an advance could be made. *Ibid.*, no. 4594, p. 74. The Foreign Office was, however, agreeable to joining any earlier expedition started by other powers. *Ibid.*, no. 4597, p. 77.

¹ "The march to Peking was a surprise to Count Lamsdorf. Kuropatkin continued to assure us that Peking could not be taken now, that the operations would not commence before September, and only when a sufficiently large number of troops were available." *Mémoires du Comte Witte*, Rousseau, p. 97. Lamsdorf told Ambassador Scott on August thirteenth, that the rumors of an allied advance must be merely a "preparatory reconnaissance." *China* # 1 (1901), no. 244, p. 106, Scott to Salisbury, Aug. 13, 1900.

cessions which would enable British merchants to secure more trade in the Celestial Kingdom. England discovered that Tokio was pursuing a policy of forcing the Peking Government to admit more foreign goods. At the same time England realized that progressive Japan with forty millions of people represented a potential market which could not be ignored. Consequently, England made a *volte-face*, deserted China, and cultivated Japan's friendship.

China naturally resented England's attitude. She was angered at being deserted by a nation that had posed as her friend for years. Russia desired to befriend China partly because such action might enable her to win Manchuria. She was, furthermore, alarmed at the sudden rise of such a strong military power as Japan seemed to be. St. Petersburg had to oppose Japan, and the best method of thwarting Japan was to befriend China. Consequently, Russia befriended China, not because of any interest in the welfare of the Celestial Kingdom, but solely because it suited her own interests to do so.

Of course the reasons why Russia protected China in 1895 were of little consequence to Oriental statesmen. The main point was that China secured Russia's help and also that of Russia's friends, France and Germany. The intervention of those three powers stood out in glaring contrast to the inactivity of England. The significance of the three-power intervention lies in the fact that it suited the interests of Russia, Germany, and France to intervene, and it suited the interests of England to remain aloof. It was simply England's misfortune that her interests made it necessary for her to desert China and lose her friendship. The history of the years 1895 to 1900 in the Far East is, therefore, the history of England's efforts to regain China's friendship and to restore her injured prestige.

Russia was quick to understand that the Far Eastern

situation had altered to England's disadvantage. She realized that there was an opportunity to injure Britain's prestige, and she seized it. Her ally, France, joined hands with St. Petersburg, and England was confronted in the Far East with the united opposition of the Dual Alliance.

It is important to remember that the Far Eastern difficulties between England on the one hand, and Russia and France on the other, were merely a part of the antagonism which existed between those nations in all parts of Asia. Russia was the enemy of England because Downing Street did not trust St. Petersburg and feared Russian aggression upon India. Consequently, Russia was opposed by England wherever she advanced. The Far Eastern antagonism, therefore, was merely an aspect of that larger quarrel between Russia and Great Britain, which was manifest throughout Asia.

Having to cope with Russia, England had, perforce, to cultivate the friendship of Germany. Consequently, Downing Street placed few obstacles in the way of Germany's expansion in the Far East. Few objections were raised in Britain when German warships entered Kiao-Chow and raised the German flag in November, 1897. Great Britain, *per contra*, seemed pleased because she hoped that Berlin would be inclined to oppose Russia's advances into China. Later, when England leased Weihaiwei in April, 1898, Downing Street clearly showed that such action was not in any way hostile to Germany.

It was quite another matter, however, when Russia leased Port Arthur. Russia, the enemy, was not given the same privileges as Germany, the potential friend. Therefore, England vigorously opposed Russia at Port Arthur, but welcomed Germany to Kiao-Chow. It may be said that the reason for this different treatment lies in the fact that Port Arthur, unlike Kiao-Chow, is a naval station which domi-

nates Peking. Is it conceivable, however, that London would have welcomed Russia to Kiao-Chow? The present writer thinks not. He is of the opinion that Russian acquisition of the latter port would have been opposed vigorously by Great Britain.

England was a bit inconsistent when she leased Weihaiwei. Nevertheless, Britain was not anxious to dismember China, as it was not to her interest commercially to do so. But she was anxious to prevent her enemy, Russia, from getting a paramount control over Peking. Her prestige would have been ruined had she allowed Russia to take Port Arthur without making some counter move. A diminution of commerce would have been a concomitant of a loss of prestige. To prevent that eventuality England leased Weihaiwei, almost against her will. She felt sorry for China, but she could not allow sentiment to preclude her from protecting her commerce.

If at times England wrung concessions from China by the ultimatum method, it was not because Britain was unfriendly to China. Such action was taken chiefly because England was safeguarding a portion of her commerce, which meant a portion of her means of sustenance. It is quite evident that England was China's friend during the years under review. But for the opposition of Downing Street, Russia would have acquired more Chinese territory than Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula.

It was of immense importance that the United States, under the lead of Secretary Hay, came to the assistance of England and helped preserve the open door. Britain had fought a good fight to keep the markets of China open to merchants of all nations on equal terms. But the difficulties to be overcome were too great and, but for the assistance of the United States, the open door might not have been preserved.

It is interesting to note that seven years after the Boxer Movement, England and Russia became friends. Fear of Germany kept London and St. Petersburg friends for ten years. But with the accession to power of the Bolsheviks in 1917, the ancient feud broke out anew, and in 1931 Russia again is the enemy of England in Asia.

Leased ports have lost their significance today (1931). Russia no longer holds Port Arthur. Germany has been ousted from Kiao-Chow. England returned Weihaiwei¹ to China in October 1930. It is a source of satisfaction for England to know that the open door policy for which she fought so long and so vigorously has been increasingly affirmed.

¹ Hongkong^o is considered a part of the British Empire.

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